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Originalism

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Full-Text Articles in Legal History

Originalism's General-Law Turn, Nina Varsava, Bill Watson Oct 2026

Originalism's General-Law Turn, Nina Varsava, Bill Watson

Northwestern University Law Review

Originalists are increasingly turning to a general-law theory of constitutional rights. Under this theory, constitutional enactment declared but did not create constitutional rights. The content of those rights was, and remains, a question of general law—a species of common law, regularly employed at the Founding, that transcends jurisdictional boundaries. This preoccupation with general law has precipitated a wave of scholarship developing general-law accounts of various constitutional rights. Yet the nature of general law itself remains poorly understood.

This Article offers a theory of general law. Using philosophical methods to reexamine early American cases and recent work in legal history, the …


Is Originalism Orthodoxy?, Neel Sukhatme Jul 2026

Is Originalism Orthodoxy?, Neel Sukhatme

Articles

What theory of constitutional interpretation has the Supreme Court followed? We search Supreme Court opinions for a wide range of sources that originalists identify as central to their methodology, over the entire universe of cases beginning in 1791. We find that for much of Supreme Court history, conventional indicators of originalist practice--citations to Founding-era sources--are largely absent, raising questions about originalism's past orthodoxy. Originalist citation practices are absent for much of the 19th century and grow sharply in the late 20th century. The Article elaborates the implications of these findings for debates in constitutional law.


Making The Party Presentation Principle Safe For Originalism, Randy E. Barnett, Lawrence B. Solum Jun 2026

Making The Party Presentation Principle Safe For Originalism, Randy E. Barnett, Lawrence B. Solum

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court sometimes adheres to what it calls the “party presentation principle”—terminology that dates back to 2008. Although judicial articulations of the principle have been inconsistent and imprecise, the gist is the familiar notion that courts should resolve cases on the basis of the issues and reasons presented by the parties to the dispute. Conversely, questions not properly raised by the parties should be avoided by the Court. Thus, the Court has on several occasions declined to address arguments outside the scope of the questions raised by the parties in their petition for certiorari.

For originalists, the importance of …


The Interpretive Force Of Alexander Hamilton’S Early Expositions Of Presidential Power, Michael Stokes Paulsen May 2026

The Interpretive Force Of Alexander Hamilton’S Early Expositions Of Presidential Power, Michael Stokes Paulsen

Pepperdine Law Review

The most important, rightly influential, early interpretations of the Constitution on presidential power concerning matters of war, peace, and foreign affairs flowed from the able pen of Alexander Hamilton in three sets of pseudonymous public essays: as “Publius” in The Federalist (1787–1788); as “Pacificus” (1793–1794); and “Camillus” (1795–1796). As Publius, Hamilton expounded a broad understanding of presidential constitutional power generally and of presidential power in war and foreign affairs specifically, including an essentially plenary Commander-in-Chief power over the conduct of authorized war (but with no constitutional power to initiate war: that power being explicitly and exclusively assigned to Congress). As …


Federalist Politics And The Elusive Original Meaning Of The Free Exercise Clause, Jack Thorlin Apr 2026

Federalist Politics And The Elusive Original Meaning Of The Free Exercise Clause, Jack Thorlin

Catholic University Law Review

Originalism requires interpreting the Constitution by reference to a provision’s original public meaning. But there is very little evidence of original public meaning for some constitutional provisions, most notably the Free Exercise Clause. Originalists have splintered into several different methodological approaches toward the Clause. Justices Scalia and O’Connor staked out opposing originalist views on the Clause thirty years ago in Employment Division v. Smith and City of Boerne v. Flores. In the Roberts Court, some of the conservative justices have attempted to apply a simple textualist interpretation of the Clause, but those efforts have not attracted most of the …


The Great Depression And Canada's Major Originalist Decade, Preston Jordan Lim Apr 2026

The Great Depression And Canada's Major Originalist Decade, Preston Jordan Lim

Faculty Publications

Few periods of Canadian history have been as momentous or terrible as the Great Depression. The Dominion and provincial governments’ inability to combat financial and environmental catastrophe led many Canadians to openly question the appropriateness of their constitutional framework. As legal historians have since documented, many leading jurists of the time believed that a strong central government could, through the institution of national programs, contain the Great Depression; in the eyes of these 1930s jurists, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—then Canada’s apex court—had sapped the federal government of its powers by misinterpreting the British North America Act, 1867 …


The Evolution Of The Supreme Court's Second Amendment Jurisprudence, Kermit V. Lipez Mar 2026

