National Security Law Commons^™

The Sec Proposed Cybersecurity Infrastructure Rules And New Disclosure Requirements, Neal F. Newman, Lawrence J. Trautman, Brian Elzweig

Faculty Scholarship

In addition to regulation of securities market issuers, the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) is also responsible for regulation of those entities that provide the networks, either electronic or physical, that enable the functioning of our securities markets. On February 9, 2022, the Commission published a Release for Cybersecurity Risk Management for Investment Advisers, Registered Investment Companies, and Business Development Companies containing proposals that, if adopted, would establish a new cybersecurity incident reporting and disclosure regime and require registered investment advisers (“advisers”) and investment companies (“funds”) to implement policies and procedures designed to address cyber risks. The comment period for …

Nato Self-Defense – Is Article 5 The Right Framework For Responding To Sub-Kinetic Cyber Aggression?, Shreyas Kumar, Gary D. Brown, Srividhya Ragavan, Maddalena Cerrato, Gourav Nagar

Faculty Scholarship

Cyber aggression presents a significant challenge to traditional frameworks of collective defense, particularly under Article 5 of the NATO Washington Treaty, which obligates member states to respond collectively to an "armed attack." While NATO has acknowledged that cyber incidents may trigger Article 5, ambiguity persists over what constitutes a cyber "armed attack," especially in the absence of kinetic effects. This uncertainty complicates NATO’s ability to address increasingly prevalent sub-kinetic cyber threats, such as economic disruption, data manipulation, and interference in democratic processes. Unlike conventional military threats, cyber operations often fall below the traditional threshold of armed conflict while still exerting …

How Domestic Institutions Shape The Global Tech War, Anu Bradford, Eileen Li, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

The United States (U.S.), China, and the European Union (EU) are engaged in a national security-driven economic competition over advanced technology. Many scholars and commentators focus on the external dimension of this geopolitical contest; that is, they describe the strategic choices by each actor in terms of geopolitical realities, threat perceptions, and relative power. However, this Article brings to the fore the internal dimension of the global tech war. We argue that each player’s strategy in the tech war is a function of its internal features, including basic constitutional powers, domestic legal institutions, and the relationships between the government and …

Property And Prejudice, Fatma E. Marouf, Vanessa Casado Pérez

Faculty Scholarship

“Alien land laws”—laws restricting noncitizens from owning real property—are back. A dozen states have enacted such laws during the past year, and over thirty states have considered such bills. These new bills are rooted in xenophobia, much like their predecessors, but they also have unique characteristics. They single out governments, citizens, and corporations of specific countries perceived to pose a threat; they impose ownership restrictions based on arbitrary distances to U.S. military bases and critical infrastructure; they inflict particularly harsh penalties; and they try to ferret out foreign control in complex corporate structures. The purported justifications are national defense, food …

Existential Threats And Deterrence: Japan’S Legal Pathway To Enhanced Collective Security In Asia, Nobuhisa Ishizuka

Faculty Scholarship

With the Japanese Cabinet’s decision in December 2022 to comprehensively upgrade Japan’s security posture, and its rapid build-up of its defense capabilities, Japan’s role in Asia’s security architecture has been undergoing a fundamental shift. This article places Japan’s 2015 Peace and Security Legislation in the context of the U.N. collective security system and argues that its most significant achievement has been to expand Japan’s power to engage more proactively in the Asian collective security order. To date, commentators have focused on the legislation’s role in expanding the Japanese constitution’s limitations on the use of force to permit collective self-defense. This …

The National Security Exception At The Wto: Should It Just Be A Matter Of When Members Can Avail Of It? What About How?, Mona Pinchis-Paulsen, Kamal Saggi, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

The GATT security exceptions were practically in hibernation until recently. The recent WTO disputes panel activity concerning such exceptions is characterized by a standard of review that places the accent on ‘when’ action should be taken and not so much on ‘what’ action should be taken. We see two problems with this construction. First, the ‘when’ might be a function of privileged information that those possessing it might be unwilling to divulge in a transparent manner. Second, national security is an amorphous concept, and unless we disaggregate it, it is impossible to pronounce the appropriateness of measures adopted to pursue …

