Litigation Commons^™

Due Process Supreme Court Rockland County

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Due Process Supreme Court Appellate Division Third Department

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Due Process Supreme Court Appellate Division

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Due Process Pringle V. Wolfe (Decided 28, 1996)

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Due Process People V. Scott (Decided June 5, 1996)

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Due Process Court Of Appeals

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Supreme Court Queens County

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Double Jeopardy

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Double Jeopardy Supreme Court Appellate Division Second Department

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Double Jeopardy

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Public Relations Litigation, Kishanthi Parella

Scholarly Articles

Conventional wisdom holds that lawsuits harm a corporation’s reputation. So why do corporations and other businesses litigate even when they will likely lose in the court of law and the court of public opinion? One explanation is settlement: some parties file lawsuits not to win but to force the defendant to pay out. But some business litigants defy even this explanation; they do not expect to win the lawsuit or to benefit financially from settlement. What explains their behavior?

The answer is reputation. This Article explains that certain types of litigation can improve a business litigant’s reputation in the eyes …

State Standing For Nationwide Injunctions Against The Federal Government, Jonathan R. Nash

Notre Dame Law Review

Recent years have seen a substantial increase of cases in which states seek, and indeed obtain, nationwide injunctions against the federal government. These cases implicate two complicated questions: first, when a state has standing to sue the federal government, and second, when a nationwide injunction is a proper form of relief. For their part, scholars have mostly addressed these questions separately. In this Essay, I analyze the two questions together. Along the way, I identify drawbacks and benefits of nationwide injunctions, as well as settings where nationwide injunctions may be desirable and undesirable. I present arguments that, although I do …

An Organizational Account Of State Standing, Katherine M. Crocker

Notre Dame Law Review

Again and again in regard to recent high-profile disputes, the legal community has tied itself in knots over questions about when state plaintiffs should have standing to sue in federal court, especially in cases where they seek to sue federal-government defendants. Lawsuits challenging everything from the Bush administration’s environmental policies to the Obama administration’s immigration actions to the Trump administration’s travel bans have become mired in tricky and technical questions about whether state plaintiffs belonged in federal court.

Should state standing cause so much controversy and confusion? This Essay argues that state plaintiffs are far more like at least one …

The Private Rights Of Public Governments, Seth Davis

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay charts the analytical and doctrinal confusion arising from the category of “proprietary” interests in state standing law. This category might be taken literally to include only the ownership of property and interests that stem from it. It might refer to interests that are analogous to those that a private corporation might litigate, or instead to any type of financial injury a state might suffer. Other possibilities would limit “proprietary” interests to those interests recognized under the common law, or only those interests recognized under private law. Perhaps the most that can be said is that “proprietary” interests should …

State Standing And Cooperative Federalism, Ernest A. Young

Notre Dame Law Review

State lawsuits challenging federal policy generally encounter arguments that the states lack standing to sue, either under Article III’s “case or controversy” clause or under various prudential standing doctrines. These arguments have often taken novel forms—such as claims that states’ injuries are “self-inflicted” or offset by other benefits of federal policies—that have few precedents or analogs in the standing jurisprudence governing suits by private individuals. The United States has taken the position, in other words, that states should have special disabilities in filing lawsuits that would not apply to ordinary litigants. Likewise, prominent academics have argued that uniquely narrow standing …

Foreword: Some Puzzles Of State Standing, Tara L. Grove

Notre Dame Law Review

When should states have standing? In recent years, there has been an explosion in literature on that question. Yet, even today, there seem to be as many questions as answers. In this Foreword to the Notre Dame Law Review's 2019 Federal Courts, Practice, and Procedure Symposium on state standing, I discuss a few such puzzles. First, should states have “special” standing when they sue the federal government—that is, greater access to federal court than private parties? Second, and conversely, should states have at least “equal” access to federal court, or should they face more barriers than private parties? These …

Standing For Nothing, Robert A. Mikos

Notre Dame Law Review

A growing number of courts and commentators have suggested that states have Article III standing to protect state law. Proponents of such “protective” standing argue that states must be given access to federal court whenever their laws are threatened. Absent such access, they claim, many state laws might prove toothless, thereby undermining the value of the states in our federal system. Furthermore, proponents insist that this form of special solicitude is very limited—that it opens the doors to the federal courthouses a crack but does not swing them wide open. This Essay, however, contests both of these claims, and thus, …

An Empirical Investigation Of Third Party Consumer Litigant Funding, Ronen Avraham, Anthony Sebok

Cornell Law Review

No abstract provided.

