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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Marketing Law
Make Some Sense Of Scent Trademarks: The United States Needs A Graphical Representation Requirement, Gabrielle E. Brill
Make Some Sense Of Scent Trademarks: The United States Needs A Graphical Representation Requirement, Gabrielle E. Brill
Law Student Publications
When it comes to consumer loyalty, some businesses have decided to go beyond attracting the eyes. Why not keep customers via their nostrils? Accordingly, the scent marketing industry is booming. Jennifer Dublino, Vice President of Development at ScentWorld Events, remarks that “smell is one of the most unique of human senses. Scent enters the limbic system [of the brain] and bypasses all of the cognitive and logical thought processes and goes directly to the emotional and memory areas of the brain.” Companies like ScentAir have been created specifically to help stores design fragrances that best fit their image and objectives …
Vertical Boilerplate, James Gibson
Vertical Boilerplate, James Gibson
Law Faculty Publications
Despite what we learn in law school about the “meeting of the minds,” most contracts are merely boilerplate—take-it-or-leave-it propositions. Negotiation is nonexistent; we rely on our collective market power as consumers to regulate contracts’ content. But boilerplate imposes certain information costs because it often arrives late in the transaction and is hard to understand. If those costs get too high, then the market mechanism fails. So how high are boilerplate’s information costs? A few studies have attempted to measure them, but they all use a “horizontal” approach—i.e., they sample a single stratum of boilerplate and assume that it represents the …
Branding The Small Wonder: Delaware's Dominance And The Market For Corporate Law, Omari Scott Simmons
Branding The Small Wonder: Delaware's Dominance And The Market For Corporate Law, Omari Scott Simmons
University of Richmond Law Review
No abstract provided.
Accidental Rights, James Gibson
Accidental Rights, James Gibson
Law Faculty Publications
Written for the Yale Law Journal's online Pocket Part, this is a much shorter and (I hope) more accessible iteration of my earlier paper, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 Yale L.J. 882 (2007). It summarizes that paper's central point - i.e., that intellectual property entitlements are growing not just because of expansive court decisions and legislative enactments, but also because of seemingly sensible, risk-averse licensing decisions that inadvertently feed back into legal doctrine - and then explores how this phenomenon might apply to (and be manipulated by) enterprises such as Google Book Search.