Deepfakes In Court: How Judges Can Proactively Manage Alleged Ai-Generated Material In National Security Cases, Abhishek Dalal, Chongyang Gao, Paul W. Grimm, Maura R. Grossman, Daniel W. Linna Jr., Chiara Pulice, V. S. Subrahmanian, John Tunheim

Faculty Scholarship

Dall-E. ChatGPT GPT-4. Words that did not exist in the English lexicon just a few years ago are now commonplace. With the widespread availability of Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools, specifically Generative AI, whether in the context of text, audio, video, imagery, or even combinations of these, it is inevitable that trials related to national security will involve evidentiary issues raised by Generative AI. We must confront two possibilities: first, that evidence presented is AI-generated and not real and, second, that other evidence is genuine but alleged to be fabricated. Technologies designed to detect AI-generated content have proven to be unreliable, …

Hidden In Plain Sight: Redefining The Field Of National Security, Aziza Ahmed

Faculty Scholarship

Throughout his campaign for presidency, Trump called for a ban on Muslims entering the United States. As President, he kept his word. Only days after he took office, the new administration released the first version of the Executive Order: Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States. The first Executive Order, however, did not say the word Muslim. Instead, it listed only Muslim-majority countries as necessary for restrictions on entry. The Executive Order also trafficked in stereotypes about Muslims, such as the need to ban people who engage in acts of "bigotry or hatred," including honor killings. …

The National Security Consequences Of The Major Questions Doctrine, Timothy Meyer, Ganesh Sitaraman

Faculty Scholarship

The rise of the major questions doctrine—the rule that says that in order to delegate to the executive branch the power to resolve a “question of ‘deep economic and political significance’ that is central to [a] statutory scheme,” Congress must do so expressly—threatens to unmake the modern executive’s authority over foreign affairs, especially in matters of national security and interstate conflict. In the twenty-first century, global conflicts increasingly involve economic warfare, rather than (or in addition to) the force of arms.

In the United States, the executive power to levy economic sanctions and engage in other forms of economic warfare …

Red White And Blue – And Also Green: How Energy Policy Can Protect Both National Security And The Environment, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

Too often, energy policy protects the environment while neglecting national security, or vice versa. Since each goal is critical, this Article shows how to advance both at the same time.

For national security, the key is to avoid depending on the wrong suppliers. If they are vulnerable to attack (like some Middle Eastern producers), they need to be defended. Or, if they are themselves geopolitical threats (like Russia and Iran), their energy exports fund harmful conduct. This Article breaks new ground in showing why suppliers tend to be insecure or menacing: authoritarian regimes — which are more likely to pose …

Reassessing The Ahistorical Judicial Use Of William Winthrop And Frederick Bernays Wiener, Joshua E. Kastenberg

Faculty Scholarship

Government lawyers, like the courts continue to cite to Winthrop. Most recently, in the pending appeal titled Larabee v. Harker, the government ‘s counsel quoted Winthrop for the proposition that “retired officers are a part of the army and so triable by court-martial—a fact indeed never admitting of question.” It is unlikely that the government’s counsel considered the matters presented in this brief article, or that Winthrop rested his statement on dicta rather than any constitutional statement on jurisdiction. Likewise, whatever criticism may be given to Justice Alito’s Ortiz dissent, I am not suggesting that either he, or Justice Neil …

Panel One: Classification And Access To National Security Information, Mary-Rose Papandrea, Margaret Kwoka, David Pozen, Stephen I. Vladeck

Faculty Scholarship

This article is a transcript of the first panel of First Amendment Law Review’s 2021 Symposium on National Security, Whistleblowers, and the First Amendment, discussing classification and access to national security information.

Civil Military Relations Panel, Joshua E. Kastenberg

Faculty Scholarship

In the first week of this month, the nation was surprised to learn that retired general officers (generals and admirals) including James Mattis, Colin Powell, Michael Glenn Mullen, and William McRaven (to name a few) spoke out against President Donald Trump’s response to demonstrations across the United States. President Trump threatened to unilaterally invoke the 1807 Insurrection Act and federalize the National Guard as well as use the active duty Armed Forces of the United States as a “super police force.”