The Evolution Of The Supreme Court's Second Amendment Jurisprudence, Kermit V. Lipez

Maine Law Review

We live in the shadow of an epidemic of gun violence. We dread the next report of an inevitable mass shooting. We no longer feel secure in public places. We fear for the safety of our children and our grandchildren at their schools. We shake our heads in disbelief at the empty ritual of "thoughts and prayers" for victims and their families. As one commentator put it, we suffer from the "[u]nbearable [m]onotony of [g]rief." Why must we live like this? Why are there no solutions? In conversations posing these questions, there are often references to the Supreme Court's Second …


Amicus Brief In Trump V. Barbara: An Originalist Defense Of Birthright Citizenship, Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Evan D. Bernick Feb 2026

Amicus Brief In Trump V. Barbara: An Originalist Defense Of Birthright Citizenship, Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Evan D. Bernick

Faculty Scholarship

For nearly all of the first 235 years under the Constitution, the citizenship of every child born in the United States to alien parents, with immaterial exceptions, was a given. Then, in 2025, the Trump administration changed course. Even though the Fourteenth Amendment makes no mention of limiting birthright citizenship to the children of domiciled parents, the Government now claims that is what “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” has always meant. While the Government and its amici admit that the common law recognized the citizenship of children of transient aliens, their remaining “survey of history range[s] from the constitutionally irrelevant” …


Creation And The Republican Revival, William M. Treanor Jan 2026

Creation And The Republican Revival, William M. Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Gordon Wood's classic book Creation of the American Republic has long influenced legal thought and originalist scholarship in particular. It played a central role in the Republican Revival movement, an effort by leading scholars such as Cass Sunstein and Frank Michelman to recover a progressive originalism at the same time as conservative originalism was starting to shape constitutional jurisprudence. But, while the Republican Revival nominally relied on Wood, it misread central elements of his book - his concept of virtue and his belief that republicanism had largely been displaced at the time of the drafting of the Constitution.

The time …


Why Constitutional Argument Matters, Philip C. Bobbitt Jan 2026

Why Constitutional Argument Matters, Philip C. Bobbitt

Faculty Scholarship

The program for this symposium promised that I would be discussing the “descriptive grammar of constitutional law.” To put my purpose less benignly, I should say that I mean to attack the practice of limiting what I will call “modal analysis” to its descriptive virtues. Part of that attack will be the claim that courts and their commentators should pay closer attention to the modal requirements of the fundamental forms of constitutional discourse, but not because straying from this is a kind of grammatical faux pas. After all, if the system I have urged for constitutional analysis — the system …


From Myers To Slaughter: A Brief Theory Of The Constitutionalization Of Secondary Sources, Dana Neacsu, Paul D. Callister Jan 2026

From Myers To Slaughter: A Brief Theory Of The Constitutionalization Of Secondary Sources, Dana Neacsu, Paul D. Callister

Faculty Works

For more than two centuries, American constitutional adjudication has relied upon secondary sources. Yet constitutional theory has almost entirely ignored them. Originalism debates constitutional text. Living constitutionalism debates constitutional evolution. Theories of precedent debate judicial authority. None asks a more fundamental question: What role do secondary sources play in constitutional adjudication? This Article argues that the answer has fundamentally changed in the last 100 of years. Chief Justice William Howard Taft's opinion in Myers v. United States (1926) marked a constitutional revolution by transforming secondary authorities from explanatory materials into evidence of constitutional continuity. Exactly one century later, Chief Justice …


The Unitary Theorists' Appointments Clause Problems, Jed Handelsman Shugerman Jan 2026

The Unitary Theorists' Appointments Clause Problems, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The unitary executive theorists’ recent retreat to the Appointments Clause as a basis for unconditional presidential removal power is contradicted by the text and by overwhelming originalist evidence.

It is a surprising argument for a power of presidential removal, because the text of the Appointments Clause plainly requires both the President and Senate to appoint. The noncommon sense reading, that the president alone appoints, and thus the president can remove, was not in any of the Trump Administration’s briefs, but it was in a single amicus brief, and it was picked up in oral argument and the mainstream media.