Fictional Pleas, Thea Johnson

Indiana Law Journal

A fictional plea is one in which a defendant pleads guilty to a crime he has not committed, with the knowledge of the defense attorney, prosecutor, and judge. With fictional pleas, the plea of conviction is detached from the original factual allegations against the defendant. As criminal justice actors become increasingly troubled by the impact of collateral consequences on defendants, the fictional plea serves as an appealing response to this concern. It allows the parties to achieve parallel aims: the prosecutor holds the defendant accountable in the criminal system, while the defendant avoids devastating noncriminal consequences. In this context, the …

Influencing Juries In Litigation "Hot Spots", Megan M. La Belle

Indiana Law Journal

This Article considers how corporations are using image advertising in litigation "hot spots" as a means of influencing litigation outcomes. It describes how Samsung and other companies advertised in the Eastern District of Texas--a patent litigation "hot spot"--to curry favor with the people who live there, including by sponsoring an ice rink located directly outside the courthouse. To be sure, image advertisements are constitutionally protected speech and might even warrant the highest level of protection under the First Amendment when they are not purely commercial in nature. Still, the Article argues, courts should be able to prohibit such advertisements altogether, …

Quasi-Sovereign Standing, F. Andrew Hessick

Notre Dame Law Review

Judges have concluded that states do not have standing based on their quasi-sovereign interests to sue the United States for not obeying the law. Two different reasons have been given. First, because a state can assert quasi-sovereign interests only in its capacity of representing its residents, a state has standing to press those interests only if it can demonstrate that its residents have suffered an injury in fact. On this view, states do not have general standing to sue the federal government for disobeying the law; they have standing only if they can show that the disobedience injured a resident. …

State Standing And National Injunctions, Bradford Mank, Michael E. Solimine

Notre Dame Law Review

Most of the growing literature on national injunctions makes only passing mention, if at all, of states being plaintiffs or of the appropriateness of state standing and how it might bear on the geographic scope of an injunction. This Essay undertakes to fill that gap in a more extended way. Part I of the Essay addresses the issue of state standing in suits against the federal government, and argues that such standing is well grounded in the traditional parens patriae powers of states and should be permitted to protect the health, welfare, and natural resources of their citizens. That is, …

Reining In State Standing, Ann Woolhandler, Michael G. Collins

Notre Dame Law Review

In upholding standing in Massachusetts v. EPA, Justice Stevens said that states “are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.” While one might agree that the states are not normal litigants, that abnormality might well suggest that states should get standing less easily than private parties.

As a historical matter, states were limited in the kinds of cases they could bring in the federal courts. States typically could not litigate their sovereignty interests (their powers to govern to the exclusion of other governments), nor could they litigate their parens patriae interests (the interests of their citizens) …

State Standing's Uncertain Stakes, Aziz Z. Huq

Notre Dame Law Review

I offer a quite modest contribution to debates on state standing. I do not offer “right answers.” Rather, I posit that it is useful to understand the “stakes” of state standing. By “stakes,” I mean the practical consequences of resolving, one way or another, the unsettled doctrinal choices respecting the ability of states to initiate a matter in federal courts. Why, that is, does state standing matter? An inquiry into stakes can usefully proceed stepwise. A first task is to identify the subset of state standing cases that presently elicit division among the Justices. A second task is to articulate …

Legal Education In The United States: Moving Toward More Practical Experience, Hon. Sandra R. Klein

Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review

No abstract provided.

The United Nations Compensation Commission: Mass Reparations Apotheosis, Gregory Townsend

Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review

No abstract provided.

Malaysia Historical Salvors Revisited:, John P. Given

Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judicial And Practitioner Perspectives On Adr, Young Hye Chun

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Shelby County And Local Governments: A Case Study Of Local Texas Governments Diluting Minority Votes, Sydnee Fielkow

Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy

No abstract provided.

Brief Of Brian Wolfman, Aderson B. Francois, And Eric Schnapper As Amici Curiae In Support Of Petitioner In Peterson V. Linear Controls Incorporated, No. 18-1401 (U.S. Supreme Court June 6, 2019), Brian Wolfman, Aderson B. François

U.S. Supreme Court Briefs

In Title VII disparate-treatment, employment-discrimination cases, the term “adverse employment action” originally developed as judicial shorthand for the statute’s text, which broadly prohibits any discriminatory conduct by an employer against an employee based on the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). But what started simply as shorthand has taken on a life of its own and now improperly limits the statute’s reach. The Fifth Circuit’s version of the adverse-employment-action rule stands out as especially improper: Only an “ultimate employment decision”—a refusal to hire, a firing, a demotion, or the like—constitutes impermissible discrimination.

In this …