Legal History Commons^™

Is Originalism Orthodoxy?, Neel Sukhatme

Articles

What theory of constitutional interpretation has the Supreme Court followed? We search Supreme Court opinions for a wide range of sources that originalists identify as central to their methodology, over the entire universe of cases beginning in 1791. We find that for much of Supreme Court history, conventional indicators of originalist practice--citations to Founding-era sources--are largely absent, raising questions about originalism's past orthodoxy. Originalist citation practices are absent for much of the 19th century and grow sharply in the late 20th century. The Article elaborates the implications of these findings for debates in constitutional law.

The Supreme Court Under Threat: Early Lessons In Judicial Self-Protection, Curtis A. Bradley, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay explores how the U.S. Supreme Court, despite being vulnerable to defiance of its decisions and political retaliation, has developed tools of judicial self-protection to preserve its institutional authority and thus its capacity to sustain the Constitution and the rule of law. Arguing that the Court performs not only a legal role that requires interpretation of the law but also a political one that demands institutional preservation, the Essay examines how the Court has historically navigated political threats by using a range of tools—including avoidance, delay, narrow rulings, strategic dicta, and rhetorical appeals. The Essay focuses on three nineteenth-century …

The Supreme Court, Regime Politics, And Federalism: From The New Deal To The Trump Era, J. Mitchell Pickerill, Lilly A. Pickerill

Northern Illinois University Law Review

In the 1990s, the conservative majority on the Rehnquist Court championed state sovereignty and autonomy in a series of cases some commentators dubbed a “federalism revolution.” The Supreme Court crafted constitutional doctrines under the Commerce Clause, Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment that limited federal powers while protecting or bolstering state powers. The Court’s doctrines in those cases diverged from its approach to constitutional federalism since the New Deal in the 1930s, but it tracked with the conservative Republican political agenda promoting a “new federalism” going back to Presidents Nixon and Reagan. However, as the …

The Evolution Of The Supreme Court's Second Amendment Jurisprudence, Kermit V. Lipez

Maine Law Review

We live in the shadow of an epidemic of gun violence. We dread the next report of an inevitable mass shooting. We no longer feel secure in public places. We fear for the safety of our children and our grandchildren at their schools. We shake our heads in disbelief at the empty ritual of "thoughts and prayers" for victims and their families. As one commentator put it, we suffer from the "[u]nbearable [m]onotony of [g]rief." Why must we live like this? Why are there no solutions? In conversations posing these questions, there are often references to the Supreme Court's Second …

A History Of Vacatur, Benjamin B. Johnson

UF Law Faculty Publications

Vacatur, a seemingly routine appellate tool, has evolved into one of the Supreme Court’s most potent instruments for declaring law. This Article offers the first comprehensive historical account of vacatur, tracing its roots from English and early American practice through its twentieth-century transformations to its contemporary uses. Historically, courts used vacatur to manage dockets, correct procedural irregularities, or enforce reversals on the merits. Modern usage has departed markedly from these roots. The Court now frequently employs vacatur to declare binding legal rules without issuing judgments, effectively circumventing traditional limits on judicial power. Taking seriously the Court’s own insistence on history …

Beyond Judicial Intent: The Agency Of The Defense Counsel In Ozawa’S And Thind’S Supreme Court Cases, Bret K. Luchs

Master's Theses or Doctor of Nursing Practice

This thesis seeks to examine how specific legal strategies by the defense counsel in Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922), and United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923), compelled the Supreme Court of the United States into a reactive and contradictory position. A re-examination of Ozawa and Thind delves deeper into the legal briefs and arguments made by Takao Ozawa and Bhagat Singh Thind, alongside their legal teams. These briefs, opinions of the court, past lower court cases, and personal statements by Ozawa and Thind demonstrate how they did not surrender to the confines of …

From Myers To Slaughter: A Brief Theory Of The Constitutionalization Of Secondary Sources, Dana Neacsu, Paul D. Callister

Faculty Works

For more than two centuries, American constitutional adjudication has relied upon secondary sources. Yet constitutional theory has almost entirely ignored them. Originalism debates constitutional text. Living constitutionalism debates constitutional evolution. Theories of precedent debate judicial authority. None asks a more fundamental question: What role do secondary sources play in constitutional adjudication? This Article argues that the answer has fundamentally changed in the last 100 of years. Chief Justice William Howard Taft's opinion in Myers v. United States (1926) marked a constitutional revolution by transforming secondary authorities from explanatory materials into evidence of constitutional continuity. Exactly one century later, Chief Justice …

