Legal History Commons^™

Shared Memories And Constitutional Foundations, Sanford Levinson

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

It is significant that the first word in the title of Jack Balkin’s new book [Memory and Authority] is “memory.” A repeated theme of the book is that what binds a nation—or a constitutional order—together is shared memories around which diverse individuals can gather together and therefore establish themselves as a community. Balkin refers to an impressive array of sources with regard to the topic of “public memory,” but I want to concentrate on one of them, which is cited but not extensively discussed. That is Ernest Renan’s famous speech, delivered at the Sorbonne in Paris on March …

Invocations Of Memory In State Constitutional Law, Fred O. Smith Jr.

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

This Symposium Essay discusses the roles of history and memory within the realm of state constitutional law. Building on Professor Balkin’s observations, I offer two claims. The initial argument, delineated in Part I, is descriptive. While the practice of state constitutional law often mirrors that of federal constitutional interpretation, the use of history in state constitutional interpretation has unique characteristics, both with respect to text and ethos. Regarding textual analysis, understanding the language of a state constitution often involves engaging with a concept referred to by some scholars as “interconstitutionalism.” This phenomenon occurs when a single governmental body has operated …

Recovering Constitutional Identity In Colonial South India: Sedition, Sovereignty, And Small-C Constitutionalism In Pudukkottai, Bharath Gururagavendran

National Law School Journal

Constitutional identity is easiest to identify when it has already been credentialed: by a constitutional text, constituent authorisation, or judicial recognition. What remains visible when those markers are absent? Through a historically grounded study of the ‘Little Kingdom’ of Pudukkottai, a princely state in colonial South India, this article examines whether constitutional identity can be recovered from the small-c life of a polity whose opportunities for formal constitution-making were structurally foreclosed. Pudukkottai had no big-C moment. Its constitutional life, if it had one, must be reconstructed from less authoritative materials. The article argues that the absence of a constitutional text …

The Politics Of Constitutional Dignity Jurisprudence, Daniel Haefke

Brooklyn Law Review

This Article traces the politics of (human) dignity in US constitutional law. It reveals that the notion has undergone a conservative shift, which has resulted from Supreme Court Justices increasingly unleashing dignity’s dormant conservative potential. Legal scholars arguing for prominently including the notion in constitutional jurisprudence reflect the belief that adopting the language of dignity would push the Supreme Court to be more sensitive to progressive political demands. This progressive constitutional dignity optimism is historically plausible yet conceptually misguided. It is historically plausible considering the legacy of constitutional dignity in previous opinions of the Court. As the Article expounds, the …

Affirmative Action’S Asian American Problem, Huyen Pham, Joseph Thai

Faculty Scholarship

Asian American opponents of affirmative action have received both credit and blame for their pivotal role in toppling racial preferences in university admissions in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (SFFA). Allied conservatives highlighted evidence of discrimination against Asian American applicants as a compelling reason to dismantle affirmative action; liberals either denied this discrimination existed or tolerated it as an acceptable cost of helping other minority applicants. But largely unacknowledged is the precipitating history of the Supreme Court’s marginalization of Asian American applicants and its decades of tacit approval of their exclusion from affirmative action programs. This unwritten …

Constitutional Federalism And The Nature Of The Union, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark

William & Mary Law Review

Federalism is an essential feature of the Constitution’s design and structure, but the Constitution does not spell out every respective authority of the federal government and the States in precise detail. This omission has led some observers to embrace broad—if not unlimited—federal power and reject certain longstanding federalism doctrines—such as state sovereign immunity, the anti-commandeering doctrine, and the equal sovereignty of the States. The objection to such doctrines is that the Constitution does not affirmatively grant States these sovereign rights and powers. This charge overlooks long-forgotten background context essential to faithful interpretation of the Constitution. The former British Colonies in …

Confronting The War On International Law In The United States, Rebecca Ingber

Online Publications

Harold Hongju Koh’s The National Security Constitution in the 21st Century is a code red threat assessment of the state of public law in America today. True to Koh’s nature, he does not leave us without hope; rather he devotes a sizeable portion of the book to calls for reform, from the legal frameworks governing war powers and intelligence to the division of labor in the national security legal bureaucracy plodding away within the deepest (secure) chambers of the executive branch itself.

