Legal Writing and Research Commons^™

Interpretive Theory In Its Infancy: A Reply To Posner, Cass R. Sunstein, Adrien Vermeule

Michigan Law Review

In law, problems of interpretation can be explored at different levels of generality. At the most specific level, people might urge that the Equal Protection Clause forbids affirmative action, or that the Food and Drug Act applies to tobacco products. At a higher level of generality, people might argue that the Equal Protection Clause should be interpreted in accordance with the original understanding of its ratifiers, or that the meaning of the Food and Drug Act should be settled with careful attention to its legislative history. At a still higher level of generality, people might identify the considerations that bear …

A Reply--The Missing Portion, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Inside Scoop: What Federal Judges Really Think About The Way Lawyers Write, Kristen Konrad Robbins-Tiscione

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A recent survey indicates that what troubles federal judges most is not what lawyers say but what they fail to say when writing briefs. Although lawyers do a good job articulating legal issues and citing controlling, relevant legal authority, they are not doing enough with the law itself. Only fifty-six percent of the judges surveyed said that lawyers “always” or “usually” make their client’s best arguments. Fifty-eight percent of the judges rated the quality of the legal analysis as just “good,” as opposed to “excellent” or “very good.” The problem seems to be that briefs lack rigorous analysis, and the …

Foreword: The Question Of Process, J. Harvie Wilkinson Iii

Michigan Law Review

Many in the legal profession have abandoned the great questions of legal process. This is too bad. How a decision is reached can be as important as what the decision is. In an increasingly diverse country with many competing visions of the good, it is critical for law to aspire to agreement on process - a task both more achievable than agreement on substance and more suited to our profession than waving the banners of ideological truth. By process, I mean the institutional routes by which we in America reach our most crucial decisions. In other words, process is our …

Choosing Justices: A Political Appointments Process And The Wages Of Judicial Supremacy, John C. Yoo

Michigan Law Review

William H. Rehnquist is not going to be Chief Justice forever - much to the chagrin of Republicans, no doubt. In the last century, Supreme Court Justices have retired, on average, at the age of seventy-one after approximately fourteen years on the bench. By the end of the term of the President we elect this November, Chief Justice Rehnquist will have served on the Supreme Court for thirty-two years and reached the age of eighty. The law of averages suggests that Chief Justice Rehnquist is likely to retire in the next presidential term. In addition to replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist, …

Losing Faith: America Without Judicial Review?, Erwin Chemerinsky

Michigan Law Review

In the last decade, it has become increasingly trendy to question whether the Supreme Court and constitutional judicial review really can make a difference. Gerald Rosenberg, for example, in The Hollow Hope, expressly questions whether judicial review achieves effective social change. Similarly, Michael Klarman explores whether the Supreme Court's desegregation decisions were effective, except insofar as they produced a right-wing backlash that induced action to desegregate. In Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, Mark Tushnet approvingly invokes these arguments (pp. 137, 145), but he goes much further. Professor Tushnet contends that, on balance, constitutional judicial review is harmful. He …

Playing On Words: Judge Richard A. Posner's Appellate Opinions, 1981-82--Ruminations On Sexy Judicial Opinion Style During An Extraordinary Rookie Season, Robert F. Blomquist

Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Editing Marshall, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 823 (2000), Charles F. Hobson

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Comments On Clinton: Reconsidering The Role Of Natural Law In John Marshall's Jurisprudence, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1141 (2000), James W. Ely

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Marbury, Mcculloch, Gore And Bush: A Comment On Sylvia Snowiss, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1157 (2000), Stephen B. Presser

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Property Rights In John Marshall's Virginia: The Case Of Crenshaw And Crenshaw V. Slate River Company, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1175 (2000), J. Gordon Hylton

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Comment On Frederick Schauer's Prediction And Particularity, Gerald F. Leonard

Faculty Scholarship

Ignorance of the law is generally no excuse. I say generally because the century since the publication of The Path of the Law has brought a small but increasing number of exceptions to the rule. In Oliver Wendell Holmes's day, however, exceptions to the rule were nearly nonexistent, much to Holmes's satisfaction. In The Common Law, Holmes said that the law requires persons "at their peril to know the teachings of common experience, just as it requires them to know the law."  He did not, of course, actually think that common experience was perfectly knowable or judicial interpretation perfectly predictable, …

Courts In Cyberspace, Theodore Eisenberg, Kevin M. Clermont

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

A Text Is Just A Text, Paul F. Campos

Publications

No abstract provided.

What's An Opinion For? (Special Issue: Judicial Opinion Writing), James Boyd White

Articles

The question the papers in this Special Issue address is whether it matters how judicial opinions are written, and if so why. My hope here is to suggest a way of elaborating the ques­tion that may provide the reader with a useful point of departure for reading the more extensive papers that follow.

