President/Executive Department Commons^™

Who's Checking?: Taking A Look At Recently Enacted Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Laws In The United States And Zimbabwe And Their Impact On The Separation Of Powers, Andrew M. O'Connell

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Samantar And Executive Power, Peter B. Rutledge

Scholarly Works

This essay examines Samantar v. Yousuf in the context of broader debate about the relationship between federal common law and executive power. Samantar represents simply the latest effort by the Executive Branch to literally shape the meaning of law through a process referred to in the literature as “executive lawmaking.” While traditional accounts of executive lawmaking typically have treated the idea as a singular concept, Samantar demonstrates the need to bifurcate the concept into at least two different categories: acts of executive lawmaking decoupled from pending litigation and acts of executive lawmaking taken expressly in response to litigation. As Samantar …

"Undead" Wartime Cases: Stare Decisis And The Lessons Of History, Harlan G. Cohen

Scholarly Works

References to the “lessons of history” are ubiquitous in law. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in recent debates over U.S. counterterrorism policy. In response to the Bush Administration’s reliance on World War II-era decisions - Johnson v. Eisentrager, Ex Parte Quirin, Hirota v. MacArthur, and In re Yamashita - opponents have argued that these decisions have been rejected by the “lessons of history.” They argue that the history of wartime cases is one marked by executive aggrandizement, panic-driven attacks on civil liberties, and overly quiescent courts - none of which should be repeated.

But what does it really …

Should A Statement Of Interest Matter?: Judging Executive Branch Foreign Policy Concerns, Catherine H. Curlet

Georgia Law Review

Since the enactment of the Constitution, scholars have fiercely debated the question of the appropriate balance between the branches of the federal government in matters of foreign affairs. Recently, the Supreme Court set forth some guidelines for striking this balance between the Executive and the Judicial Branches in litigation implicating foreign affairs,yet the guidelines leave much of this debate unresolved. A cross-section of recent appellate court decisions illustrates how lower courts have filled in these gaps when assessing how much deference to give an Executive's Statement of Interest filed in cases concerning foreign affairs. This Note extracts from these cases …

Legislating Clear-Statement Regimes In National-Security Law, Jonathan F. Mitchell

Georgia Law Review

Congress's national-security legislation will often require clear and specific congressional authorization before the executive can undertake certain actions. The War Powers Resolution,for example, prohibits any law from authorizing military hostilities unless it "specifically authorizes"them. And the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 required its own amendment or repeal of its "exclusive means"provision before authorizing warrantless electronic surveillance. But efforts to legislate clear-statement regimes in national-security law have failed to induce compliance. The Clinton Administration inferred congressional "authorization" for the 1999 Kosovo War from an appropriations statute that failed to specifically authorize the conflict. And the Bush Administration inferred congressional "authorization"for …

"Saturday Night's Alright For Fighting": Congressman William Jefferson, The Saturday Night Raid, And The Speech Or Debate Clause, James W. Mcphillips

Georgia Law Review

On May 20, 2006, for the first time in U.S. history, federal agents executed a search warrant in raiding the Capitol Hill office of a sitting member of Congress. The raid was the culmination of a fourteen month corruption and bribery investigation into Representative William J. Jefferson's business dealings in Africa. Supported by bipartisan outcry, Jefferson sought the return of the documents seized in the raid under the legislative immunity protection of the Speech or Debate Clause. In United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, the D.C. Circuit agreed with Jefferson that the FBI violated his constitutional rights and granted …

The Rhetoric Of Necessity (Or, Sanford Levinson's Pinteresque Conversation), Kevin Jon Heller

Scholarly Works

It may seem odd to begin a discussion of whether the President should have the power to act extraconstitutionally in times of necessity with a quote from The Dwarves. As I researched this Comment, though, I could not escape the uneasy feeling that I was witnessing what could only be described as a Pinteresque conversation--a conversation in which Professor Levinson and his interlocutors, "while exchanging remarks apparently on a common topic, and using mutually comprehensible vocabulary, are revealed as experiencing a profound failure to communicate with one another." Professor Levinson wants to find a workable balance between constitutional restraints and …

The Paradox Of Omnipotence: Courts, Constitutions, And Commitments, David S. Law

Georgia Law Review

Sovereigns, like individuals, must sometimes make commitments that limit their freedom of action in order to accomplish their goals. Scholars have observed that constitutional arrangements can, by restricting a sovereign's power, enable the sovereign to make such commitments. The opposite, however, can also be true: constitutional arrangements can and do impede sovereign commitment by entrenching inalienable governmental powers and immunities. This Article explores the nature and origins of the commitment problems that sovereigns face, and the role of courts in solving such problems. It begins by setting forth an analytical distinction between effective and persuasive commitments. Effective commitments are made …