The conduct of the retired generals is not without detractors. The Constitution was constructed with the idea that a …

National Security And Judicial Ethics: The Exception To The Rule Of Keeping Judicial Conduct Judicial And The Politicization Of The Judiciary, Joshua E. Kastenberg

Faculty Scholarship

This article is divided into three sections, and it incorporates original research from the personal correspondences of several judges and justices. This article includes unpublished correspondences from various judicial collections at the Library of Congress, the Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan, the Washington and Lee School of Law’s special collections, the Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan Presidential Libraries, the National Library of Australia in Canberra, and Canada’s National Archives in Ottawa. The first section analyzes the current framework governing judicial disqualification based on the separation of powers doctrine as well as the right to an impartial judiciary, …

National Cybersecurity Innovation, Tabrez Y. Ebrahim

Faculty Scholarship

National cybersecurity plays a crucial role in protecting our critical infrastructure, such as telecommunication networks, the electricity grid, and even financial transactions. Most discussions about promoting national cybersecurity focus on governance structures, international relations, and political science. In contrast, this Article proposes a different agenda and one that promotes the use of innovation mechanisms for technological advancement. By promoting inducements for technological developments, such innovation mechanisms encourage the advancement of national cybersecurity solutions. In exploring possible solutions, this Article asks whether the government or markets can provide national cybersecurity innovation. This inquiry is a fragment of a much larger literature …

Cyberattacks And The Constitution, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Contrary to popular view, cyberattacks alone are rarely exercises of constitutional war powers – and they might never be. They are often instead best understood as exercises of other powers pertaining to nonwar military, foreign affairs, intelligence, and foreign commerce, for example. Although this more fine-grained, fact-specific conception of cyberattacks leaves room for broad executive leeway in some contexts, it also contains a strong constitutional basis for legislative regulation of cyber operations.

War Powers: Congress, The President, And The Courts – A Model Casebook Section, Stephen M. Griffin, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

This model casebook section is concerned with the constitutional law of war powers as developed by the executive and legislative branches, with a limited look at relevant statutes and federal court cases. It is intended for use in Constitutional Law I classes that cover separation of powers. It could also be used for courses in National Security Law or Foreign Relations Law, or for graduate courses in U.S. foreign policy. This is designed to be the reading for one to two classes, and it can supplement or replace standard casebook sections on war powers that are shorter and offer less …

The Vast Gulf Between Attempted Mass Shootings And Attempted Material Support, Heidi Gilchrist

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Beyond The Counterinsurgency Paradigm Of Governing: Letting Go Of Prediction And The Illusion Of An Internal Enemy, Bernard E. Harcourt

Faculty Scholarship

Bernard E. Harcourt expands the thesis about the illusion of insurgency in the United States to the current day. What, he asks, could alter fraudulent and overblown perceptions about the sanctity and importance of the national security state? He suggests that the way forward might begin with relinquishing the institutionalized practice of predicting danger. How to do this and what the consequences might be for his three-pronged analysis of state counterinsurgency strategy provides fresh thinking for future analysis and policymaking.

Bureaucratic Resistance And The National Security State, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Modern accounts of the national security state tend toward one of two opposing views of bureaucratic tensions within it: At one extreme, the executive branch bureaucracy is a shadowy “deep state,” unaccountable to the public or even to the elected President. On this account, bureaucratic obstacles to the President’s agenda are inherently suspect, even dangerous. At the other end, bureaucratic resistance to the President represents a necessary benevolent constraint on an otherwise imperial executive, the modern incarnation of the separation of powers, as the traditional checks on the President of the courts and Congress have fallen down on the job. …

