National Security Law Commons^™

How Domestic Institutions Shape The Global Tech War, Anu Bradford, Eileen Li, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

The United States (U.S.), China, and the European Union (EU) are engaged in a national security-driven economic competition over advanced technology. Many scholars and commentators focus on the external dimension of this geopolitical contest; that is, they describe the strategic choices by each actor in terms of geopolitical realities, threat perceptions, and relative power. However, this Article brings to the fore the internal dimension of the global tech war. We argue that each player’s strategy in the tech war is a function of its internal features, including basic constitutional powers, domestic legal institutions, and the relationships between the government and …

Existential Threats And Deterrence: Japan’S Legal Pathway To Enhanced Collective Security In Asia, Nobuhisa Ishizuka

Faculty Scholarship

With the Japanese Cabinet’s decision in December 2022 to comprehensively upgrade Japan’s security posture, and its rapid build-up of its defense capabilities, Japan’s role in Asia’s security architecture has been undergoing a fundamental shift. This article places Japan’s 2015 Peace and Security Legislation in the context of the U.N. collective security system and argues that its most significant achievement has been to expand Japan’s power to engage more proactively in the Asian collective security order. To date, commentators have focused on the legislation’s role in expanding the Japanese constitution’s limitations on the use of force to permit collective self-defense. This …

The National Security Exception At The Wto: Should It Just Be A Matter Of When Members Can Avail Of It? What About How?, Mona Pinchis-Paulsen, Kamal Saggi, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

The GATT security exceptions were practically in hibernation until recently. The recent WTO disputes panel activity concerning such exceptions is characterized by a standard of review that places the accent on ‘when’ action should be taken and not so much on ‘what’ action should be taken. We see two problems with this construction. First, the ‘when’ might be a function of privileged information that those possessing it might be unwilling to divulge in a transparent manner. Second, national security is an amorphous concept, and unless we disaggregate it, it is impossible to pronounce the appropriateness of measures adopted to pursue …

Red White And Blue – And Also Green: How Energy Policy Can Protect Both National Security And The Environment, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

Too often, energy policy protects the environment while neglecting national security, or vice versa. Since each goal is critical, this Article shows how to advance both at the same time.

For national security, the key is to avoid depending on the wrong suppliers. If they are vulnerable to attack (like some Middle Eastern producers), they need to be defended. Or, if they are themselves geopolitical threats (like Russia and Iran), their energy exports fund harmful conduct. This Article breaks new ground in showing why suppliers tend to be insecure or menacing: authoritarian regimes — which are more likely to pose …

Panel One: Classification And Access To National Security Information, Mary-Rose Papandrea, Margaret Kwoka, David Pozen, Stephen I. Vladeck

Faculty Scholarship

This article is a transcript of the first panel of First Amendment Law Review’s 2021 Symposium on National Security, Whistleblowers, and the First Amendment, discussing classification and access to national security information.

Cyberattacks And The Constitution, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Contrary to popular view, cyberattacks alone are rarely exercises of constitutional war powers – and they might never be. They are often instead best understood as exercises of other powers pertaining to nonwar military, foreign affairs, intelligence, and foreign commerce, for example. Although this more fine-grained, fact-specific conception of cyberattacks leaves room for broad executive leeway in some contexts, it also contains a strong constitutional basis for legislative regulation of cyber operations.

War Powers: Congress, The President, And The Courts – A Model Casebook Section, Stephen M. Griffin, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

This model casebook section is concerned with the constitutional law of war powers as developed by the executive and legislative branches, with a limited look at relevant statutes and federal court cases. It is intended for use in Constitutional Law I classes that cover separation of powers. It could also be used for courses in National Security Law or Foreign Relations Law, or for graduate courses in U.S. foreign policy. This is designed to be the reading for one to two classes, and it can supplement or replace standard casebook sections on war powers that are shorter and offer less …

Beyond The Counterinsurgency Paradigm Of Governing: Letting Go Of Prediction And The Illusion Of An Internal Enemy, Bernard E. Harcourt

Faculty Scholarship

Bernard E. Harcourt expands the thesis about the illusion of insurgency in the United States to the current day. What, he asks, could alter fraudulent and overblown perceptions about the sanctity and importance of the national security state? He suggests that the way forward might begin with relinquishing the institutionalized practice of predicting danger. How to do this and what the consequences might be for his three-pronged analysis of state counterinsurgency strategy provides fresh thinking for future analysis and policymaking.

