Litigation Commons^™

Litigating Toward Settlement, Christina L. Boyd, David A. Hoffman

Scholarship@WashULaw

Civil litigation typically ends when the parties compromise. While existing theories of settlement primarily focus on information exchange, we instead examine how motion practice, especially non-discovery motions, can substantially shape parties’ knowledge about their cases and thereby influence the timing of settlement. Using docket-level federal district court data, we find a number of strong effects regarding how motions can influence this process, including that the filing of a motion significantly speeds case settlement, that granted motions are more immediately critical to settlement timing than motions denied, and that plaintiff victories have a stronger effect than defendant victories. These results provide …

The Patent Litigation Explosion, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

This Article provides the first look at patent litigation hazards for public firms during the 1980s and 1990s. Litigation is more likely when prospective plaintiffs acquire more patents, when firms are larger and technologically close and when prospective defendants spend more on research and development ("R&D"). The latter suggests inadvertent infringement may be more important than piracy. Public firms face dramatically increased hazards of litigation as plaintiffs and even more rapidly increasing hazards as defendants, especially for small public firms. The increase cannot be explained by patenting rates, R&D, firm value or industry composition. Legal changes are the most likely …

Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French

Faculty Scholarship

In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing so. …

Mandatory Class Action Lawsuits As A Restructuring Technique, Bryant B. Edwards, Jeffrey A. Herbst, Selina K. Hewitt

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Immunizing Arbitrators From Claims For Equitable Relief, Michael D. Moberly

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal

The article begins with a summary of the historical origins of the judicial and arbitral immunity doctrines. Next, the article discusses the courts' refusal to extend judicial immunity to claims for declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief, except perhaps in the case of federal judges. The article then explores the propriety of recognizing a similar limitation in cases construing the arbitral immunity doctrine. The article ultimately concludes that (1) arbitrators should be immune from claims for equitable relief as a matter of policy, and (2) in jurisdictions where that result is currently precluded by existing precedent, a comparable result can …

Market-Based Prediction Models As An Aid To Litigation Strategy And Settlement Negotiations, Kris Steckman

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

In his recent book, “Litigation is War,” Fredrick L. Whitmer suggests effective advocacy in litigation mirrors many tactics common in strategic military preparation. On a battlefield or in a courtroom, quantifying the likelihood of uncertainties that may hinder or facilitate a particular line of attack will provide an advantage to the party holding such information. Consider this scenario: you are a plaintiff bringing suit against a corporation for ten million dollars, your trial starts in two weeks, the corporation has offered to settle for one million dollars, but you believe that you deserve more; do you accept? There is no …

D Is For Digitize: An Introduction, James Grimmelmann

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

H Is For Harmonization: The Google Book Search Settlement And Orphan Works Legislation In The European Union, Katharina De La Durantaye

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Managerial Judge Goes To Trial, Elizabeth G. Thornbug

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Disputing Limited Liability, Christina L. Boyd, David A. Hoffman

Scholarship@WashULaw

This project presents six years of hand-collected federal district court data to analyze the first representative sample of veil piercing litigation. Our method identifies veil piercing complaints through Westlaw's trial pleadings database and codes each case through a detailed examination of PACER records. We test a variety of hypotheses to understand how such litigations are resolved. We find that plaintiffs succeed quite often in veil piercing litigation, if success is defined as winning on motions that do not terminate a case. A variety of legal and extra-legal factors predict such interstitial veil piercing successes. Voluntary creditor causes of action promote …

Slides: Groundwater Law And Administration: From Conflict To Reform, Michael A. Gheleta

Western Water Law, Policy and Management: Ripples, Currents, and New Channels for Inquiry (Martz Summer Conference, June 3-5)

Presenter: Michael A. Gheleta, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck LLP, Denver, CO

14 slides

Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering Of Public Adjudication, Robert J. Rhee

UF Law Faculty Publications

Private resolution and public adjudication of disputes are commonly seen as discrete, antipodal processes. There is a generally held understanding of the dispute resolution processes. The essence of private dispute resolution is that the parties can arrange the disputed rights and entitlements per agreement and without judicial intervention. In public adjudication, however, the sovereign mandates the substantive and procedural laws to be applied, many of which cannot be changed by either a party's unilateral decision or both parties' mutual consent. Neither approach allows a party an option to unilaterally alter important aspects of the process, such as the standards of …

Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering Of Public Adjudication, Robert J. Rhee