Searching For The Radical Constitution, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

Due to its length and richness, The Constitutional Bind could be considered several books in one. It is a socialist critique of American political development that highlights the tradeoffs from incremental rather than transformational progress. It is also a partial intellectual history of radical and alternative constitutional theories marginalized by the set of ideas that came to rule. Finally, the book serves as an urgent plea for fellow citizens to give up the mesmerizing, yet frustratingly confining rhetoric of twentieth-century liberal constitutionalism.

Given Rana’s central objective of investigating the rise of the “creedal” approach to American constitutionalism, I believe it …

Is The Constitution Of 1787 A White Supremacist Document? Against Essentialism In Constitutional Interpretation, David S. Schwartz

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

A curious convergence is emerging in legal academia around the conclusion that the 1787 Constitution is a white supremacist document. Although most originalists would deny that contention, their methodology strongly favors, if it does not compel, an agreement with progressive, “neo-Garrisonian” scholars that the Constitution of 1787 is indeed a white supremacist document. Both the neo-Garrisonian and originalist elements of this implicit convergence stem from their “essentialism” in Constitutional interpretation: the idea that the Constitution or its terms or provisions carry a uniquely and objectively correct meaning, invariant over time, and independent of our evolving normative commitments.

This Article argues …

Section Three Of The Fourteenth Amendment: Insurrection, Mark A. Graber

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The public, scholarly, and legal debate over whether former president Donald Trump is eligible to hold office under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment has focused far more on technical legal questions than on whether Trump engaged in an insurrection. Scholarly and public commentary rarely examines the constitutional/ common law of insurrection, preferring instead to examine whether Trump is exempt from Section Three because Section Three either exempts presidents or the presidency from disqualification or because Section Three is not self-executing. Trump v. Anderson (2024) focused on state incapacity to disqualify “oathbreaking insurrectionists” rather than on whether Trump was an …

Theistic Illiberal Constitutionalism: A Review Of Adrian Vermeule’S Common Good Constitutionalism, Kyron J. Huigens

Articles

Adrian Vermeule’s Common Good Constitutionalism drew a remarkable amount of attention from constitutional law scholars when it was published in 2020. About eighteen months later, Vermeule published a piece complaining that the critics had missed the point, that they had ignored the natural law jurisprudence that grounds the work. He was correct. This Review addresses Vermeule’s natural law jurisprudence, emphasizing the fact that it is a religious natural law jurisprudence. His arguments are in the tradition of ScholasticismAristotelian logic incorporated into Christian theology by St. Thomas Aquinas. Scholasticism is a remarkably weak foundation for constitutional jurisprudence. It is a vast …

Constitutional Disorder, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This is a review essay inspired by two books: Yuval Levin's American Covenant (2024) and Erwin Chemerinsky's No Democracy Lasts Forever (2024). I make the following points. First, all treatments of the U.S. Constitution can be mapped on a continuum from the worshipful to the diagnostic. Second, Levin's account, which inclines toward the devotional, extols certain features deemed both originalist and virtuous: social unity over untidiness, consensus over dissent, fear and loathing of mass politics. Third, such accounts may not be sufficiently nimble to grapple with contemporary problems such as new forms of oligarchy or movement capture of traditional parties. …

The Takings Blunderbuss: From Pennsylvania Coal To Dobbs, Michael Allan Wolf

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article explores three problems with the excess use of the Takings Clause (the "takings blunderbuss") that should cause concern not to left-wing judges and scholars who endorse seemingly unfettered activism from the bench and champion an organic view of the Constitution, but instead, and somewhat surprisingly, to conservatives who claim to eschew those practices. The first problem is that the text and original understanding, as far as we can discern, indicate that the Takings Clause was designed to ensure that owners receive payment when they are forced to sacrifice ownership of their tangible property for public use, most commonly …

Prudence, Role Morality, And Restraint: Judge Wilkinson On The Separation Of Powers, Katherine Mims Crocker, Jack Goldsmith

Faculty Scholarship

Caution in reviewing the actions of the legislative and executive branches has been a hallmark of the jurisprudence of Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III. The Constitution “at most gives judges specific authority to redress violations of specific provisions,” Judge Wilkinson writes in his book Cosmic Constitutional Theory. But even when doing so, “courts must exercise great caution before injecting themselves into the vortex of varied political questions,” for “[i]t is often far preferable to allow the political institutions under our Constitution to struggle among themselves, with each bringing to bear the respective arsenal of powers the Framers accorded them.” …