This …


Five Lessons From Ken Kersch’S Conservatives And The Constitution For The Present Moment, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain Jan 2026

Five Lessons From Ken Kersch’S Conservatives And The Constitution For The Present Moment, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

Timothy Snyder’s On Tyranny, a New York Times bestseller, has the subtitle, “Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century.” Ken Kersch’s Conservatives and the Constitution: Imagining Constitutional Restoration in the Heyday of American Liberalism (2019) provides at least twenty lessons from the second half of the Twentieth Century about the development of conservative constitutional thought and activism. Although conservatism has changed in many ways since the 1954-1980 period on which Kersch’s book focuses, these lessons are relevant for understanding the present political moment, filled with concerns that the U.S., during the second Trump Administration, is lurching toward tyranny, authoritarianism, and …


Reckoning With Antisemitism In History And Tradition, Nathaniel Shaw Hay, Isaac Barnes May Nov 2025

Reckoning With Antisemitism In History And Tradition, Nathaniel Shaw Hay, Isaac Barnes May

Pepperdine Law Review

“History and tradition” has become a watchword of modern constitutional interpretation, shaping Supreme Court jurisprudence and framing ongoing debates over the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet this interpretive framework remains under-theorized in one critical respect: how should it grapple with the prejudices embedded in the very traditions it invokes? This Article examines that question through the lens of anti-Jewish discrimination in Anglo-American law, using this history as a case study to examine both the perils and promise of relying on history as a source of constitutional authority. For centuries, the common law excluded Jews from full civic participation in …


Take In Case Of Emergency: Reconciling Necessity Takings With The Original Meaning Of The Takings Clause, Tony Smith Oct 2025

Take In Case Of Emergency: Reconciling Necessity Takings With The Original Meaning Of The Takings Clause, Tony Smith

Northwestern University Law Review

Does the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause permit the state to destroy property without compensation whenever it declares an emergency? The long-standing doctrine of necessity empowers the state to do exactly that.

Courts dating back to common law England have permitted governments to claim a privilege of necessity to avoid paying for private property they destroy in times of crisis. The privilege rests on the principle that the public good sometimes outweighs the harm the individual suffers. Today’s courts and academics stretch this principle to its limits, arguing necessity should be used as a vehicle for combating all manner of social …


The Evolution Of The Second Amendment And The American Gun Violence Epidemic: A Historical Analysis Of Political Self-Sabotage, Amanda Tureaud Oct 2025

The Evolution Of The Second Amendment And The American Gun Violence Epidemic: A Historical Analysis Of Political Self-Sabotage, Amanda Tureaud

Senior Theses

From the conception of the Bill of Rights until the 21st century, the Second Amendment was read and understood by the American population, both ordinary citizens and government officials, branches, and agencies inclusively, to allow the nation to have an armed military but not for private citizens to own and/or carry firearms. Since 2008, however, the Second Amendment has been interpreted as an absolute freedom for private citizens to own and carry semiautomatic assault weapons in the name of personal protection. This thesis holds that the evolution of society’s attitude on guns and gun control is specifically denoted by the …


A Historical Case For A Robust But Non-Remedial Seventh Amendment, Jed Handelsman Shugerman Jul 2025

A Historical Case For A Robust But Non-Remedial Seventh Amendment, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

In Jarkesy, the Supreme Court rightly held that the Seventh Amendment required a jury trial for a case fundamentally similar to common law fraud, and it rightly limited the scope of the “public rights” exception to the Seventh Amendment. Grounded in historical and originalist methods, this essay makes four suggestions after Jarkesy:

  1. Following Jarkesy, the judiciary should continue a more robust enforcement of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The courts should eliminate the “public rights” exception to the Seventh Amendment, which does not appear to have an original link to the Seventh Amendment. The …


An Originalist Case For Birthright Citizenship Of Unlawful Immigrants' Children: Anti-Gypsy And Anti-Chinese Restrictions As Context, Jed Handelsman Shugerman Jul 2025

An Originalist Case For Birthright Citizenship Of Unlawful Immigrants' Children: Anti-Gypsy And Anti-Chinese Restrictions As Context, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The Trump administration and other opponents of birthright citizenship for the children of “unlawful immigrants” make the following originalist claim about the Fourteenth Amendment: Even if the clause meant birthright citizenship, it applies today only to “lawful immigrants,” because the category of “unlawful immigrant” or “illegal immigrant” did not exist in the 1860s, when the clause was written and ratified. Opponents also argue that the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause originally implied a “loyalty” or “allegiance” requirement.

These assertions are historically inaccurate.