Faculty Scholarship

Private resolution and public adjudication of disputes are commonly seen as discrete, antipodal processes. There is a generally held understanding of the dispute resolution processes. The essence of private dispute resolution is that the parties can arrange the disputed rights and entitlements per agreement and without judicial intervention. In public adjudication, however, the sovereign mandates the substantive and procedural laws to be applied, many of which cannot be changed by either a party’s unilateral decision or both parties’ mutual consent. Neither approach allows a party an option to unilaterally alter important aspects of the process, such as the standards of …

Trouble With All-Or-Nothing Settlements, The Symposium: Aggregate Justice: Perspectives Ten Years After Amchem And Ortiz, Howard M. Erichson

Faculty Scholarship

When defendants settle litigation involving multiple plaintiffs, they often insist that they will settle only if they obtain releases from all or nearly all of the plaintiffs in the group. If a defendant is going to spend money to resolve claims, it prefers to take its hit and move on. As one experienced settlement administrator puts it, when a defendant approaches plaintiffs' lawyers to discuss the settlement of a mass dispute, the "subject might be broached in various terms, [but] the underlying message is the same-'How much will it cost us to get out of all of these cases?" A …

Emotional Adaptation And Lawsuit Settlements, Peter H. Huang

Publications

In Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, Professors John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur note an unexplored aspect of protracted lawsuits: During prolonged litigation tort victims can adapt emotionally to even permanent injuries, and therefore are more likely to settle--and for less--than if their lawsuits proceeded faster. This Response demonstrates that this is a facile application of hedonic adaptation with the following three points. First, people care about more than happiness: Tort victims may sue to seek justice or revenge; emotions in tort litigation can be cultural evaluations; and people are often motivated by identity and …

Justice Delayed: A Tribal Attorney’S Perspective On Elwha River Dam Removal And Ecosystem Restoration, Russell W. Busch

The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

Presenter: Russell W. Busch, Attorney for the Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe

10 pages.

Agenda: The Future Of Natural Resources Law And Policy, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation

The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

The Natural Resources Law Center's 25th Anniversary Conference and Natural Resources Law Teachers 14th Biennial Institute provided an opportunity for some of the best natural resources lawyers to discuss future trends in the field. The conference focused on the larger, cross-cutting issues affecting natural resources policy. Initial discussions concerned the declining role of scientific resource management due to the increased inclusion of economic-cost benefit analysis and public participation in the decision-making process. The effectiveness of this approach was questioned particularly in the case of non-market goods such as the polar bear. Other participants promoted the importance of public participation and …

What We Know About Malpractice Settlements, Philip G. Peters Jr.

Faculty Publications

The enclosed article is the first comprehensive synthesis of two decades of empirical research on medical malpractice settlement. The portrait that emerges from this synthesis is both more reassuring and more complex than popular portrayals. Although the fit is not perfect, the merits generally drive the settlement process. Weak claims consistently fare the worst, toss-ups cases do better, and strong cases have the most success.Prior scholarship on malpractice outcomes has understated the strength of this correlation because it has focused principally on the impact of negligence on the settlement rates and has largely ignored the importance of settlement amount. The …

The Relationship Between Defense Counsel, Policyholders, And Insurers: Nevada Rides Yellow Cab Toward "Two-Client" Model Of Tripartite Relationship. Are Cumis Counsel And Malpractice Claims By Insurers Next?, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

It happens constantly in civil litigation. An insurance company hires a lawyer to defend its policyholder from a third party’s claim of injury. But just who is the lawyer’s “client?” Is it the policyholder who is the named defendant in the case and is “represented” in court proceedings? Or is it the insurer who, in most cases, selected the attorney, pays the attorney, supervises the litigation, and has (by the terms of the liability insurance policy) the right to settle the case, even over the objections of the policyholder? Ordinarily, the liability insurer has both the duty to defend a …

Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis Of Confidential Settlements, Scott A. Moss

Publications

Even the most hotly contested lawsuits typically end in a confidential settlement forbidding the parties from disclosing their allegations, evidence, or settlement amount. Confidentiality draws fierce criticism for harming third parties by concealing serious misdeeds like discrimination, pollution, defective manufacturing, and sexual abuse. Others defend confidentiality as a mutually beneficial pay-for-silence bargain that facilitates settlement, serves judicial economy, and prevents frivolous copycat lawsuits. This debate is based in economic logic, yet most analyses have been surprisingly shallow as to how confidentiality affects incentives to settle. Depicting a more nuanced, complex reality of litigation and settlement, this Article reaches several conclusions …