Why Dobbs Is No Roadmap For Deciding State Constitutional Abortion Issues, Daniel A. Small

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law

In deciding that Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” does not protect a woman’s decision to end her pregnancy, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization sought to distinguish the precedent that Roe and Casey relied on to recognize an abortion right. The Dobbs majority claimed that this precedent did not support a right to abortion because, in its view, destroying a fetus is more immoral than the conduct at issue in those earlier cases. However, moral concerns about fetal destruction shed no light on the nature or characteristics of a woman’s liberty interest in an abortion decision. These concerns, therefore, cannot show whether …

Five Lessons From Ken Kersch’S Conservatives And The Constitution For The Present Moment, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

Timothy Snyder’s On Tyranny, a New York Times bestseller, has the subtitle, “Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century.” Ken Kersch’s Conservatives and the Constitution: Imagining Constitutional Restoration in the Heyday of American Liberalism (2019) provides at least twenty lessons from the second half of the Twentieth Century about the development of conservative constitutional thought and activism. Although conservatism has changed in many ways since the 1954-1980 period on which Kersch’s book focuses, these lessons are relevant for understanding the present political moment, filled with concerns that the U.S., during the second Trump Administration, is lurching toward tyranny, authoritarianism, and …

A Peek Behind The Scenes Of Supreme Court Decision Making Concerning The Federal Ip System, Jonathan Band

Joint PIJIP/TLS Research Paper Series

In the 1970s and 80s, the Supreme Court decided three cases that continue to define the limits of the authority of the states within the federal intellectual property system: Goldstein v. California (1973); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Oil Co. (1974); and Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. (1989). The papers of the Supreme Court Justices that decided these cases show the Court as a human institution wrestling with this complex issue. This issue has assumed new importance as state legislatures have rushed to enact laws on the use of generative artificial intelligence to replicate the voice …

The Waiting Is The Hardest Part: The Constitutionality Of Firearm Waiting Periods, F. Lee Francis

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This Article examines the constitutionality of firearm waiting period laws through the lens of the Supreme Court’s evolving Second Amendment jurisprudence. Although such laws are frequently defended as prudent public safety measures, their validity turns not on legislative purpose but on constitutional principle, particularly as framed in District of Columbia v. Heller and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.

Under those decisions, the scope of the Second Amendment is determined not by judicial balancing of contemporary interests, but by reference to the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Article surveys that tradition and finds no …

Just To Be Safe, Let’S Keep Ignoring What “Arms” Meant In 1791, Jack Thorlin

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

The Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller and reaffirmed in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen that “arms,” referred to in the Second Amendment, are common weapons useful for lawful purposes. The majority argued that militiamen fought with whatever common weapons they had on hand for civilian purposes, such as self-defense and hunting. Therefore, under Heller, only those weapons are covered by the Second Amendment. However, Heller did little to ground the “self-defense” theory of “arms” in original public meaning or even actual history. Commonality and lawful purpose have proved difficult for lower …

Brennan And State Constitutions, Stephen Wermiel

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

The former Great Gorge Playboy Resort in New Jersey seems an unlikely place to help form a jurisprudential movement toward reliance on state constitutions to protect civil rights and liberties.

One need only turn back the clock to 1976 to find the story of one of the most significant moments in the rise of state constitutions. Anyone who is steeped in this movement is likely familiar with the lead article in the January 1977 issue of the Harvard Law Review, “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights.” The author was U.S. Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan Jr.

