Legal History Commons^™

The Evolution Of The Supreme Court's Second Amendment Jurisprudence, Kermit V. Lipez

Maine Law Review

We live in the shadow of an epidemic of gun violence. We dread the next report of an inevitable mass shooting. We no longer feel secure in public places. We fear for the safety of our children and our grandchildren at their schools. We shake our heads in disbelief at the empty ritual of "thoughts and prayers" for victims and their families. As one commentator put it, we suffer from the "[u]nbearable [m]onotony of [g]rief." Why must we live like this? Why are there no solutions? In conversations posing these questions, there are often references to the Supreme Court's Second …

Apportioned Direct Taxes, Conor Clarke, Ari Glogower

Scholarship@WashULaw

The Constitution requires that Congress apportion any “direct” tax among the states by population. This once-dormant provision is now the most important constitutional limitation on Congress’s taxing power. Last year, in Moore v. United States, the Supreme Court seriously considered, for the first time in decades, whether to invalidate an Act of Congress as an unapportioned direct tax. While the law survived, Moore has opened a new era in which scholars and policymakers must again take apportionment seriously. Yet the apportionment requirement remains poorly understood.

This Article provides a new perspective on apportionment by examining how Congress and Treasury …

Presidents, Opinions, And Independent Officers, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The Opinions in Writing Clause is a persistent textual problem for the claim that Article II implies an indefeasible removal power: If the Framers believed they had given the president an unconditional removal power, why would they also specify a lesser power merely to ask for opinions? New historical research confirms this textual problem was also contextual: early state constitutions, the Ratification debates, and the First Congress indicate that the Opinions Clause’s original public meaning signaled independence of department heads, or at least the possibility of congressional requirements like good cause.

Legal scholars have already shown that the texts of …

Statelessness As An Academic Concern: The Indian Supreme Court’S Engagement With Citizenship Policy In In Re: Section 6a Of The Citizenship Act, 1955, Aishwarya Birla

Articles

In October 2024, the Supreme Court of India (‘Court’) made a significant ruling regarding citizenship laws in Assam, a state in the north-east of the country. The case In Re: Section 6Aof the Citizenship Act, 1955(‘In Re: s 6A’)centred on s 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955(‘Citizenship Act’), which pertains to granting citizenship to a specific class of migrants who entered Assam before ‘the 1stday of January, 1966’.The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of s 6A in a 4:1 majority. In doing so, the Court also engaged with a multitude of important issues for constitutional law and citizenship in …

A Historical Case For A Robust But Non-Remedial Seventh Amendment, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

In Jarkesy, the Supreme Court rightly held that the Seventh Amendment required a jury trial for a case fundamentally similar to common law fraud, and it rightly limited the scope of the “public rights” exception to the Seventh Amendment. Grounded in historical and originalist methods, this essay makes four suggestions after Jarkesy:

1. Following Jarkesy, the judiciary should continue a more robust enforcement of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The courts should eliminate the “public rights” exception to the Seventh Amendment, which does not appear to have an original link to the Seventh Amendment. The …

The Gift Of Public Funds Bogeyman, Noah Purcell, Michelle Saperstein

Washington Law Review

Washington’s “gift of public funds” doctrine is frequently misunderstood in ways that impede innovative ideas aimed at remedying some of our state’s most intractable problems. This doctrine arises from article VIII, sections 5 and 7 of the Washington Constitution, which prohibit state and local governments from gifting assets or loaning credit. While the Washington State Supreme Court historically applied these provisions in restrictive and confusing ways, the Court’s modern jurisprudence recognizes that the doctrine is inapplicable to funding expended for any of the many “fundamental purposes” of government. Even where a government program does not fall under this broad category, …

Privacy In The Age Of Platforms: How Digital Advancements Are Outrunning Our Constitution, Haleigh Fagundes

Capstone Projects and Master's Theses

This project analyzes the procedural history of Fourth Amendment doctrine in the Supreme Court. This timeline begins with the 1928 case of Olmstead v. United States and proceeds with recent cases that resolve more modern concerns such as location tracking via cell-cite information, as seen in Carpenter v. United States (2018). Prevalent cases are analyzed through both majority and dissenting opinions to demonstrate the entire Courts’ attitude towards the interpretation. Though more recently the Court has moved towards expanding the expectation of privacy that one can assume from the Fourth Amendment, digital privacy has yet to be incorporated. The research …

James Baldwin And What U.S. Governments Owe Every American, Randall K. Johnson

Faculty Works

This book review looks at the life, work and impact of James Baldwin, a famous writer and civil rights activist that was born one hundred (100) years ago. It does so, for one of the first times in the field of law, by examining Baldwin’s influence on the legal system. The book review carries out its work by identifying Baldwin’s impacts upon U.S. law: before, during and after his public service career. In the process, this book review describes how governments can build on Baldwin's writings and advocacy work.