Who Decides?: A Critical Look At Procedural Discretion, Robert G. Bone

ExpressO

Federal civil procedure today relies extensively on trial judge discretion to manage litigation, promote settlements, and otherwise tailor process to individual cases. Even those rules with decisional standards leave trial judges considerable interpretive freedom to make case-specific determinations. This Article criticizes these choices and recommends stricter rules. Many judges and procedure scholars applaud the discretionary approach, and the Advisory Committee seems content to draft vague rules that implement it. The assumption seems to be that trial judges have the expertise and experience to do a good job of tailoring procedures to the needs of particular cases. The assumption is wrong, …

How Much Justice Can We Afford?: Defining The Courts' Roles And Deciding The Appropriate Number Of Trials, Settlement Signals, And Other Elements Needed To Administer Justice, John M. Lande

Faculty Publications

This article discusses how the U.S. court system can function optimally given declining trial rates and the limited resources available. The question of how much justice we can afford is a challenge that becomes more difficult as budgets fall behind the increasing demand for and cost of court services. Presumably most analysts would agree that courts should try cases when appropriate - and help litigants find just resolutions without trial when it is not needed. The courts' ability to provide trials in some cases is possible only if the vast majority of other cases are not tried.This article provides background …

The Unexpected Value Of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, Joseph A. Grundfest, Peter H. Huang

Publications

In this Article, we suggest that litigation can be analyzed as though it is a competitive research and development project. Developing this analogy, we present a two-stage real option model of the litigation process that involves sequential information revelation and bargaining over the surplus generated by early settlement. Litigants are risk-neutral and have no private information. The model generates results that, we believe, have analytic and normative significance for the economic analysis of litigation

From an analytic perspective, we demonstrate that negative expected value (NEV) lawsuits are analogous to out of the money call options held by plaintiffs and that …

Lessons For Patent Policy From Empirical Research On Patent Litigation, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

This Article reviews empirical patent litigation research to reveal patent policy lessons. First, the Article presents facts about patent litigation. Next, it analyzes the patent premium. Patent litigation research reveals little about the magnitude of the patent premium, but the research reveals the strategies firms use to capture the patent premium and the patent policy instruments that determine the patent premium. Next, the Article evaluates the patent prosecution process and notes that making efforts to refine a patent application can affect the value of the patent. The Article then identifies reforms for improving PTO performance. Finally, the Article discusses policy …

Will The Ninth Circuit Be Reversed In Banaitis V. Commissioner?, Richard Mason

Nevada Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Solving The Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Manadatory Summary Judgment, David Rosenberg, Randy J. Kozel

Journal Articles

The nuisance-value settlement problem arises whenever a litigant can profitably initiate a meritless claim or defense and offer to settle it for less than it would cost the opposing litigant to have a court dismiss the claim or defense on a standard motion for merits review like summary judgment. The opposing litigant confronted with such a nuisance-value claim or defense rationally would agree to settle for any amount up to the cost of litigating to have it dismissed. These settlement payoffs skew litigation outcomes away from socially appropriate levels, undermining the deterrence and compensation objectives of civil liability. Yet current …

No Free Lunch: How Settlement Can Reduce The Legal System's Ability To Induce Efficient Behavior, Abraham Lee Wickelgren

ExpressO

While there is widespread agreement that it is better for cases to settle than go to trial, the arguments in favor of settlement have typically overlooked how settlement affects one of the most important functions of the legal system: influencing the behavior that gives rise to lawsuits. This essay argues that, in some cases, settlement can impair the ability of the legal system to deter harmful behavior without chilling desirable behavior. Where it exists, this effect is a fundamental property of settlement in that there is no way to change other legal rules to eliminate it. Because settlements also have …

Anticompetitive Settlement Of Intellectual Property Disputes, Mark D. Janis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Mark A. Lemley

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Welfare Implications Of Costly Litigation Under Strict Liability, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines a model of strict liability with costly litigation and presents conditions under which (1) potential injurers take optimal precautions, (2) increasing the cost of litigation enhances precaution and social welfare, (3) the optimal level of liability exceeds the compensatory level, and (4) increasing the rate of settlement enhances social welfare. The results have implications for controversies surrounding fee shifting, optimal damage awards (e.g., punitive damages), and the social desirability of settlement. The most striking implication is that fee shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs is socially desirable in low-transaction-cost settings.

Ulysses Tied To The Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey Of Discovery "Reform", Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

One need not be a charter member of the Critical Legal Studies Movement (“CLS”) to see a few fundamental contradictions in litigation practice in the United States. A prominent philosophical tenet of the CLS movement is that law and society are gripped by a “fundamental contradiction” and simultaneously seek to embrace contradictory objectives. Civil litigation, particularly discovery, is no exception: New amendments to the discovery rules are the latest example of this contradiction. Although the new changes are not drastic, they continue the post-1976 pattern of making discovery the convenient scapegoat for generalized complaints about the dispute resolution system. One …