Promoting International Cybersecurity Cooperation: Lessons From The Proliferation Security Initiative, Duncan B. Hollis, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Global efforts by states to cooperate through international rules in combating cyber threats have generated mixed results, at best. In this paper, we examine the architecture of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a possible model for future cybersecurity cooperation among interested states. We identify several features of PSI’s architecture (rather than its substantive focus on non-proliferation) for further analysis, including PSI’s low entry costs, tiered structure, and flexibility, as well as its leveraging of both territorial jurisdiction and state consent. We conclude that, despite several hurdles visible in the scope of its membership and its legal framework, PSI still …

What's So Great About The Declare War Clause?, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

I have long believed two things about constitutional war powers, which my reading of Noah Feldman’s “The Three Lives of James Madison” largely confirmed. First, James Madison was brilliant and prescient about many things, but the strategy and politics of war were not among them. Second, modern constitutional critics of an imperial presidency place too much weight on the declare war clause – and especially Madison’s statements about it. Madison, indeed, worried deeply about unchecked presidential war powers. But Feldman’s book shows that Madison did not emphasize the same risks and checks so often ascribed to him today, especially by …

Presidents And War Powers, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Constitution vests the president with “executive power” and provides that “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,” while it endows Congress with the power “To declare War.” These provisions have given rise to two major questions about presidential war powers: first, what should be the president’s role in taking the country to war, and, second, what are the president’s powers to direct its conduct. Historian Michael Beschloss’s new book, “Presidents of War,” examines how presidents have responded to each of these questions across two hundred years of U.S. history.

The major argument of …

Energy Subsidies: Worthy Goals, Competing Priorities, And Flawed Institutional Design, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

The United States uses on targeted subsidies for both "green" energy and hydrocarbons. These subsidies pursue worthwhile goals. But unfortunately, many have design flaws that make them less effective or even counterproductive. The goal of this Article is to show how to do better.

Specifically, this Article focuses on three sets of issues. First, there often is tension between our environmental and national security goals. Unfortunately, the economics literature on energy largely ignores these trade-offs by omitting national security from the analysis. This Article takes issue with this approach and suggests ways to manage these trade-offs. Second, this Article argues …

Cyber Strategy & Policy: International Law Dimensions, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Important international law questions for formulating cyber strategy and policy include whether and when a cyber-attack amounts to an “act of war,” or, more precisely, an “armed attack” triggering a right of self-defense, and how the international legal principle of “sovereignty” could apply to cyber activities. International law in this area is not settled. There is, however, ample room within existing international law to support a strong cyber strategy, including a powerful deterrent. The answers to many international law questions discussed below depend on specific, case-by-case facts, and are likely to be highly contested for a long time to come. …

Gags As Guidance: Expanding Notice Of National Security Letter Investigations To Targets And The Public, Rebecca Wexler

Faculty Scholarship

National Security Letters (NSLs) are administrative subpoenas that the FBI uses to demand information from Internet service providers without prior judicial approval. They almost always include nondisclosure orders, commonly called “gags,” which prohibit the recipient from discussing the letter’s contents or even its mere existence. Courts and commentators have expressed concern that these gags may be overbroad prior restraints that violate the First Amendment and shroud government surveillance in undue secrecy. On November 30, 2015, an NSL gag order was lifted in full for the first time after a federal district judge found no “good reason” to retain it.

This …

Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

Legal and policy debates about privacy revolve around conflicts between privacy and other goods. But privacy also conflicts with itself. Whenever securing privacy on one margin compromises privacy on another margin, a privacy-privacy tradeoff arises.