May Federal Courts Answer Questions When Not Deciding Cases?, Benjamin B. Johnson

UF Law Faculty Publications

Conventional wisdom says that Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement prevents federal courts from answering legal questions when they are not deciding cases. This is only partially correct. This Article shows conditions under which a federal court may answer questions even when not deciding a case. To do so, it traces the appellate power back to its origins in English common law courts and through the early American judiciary. For centuries, common law judges have answered questions sent to them by lower courts when doing so would help those lower courts to decide pending cases. In England, the “case stated” procedure facilitated …

Dobbs V. Brown, Benjamin H. Barton

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization1is the most important and impactful Supreme Court decision since at least Roe v. Wade, and potentially since Brown v. Board of Education. Past survey data show that most Americans can only name two Supreme Court opinions: Roe and Brown. Dobbs will surely join that list. This Article compares the history, drafting, and opinions of Dobbs and Brown to show what a missed opportunity Dobbs represents. Regardless of whether you agree or disagree with the opinion, it should be clear that Dobbs was one of those unique times (like that of Brown) where the Court …

Obstructing Precedent, Bill Watson

Northwestern University Law Review

Critics of the Supreme Court sometimes accuse the Justices of disrespecting or being unfaithful to precedent—of undermining certain precedents while leaving them formally in place. Yet it remains unclear what exactly these criticisms mean or why they point to anything objectionable. This Article proposes that critics are often drawing attention to a particular practice: obstructing precedent. A better grasp of what obstructing precedent is and when it is legitimate is important to understanding the Roberts Court’s treatment of precedent in a range of cases.

A court obstructs precedent when it refuses to cooperate with its prior self in building a …

The Pioneers, Waves, And Random Walks Of Securities Law In The Supreme Court, Elizabeth Pollman

Seattle University Law Review

After the pioneers, waves, and random walks that have animated the history of securities laws in the U.S. Supreme Court, we might now be on the precipice of a new chapter. Pritchard and Thompson’s superb book, A History of Securities Law in the Supreme Court, illuminates with rich archival detail how the Court’s view of the securities laws and the SEC have changed over time and how individuals have influenced this history. The book provides an invaluable resource for understanding nearly a century’s worth of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of securities law and much needed context for …

Three Stories: A Comment On Pritchard & Thompson’S A History Of Securities Laws In The Supreme Court, Harwell Wells

Seattle University Law Review

Adam Pritchard and Robert Thompson’s A History of Securities Laws in the Supreme Court should stand for decades as the definitive work on the Federal securities laws’ career in the Supreme Court across the twentieth century.1 Like all good histories, it both tells a story and makes an argument. The story recounts how the Court dealt with the major securities laws, as well the agency charged with enforcing them, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the rules it promulgated, from the 1930s into the twenty-first century. But the book does not just string together a series of events, “one …

The Past As A Colonialist Resource, Deepa Das Acevedo

Faculty Articles

Originalism’s critics have failed to block its rise. For many jurists and legal scholars, the question is no longer whether to espouse originalism but how to espouse it. This Article argues that critics have ceded too much ground by focusing on discrediting originalism as either bad history or shoddy linguistics. To disrupt the cycle of endless “methodological” refinements and effectively address originalism’s continued popularity, critics must do two things: identify a better disciplinary analogue for originalist interpretation and advance an argument that moves beyond methods.

Anthropology can assist with both tasks. Both anthropological analysis and originalist interpretation are premised on …

Foreword: The Life, Work & Legacy Of Felix Frankfurter, The Justice Known As “Ff”, Rodger D. Citron

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

John Marshall And Felix Frankfurter: An Icon And A Disappointment?, William E. Nelson

Touro Law Review

This article shows how Chief Justice John Marshall first developed the doctrine of judicial restraint in Marbury v. Madison to assure the public that the Supreme Court would not engage in politically oriented judicial review as colonial courts had in holding Parliament’s 1765 Stamp Act unconstitutional. Justice Felix Frankfurter, in contrast, adopted judicial restraint differently—by reading the scholarship of James Bradley Thayer. This article also shows that Frankfurter did not abandon his commitment to judicial restraint when during his years on the bench it began to serve conservative purposes rather than the progressive purposes it had once served.

Felix Frankfurter: Liberal Lawyer, Conservative Justice, Jed S. Rakoff

Touro Law Review

The Hon. Jed S. Rakoff gave the first presentation at the conference, providing an introduction to Justice Felix Frankfurter by describing some of his accomplishments and situating his tenure on the Supreme Court in the context of the Court’s historically conservative orientation.