Dangerous And Unusual: How Heller’S Ahistorical Assumption Violates The Founders’ Original Intent, Oliver Krawczyk, Gilbert Ambler

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

When the U.S. Supreme Court ended its generational silence on the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court held that “a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society” is “invalid.” In so holding, the Court suggested that the Constitution protects only those weapons “in common use at the time,” a limitation thought to be “fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’” The Court defined none of these terms then, and it has not since.

Over a decade of constitutional infidelity ensued. …

The Misuse Of Ratification-Era Sources By Unitary Executive Theorists, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

This symposium essay suggests that, given an ostensibly originalist Supreme Court, the future depends on getting the past right. The unitary executive theory is approaching its political and doctrinal zenith in 2025, at the very moment it is approaching an evidentiary crisis. This essay details that crisis: a subset of misuses and misrepresentations of sources in the unitary executive scholarship. This subset focuses on serious misrepresentations of the Ratifications debates.

The Ratification debates appropriately have become the primary source of evidence for original public meaning, the dominant theory of originalism. The Ratification debates have always been a significant problem for …

Brief In Support Of Respondents As Amici Curiae, Donald J. Trump, President Of The United States, Et Al. V. Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Et. Al, No. 25-332, Andrea Scoseria Katz, Jonathan Gienapp

Scholarship@WashULaw

In the years since this Court’s decision in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197 (2020), legal historians—including originalists—have unearthed a rich body of evidence challenging the conventional wisdom concerning the scope of the President’s removal powers at the Founding. Revisiting not only the Framers’ intellectual influences, but also their driving philosophical concerns and political incentives, this scholarship explains that removal authority was not understood to be vested exclusively in the President as a matter of settled constitutional law, but rather was permissibly exercised by various actors in various ways, intentionally not settled by the …

Originalisms' Indifferences?: Friendly Amendments To Sherif Girgis's "Originalism's Difference?", Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Sherif Girgis’s Lecture Originalism’s Differences? reflects on what had differentiated originalism from other methods and why those differences are eroding. The differences are (or were): (1) avoiding “ostentatious moral reasoning”; (2) relatedly, constraining judges by requiring originalist historical evidence (i.e., tying judges’ hands); and (3) engaging historical research with more “intensity.” Girgis rightly criticizes the Court for engaging in the same kind of flexibility and creativity that originalists had long rejected.

In this commentary, I highlight our areas of agreement and offer friendly amendments. My title takes Girgis’s title two or three steps further: I use an “s-apostrophe” because I …

Prudence, Role Morality, And Restraint: Judge Wilkinson On The Separation Of Powers, Katherine Mims Crocker, Jack Goldsmith

Faculty Scholarship

Caution in reviewing the actions of the legislative and executive branches has been a hallmark of the jurisprudence of Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III. The Constitution “at most gives judges specific authority to redress violations of specific provisions,” Judge Wilkinson writes in his book Cosmic Constitutional Theory. But even when doing so, “courts must exercise great caution before injecting themselves into the vortex of varied political questions,” for “[i]t is often far preferable to allow the political institutions under our Constitution to struggle among themselves, with each bringing to bear the respective arsenal of powers the Framers accorded them.” …

American Law In The New Global Conflict, Mark Jia

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article surveys how a growing rivalry between the United States and China is changing the American legal system. It argues that U.S.-China conflict is reproducing, in attenuated form, the same politics of threat that has driven wartime legal development for much of our history. The result is that American law is reprising familiar patterns and pathologies. There has been a diminishment in rights among groups with imputed ties to a geopolitical adversary. But there has also been a modest expansion in rights where advocates have linked desired reforms with geopolitical goals. Institutionally, the new global conflict has at times …

American Star Chamber: Online Misinformation, Government Intervention, And The Intellectual Matrix Of The First Amendment, Emily E. Burton

Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology

Just as monarchs and clerical authorities struggled to respond to seditious and heretical writings enabled by the invention of the printing press, twenty-first century governments are experiencing a similar information revolution as a result of the digital age and a rising tide of what the United States has labeled online misinformation. Like the printing press, the Internet has enabled the spread of information at an exponentially lower cost and an exponentially higher speed as it extends the ability to publish thoughts and opinions to an increasingly diverse array of individuals. Although this was largely celebrated during the first two decades …

Rethinking Antebellum Bankruptcy, Rafael I. Pardo

Scholarship@WashULaw

Bankruptcy law has been repeatedly reinvented over time in response to changing circumstances. The Bankruptcy Act of 1841—passed by Congress to address the financial ruin caused by the Panic of 1837—constituted a revolutionary break from its immediate predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, which was the nation’s first bankruptcy statute. Although Congress repealed the 1841 Act in 1843, the legislation lasted significantly longer than recognized by scholars. The repeal legislation permitted pending bankruptcy cases to be finally resolved pursuant to the Act’s terms. Because debtors flooded the judicially understaffed 1841 Act system with over 46,000 cases, the Act’s administration continued …

The Riddle Of Race-Based Redistricting, Travis Crum

Scholarship@WashULaw

The Supreme Court has adopted divergent interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause as applied to race and redistricting. Vote dilution doctrine requires mapmakers to consider race to ensure that racial minorities are not packed or cracked. Congress, moreover, has embraced vote dilution doctrine in Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. By contrast, racial gerrymandering doctrine triggers strict scrutiny if mapmakers subordinate traditional redistricting principles to race, thereby threatening Section 2’s constitutionality.

To resolve this doctrinal riddle, this Essay examines whether, as originally understood, the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment governed the use of race during redistricting. The Equal Protection Clause …

Removal Rehashed Legal History: Response, Andrea Scoseria Katz, Noah A. Rosenblum

Scholarship@WashULaw

We are grateful to the Harvard Law Review Forum for the chance to respond in these pages to The Executive Power of Removal. In this new piece, Professors Aditya Bamzai and Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash aim to persuade readers that the President’s power to remove executive officers is exclusive and nondefeasible; textually mandated; and a matter of common assent at the time of the Founding.

There are high hurdles to proving this argument, and this piece fails to scale them. There is little evidence for any of these separate contentions, whether we look to the Constitution’s text or the history …

Recovering The Lost General Welfare Clause, David S. Schwartz

William & Mary Law Review

The General Welfare Clause of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution enumerates a power to “provide for the common defense and general welfare.” A literal interpretation of this clause (“the general welfare interpretation”) would authorize Congress to legislate for any national purpose, and therefore to address all national problems— for example, the COVID-19 pandemic—in ways that would be precluded under the prevailing understanding of limited enumerated powers. But conventional doctrine rejects the general welfare interpretation and construes the General Welfare Clause to confer the so-called “Spending Power,” a power only to spend, but not to regulate, for …

Towards A Dramaturgical Theory Of Constitutional Interpretation, Jessica Rizzo

Seattle University Law Review

Like legal texts, dramatic texts have a public function and public responsibilities not shared by texts written to be appreciated in solitude. For this reason, the interpretation of dramatic texts offers a variety of useful templates for the interpretation of legal texts. In this Article, I elaborate on Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson’s neglected account of law as performance. I begin with Balkin and Levinson’s observation that both legal and dramatic interpreters are charged with persuading audiences that their readings of texts are “authoritative,” analyzing the relationship between legal and theatrical authority and tradition. I then offer my own theory …

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents

Putting The Bar Exam On Constitutional Notice: Cut Scores, Race & Ethnicity, And The Public Good, Scott Johns

Seattle University Law Review

Nothing to see here. Season in and season out, bar examiners, experts, supreme courts, and bar associations seem nonplussed, trapped by what they see as the facts, namely, that the bar exam has no possible weaknesses, at least when it comes to alternative licensure mechanisms, that the bar exam is not to blame for disparate racial impacts that spring from administration of this ritualistic process, and that there are no viable alternatives in the harsh cold world of determining minimal competency for the noble purpose of protecting the public from legal harms. All a lie, of course.