This Essay introduces the phenomenon of privacy-privacy tradeoffs, with particular attention to their role in NSA surveillance. After explaining why these tradeoffs are pervasive in modern society and developing a typology, the Essay shows that many of the arguments made by the NSA's defenders appeal not only to a national-security need but also to a privacy-privacy tradeoff. An appreciation of these tradeoffs, the Essay contends, …

When The Curtain Must Be Drawn: American Experience With Proceedings Involving Information That, For Reasons Of National Security, Cannot Be Disclosed, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

In numerous contexts today, ranging from no-fly lists, to the designation of foreign terrorist organizations, to controls over foreign investments in the United States, federal authorities reach decisions having dramatic consequences for individuals’ liberty and property on the basis of information that those individuals cannot obtain, even in summary form. Recent and pending litigation has challenged these deprivations on due process grounds, with only moderate success. Perhaps unclassified information on which the government has acted must be revealed, with an opportunity given to challenge it and to submit contrary evidence; but in the words of the DC Circuit writing last …

Square Pegs And Round Holes: Moving Beyond Bivens In National Security Cases, Alexander Steven Zbrozek

National Security Law Program

Since its inception, the Supreme Court has largely orphaned the Bivens doctrine, a child of its own jurisprudence. In doing so, the Court has repeatedly invoked dicta from the Bivens case warning that unspecified “special factors counseling hesitation” could preclude judicial recognition of future constitutional remedies. Picking up on this thread, lower courts have notably limited the justiciability of Bivens claims in cases challenging counterterrorism-related government conduct. This so-called “national security exception” to the Bivens doctrine has created a substantial hurdle to individual justice and government transparency.

This Note therefore proposes the creation of an Article I administrative court with …

Cipa Creep: The Classified Information Procedures Act And Its Drift Into Civil National Security Litigation, Ian Macdougall

National Security Law Program

This Note documents an incipient trend in the courts and Congress, which I call "CIPA creep," and investigates its implications for civil national security litigation. CIPA – the Classified Information Procedures Act – governs the use of classified information in federal criminal cases. No comparable statute exists in the civil context, where the judge-made state secrets privilege determines whether litigants may use sensitive government information. The prevailing scholarly and popular accounts hold that this privilege, in the tense post-9/11 security environment, transformed from a narrow evidentiary rule into a non-justiciability doctrine that cedes to executive branch officials the power to …

Warrant Canaries And Disclosure By Design: The Real Threat To National Security Letter Gag Orders, Rebecca Wexler

Faculty Scholarship

Since the 1980s, the FBI has issued documents referred to as National Se­curity Letters (NSLs), which demand data from companies — including finan­cial institution records and the customer records of telephone companies and communications service providers—for foreign intelligence investigations. The use of the letters increased dramatically after the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the USA PATRIOT Act’s expansion of the FBI’s statutory NSL authority. But these letters were rarely publicized or publicly challenged, as they often included gag orders that required recipients not to reveal the contents of the letter, or even its existence. After the leak of classified …

Adapting The Law Of Armed Conflict To Autonomous Weapon Systems, Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Weapon systems are becoming increasingly automated and arguably some autonomous military systems have been deployed for years. Recent advances in automated systems and the possibilities they portend have generated interest and anxiety within some militaries and defense ministries, and a movement of non-governmental activists seeking to ban fully autonomous weapons. In May 2014, the High Contracting Parties of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) convened an extensive discussion of the legal and ethical issues that autonomous weapons raise, while recognizing that many of these problems lie at an uncertain point in the future.

It is important that normative …

The Power To Threaten War, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Existing war powers scholarship focuses overwhelmingly on the President's power to initiate military operations abroad and the extent to which that power is constrained by Congress. It ignores the allocation of legal power to threaten military force or war, even though threats – to coerce or deter enemies and to reassure allies – are one of the most important ways in which the United States government wields its military might. This paper fills that scholarly void, and draws on recent political science and historical scholarship to construct a richer and more accurate account of the modern presidency's powers to shape …

The Leaky Leviathan: Why The Government Condemns And Condones Unlawful Disclosures Of Information, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

The United States government leaks like a sieve. Presidents denounce the constant flow of classified information to the media from unauthorized, anonymous sources. National security professionals decry the consequences. And yet the laws against leaking are almost never enforced. Throughout U.S. history, roughly a dozen criminal cases have been brought against suspected leakers. There is a dramatic disconnect between the way our laws and our leaders condemn leaking in the abstract and the way they condone it in practice.