Is The President A Traitor? A Legal Analysis, Noah Kupferberg

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

National Security, Immigration And The Muslim Bans, Shoba Wadhia

Faculty Scholarship

National security language has continued to guide the creation and defense of Executive Orders and related immigration policies issued in the Donald J. Trump administration. This Article builds on earlier scholarship examining the relationship between national security and immigration in the wake of September 11, 2001, under the Obama administration, and during the campaign leading to the 2016 Election. While the Article is largely descriptive, it ultimately questions the longevity of using national security to create and defend immigration law. This Article is limited in scope -- it does not provide a deep dive into the constitutionality of the Muslim …

Promoting International Cybersecurity Cooperation: Lessons From The Proliferation Security Initiative, Duncan B. Hollis, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Global efforts by states to cooperate through international rules in combating cyber threats have generated mixed results, at best. In this paper, we examine the architecture of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a possible model for future cybersecurity cooperation among interested states. We identify several features of PSI’s architecture (rather than its substantive focus on non-proliferation) for further analysis, including PSI’s low entry costs, tiered structure, and flexibility, as well as its leveraging of both territorial jurisdiction and state consent. We conclude that, despite several hurdles visible in the scope of its membership and its legal framework, PSI still …

What's So Great About The Declare War Clause?, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

I have long believed two things about constitutional war powers, which my reading of Noah Feldman’s “The Three Lives of James Madison” largely confirmed. First, James Madison was brilliant and prescient about many things, but the strategy and politics of war were not among them. Second, modern constitutional critics of an imperial presidency place too much weight on the declare war clause – and especially Madison’s statements about it. Madison, indeed, worried deeply about unchecked presidential war powers. But Feldman’s book shows that Madison did not emphasize the same risks and checks so often ascribed to him today, especially by …

Presidents And War Powers, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Constitution vests the president with “executive power” and provides that “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,” while it endows Congress with the power “To declare War.” These provisions have given rise to two major questions about presidential war powers: first, what should be the president’s role in taking the country to war, and, second, what are the president’s powers to direct its conduct. Historian Michael Beschloss’s new book, “Presidents of War,” examines how presidents have responded to each of these questions across two hundred years of U.S. history.

The major argument of …

Security Clearance Conundrum: The Need For Reform And Judicial Review, Heidi Gilchrist

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Cyber Strategy & Policy: International Law Dimensions, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Important international law questions for formulating cyber strategy and policy include whether and when a cyber-attack amounts to an “act of war,” or, more precisely, an “armed attack” triggering a right of self-defense, and how the international legal principle of “sovereignty” could apply to cyber activities. International law in this area is not settled. There is, however, ample room within existing international law to support a strong cyber strategy, including a powerful deterrent. The answers to many international law questions discussed below depend on specific, case-by-case facts, and are likely to be highly contested for a long time to come. …

Energy Subsidies: Worthy Goals, Competing Priorities, And Flawed Institutional Design, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

The United States uses on targeted subsidies for both "green" energy and hydrocarbons. These subsidies pursue worthwhile goals. But unfortunately, many have design flaws that make them less effective or even counterproductive. The goal of this Article is to show how to do better.

Specifically, this Article focuses on three sets of issues. First, there often is tension between our environmental and national security goals. Unfortunately, the economics literature on energy largely ignores these trade-offs by omitting national security from the analysis. This Article takes issue with this approach and suggests ways to manage these trade-offs. Second, this Article argues …

Lawfare 101: A Primer, Charles J. Dunlap Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Dunlap discusses the concept of lawfare—using law as a form of asymmetrical warfare—and provides some considerations for how to combat this phenomenon. The article establishes the intellectual framework and thematic direction for this Issue of Military Review.

"Cybervandalism" Or "Digital Act Of War?" America's Muddled Approach To Cyber Incidents Will Not Deter More Crises, Charles J. Dunlap Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

If experts say a "malicious [cyber] code"' has "similar effects" to a "physical bomb,"' and that code actually causes "a stunning breach of global internet stability," is it really accurate to call that event merely an instance of a "cyber attack"?

Moreover, can you really expect to deter state and non-state actors from employing such code and similarly hostile cyber methodologies if all they think that they are risking is being labeled as a cyber-vandal subject only to law enforcement measures? Or might they act differently if it were made clear to them that such activity is considered an "armed …