Legal History Commons^™

Litigating Original Meaning From Heller To Rahimi: The Role Of Lawyering In The Confused Path Of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, Lawrence Rosenthal

American University Law Review

The Second Amendment is on a jurisprudential march. An individual right to “keep and bear arms” for purposes unrelated to militia or military service was not recognized until the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, applying what it took to be the original meaning of the “right to keep and bear arms” found in the Second Amendment, in District of Columbia v. Heller. Subsequently, the Court, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, invalidated a statute requiring a permit to carry concealable firearms on a showing of particularized need. Most recently, in United States v. Rahimi, …

The Abortion Archipelago: A Potential Return To San Juan Post Dobbs, Grant Albert

FIU Law Review

This paper will discuss whether the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico could be another option for women to travel to and from to terminate their pregnancy following Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization.

Venality: A Strangely Practical History Of Unremovable Offices And Limited Executive Power, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The Roberts Court has asserted that Article II’s “executive power” implied an “indefeasible” or unconditional presidential removal power. In response to counterevidence from the Founding era, unitary executive theorists have claimed a “British Backdrop” of a general removal power under the English Crown and European “executive power.” These assumptions are incorrect.

This Article shows that many powerful executive officers through the late eighteenth century, especially high English Treasury offices and even “department heads” in the cabinet, were unremovable. A long common law tradition protected many English offices as freehold property rights. Moreover, this Article explains why it was widely understood …

A Matter Of Facts: The Evolution Of Copyright’S Fact-Exclusion And Its Implications For Disinformation And Democracy, Jessica Silbey

Faculty Scholarship

The Article begins with a puzzle: the curious absence of an express fact-exclusion from copyright protection in both the Copyright Act and its legislative history despite it being a well-founded legal principle. It traces arguments in the foundational Supreme Court case (Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service) and in the Copyright Act’s legislative history to discern a basis for the fact-exclusion. That research trail produces a legal genealogy of the fact-exclusion based in early copyright common law anchored by canonical cases, Baker v. Selden, Burrow-Giles v. Sarony, and Wheaton v. Peters. Surprisingly, none of them …