President/Executive Department Commons^™

The Rule Of Recognition And Presidential Power, Austin Piatt

Northwestern University Law Review

Professor H.L.A. Hart’s theory of the rule of recognition, introduced in 1961, asserts that every legal system requires a rule of recognition to tell society what the law is. Though much scholarship has been dedicated to analyzing America’s theoretical rule of recognition, Hart’s theory has not yet been applied to the numerous actions and operations of America’s Executive Branch. The rule of recognition should be able to tell us which executive actions have the authority of law. Yet, when we try to make sense of various recent orders, memos, guidance documents, and letters emanating from the White House and administrative …

Wake Up And Smell The Smog: The Third Circuit Provides Clarity On Cercla's Federally Permitted Release Reporting Exemption In Clean Air Council V. United States Steel Corp., Zachary Lawlor

Villanova Environmental Law Journal (1991 - )

No abstract provided.

An Administrative Solution To The Student Loan Debt Crisis, Justin C. Van Orsdol

Washington and Lee Law Review Online

To say that the student loan debt crisis is out of control is a massive understatement. Although solutions such as Public Service Loan Forgiveness and the recent temporary payment/interest rate freeze have provided some relief for borrowers, more can be done. Of course, as with any large outlay of taxpayer dollars, opposition is sure to be heated. Given the current political climate, the likelihood of any legislative fixes seems unlikely.

But what if there was an administrative solution that could do more to address this crisis without the cost of the legislative process? This essay proposes such a solution. It …

Bring On The Chicken And Hot Oil: Reviving The Nondelegation Doctrine For Congressional Delegations To The President, Loren Jacobson

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

The so-called “nondelegation doctrine” posits that Congress may not transfer its legislative power to another branch of government, and yet Congress delegates its authority routinely not only to the President, but to a whole host of other entities it has created and that are located in the executive branch, including executive branch agencies, independent agencies, commissions, and sometimes even private parties. Recognizing that “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives,” the Supreme Court of the United States …

Administrative Deference And The Social Security Administration: Survey And Analysis, Nicholas M. Ohanesian

Journal of Law and Policy

The purpose of this article is to examine the role of administrative deference when decisions of the Social Security Administration are reviewed by federal courts. The concept of administrative deference to administrative agencies in federal courts goes back to the 1930’s during the rise of the New Deal­­—with the high-water mark reached by the Supreme Court in Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council. Since this point, there has been a growing chorus calling to re-examine or outright roll back the deference owed to these agencies when their decisions are reviewed in federal court. Prior to rewriting the standards, this article …

May The Executive Branch Forgive Student Loan Debt Without Further Congressional Action?, Colin Mark

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

On April 1, 2021, the Biden administration announced that Secretary of Education Michael Cardona will consider whether the President has legal authority to forgive up to $50,000 per debtor in student loan debt without further Congressional action. This paper interrogates the leading arguments for and against the Biden administration’s capacity to forgive this student loan debt strictly using administrative action. This article first surveys the history of federal student loan forgiveness programs in the United States. It then considers whether statutes on the books—in particular, the Higher Education Act of 1965 and the Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966—grant the …

Overseeing Oversight, Michael Karanicolas, Margaret B. Kwoka

Connecticut Law Review

Accountability is at the core of democratic governance. In the United States, the administrative state is formally situated within the executive branch, but the unelected nature of agency officials, combined with the vast power they wield, has long been cause for concern. A crucial tool for establishing accountability within this so-called “Fourth Branch” is the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which provides ordinary members of the public with a mechanism for direct oversight of how administrative agencies function. Similar right-to-information laws have been implemented in over one hundred countries. However, in contrast to most of its international counterparts, the FOIA …

Heirs Of An Administration: Unlawful Executive Actions, Jerome Perez

Catholic University Law Review

The Supreme Court of the United States in DHS v. Regents on June 18, 2020, decided to stall the Trump administration from rescinding the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy that the Obama administration created contrary to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)––even though in 2016 the Supreme Court affirmed a preliminary injunction on the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) policy, which mirrors DACA. This blunder offhandedly sacrifices the Supreme Court’s reputation as nonpartisan by enlisting itself as the future arbiter of administrative issues with self-evident resolutions and deciding contrary to those resolutions to endorse a political agenda. …

The False Allure Of The Anti-Accumulation Principle, Michael E. Herz, Kevin M. Stack

Articles

Today the executive branch is generally seen as the most dangerous branch. Many worry that the executive branch now defies or subsumes the separation of powers. In response, several Supreme Court Justices and prominent scholars assert that the very separation-of-powers principles that determine the structure of the federal government as a whole apply with full force within the executive branch. In particular, they argue that constitutional law prohibits the accumulation of more than one type of power—legislative, executive, and judicial—in the same executive official or government entity. We refer to this as the anti-accumulation principle. The consequences of this principle, …

Health Choice Or Health Coercion? The Osha Emergency Temporary Standard Covid-19 Vaccination Mandates: Ax Or Vax, Savannah Snyder

Helm's School of Government Conference - 2021-2024

No abstract provided.