Restrictions On Publication And Citation Of Judicial Opinions: A Reassessment, Robert J. Martineau

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In response to the "crisis of volume," state and federal appellate courts have been restricting the opinions they write to those opinions which will: (1) establish a new. rule of law or expand, alter, or modify an existing rule; (2) involve a legal issue of continuing public interest; (3) criticize existing law; or (4) resolve a conflict of authority. All other opinions are limited to brief statements of the reasons for the decision, go unpublished, and generally carry a prohibition against their being cited as precedent. Recently, critics have alleged a number of faults with this practice, including the supposed …

Did She Mention My Name?: Citation Of Academic Authority By The Supreme Court Of Canada, 1985-1990, Vaughan Black, Nicholas Richter

Dalhousie Law Journal

Readers of court judgments will have observed that in the course of expressing reasons for the decisions they reach, judges commonly refer to books and articles written by academics. This is not surprising. Many scholarly publications contain information, arguments and opinions pertinent to the choices that judges must make, and lawyers commonly refer to such works in the written and oral arguments they present to courts. We would therefore expect the judges who must assess and respond to such arguments to make mention of that scholarly material. Moreover a certain portion of academic writing-in particular, a preponderance of law review …

The Code Of The Moral, Niklas Luhmann

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

Advocacy And Scholarship, Paul F. Campos

Publications

The apex of American legal thought is embodied in two types of writings: the federal appellate opinion and the law review article. In this Article, the author criticizes the whole enterprise of doctrinal constitutional law scholarship, using a recent U.S. Supreme Court case and a Harvard Law Review article as quintessential examples of the dominant genre. In a rhetorical tour de force, the author argues that most of modern constitutional scholarship is really advocacy in the guise of scholarship. Such an approach to legal scholarship may have some merit as a strategic move towards a political end; however, it has …

Advice And Consent In Theory And Practice, Roger J. Miner '56

Federal Court System and Administration

No abstract provided.

Restoring The Common In The Law: Proposal For The Elimination Of Rules Prohibiting The Citation Of Unpublished Decisions In Kansas And The Tenth Circuit, Mark D. Hinderks, Steve A. Leben

Faculty Works

No abstract provided.

Writing For Judges, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

The American Jury At Twenty-Five Years, Valerie P. Hans, Neil Vidmar

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The year 1991 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel's classic work, The American Jury. Arguably one of the most important books in the field of law and social science, this research monograph began the modrn field of jury studies and deeply influenced contemporary understanding of the jury as an institution.

In this essay we assess the book from the vantage point of a quarter- century. First, we provide a historical backdrop by reviewing the activities of the University of Chicago's Jury Project that led to the publication of The American Jury …

Remarks: Appellate Advocacy Program, New York County Lawyers Association, Roger J. Miner '56

Bar Associations

No abstract provided.

Concerned Readers V. Judicial Opinion Writers, Erik Paul Belt

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In this action, Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus compelling the offending judges to write better, but the court below denied the writ. Plaintiffs then petitioned for relief from poor writing. Because some judges do, in fact, write clear and effective opinions, we have granted certiorari to resolve the differences between the various courts. The issue before us, then, is whether judges and clerks have abused their discretion by writing weak opinions and, if so, how they can improve their writing. Because stronger writing greatly eases the reader's job and makes opinions more effective, we hold that judges and clerks …

Appellate Advocacy From The Viewpoint Of An Appellate Judge, Roger J. Miner '56

Law Practice

No abstract provided.

Judging The Judges: Three Opinions, James Boyd White

Articles

For some time I have been working on the problem of judicial criticism, focusing especially on the question: What is it in the work of a judge that leads us to admire a judicial opinion with the result of which we disagree, or to condemn an opinion that "comes out" the way we would do if we were charged with the responsibility of decision? The response I have been making is that this kind of judicial excellence (and its opposite too) lies in the sort of social and intellectual action in which the opinion engages: in the character the court …

A Critical Approach To Section 1983 With Special Attention To Sources Of Law, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The Civil Rights Act of 1871¹ ("§ 1983") establishes a tort-like remedy for persons deprived of federally protected rights "under color of law."'² While the statute's broad language provides a remedy for violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights, the statute itself provides little or no guidance regarding important subjects such as the measure of damages, the availability of punitive damages, the requirements for equitable relief, the statute of limitations, survival of claims, proper parties, and immunities from suit.³...

...The first part of this article examines the narrowly "legal" analysis of § 1983 in the cases …

The New York Law School Reporter, V 6, No. 6, May 1989, New York Law School

Student Newspapers

Vol 6, no. IV

This Newspaper contains:

Tenure Controversy Escalates, page 1

Public Interest Scholarship Fund Takes Off, page 1

(Almost) Everything You Always Wanted to Know About the Tenure Process but Were Afraid to Ask, page 4

IRAC, page 5

Muck-Wrestling, page 7

An Assault on Gun Control, page 12

Moot Court Association, page 17

Dworkin's Domain, Philip E. Soper

Reviews

No one has done more in the last twenty years to revitalize debates about how judges should and do decide cases than Ronald Dworkin. At the same time, no one has been more equivocal than Dworkin in explaining how a theory of adjudication bears on the dispute within legal theory about the connection between law and morality. This fine book continues both traditions.