Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
- Institution
Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Legal Profession
Judging Judges And Dispute Resolution Processes, John M. Lande
Judging Judges And Dispute Resolution Processes, John M. Lande
Faculty Publications
This article critiques Professor Chris Guthrie's lead symposium article entitled, "Misjudging." Guthrie's article makes two major arguments. The first is a descriptive, empirical argument that judges are prone to error because of three types of "blinders" and that people underestimate the amount of such judicial error. The second argument is prescriptive, recommending that, because of these judicial blinders, disputants should consider using non-judicial dispute resolution processes generally, and particularly facilitative mediation and arbitration.This article critiques both arguments. It notes that, although Guthrie presents evidence that judges do make the kinds of errors that he describes, his article does not address …
Amicus Briefs, Kenneth Lasson
The Effect Of Judicial Expedience On Attorney Fees In Class Actions, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick
The Effect Of Judicial Expedience On Attorney Fees In Class Actions, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick
All Faculty Scholarship
Judges facing exogenous constraints on their pecuniary income have an incentive to reduce their workload to increase their private welfare. In the face of an increase in caseload, this incentive will induce judges to attempt to terminate some cases more rapidly. In class action cases, failing to grant an attorney fee request will delay termination. This conflict is likely to lead judges to authorize higher fees as court congestion increases. Using two data sets of class action settlements, we show that attorney fees are significantly and positively related to the congestion level of the court hearing the case.
Guilty Pleas And Barristers' Incentives: Lessons From England, Peter W. Tague
Guilty Pleas And Barristers' Incentives: Lessons From England, Peter W. Tague
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
When considering the defendant's plea, barristers, like lawyers, have two overriding, selfish interests: maximizing remuneration and avoiding sanction. The tension between defendant and defender is most acute when the defendant is indigent and the defender has been chosen to represent him. It is their relationship that is addressed in this article.
The goal is to align the defender's selfish interests with the defendant's need for thoughtful advice over how to plead, so that, behind the guise of apparently disinterested advice, the advocate is not pursuing his interests at the defendant's expense. By contrast to most American practice, the method of …