President/Executive Department Commons^™

Executive Underreach, In Pandemics And Otherwise, David E. Pozen, Kim Lane Scheppele

Faculty Scholarship

Legal scholars are familiar with the problem of executive overreach, especially in emergencies. But sometimes, instead of being too audacious or extreme, a national executive's attempts to address a true threat prove far too limited and insubstantial. In this Essay, we seek to define and clarify the phenomenon of executive underreach, with special reference to the COVID-19 crisis; to outline ways in which such underreach may compromise constitutional governance and the international legal order; and to suggest a partial remedy.

Executive Overreach And Underreach In The Pandemic, Kim Lane Scheppele, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

The pandemic that convulsed the globe in 2020 was long foretold but still surprising to many. Within a few months of its appearance, COVID-19 became one of the leading causes of death worldwide. Governments struggled at first to comprehend what was happening – and then reacted in very different ways. Most political leaders followed the advice of epidemiologists. Many declared states of emergency. A few pursued autocratic agendas. And some did almost nothing.

During emergencies, constitutional scholars normally worry about executive aggrandizement at the expense of human rights and democratic values. Emergencies often require national executives to act quickly and …

The Failed Transparency Regime For Executive Agreements: An Empirical And Normative Analysis, Oona A. Hathaway, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith

Faculty Scholarship

The Constitution specifies only one process for making international agreements. Article II states that the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” The treaty process has long been on a path to obsolescence, however, with fewer and fewer treaties being made in each presidential administration. Nevertheless, the United States has not stopped making international agreements. Even as Article II treaties have come to a near halt, the United States has concluded hundreds of binding international agreements each year. These agreements, known as …

Why Robert Mueller's Appointment As Special Counsel Was Unlawful, Steven G. Calabresi, Gary Lawson

Notre Dame Law Review

Since 1999, when the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act expired, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has had in place regulations providing for the appointment of “special counsels” who possess “the full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney.” Appointments under these regulations, such as the May 17, 2017 appointment of Robert S. Mueller to investigate the Trump campaign, are patently unlawful, for three distinct reasons.

First, all federal offices must be “established by Law,” and there is no statute authorizing such an office in the DOJ. We …

The President And Nuclear Weapons: Authorities, Limits, And Process, Mary B. Derosa, Ashley Nicolas

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

There is no more consequential decision for a president than ordering a nuclear strike. In the Cold War, the threat of sudden nuclear annihilation necessitated procedures emphasizing speed and efficiency and placing sole decision-making authority in the president’s hands. In today’s changed threat environment, the legal authorities and process a U.S. president would confront when making this grave decision merit reexamination. This paper serves as a resource in the national discussion about a president’s legal authority and the procedures for ordering a nuclear strike, and whether to update them.

"When The President Does It": Why Congress Should Take The Lead In Investigations Of Executive Wrongdoing, Andrew B. Pardue

William & Mary Law Review

Asked by British journalist David Frost whether the President of the United States has the ability to authorize illegal acts when he believes such action is justified, Richard Nixon infamously replied: “Well, when the President does it, that means it is not illegal.” A majority of Americans disagreed with the former President’s assessment. But the question remains: If the President is theoretically capable of breaking the law while in office, what is the best way to determine whether a crime has actually been committed? This question has forced lawmakers to attempt to reconcile various investigatory mechanisms—all differing in their independence …

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Presidential War Powers And Humanitarian Intervention, Michael J. Sherman

Pace Law Review

Does the fact that Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution reserves to Congress the authority to “declare war” mean that the president needs congressional approval before using military force? As this Article discusses, there are a range of answers to this question. The Article examines this debate in the context of humanitarian intervention, i.e. military actions taken, not for purposes of conquest, but instead to stop largescale, serious violations of human rights. If the president wishes to use the military for these purposes, should he have more authority under the Constitution to do so? Less? The same? …

Interpreting Emoluments Today: The Framers’ Intent And The “Present” Problem, Bianca Spinosa

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

"Believe Me," We Do Not Have A Foreign Emoluments Clause Violation, Scotty N. Teal

