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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Legal Profession
Lawyers And Conscience, Thomas Morawetz
Lawyers And Conscience, Thomas Morawetz
Faculty Articles and Papers
No abstract provided.
Particularism And The Struggle For Coherence In The Common Law Literary Tradition, E. P. Krauss
Particularism And The Struggle For Coherence In The Common Law Literary Tradition, E. P. Krauss
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Legal Affinities, Joseph Vining
Legal Affinities, Joseph Vining
Articles
Not long ago, any question of the kind "How may theology serve as a resource in understanding law?" would have been hardly conceivable among lawyers. When Lon Fuller brought out his first book in 1940, The Law in Quest of Itself, he could think of no better way of tagging his adversary the legal positivist than to note a "parallel between theoretical theology and analytical jurisprudence." Two decades later, in the name of realism, Thurman Arnold dismissed Henry Hart's non-positivist jurisprudence in harsh terms. A master of the cutting phrase, he confidently entitled his attack "Professor Hart's Theology." Two decades …
That's Just The Way It Is: Langille On Law, Allan C. Hutchinson
That's Just The Way It Is: Langille On Law, Allan C. Hutchinson
Articles & Book Chapters
This article is a defence of the sceptical critique of the legitimacy of law and adjudication. It is a direct reply to the arguments of Professor Brian Langille, whose article "Revolution Without Foundation: The Grammar of Scepticism and Law" appeared in Volume 33 of this Journal. In that article, Langille defended the viability of law, legal discourse and legal critique primarily by attacking the claim that scepticism based on the "indeterminacy of language" can be grounded in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Professor Hutchinson concentrates his spirited response on the indeterminacy of language. He contends that law fails to meet …