Administrative Sabotage, David L. Noll

Michigan Law Review

Government can sabotage itself. From the president’s choice of agency heads to agency budgets, regulations, and litigating positions, presidents and their appointees have undermined the very programs they administer. But why would an agency try to put itself out of business? And how can agencies that are subject to an array of political and legal checks sabotage statutory programs?

This Article offers an account of the “what, why, and how” of administrative sabotage that answers those questions. It contends that sabotage reflects a distinct mode of agency action that is more permanent, more destructive, and more democratically illegitimate than more-studied …

So Sue Me: How The Justice Department Can Protect Children By Suing Indigent Defenders, Joshua Perry

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

A Weaponized Process: The Deterioration Of Asylum Administration Under Trump, David C. Portillo Jr.

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

Under the Trump Administration, a series of Attorney General decisions increased Executive Branch scrutiny over decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). This scrutiny serves to advance an anti-immigration policy at the cost of denying entry of valid asylum seekers. These decisions are due to tension between the politically directed executive power of Attorneys General and the Judicial nature of the BIA. This internal contradiction results in Attorney General decisions that are arbitrary, inconsistent, employ poor reasoning, deviate from precedent, and cause inhumane effects. The structure of asylum administration, as laid out in the Immigration and Naturalization Act and …

Presidential Signing Statements In The Federal Bureaucracy, Joshua M. Feinzig

Faculty Scholarship

This Note examines the relationship between presidential signing statements and administrative decision-making over the Obama and Trump presidencies and from a variety of institutional angles, updating previous studies rooted in a narrow set of observations from the mid-2000s. It identifies occasions where presidents, agencies, and other Executive Branch actors have referenced statements in the course of justifying inactions, rules and regulations, and legal characterizations of executive entities. In moving the focus beyond a strict causation approach to measuring influence, which suffers from proof limitations and indeterminacy, the Note offers a more modest formulation of statements’ contextual and atmospheric role in …

Delegating Climate Authorities, Mark P. Nevitt

Faculty Articles

The science is clear: the United States and the world must take dramatic action to address climate change or face irreversible, catastrophic planetary harm. Within the U.S.—the world’s largest historic emitter of greenhouse gas emissions—this will require passing new legislation or turning to existing statutes and authorities to address the climate crisis. Doing so implicates existing and prospective delegations of legislative authority to a large swath of administrative agencies. Yet congressional climate decision-making delegations to any executive branch agency must not dismiss the newly resurgent nondelegation doctrine. Described by some scholars as the “most dangerous idea in American law,” the …

Requiring The Executive To Turn Square Corners: The Supreme Court Increases Agency Accountability In Department Of Homeland Security V. Regents Of The University Of California, Claudia J. Bernstein

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Administrative agencies frequently promulgate rules that have dramatic effects on peoples’ lives. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) is one such example. DACA grants certain unlawful immigrants a temporary reprieve from deportation, as well as ancillary benefits such as work permits. In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) sought to rescind DACA on the basis that the program violates the Immigration and Nationality Act.

This Comment analyzes the recent Supreme Court decision about DACA’s recission in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of University of California. In rejecting DHS’s attempt to rescind DACA, the Court strengthened agency accountability …

Book Review: This Is How They Tell Me The World Ends: The Cyberweapons Arms Race (2020) By Nicole Perlroth, Amy C. Gaudion

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

No abstract provided.

How Can Federal Actors Compete On Noncompetes? Examining The Need For And Possibility Of Federal Action On Noncompetition Agreements, Robert Mcavoy

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Employees have been frustrated by the restrictiveness of noncompete agreements and confused about their enforceability for decades. The added complication of choice-of-law provisions in employment contracts with noncompetes creates a sea of unpredictability for both employees and employers.

Each state applies its own policy to noncompete agreements. While every state treats noncompetes differently than typical contract provisions, a broad spectrum exists between the states that are friendly and those that are hostile to the enforcement of noncompetes. Employees and employers often fail to understand whether their noncompete is enforceable under the jurisdiction chosen by the contract, and courts override choice-of-law …

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents

Polarization And Reform: Rethinking Separation Of Emergency Powers, Kevin Rizzo

Cardozo International & Comparative Law Review

The note examines the challenges posed by the expansion of presidential emergency powers, particularly under the National Emergencies Act (NEA), and argues that political polarization has weakened Congress's ability to check the President's use of these powers. It advocates for reforms to balance national security needs with constitutional checks and balances, emphasizing the need to address the structural and political factors that enable presidential overreach.

