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Articles 421 - 425 of 425

Full-Text Articles in Organizations Law

Organizational Misconduct: Beyond The Principal-Agent Model, Kimberly D. Krawiec Feb 2005

Organizational Misconduct: Beyond The Principal-Agent Model, Kimberly D. Krawiec

ExpressO

This article demonstrates that, at least since the adoption of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991, the United States legal regime has been moving away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational liability. Under this system, organizational liability for agent misconduct is dependant on whether or not the organization has exercised due care to avoid the harm in question, rather than under traditional agency principles of respondeat superior. Courts and agencies typically evaluate the level of care exercised by the organization by inquiring whether the organization had in place internal compliance structures ostensibly designed …

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The Code For Corporate Citizenship: States Should Amend Statutes Governing Corporations And Enable Corporations To Be Good Citizens, Elisa Scalise Jan 2005

The Code For Corporate Citizenship: States Should Amend Statutes Governing Corporations And Enable Corporations To Be Good Citizens, Elisa Scalise

Seattle University Law Review

Corporations are important social actors. They are created by law and create products, services, jobs, and wealth upon which modem societies rely. Investments injected by corporations bring jobs, capital, and technology to communities, thereby raising living standards and creating derivative rights such as education, health and housing, and political freedoms. Modem corporations allow entrepreneurs to raise massive amounts of capital for large projects and research, which results in innovation and a wide range of products and services. However, these same corporations can also cause social harm. They are structured in such a way that it is possible for agents in …

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The Economics Of Limited Liability: An Empirical Study Of New York Law Firms, Scott Baker, Kimberly D. Krawiec Dec 2004

The Economics Of Limited Liability: An Empirical Study Of New York Law Firms, Scott Baker, Kimberly D. Krawiec

ExpressO

Since the rapid rise in organizational forms for business associations, academics and practitioners have sought to explain the choice of form rationale. Each form contains its own set of default rules that inevitably get factored into this decision, including the extent to which each individual firm owner will be held personally liable for the collective debts and obligations of the firm. The significance of the differences in these default rules continues to be debated. Many commentators have advanced theories, most notably those based on unlimited liability, profit-sharing, and illiquidity, asserting that the partnership form provides efficiency benefits that outweigh any …

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Bankruptcy Law And Inefficient Entitlements, Irit Haviv-Segal Oct 2004

Bankruptcy Law And Inefficient Entitlements, Irit Haviv-Segal

ExpressO

The question as to the justification of bankruptcy law remains unanswered. The literature tends to emphasize the conflict and inability to compromise between the different normative outlooks of the insolvency law system. A deeper reflection on the existing theories of bankruptcy law reveals, however, that all theories share the same starting point: All theories share the understanding that efficiency considerations justify the enforcement of contractual bankruptcy arrangements. When the social theories call for increased levels of coercion and redistribution, these theories rely on normative considerations of distributive justice and rehabilitation values. They by no means rely on efficiency grounds. This …

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Strict Liability For Gatekeepers: A Reply To Professor Coffee, Frank Partnoy Oct 2004

Strict Liability For Gatekeepers: A Reply To Professor Coffee, Frank Partnoy

University of San Diego Law and Economics Research Paper Series

This article responds to a proposal by Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. for a modified form of strict liability for gatekeepers. Professor Coffee’s proposal would convert gatekeepers into insurers, but cap their insurance obligations based on a multiple of the highest annual revenues the gatekeepers recently had received from their wrongdoing clients. My proposal, advanced in 2001, would allow gatekeepers to contract for a percentage of issuer damages, after settlement or judgment, subject to a legislatively-imposed floor. This article compares the proposals and concludes that a contractual system based on a percentage of the issuer’s liability would be preferable to …

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