To the contrary, the concept of “unlawful immigrants” existed in the 1850s-60s, and Americans ratified birthright citizenship without indicating …


The Gilded Approach: A Critique Of Constitutional Originalism, Banks T. Eidson Apr 2025

The Gilded Approach: A Critique Of Constitutional Originalism, Banks T. Eidson

Honors College Theses

The method from which we approach Constitutional interpretation would obviously hold a great deal of significance in our government structure, yet the modern judiciary is plagued by a constant debate between Living Constitutionalism and Originalism. The latter of these ideas has become rather prominent amongst the justices, with six of the nine current Supreme Court justices being self-proclaimed practitioners of originalism. An idea which portrays itself as the only logical way to approach a Constitution, this thesis seeks to prove that despite its popularity, originalism is little more than a tool to expand conservative policies within the courts in precisely …


Trump V. United States And The Half-Originalist Presidency, Christine Kexel Chabot Apr 2025

Trump V. United States And The Half-Originalist Presidency, Christine Kexel Chabot

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trump v. United States has been criticized for its ahistorical approach to presidential immunity. This Essay offers the first account of the historical mismatch between the Trump Court’s decision to immunize presidential removal power and Founding era conceptions of the presidency. Unlike the presumptive immunity that the Court recognized for most other official presidential acts, the immunity afforded for presidential removal power is absolute. The Court ruled that the President’s “unrestricted power of removal” can never be regulated by Congress or considered as evidence of wrongdoing, even when the President threatens removal to effectuate …


The Misuse Of Ratification-Era Sources By Unitary Executive Theorists, Jed Handelsman Shugerman Apr 2025

The Misuse Of Ratification-Era Sources By Unitary Executive Theorists, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

This symposium essay suggests that, given an ostensibly originalist Supreme Court, the future depends on getting the past right. The unitary executive theory is approaching its political and doctrinal zenith in 2025, at the very moment it is approaching an evidentiary crisis. This essay details that crisis: a subset of misuses and misrepresentations of sources in the unitary executive scholarship. This subset focuses on serious misrepresentations of the Ratifications debates.

The Ratification debates appropriately have become the primary source of evidence for original public meaning, the dominant theory of originalism. The Ratification debates have always been a significant problem for …


Dobbs V. Brown, Benjamin H. Barton Jan 2025

Dobbs V. Brown, Benjamin H. Barton

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization1is the most important and impactful Supreme Court decision since at least Roe v. Wade, and potentially since Brown v. Board of Education. Past survey data show that most Americans can only name two Supreme Court opinions: Roe and Brown. Dobbs will surely join that list. This Article compares the history, drafting, and opinions of Dobbs and Brown to show what a missed opportunity Dobbs represents. Regardless of whether you agree or disagree with the opinion, it should be clear that Dobbs was one of those unique times (like that of Brown) where the Court …


Is Federal Question Jurisdiction Arising Or Setting, Lumen N. Mulligan Jan 2025

Is Federal Question Jurisdiction Arising Or Setting, Lumen N. Mulligan

Faculty Works

In this essay, I respond to Professor Arthur D. Hellman. Hellman argues that "there is reason to be concerned that the [federal] judicial system falls short of the Framers' expectations--primarily by denying many litigants in cases presenting federal questions 'their real day in an Article III court,' but also by fostering 'balkanization' rather than uniformity in the interpretation of federal law." It is a privilege to comment upon Hellman's thoughtful piece. In doing so, I begin by questioning the value of originalist interpretations of Article III jurisdiction both descriptively and normatively. I then turn to an intra-originalist critique that paints …


Originalisms' Indifferences?: Friendly Amendments To Sherif Girgis's "Originalism's Difference?", Jed Handelsman Shugerman Jan 2025

Originalisms' Indifferences?: Friendly Amendments To Sherif Girgis's "Originalism's Difference?", Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Sherif Girgis’s Lecture Originalism’s Differences? reflects on what had differentiated originalism from other methods and why those differences are eroding. The differences are (or were): (1) avoiding “ostentatious moral reasoning”; (2) relatedly, constraining judges by requiring originalist historical evidence (i.e., tying judges’ hands); and (3) engaging historical research with more “intensity.” Girgis rightly criticizes the Court for engaging in the same kind of flexibility and creativity that originalists had long rejected.