This Article challenges the standard account of that disconnect, which emphasizes the difficulties of apprehending and prosecuting offenders, and advances an …

Self-Defensive Force Against Cyber Attacks: Legal, Strategic And Political Dimensions, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

When does a cyber attack (or threat of cyber attack) give rise to a right of self-defense – including armed self-defense – and when should it? By "cyber attack" I mean the use of malicious computer code or electronic signals to alter, disrupt, degrade or destroy computer systems or networks or the information or programs on them. It is widely believed that sophisticated cyber attacks could cause massive harm – whether to military capabilities, economic and financial systems, or social functioning – because of modern reliance on system interconnectivity, though it is highly contested how vulnerable the United States and …

Regulating Resort To Force: Form And Substance Of The Un Charter Regime, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Much of the international legal debate about regulating force and self-defence takes place on a substantive axis, focusing on the scope of force prohibitions and exceptions. This article instead focuses on their doctrinal form, or modes of argumentation and analysis through which facts are assessed in relation to legal directives, to illuminate how many of the assumptions about substantive policy goals and risks tend to be coupled with other assumptions about the way international law operates in this field. It shows that the flexible, adaptable standards favoured by some states, scholars, and other international actors and the fixed rules and …

National Security Federalism In The Age Of Terror, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

National security law scholarship tends to focus on the balancing of security and liberty, and the overwhelming bulk of that scholarship is about such balancing on the horizontal axis among branches at the federal level. This Article challenges that standard focus by supplementing it with an account of the vertical axis and the emergent, post-9/11 role of state and local government in American national security law and policy. It argues for a federalism frame that emphasizes vertical intergovernmental arrangements for promoting and mediating a dense array of policy values over the long term. This federalism frame helps in understanding the …

Cyber-Attacks And The Use Of Force: Back To The Future Of Article 2(4), Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

This Article makes two overarching arguments. First, strategy is a major driver of legal evolution. Most scholarship and commentary on cyber-attacks capture only one dimension of this point, focusing on how international law might be interpreted or amended to take account of new technologies and threats. The focus here, however, is on the dynamic interplay of law and strategy – strategy generates reappraisal and revision of law, while law itself shapes strategy – and the moves and countermoves among actors with varying interests, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. The purpose is not to come down in favor of one legal interpretation or …

Cyber Attacks As "Force" Under Un Charter Article 2(4), Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

In a 2010 article in Foreign Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn revealed that in 2008 the Department of Defense suffered "the most significant breach of U.S. military computers ever" when a flash drive inserted into a US military laptop surreptitiously introduced malicious software into US Central Command's classified and unclassified computer systems. Lynn explains that the US government is developing defensive systems to protect military and civilian electronic infrastructure from intrusions and, potentially worse, disruptions and destruction, and it is developing its own cyber-strategy "to defend the United States in the digital age."

To what extent is …

Open Service And Our Allies: A Report On The Inclusion Of Openly Gay And Lesbian Servicemembers In U. S. Allies' Armed Forces, Suzanne B. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In the wake of the Obama Administration's pledge to repeal "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in the United States, the Columbia Law School Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic undertook a review of how allies of the United States moved from a policy of banning gay and lesbian servicemembers from serving in the armed forces to a policy of allowing these servicemembers to serve openly ("open service"). In documenting this review, this report aims to provide information about the decision to implement open service and the mechanics of the transition to open service in Australia, Canada, Israel, and the United Kingdom. In …

The Structure Of Terrorism Threats And The Laws Of War, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

This article considers a major debate in the American and European counterterrorism analytic community – whether the primary terrorist threat to the West is posed by hierarchical, centralized terrorist organizations operating from geographic safe havens, or by radicalized individuals conducting a loosely organized, ideologically common but operationally independent fight against western societies – and this debate’s implications for both jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Analysis of how the law of armed conflict might be evolving to deal with terrorism should engage in more nuanced and sophisticated examination of how terrorism threats are themselves evolving. Moreover, the merits of …

Deep Secrecy, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

This Article offers a new way of thinking and talking about government secrecy. In the vast literature on the topic, little attention has been paid to the structure of government secrets, as distinct from their substance or function. Yet these secrets differ systematically depending on how many people know of their existence, what sorts of people know, how much they know, and how soon they know. When a small group of similarly situated officials conceals from outsiders the fact that it is concealing something, the result is a deep secret. When members of the general public understand they are being …