President/Executive Department Commons^™

Without Unnecessary Delay: Using Army Regulation 190–8 To Curtail Extended Detention At Sea, Meghan Claire Hammond

Northwestern University Law Review

This Note analyzes instances of U.S. detention of suspected terrorists while at sea as an alternative to Guantánamo, and how this at-sea detention fits in the interplay of U.S. statutory law, procedural law, and applicable international law. Of particular interest is the dual use of military and civilian legal regimes to create a procedural-protection-free zone on board U.S. warships during a detainee’s transfer from their place of capture to the U.S. court system. The Note concludes that U.S. Army Regulation 190–8 contains language of which the purpose and intent may be analogized to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requirements …

War By Legislation: The Constitutionality Of Congressional Regulation Of Detentions In Armed Conflicts, Christopher M. Ford

Northwestern University Law Review

In this essay, Ford considers provisions of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which place restrictions on the disposition of detainees held in Guantánamo Bay. These provisions raise substantial separation of powers issues regarding the ability of Congress to restrict detention operations of the Executive. These restrictions, and similar restrictions found in earlier NDAAs, specifically implicate the Executive's powers in foreign affairs and as Commander in Chief. Ford concludes that, with the exception of a similar provision found in the 2013 NDAA, the restrictions are constitutional.

New Judicial Review In Old Europe, Alyssa S. King

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

The President's Budget As A Source Of Agency Policy Control, Eloise Pasachoff

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A large body of literature in administrative law discusses presidential control of executive agencies through centralized review of regulations in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), part of the White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Largely overlooked in this literature is how the President’s budget acts as a source of agency policy control—in particular, how the White House exercises control through OMB’s authority to prepare the budget, oversee agencies’ execution of the budget, and create and implement management initiatives through the budget process. This Article identifies seven levers associated with OMB’s work on budget preparation, budget …

The Judicial Role In Constraining Presidential Non-Enforcement Discretion: The Virtues Of An Apa Approach, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars, lawyers, and, indeed, the public at large increasingly worry about what purposive presidential inaction in enforcing statutory programs means for the rule of law and how such discretionary inaction can fit within a constitutional structure that compels Presidents to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Yet those who have recognized the problem have been hesitant to assign a role for the court in policing the constitutional limits they articulate, mostly because of the strain on judicial capacity that any formulation of Take Care Clause review would cause. In this Article, I argue that courts still can and …

Some Structural Dilemmas Of World Organization, C. Wilfred Jenks

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Foreign Policy And The Government Legal Adviser, Henry Darwin

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Law Professors Want Hearing, Vote On Garland, Eric Berger, Kristen M. Blankley, Brian H. Bornstein, Eve M. Brank, Robert C. Denicola, Alan H. Frank, Stephen S. Gealy, Justin Hurwitz, David Landis, Craig M. Lawson, Richard Leiter, William H. Lyons, Richard H. Lawson, Matt Novak, Allen Overcash, Stefanie S. Pearlman, Ross Pesek, Kevin Ruser, Robert F. Schopp, Anthony Schutz, Anna Williams Shavers, Brett C. Stohs, Ryan Sullivan, Richard L. Weiner, Steven L. Willborn, Sandra Zellmer

Nebraska College of Law: Faculty Publications

Dear Senator Fischer and Senator Sasse,

We write this as citizens, but we all teach at the University of Nebraska College of Law. We hold different political viewpoints and disagree frequentIy with each other on political and legal issues. As law professors, however, we share a deep commitment to the rule of law and an impartial judiciary. We therefore urge you to hold confirmation hearings and a vote on President Obama's Supreme Court nominee, Chief Judge Merrick B. Garland.

The Curious Case Of Cell Phone Location Data: Fourth Amendment Doctrine Mash-Up, Monu Bedi

Northwestern University Law Review

Police surveillance ability and information gathering capacity have a dynamic relationship with technology. Greater advancements in technology make it easier for the police to surveil individuals and collect information. This state of affairs leads to heightened concerns over Fourth Amendment protection. This issue has most recently played out in the context of police collecting cell phone location data. Courts disagree on whether and to what extent this data garners Fourth Amendment protection. Underlying this disagreement rests a hitherto overlooked tension between two interrelated Fourth Amendment doctrines—the third-party and the public disclosure doctrines. While both vitiate privacy protection and are commonly …

The Indefinite Deflection Of Congressional Standing, Nat Stern

Pepperdine Law Review

Recent litigation brought or threatened against the administration of President Obama has brought to prominence the question of standing by Congress or its members to sue the President for nondefense or non-enforcement of federal law. While scholars divide over the normative propriety of such suits, the Court has never issued a definitive pronouncement on their viability. Nevertheless, the Court’s rulings when the issue has arisen have displayed a distinct pattern. While the Court has not formally repudiated suits of this nature, neither has it issued a decision that hinges on the presence of congressional standing. On the contrary, the Court …

Originalism And The Executive, Neil Kinkopf

Faculty Publications By Year

No abstract provided.