Defending The Defenders: Why Bureaucratic Independence Is A Necessary Supplement To Judicial Defense Of Democracy The Specter Of Dictatorship: Judicial Enabling Of Presidential Power, Andrea Scoseria Katz

Scholarship@WashULaw

A familiar story is being observed in countries ranging from Brazil to Australia, the United States, and Poland, as elected executives deploy a populist threat narrative to politicize the rule of law and entrench themselves in power. Out of the academy, a growing literature on democratic “backsliding” or “decline” proposes a menu of “guardrails” for shoring up democracy from gradual collapse. Broadly, these guardrails fall under two headings: I call one judicial, the other bureaucratic. The former looks to the power of judicial review, under which courts may invalidate enactments that threaten, not just the Constitution, but the very democratic …

Table Of Contents

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents

Responding To Mass, Computer-Generated, And Malattributed Comments, Steven J. Balla, Reeve Bull, Bridget C.E. Dooling, Emily Hammond, Michael A. Livermore, Michael Herz, Beth Simone Noveck

Articles

A number of technological and political forces have transformed the once staid and insider dominated notice-and-comment process into a forum for large scale, sometimes messy, participation in regulatory decisionmaking. It is not unheard of for agencies to receive millions of comments on rulemakings; often these comments are received as part of organized mass comment campaigns. In some rulemakings, questions have been raised about whether public comments were submitted under false names, or were automatically generated by computer “bot” programs. In this Article, we examine whether and to what extent such submissions are problematic and make recommendations for how rulemaking agencies …

Transition Administration, Michael Herz, Katherine A. Shaw

Articles

The period from November 3, 2020 to January 20, 2021, was unlike any presidential transition in our history. President Donald Trump refused to accept his ballot-box defeat, instead battling to overturn the election’s outcome. This dramatic public campaign was waged in state and federal courts, state legislatures, the offices of state and local election officials, the Department of Justice, and finally the halls of Congress, where on January 6, 2021, a mob incited by the President stormed the Capitol with the explicit goal of preventing the final counting of electoral votes for Joe Biden. These efforts had more mundane and …

Delegation, Administration, And Improvisation, Kevin Arlyck

Notre Dame Law Review

Nondelegation originalism is having its moment. Recent Supreme Court opinions suggest that a majority of Justices may be prepared to impose strict constitutional limits on Congress’s power to delegate policymaking authority to the executive branch. In response, scholars have scoured the historical record for evidence affirming or refuting a more stringent version of nondelegation than current Supreme Court doctrine demands. Though the debate ranges widely, sharp disputes have arisen over whether a series of apparently broad Founding-era delegations defeat originalist arguments in favor of a more demanding modern doctrine. Proponents—whom I call “nondelegationists”—argue that these historical delegations can all be …

Oversight Riders, Kevin M. Stack, Michael P. Vandenbergh

Notre Dame Law Review

Congress has a constitutionally critical duty to gather information about how the executive branch implements the powers Congress has granted it and the funds Congress has appropriated. Yet in recent years the executive branch has systematically thwarted Congress’s powers and duties of oversight. Congressional subpoenas for testimony and documents have met with blanket refusals to comply, frequently backed by advice from the Department of Justice that executive privilege justifies withholding the information. Even when Congress holds an official in contempt for failure to comply with a congressional subpoena, the Department of Justice often does not initiate criminal sanctions. As a …

A Call To Replace The Apa’S Notice-And-Comment Exemption For Guidance Documents, Crystal M. Cummings

Brooklyn Law Review

Section 553 of the APA requires public “notice-and-comment” before a federal agency issues substantive rules and exempts from these procedures guidance documents that merely offer nonbinding insight and assistance on existing law. The problem of federal agencies using the notice-and-comment exemption to issue legislative rules that are legally binding has garnered considerable attention. Congressional efforts to amend the APA in response have failed and, in turn, variations have been offered on a seemingly simple fix—mandate or encourage agencies to solicit public input before issuing guidance documents. This note characterizes these proposals as overlays on the § 553(b)(A) exemption. The note …

Inspectors General And The Law Of Oversight Independence, Andrew Brunsden

Articles & Chapters

President Trump's defiance of basic norms threatened the oversight institutions of American democracy. His brazen assault on the prosecutorial and investigative independence of federal law enforcement was well documented. Yet few have thoroughly scrutinized his violations of the oversight independence of internal institutions that monitor the government to promote integrity, transparency, and accountability. This Article examines the independence of Inspectors General (IGs), the internal watchdogs of the Executive Branch, and the President's attacks on the institution. President Trump breached long-standing independence norms when he fired or replaced IGs in retaliation for their legitimate exercise of oversight duties. Then, in some …

The Emerging Lessons Of Trump V. Hawaii, Shalini Bhargava Ray

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

In the years since the Supreme Court decided Trump v. Hawaii, federal district courts have adjudicated dozens of rights-based challenges to executive action in immigration law. Plaintiffs, including U.S. citizens, civil rights organizations, and immigrants themselves, have alleged violations of the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause with some regularity based on President Trump’s animus toward immigrants. This Article assesses Hawaii’s impact on these challenges to immigration policy, and it offers two observations. First, Hawaii has amplified federal courts’ practice of privileging administrative law claims over constitutional ones. For example, courts considering …

Who Constrains Presidential Exercise Of Delegated Powers?, Rebecca L. Brown

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Building on the work of administrative law scholars who have identified and illuminated the several components of the problem over the years, this Article will seek to show what has happened when a cluster of separate circumstances have come together to create a new and serious threat to individual liberty when the President exercises expansive delegated authority. Several doctrinal components lead to this confluence: First, the moribund “intelligible principle” test has evolved to provide little or no constraint on this or any other delegation. Second, a delegation to the President, specifically, is not subject to the procedural requirements of the …