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

President Trump was sued in New York District Court for allegedly violating the Foreign Emoluments Clause. In its brief, the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) alleged that the president's international businesses and real estate holdings positioned him to receive money from foreign governments. These business interests, or entanglements, could "sway" or create an opportunity for negative foreign influence in violation of the Emoluments Clause. CREW states that these "entanglements between American officials and foreign powers could pose a creeping, insidious threat to the Republic." CREW argued that President Trump violated the Emoluments Clause because the clause "cover[s] …

Restoring Effective Congressional Oversight: Reform Proposals For The Enforcement Of Congressional Subpoenas, Kia Rahnama

Journal of Legislation

This Article proposes possible legislative reforms to Congress’s exercise of its contempt power in combating non-compliance with subpoenas duly issued as part of congressional investigations. With the recent trends in leveraging congressional investigations as an effective tool of separation of powers, this Article seeks to explore the exact bounds of congressional power in responding to executive officers’ noncompliance with congressional subpoenas, and whether or not current practice could be expanded beyond what has historically been tried by the legislative branch. This Article provides a brief summary of the historic practice behind different options for responding to non-compliance with subpoenas (inherent …

Article Ii Vests Executive Power, Not The Royal Prerogative, Julian Davis Mortenson

Articles

Article II of the United States Constitution vests “the executive power” in the President. For more than two hundred years, advocates of presidential power have claimed that this phrase was originally understood to include a bundle of national security and foreign affairs authorities. Their efforts have been highly successful. Among constitutional originalists, this so-called “Vesting Clause Thesis” is now conventional wisdom. But it is also demonstrably wrong. Based on an exhaustive review of the eighteenth-century bookshelf, this Article shows that the ordinary meaning of “executive power” referred unambiguously to a single, discrete, and potent authority: the power to execute law. …

Prosecutors At The Periphery, Peter M. Shane

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Contrary to so-called unitary executive theory, Article II does not guarantee presidents the power to control federal criminal prosecution, a supervisory role Congress has placed by statute with the Attorney General. Nor is Congress without authority to protect federal prosecutors from policy-based dismissals. Rule-of-law values embodied in our system of checks and balances could alone justify these conclusions. But the same conclusions follow also from close attention to the entirety of the relevant constitutional text and from an understanding of how the Founding generation would have understood the relationship between executive power and criminal prosecution. In contemplating the newly proposed …

The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Incapacity And Ability To Discharge The Powers And Duties Of Office?, Lawrence J. Trautman

Cleveland State Law Review

History provides many instances of U.S. presidential or vice presidential incapacity. It was the death of President John F. Kennedy that prompted the 25th Amendment to the Constitution to gain ratification in 1967, in part to establish a method to fill the vice presidency if it became vacant. On Saturday morning September 22, 2018, readers of The New York Times awoke to read a page-one story about how the Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein had previously advocated the secret White House recording of President Trump “to expose the chaos consuming the administration, and he discussed recruiting cabinet members to …

Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election, Volumes I And Ii (Redacted Version Of April 18, 2019), Robert S. Mueller Iii

United States Department of Justice: Publications

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I

RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN

The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the earliest Russian interference operations identified by the investigation–a social media campaign designed to provoke and amplify political and social discord in the United States. The IRA was based in St. Petersburg, Russia, and received funding from Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin and companies he controlled. Priozhin is widely reported to have ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin [redacted]

In mid-2014, the IRA sent employees to the United States on an intelligence-gathering mission with instructions [redacted]

The IRA later used social media accounts and interest …

The Forgotten Unitary Executive Power: The Textualist, Originalist, And Functionalist Opinions Clause, Zachary J. Murray

Pace Law Review

This article will analyze the Opinion Clause’s text, its history and intent, and its potential functions as a power. Part II catalogues much of the prior scholarship on the Opinions Clause, which generally fits into two categories: the anti-unitary approach, which argues that a substantive reading of the Vesting Clause renders the Opinions Clause redundant, and the unitary response, which essentially accepts that redundancy. To some extent, both sides miss the mark. The unitary approach misreads the text, assigning great substantive weight to the descriptive Vesting Clause, while assigning descriptive status to the substantive Opinions Clause. The anti-unitary approach, on …