In this commentary, I highlight our areas of agreement and offer friendly amendments. My title takes Girgis’s title two or three steps further: I use an “s-apostrophe” because I …


An Originalist Approach To Puerto Rico: Arguments Against The Status Quo, Micah Allred Apr 2024

An Originalist Approach To Puerto Rico: Arguments Against The Status Quo, Micah Allred

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Few originalists have grappled with a fundamental question about Puerto Rico: whether the Constitution permits the United States to hold the island indefinitely as nonstate territory. There are reasons to doubt that it does. The main purpose of the Constitution’s territorial provisions was to allow Congress to transition the then West-ern Territory into states. And, as a structural matter, Congress’s direct authority over Puerto Ricans conflicts with important constitutional principles such as federalism. But for originalists, arguments from purpose and structure are helpful only insofar as they elucidate the original meaning of the Constitution’s text. This Article lays out two …


Outcome Reasons And Process Reasons In Normative Constitutional Theory, Lawrence B. Solum Mar 2024

Outcome Reasons And Process Reasons In Normative Constitutional Theory, Lawrence B. Solum

Faculty Scholarship

Constitutional theory is a mess. Disagreements about originalism and living constitutionalism have become intractable. Constitutional theorists make some arguments that seem clearly fallacious and advance proposals that are pie in the sky. One of the reasons for the mess is an overreliance by constitutional theorists on “outcome reasons,” justifications that rely on the theorist’s beliefs about what outcomes are good and what outcomes are bad. This outcome-drive approach is exemplified by the so-called “canonical cases” argument, which evaluates positions in normative constitutional theory on the basis of its counterfactual implications for a handful of prior decisions of the Supreme Court. …


Corpus Linguistics And The Original Public Meaning Of The Sixteenth Amendment, Thomas R. Lee, Lawrence B. Solum, James C. Phillips, Jesse A. Egbert Feb 2024

Corpus Linguistics And The Original Public Meaning Of The Sixteenth Amendment, Thomas R. Lee, Lawrence B. Solum, James C. Phillips, Jesse A. Egbert

Faculty Scholarship

Moore v. United States raises the question whether unrealized gains, such as an increase in property value or a stock portfolio, constitute “incomes, from whatever source derived” under the original meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. Moore is widely viewed as the most important tax case to reach the United States Supreme Court in decades. It is also an opportunity for the Court to refine its theory and method of finding original meaning.

We focus here on the original public meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment—the ordinary, common meaning attributed to its text by the general public in 1913. So far, the …


When Originalism Failed: Lessons From Tort Law, Donald G. Gifford, Richard C. Boldt, Christopher J. Robinette Jan 2024

When Originalism Failed: Lessons From Tort Law, Donald G. Gifford, Richard C. Boldt, Christopher J. Robinette

Faculty Scholarship

Two recent Supreme Court decisions upended American life. Opinions released on consecutive days in June 2022 overturned the right of reproductive choice nationwide and invalidated a statute regulating the carrying of concealed weapons in New York. The opinions were united by a common methodology. Pursuant to what one scholar terms “thick” originalism, history, as told by the majority, dictated the resolution of constitutional disputes.

This Article explores the use of thick originalism in several celebrated torts cases that raised constitutional issues. These cases illustrate two significant kinds of problems associated with a rigid historical approach to constitutional interpretation. The first …


Originalism & Judicially-Enacted Religious Exemptions: Revisiting Employment Division Of Oregon V. Smith, Eric Russell Coykendall Jan 2024

Originalism & Judicially-Enacted Religious Exemptions: Revisiting Employment Division Of Oregon V. Smith, Eric Russell Coykendall

CGU Theses & Dissertations

In the 1963 case Sherbert v. Verner , the Supreme Court read the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause to mean that, in certain cases, religious believers should be exempted from otherwise applicable laws. In 1990, the Supreme Court essentially overturned that framework in the case Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith . The Smith case has proved quite controversial, and numerous public-interest law firms, especially those that defend religious litigants, have regularly asked the Court to overturn it in favor of a re-application of the Sherbert precedent. Their contention is often that the Smith ruling is inconsistent with the original …


The Past As A Colonialist Resource, Deepa Das Acevedo Jan 2024

The Past As A Colonialist Resource, Deepa Das Acevedo

Faculty Articles

Originalism’s critics have failed to block its rise. For many jurists and legal scholars, the question is no longer whether to espouse originalism but how to espouse it. This Article argues that critics have ceded too much ground by focusing on discrediting originalism as either bad history or shoddy linguistics. To disrupt the cycle of endless “methodological” refinements and effectively address originalism’s continued popularity, critics must do two things: identify a better disciplinary analogue for originalist interpretation and advance an argument that moves beyond methods.

Anthropology can assist with both tasks. Both anthropological analysis and originalist interpretation are premised on …