Felix Frankfurter, Collector Of People, John Q. Barrett

Faculty Publications

Felix Frankfurter engaged, intensely, with people—they were the treasures that he hunted down, evaluated, and collected. This essay, written on the great occasion of Brad Snyder’s Frankfurter biography, considers some of Frankfurter’s most treasured people. One group is people who made Frankfurter, including Frankfurter himself, Henry L. Stimson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Another group is Justice Frankfurter’s three great U.S. Supreme Court colleagues: Justices Hugo L. Black, Robert H. Jackson, and William O. Douglas. A third group is biographers who Frankfurter admired and pushed: Harlan Buddington Phillips, Mark DeWolfe Howe, Jr., McGeorge Bundy, Alexander Bickel, Andrew L. Kaufman, and Philip …

The Riddle Of Race-Based Redistricting, Travis Crum

Scholarship@WashULaw

The Supreme Court has adopted divergent interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause as applied to race and redistricting. Vote dilution doctrine requires mapmakers to consider race to ensure that racial minorities are not packed or cracked. Congress, moreover, has embraced vote dilution doctrine in Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. By contrast, racial gerrymandering doctrine triggers strict scrutiny if mapmakers subordinate traditional redistricting principles to race, thereby threatening Section 2’s constitutionality.

To resolve this doctrinal riddle, this Essay examines whether, as originally understood, the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment governed the use of race during redistricting. The Equal Protection Clause …

Students For Fair Admissions: Affirming Affirmative Action And Shapeshifting Towards Cognitive Diversity?, Steven A. Ramirez

Seattle University Law Review

The Roberts Court holds a well-earned reputation for overturning Supreme Court precedent regardless of the long-standing nature of the case. The Roberts Court knows how to overrule precedent. In Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (SFFA), the Court’s majority opinion never intimates that it overrules Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court’s leading opinion permitting race-based affirmative action in college admissions. Instead, the Roberts Court applied Grutter as authoritative to hold certain affirmative action programs entailing racial preferences violative of the Constitution. These programs did not provide an end point, nor did they require assessment, review, periodic expiration, or revision for greater …

Judges And The Regulatory State: Trends Of Resistance And Restraint, Luke Norris

Law Faculty Publications

The last great confrontation between courts and the regulatory state occurred at the turn of the previous century. As courts in the first decades of the twentieth century resisted regulatory laws designed to protect workers and curb market excesses, they sustained broad legal and public critique, including claims that they were guardians of corporate power and monied and propertied interests. The showdown, as is familiar fare, was seemingly resolved in the New Deal, with the Supreme Court and judiciary largely accepting the constitutionality of federal and state regulatory laws. The compromise that emerged, dubbed the “New Deal settlement,” ostensibly called …

Bureaucratic Overreach And The Role Of The Courts In Protecting Representative Democracy, Katie Cassady

Liberty University Journal of Statesmanship & Public Policy

The United States bureaucracy began as only four departments and has expanded to address nearly every issue of public life. While these bureaucratic agencies are ostensibly under congressional oversight and the supervision of the President as part of the executive branch, they consistently usurp their discretionary authority and bypass the Founding Fathers’ design of balancing legislative power in a bicameral Congress.

The Supreme Court holds an indispensable role in mitigating the overreach of executive agencies, yet the courts’ inability to hold bureaucrats accountable has diluted voters’ voices. Since the Supreme Court’s 1984 ruling in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense …

Counting To Four: The History And Future Of Wisconsin's Fractured Supreme Court, Jeffrey A. Mandell, Daniel J. Schneider

Marquette Law Review

Over the past decade, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has issued “fractured” opinions—decisions without majority support for any one legal rationale supporting the outcome—at an alarming clip. These opinions have confounded legal analysts, attorneys, and government officials due to their lack of majority reasoning, but also due to their length and the court’s particular procedures for assigning, drafting, and labelling opinions. This has become especially problematic where the court has issued fractured opinions in areas core to the basic functioning of state and local government, leaving the state without clear precedential guidance on what the law is. Yet, virtually no one …

Texas Juvenile Justice: The Need For A “Second Look” At Juvenile Prison Sentences, Kyle Jenkins

St. Mary's Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Foreword: New Supreme Court Cases: Duquesne Law Faculty Explains, Wilson Huhn

Law Faculty Publications

On September 30, 2022, several members of the faculty of the Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University presented a Continuing Legal Education program, New Supreme Court Cases: Duquesne Law Faculty Explains, reviewing these developments. Duquesne Law Review graciously invited the faculty panel to contribute their analysis of these cases from the Supreme Court's 2021- 2022 term for inclusion in this symposium issue of the Law Review.