The Court Can’T Even Handle Me Right Now: The Arpaio Pardon And Its Effect On The Scope Of Presidential Pardons, Tyler Brown

Pepperdine Law Review

The Constitution grants the president the power to pardon individuals for offenses against the United States. Courts have interpreted this power broadly, and the American public has historically accepted its use, even in the face of several controversial pardons over the last five decades. However, after President Trump pardoned Joe Arpaio—a former Arizona sheriff who was held in criminal contempt of court for continuing to illegally detain suspected undocumented immigrants—scholars, activists, and political figures questioned whether this pardon was unconstitutional. This Comment discusses the Court’s interpretation of the pardoning power, controversial pardons in modern history, and the details of the …

Statutory Anti-Constitutionalism, Maciej Bernatt, Michał Ziółkowski

Washington International Law Journal

The article aims at demonstrating that unconstitutional results, marking an illiberal transformation may be achieved by means of a series of statutory amendments outside the constitutional amendment procedure, when the guardian of the constitution is deactivated. In other words, the evasion of the constitution becomes a means of illiberal change of the legal system. This process is referred to as “statutory anti-constitutionalism.” The article offers a detailed analysis of the legal methods which are used to evade the constitution. These include excessive use of transitional and intertemporal provisions in the statutes, shortening vacatio legis, shortening of constitutionally-determined terms of …

O’Neill, Oh O’Neill, Wherefore Art Thou O’Neill: Defining And Cementing The Requirements For Asserting Deliberative Process Privilege, Andrew Scott

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

The government may invoke the deliberative process privilege to protect the communications of government officials involving policy-driven decision-making. The privilege protects communications made before policy makers act upon the policy decision to allow government officials to speak candidly when deciding a course of action without fear of their words being used against them.

This privilege is not absolute and courts recognize the legitimate countervailing interest the public has in transparency. The Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds held that someone with control over the protected information should personally consider the privilege before asserting it but did not provide definitive …

Withdrawing From Nafta, Alison Peck

Faculty & Staff Scholarship

Since the 2016 campaign, Donald Trump has threatened to withdraw from NAFTA. Can he? The question is complex. For one thing, NAFTA is not a treaty negotiated under the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, but rather a congressional–executive agreement, a creature of dubious con- stitutionality and ill-defined withdrawal and termination parameters. This Article reviews the scope of those restrictions and concludes that unilateral presidential withdrawal from NAFTA, although not without support, is ultimately unlawful. On one hand, unilateral presidential withdrawal would be valid as a matter of international law, and the NAFTA Implementation Act appears to be designed to terminate …

Rediscovering The Journal Clause: The Lost History Of Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, Nicholas Handler

Faculty Scholarship

Article I, Section 5 of the United States Constitution requires that each house of Congress keep a Journal of its proceedings. Contemporary observers have largely ignored this provision, treating it as a vestigial record-keeping requirement with little significance for modern law. This dismissive attitude is misguided. Historically, legislative Journals were one of the primary mechanisms by which Parliament, and later Congress, made and interpreted constitutional law. Journals are the official histories of legislatures’ activity. They record what legislatures do as institutions—what powers they exercise, what procedures they use, and what actions by the coordinate branches they protest or resist. In …

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

No abstract provided.

President Trump's Big Beautiful Wall: Discrimination, Eminent Domain, And The Public Use Requirement, Meghan K. Tierney

Chicago-Kent Law Review

At a press conference held in Trump Tower New York City on June 16, 2015, Donald Trump announced his candidacy for President of the United States by promising to expand the border wall along the Southern United States. President Trump has insisted that his only reasons behind completely separating the United States from Mexico are to curtail illegal immigration and curb drug cartel activity, but many argue that his statements indicate a much more sinister motive based in racial discrimination. The public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause allows the federal government to take private land for the …

Weed Whacking Through The Tenth Amendment: Navigating A Trump Administration Threat To Withhold Funding From Marijuana-Friendly States, Arlen Gharibian

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

The Trump administration has taken a firm stance against marijuana legalization at the state level. While an official federal policy is still pending, this Article focuses on whether the Trump administration’s threats to preventCalifornia from pursuing its duly enacted marijuana legalization law violates the Tenth Amendment. This Article then addresses how the federal government could achieve its goal while remaining within the bounds of the Constitution.