The Constitutional Nature Of The United States Tax Court, Brant J. Hellwig

Scholarly Articles

Is the United States Tax Court part of the Executive Branch of government? One would expect that question would be capable of being definitively answered without considerable difficulty. And as recently expressed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, that indeed is the case. In the course of addressing a challenge to the President's ability to remove a judge of the Tax Court for cause on separation of powers grounds, the D.C. Circuit rejected the premise that the removal power implicates two branches of government: "the Tax Court exercises Executive authority as part of the Executive …

What Judges Say And Do In Deciding National Security Cases: The Example Of The State Secrets Privilege, Anthony John Trenga

Duke Law Master of Judicial Studies Theses

From the criminal trial of Aaron Burr on charges of treason to modern-day litigation involving the CIA, the state secrets privilege presents a thorny issue for federal judges. Judge Trenga examines the legal issues at the heart of this privilege—separation of powers, non-justiciability, evidentiary privilege, national security interests, and military secrets—and the two primary doctrinal tracks judges invoke. Then, based on interviews with thirty-one federal judges, Judge Trenga offers insights into how judges think about applying the state secrets privilege to sensitive material.

Is The Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act Constitutional?, Robert J. Delahunty

Cardozo Law Review de•novo

My topic is both timely and perennial: The Electoral College. More specifically, I will first discuss the constitutional problem known as the “Faithless Elector” and, then, I will attempt to solve such problem. My proposed solution is the Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act (UFPEA), a statute that several states have adopted.

Political Dysfunction And The Election Of Donald Trump: Problems Of The U.S. Constitution's Presidency, David Orentlicher

Scholarly Works

In this article, Professor Orentlicher examines the Constitution's design for the executive branch. He argues that by opting for a single executive rather than a multi-person executive, the Constitution causes two serious problems-it fuels the high levels of partisan polarization that we see today, and it increases the likelihood of misguided presidential decision making. Drawing on the experience in other countries with executive power shared by multiple officials, he proposes a bipartisan executive.

Herbert Hoover And The Constitution, John Q. Barrett

Faculty Publications

Herbert Clark Hoover, first an international businessman, a global hero during World War I, and then a cabinet officer under Presidents Harding and Coolidge, was elected president in 1928. The next year, as President Hoover embarked on his progressive agenda for the country, the Roaring Twenties ended, crashingly, in the Great Depression. Hoover responded inadequately, constrained more by his own beliefs in volunteerism than by constitutional limits on his powers. His failure to relieve public suffering overshadowed his presidential accomplishments, including innovative government programs and three Supreme Court appointments.

Making Sense Of Legislative Standing, Matthew I. Hall

Scholarly Works

Legislative standing doctrine is neglected and under-theorized. There has always been a wide range of opinions on the Supreme Court about the proper contours of legislative standing doctrine and even about whether the Court should adjudicate disputes between the other two branches at all. Perhaps owing to these disagreements, the full Court has never articulated a clear vision of the doctrine. While the Court has managed to resolve some cases, it has not achieved the consensus necessary to provide a comprehensive and coherent account of critical doctrinal issues such as what type of injury can give rise to legislative standing …

How Presidents Interpret The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

The President's Faithful Execution Duty, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Congressional And Presidential War Powers As A Dialogue: Analysis Of The Syrian And Isis Conflicts, Charles Tiefer, Kathleen Clark

All Faculty Scholarship

Much of the scholarship on war powers looks back on whether U.S. military interventions were authorized, examining the President's powers under Article II of the Constitution, and congressional enactments. That legal question is important, but it does not capture the interactive nature of the dynamic between Congress and the President. This Article instead focuses on the process of dialogue between Congress and the President prior to the exercise of war powers. We examine in detail how that dialogue operates in two recent episodes: the U.S. response to Syrian President Assad's use of chemical weapons in 2013, and the rise of …

Transforming The “Thurmond Rule” In 2016, Carl W. Tobias

Law Faculty Publications

This piece first analyzes the Rule’s history. Part II explains the convention and its deleterious consequences. Finding that each party reinterprets the notion to stymie appointments—which perverts the selection process, deprives courts of judicial resources for delivering justice, and intensifies the “confirmation wars”—the final Part proffers solutions. Because the Rule has multiple detrimental effects, it warrants abolition.