But rather than …

The Lawfulness Of The Fifteenth Amendment, Travis Crum

Scholarship@WashULaw

One of the most provocative debates in constitutional theory concerns the lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments’ adoptions. Scholars have contested whether Article V permits amendments proposed by Congresses that excluded the Southern States and questioned whether those States’ ratifications were obtained through unlawful coercion. Scholars have also teased out differences in how States were counted for purposes of ratifying the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. This debate has focused exclusively on the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, dismissing the Fifteenth Amendment as a mere sequel.

As this Essay demonstrates, the unique issues raised by the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification adds important nuance to …

The Lost History Of Delegation At The Founding, Christine Chabot

Georgia Law Review

The new Supreme Court is poised to bring the administrative state to a grinding halt. Five Justices have endorsed Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy v. United States—an opinion that threatens to invalidate countless regulatory statutes in which Congress has delegated significant policymaking authority to the Executive Branch. Justice Gorsuch claimed that the “text and history” of the Constitution required the Court to replace a longstanding constitutional doctrine that permits broad delegations with a more restrictive one. But the supposedly originalist arguments advanced by Justice Gorsuch and like-minded scholars run counter to the understandings of delegation that prevailed in the Founding …

Court Packing As An Antidote, Rivka Weill

Cardozo Law Review

Court packing is considered the nuclear weapon that may unleash total chaos on the American constitutional system. Even in the face of a highly controversial appointment process to the U.S. Supreme Court during the 2020 presidential election season, scholars caution against the wisdom and utility of resorting to court packing. This Essay makes three bold arguments: First, a President may nominate a candidate to the Supreme Court at any time, including their last year in office; this is true both empirically and normatively. It is the Senate’s responsibility to ensure the people’s will is not frustrated. Second, never since the …

The Original Meaning Of The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause, The Right Of Natural Liberty, And Executive Discretion, John Harrison

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause of Article I, Section 9, is primarily a limit on Congress’s authority to authorize detention by the executive. It is not mainly concerned with the remedial writ of habeas corpus, but rather with the primary right of natural liberty. Suspensions of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are statutes that vest very broad discretion in the executive to decide which individuals to hold in custody. Detention of combatants under the law of war need not rest on a valid suspension, whether the combatant is an alien or a citizen of the United States. …

The Pure-Hearted Abrams Case, Andres Yoder

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

One hundred years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes changed his mind about the right to free speech and wound up splitting the history of free speech law into two. In his dissent in Abrams v. United States, he called for the end of the old order—in which courts often ignored or rejected free speech claims—and set the stage for the current order—in which the right to free speech is of central constitutional importance. However, a century on, scholars have been unable to identify a specific reason for Holmes’s Abrams transformation, and have instead pointed to more diffuse influences. By …

W(H)Ither Judgment, Elias Leake Quinn

Cardozo Law Review de•novo

Textualists complain that loose rules of statutory interpretation inject uncertainty and inconsistency into judicial resolutions of statutory ambiguity. But by employing an incomplete theory of meaning, pure textualists fail to shore up their decisions. And by disparaging the judgement necessary to navigate complex questions of meaning, they erode trust in the judicial process—the very foundation of the rule of law.

No, The Firing Squad Is Not Better Than Lethal Injection: A Response To Stephanie Moran’S A Modest Proposal, Michael Conklin

Seattle University Law Review

In the article A Modest Proposal: The Federal Government Should Use Firing Squads to Execute Federal Death Row Inmates, Stephanie Moran argues that the firing squad is the only execution method that meets the requirements of the Eighth Amendment. In order to make her case, Moran unjustifiably overstates the negative aspects of lethal injection while understating the negative aspects of firing squads. The entire piece is predicated upon assumptions that are not only unsupported by the evidence but often directly refuted by the evidence. This Essay critically analyzes Moran’s claims regarding the alleged advantages of the firing squad over …

The Lost Promise Of Progressive Formalism, Andrea Scoseria Katz

Scholarship@WashULaw

Today, any number of troubling government pathologies—a lawless presidency, a bloated and unaccountable administrative state, the growth of an activist bench—are associated with the emergence of a judicial philosophy that disregards the “plain meaning” of the Constitution for a loose, unprincipled “living constitutionalism.” Many trace its origins to the Progressive Era
(1890–1920), a time when Americans turned en masse to government as the solution to emerging problems of economic modernity—financial panics, industrial concentration, worsening workplace conditions, and skyrocketing unemployment and inequality—and, the argument goes, concocted a flexible, new constitutional philosophy to allow the federal government to take on vast, new …