Faithful Nonexecution, Peter M. Shane

Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy

Decisions by the federal executive branch to under-enforce statutes, whether on a case-by-case or programmatic basis, are a commonplace feature of the modern administrative state. Critics may challenge "nonexecution" decisions in court or otherwise as inconsistent with the President's constitutional duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Such decisions, however, are most helpfully viewed not as instances of the executive's failure to act, but rather as part and parcel of an agency's affirmative strategies for implementing its statutory mandates. As such, their legality is appropriately judged not under the terms of Article II, but rather according to …

Disgorging Emoluments, Caprice L. Roberts

Marquette Law Review

This Article is about unjust enrichment. It includes a theory of an unjust

enrichment cause of action against executive actors who receive unlawful

emoluments. Interpretations of the boundaries of unlawful emoluments range

from receipt of a gift or benefit because of the position of power held to quid

pro quo exchanges of a thing of value in exchange for government information

or advantage. Wherever the proper line, the purpose of the law of unjust

enrichment is to prevent and undo benefits one has no right to retain. It

achieves those goals with the use of restitution remedies including

disgorgement of …

Article Ii And Antidiscrimination Norms, Aziz Z. Huq

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Trump v. Hawaii validated a prohibition on entry to the United States from several Muslim-majority countries and at the same time repudiated a longstanding precedent associated with the Japanese American internment of World War II. This Article closely analyzes the relationship of these twin rulings. It uses their dichotomous valences as a lens on the legal scope for discriminatory action by the federal executive. Parsing the various ways in which the internment of the 1940s and the 2017 exclusion order can be reconciled, the Article identifies a tension between the Court’s two holdings in Trump …

Life Becoming Hazy: The Withdrawal Of The United States From The Paris Agreement And How The Youth Of America Are Challenging It, Anne Ustynoski

Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology

This Comment covers the ways in which each presidential administration has viewed the United States’ role and responsibilities in combating climate change. It discusses the ways in which the Clean Air Act has evolved and changed, as well as the ways in which the United States has been involved in environmental protection initiatives undertaken by the United Nations. The Comment also examines the ways in which individual states and groups have taken the initiative to combat climate change. Finally, this Comment discusses alternative approaches to combating climate change. For example, it focuses on how youths in America are arguing that …

The Constitutionality Of Appropriations Transfer Authority Under The Nondelegation Doctrine, Shelby Begany Telle

Catholic University Law Review

Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution provides the Legislative Branch with the power of the purse by granting it the exclusive authority to designate how federal dollars may be spent via appropriations laws. Congress often includes transfer authority, which provides Executive Branch recipients of appropriations the ability to shift funds from one budget account to another. Allowing an agency to transfer funds from one non-specific appropriation to another is arguably an unconstitutional abdication of the Legislative Branch’s exclusive power over the purse strings.

Appropriations transfers are unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine. Certain attempts to alleviate these nondelegation concerns …

A Gun To Whose Head? Federalism, Localism, And The Spending Clause, Daniel S. Cohen

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

President Trump’s executive order rescinding federal funds from “sanctuary jurisdictions” has brought a critical, but overlooked, question of constitutional law to the forefront of the political debate: how does the Spending Clause apply to local governments? The purpose of the Spending Clause is to empower the federal government to bargain with the states to enact policies it cannot enact itself. This power, however, is constrained within the confines of federalism. The Supreme Court has sought to restrict the Spending Clause by crafting the Dole-NFIB framework, a test to determine whether a federal grant has compromised federalism. At its …