Separations Of Wealth: Inequality And The Erosion Of Checks And Balances, Kate Andrias

Articles

American government is dysfunctional: Gridlock, filibusters, and expanding presidential power, everyone seems to agree, threaten our basic system of constitutional governance. Who, or what, is to blame? In the standard account, the fault lies with the increasing polarization of our political parties. That standard story, however, ignores an important culprit: Concentrated wealth and its organization to achieve political ends. The only way to understand our current constitutional predicament—and to rectify it—is to pay more attention to the role that organized wealth plays in our system of checks and balances. This Article shows that the increasing concentration of wealth and political …

Accountability And The Foreign Commerce Power: A Case Study Of The Regulation Of Exports, Richard R. Carlson

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Presidential Control Across Policymaking Tools, Catherine Y. Kim

Florida State University Law Review

Over the past quarter century, administrative law scholars have observed the President’s growing control over agency policymaking and the separation-of-powers concerns implicated by such unilateral exercises of power. The paradigmatic form of agency policymaking—notice-and-comment rulemaking—mitigates these concerns by ensuring considerable oversight by the courts, Congress, and the public at large. Agencies, however, typically have at their disposal a variety of policymaking tools with which to implement White House goals, including the issuance of guidance documents and the strategic exercise of enforcement discretion. While commentators have drawn attention to the risk that agencies will circumvent the extensive checks associated with rulemaking …

Taking Care Of Federal Law, Leah Litman

Articles

Article II of the Constitution vests the “executive power” in the President and directs the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” But do these provisions mean that only the President may execute federal law? Two lines of Supreme Court precedent suggest conflicting answers to that question. In several prominent separation-of-powers cases, the Court has suggested that only the President may execute federal law: “The Constitution requires that a President chosen by the entire Nation oversee the execution of the laws.” Therefore, the Court has reasoned, Congress may not create private rights of action that allow nonexecutive …

Arms Control: Salt Ii- Executive Agreement Or Treaty?, Keith E. Fryer, J. Michael Levengood

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Presidential Impoundment Of Funds: A Constitutional Crisis, Gerald A. Figurski

Akron Law Review

It seems that our maligned Congress, so docile at times in the face of presidential aggrandizement of power, is forging a constitutional crisis. The basic issue involved is whether the President has authority, either constitutional or statutory, to refuse to spend funds appropriated by Congress. The questions pursued in the following pages are basically four: does the President have the (1) statutory, (2) historical, (3) case, or (4) constitutional authority to continue to impound?

Executive Privilege: A Review Of Berger, R. H. Clark

Akron Law Review

RAOUL BERGER HAS ONCE AGAIN placed within a solidly professional framework an issue of considerable public interest and debate. As was the case with impeachment,' Berger's scholarly study on executive privilege brings to the controversy surrounding the issue a much needed analytical construct and massing of evidence which can only result in a greater level of general understanding. Although it is not accurate to suggest that Berger is neutral on the topic, since he published a significant study as far back as 1965 attacking the concept, 2 his method of massing every conceivable argument and piece of evidence on both …

In Re: Grand Jury Proceedings: The Semantics Of "Presumption" And "Need", James M. Popson

Akron Law Review

This note analyzes the District Court of the District of Columbia’s application of the doctrine of executive privilege in In re Grand Jury Proceedings. Part II provides a brief history of executive privilege and discusses precedents that impacted the court’s decision. Part III indicates the procedural posture of the case and sets forth the substantive facts. Part IV discusses the court’s analysis of the executive privilege issue in light of recent District of Columbia Circuit Court decisions. Part V concludes that In re Grand Jury Proceedings bolstered the notion of a presumption in favor of the privilege, while observing that …

The President's Wartime Detention Authority : What History Teaches Us, Anirudh Sivaram

Harvey M. Applebaum ’59 Award

This thesis examines the extent of the President’s wartime detention authority over citizens (in particular, detention authority pursuant to Article II of the U.S. Constitution) through a legal-historical lens. Some Presidents (Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, George W. Bush) have historically relied on Article II authority for detention, while others (Ulysses Grant, Barack Obama) have disclaimed the notion that such authority exists. Clarifying the scope and source of the Presidential detention authority over citizens bears both theoretical and real-world relevance. Theoretically, it lies at the confluence of two central American constitutional traditions – the separation of powers, and the protection of …