Constitutional Norms In A State Of Permanent Emergency, Sanford Levinson

Georgia Law Review

Perhaps the most important constitutional issue of our time involves claims by the President to exercise power sufficient to confront ostensible 'emergencies" faced by the United States. One question is whether the Constitution grants the President sufficient powers. If not, are presidents justified in going 'beyond the Constitution"in order to do what they believe necessary in the given context? Professor Levinson demonstrates that debates about "emergency powers" have been a feature of our political system almost from its beginning. Many of those deemed our "greatest" presidents-Jefferson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt-have acted in questionable ways with regard to what might legitimately …

The Rhetoric Of Necessity (Or, Sanford Levinson's Pinteresque Conversation), Kevin J. Heller

Georgia Law Review

It may seem odd to begin a discussion of whether the President should have the power to act extraconstitutionally in times of necessity with a quote from The Dwarfs. As I researched this Comment, though, I could not escape the uneasy feeling that I was witnessing what could only be described as a Pinteresque conversation-a conversation in which Professor Levinson and his interlocutors, "while exchanging remarks apparently on a common topic, and using mutually comprehensible vocabulary, are revealed as experiencing a profound failure to communicate with one another."2 Professor Levinson wants to find a workable balance between constitutional restraints and …

The Emancipation Proclamation And The Commander In Chief Power, Michael S. Paulsen

Georgia Law Review

Levinson, a good Socratic teacher, poses the question what is the relationship of emergency or necessity to constitutional power, constitutional rights, and constitutional interpretation generally, and surrounds it with a characteristically fascinating discussion. But while his leanings are clear, he does not clearly answer the question his discussion poses. One can certainly infer that Levinson dislikes Carl Schmitt's legal theories of emergency, which he sees as justifying Hitler's rise to power. And it certainly comes through quite clearly that Levinson feels the same way about the U.S. Department of Justice's legal analysis concerning detention and interrogation of war prisoners (which …

Small Emergencies, Kim L. Scheppele

Georgia Law Review

In this Comment, I argue that the "normal" American constitutional order can be seen as thoroughly shot through with emergency law and that this constant sense of emergency has fundamentally shaped the possibilities of American constitutionalism. America is now-and has been since the First World War-virtually always in a state of emergency, one way or another. Sometimes these states of emergency have been local, other times they have been federal, and still other times they have been international. Sometimes these states of emergency have been political; other times they have been economic or social. Sometimes these states of emergency have …

Time To Look Abroad? The Legal Regulation Of Emergency Powers, William E. Scheuerman

Georgia Law Review

The starting point for Professor Levinson's thought-provoking ruminations on emergency power and constitutionalism is his deep skepticism about the Bush Administration's legal response to 9/11.1 In the context of the "war on terror," Professor Levinson accurately recounts, the Administration has claimed the right to override both longstanding domestic and international legal commitments.2 Even strict prohibitions on torture, it seems, are not exempt from the President's constitutionally based prerogative as "Commander in Chief to keep the nation out of harm's way, and only he apparently possesses the rightful authority to determine the fate of accused terrorists. Although many constitutional lawyers will …

Abu Ghraib, Diane Marie Amann

Scholarly Works

This article posits a theoretical framework within which to analyze various aspects of post-September 11 detention policy - including the widespread prisoner abuse that has been documented in the leaks and official releases that began with publication of photos made at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison. Examined are the actions of civilian executive officials charged with setting policy, of judicial officers who evaluated it, and military personnel who implemented it. Abuse has been attributed to failures of training or planning. The article concentrates on a different failure, the failure of law to keep lawlessness in check. On September 11, law's map …

The Independent Counsel Statute: A Premature Demise, Julian A. Cook

Scholarly Works

With the backdrop of the impeachment trial of President William Jefferson Clinton, Congress was confronted with the quandary of whether to reauthorize the independent counsel statute. As the statute approached its June 30, 1999 lapse date, lawmakers grappled with and bandied about an array of proposals, including statutory abandonment, in the midst of tremendous political tension and public fervor over the actions of the President, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, and members of Congress. Ultimately, Congress allowed the statute to expire, leaving the prosecution of high-ranking Executive Branch officials in the hands of the Department of Justice. Advocates of reauthorization could …

Federal Reserve: History, Purposes And Functions - An Analysis, Mukunda Lakshamanarao

LLM Theses and Essays

On December 23, 1913, President Woodrow Wilson signed into law the Federal Reserve Act. With this law, Congress established a central banking system which would enable the world’s most powerful industrial nation to manage its money and credit more effectively than ever before. The political and legislative struggle to create the Federal Reserve System was long and often bitter, and this final product in 1913 was the result of a carefully crafted and somewhat tenuous political compromise between national and regional powers. Since its founding, the Federal Reserve System has evolved to meet the needs of a changing financial system …