Bruen’S Enforcement Puzzle: Unearthing And Adjudicating The Historical Enforcement Record In Second Amendment Cases, Andrew Willinger

Notre Dame Law Review

The Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen brings historical complexity to the fore by instituting a history-focused test for the Second Amendment that demands analogues from the Founding or Reconstruction eras to support modern gun regulations. The majority opinion in Bruen considers, in multiple places, how certain historical gun regulations may have been enforced. In each instance, the Court suggests that evidence of racially disparate enforcement of a historical law is relevant to whether that law is part of the American historical tradition and an appropriate analogue. Historical enforcement data appear to …

Diverse Originalism, History & Tradition, Christina Mulligan

Notre Dame Law Review

The Supreme Court’s New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen decision appears to be an originalist opinion, ostensibly looking for the meaning of the Constitution’s text by looking to the public’s understanding of the language used. But Bruen's test actually fails to follow a public meaning originalist methodology. The Court focuses present-day constitutional interpreters on evidence of constitutional meaning that only reflects a portion of the public—the politically empowered men who were in a position to pass legislation. Two unfortunate outcomes follow. First, by limiting potential evidence of public meaning so severely, the Court raises the risk …

The General-Law Right To Bear Arms, William Baude, Robert Leider

Notre Dame Law Review

In this Article, we argue that Bruen's intended methodological shift has been widely misunderstood by the bench and bar. This has led to confusion and misapplication in the lower courts, as well as much scholarly criticism of the test that is, we think, misdirected. As we will explain, Bruen calls for a form of legal originalism, applying a classical view of fundamental rights as a form of unwritten customary law. This is consistent with the text and history of the Constitution and leads to results that are less mechanical and more sensible than many lower courts have thought. Understanding …

Historical Fact, Ryan C. Williams

Notre Dame Law Review

The growing emphasis on history as a criterion of constitutional decision-making in Supreme Court jurisprudence has raised the importance of a distinctive type of judicial fact-finding—namely, the investigation and resolution of contested questions of historical fact. Although history has always played an important role in constitutional adjudication, its primary role has traditionally been as an input to constitutional interpretation. But in cases like New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, the Court has increasingly demanded that factual determinations regarding the content, meaning, purposes, and effects of decisions taken in the distant past should also guide the lower …

What Originalism Can Teach Historians: History As Analogy, Means-Ends Tests, And The Problem Of History In Bruen, Kunal M. Parker

Notre Dame Law Review

There is a long tradition of professional historians’ critiques of lawyers’ truncated understandings and clumsy deployments of the past. The intellectual historian J.G.A. Pocock’s The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, with its depiction of a “common-law mind” obdurately committed to the continuity of law and unable to grasp the significance of situating law in historical context, might be taken as the origin point of a post–World War II tradition. Historians’ critiques have enjoyed a fresh lease of life since constitutional originalism began to assume prominence in the closing decades of the twentieth century. As legal scholars and judges …

Interview Of Professor John Brittain, Donny R. Williams

University of the District of Columbia Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Complexity Of American Federalism, Christian G. Fritz

Faculty Scholarship

For the Balkinization Symposium on Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution: Union, Commerce, and Slavery in the Age of Federalisms (Yale University Press, 2024).

Alison LaCroix’s insightful new book, The Interbellum Constitution, builds on an often-overlooked fact: that Americans living before the Civil War did not know they were part of an “antebellum” period. That oversight has contributed to a conventional narrative of constitutional history and doctrine during the first half of the nineteenth-century that tends to read that history and doctrine backwards through the lens of a war that contemporaries did not know would define them. From this …

Editorial, Nlsj Editorial Board

National Law School Journal

Drawing on select papers from the Pluralist Agreement and Constitutional Transformation (PACT) Conference, this first part of the PACT Special Issue recovers forgotten and unrecorded constitutional histories. The articles reflect on the constitutional archives as a source of historical writing and ask how they are constituted, studied, and challenged. In doing this, they explore the documentary record of India’s constitutional founding, question prevalent narratives, and uncover marginalised perspectives. This comprehensive engagement goes beyond orthodox legal scholarship and illustrates the university’s commitment to multidisciplinary research, with the first issue bringing together contributions from scholars of law, English literature, and political science.

Egypt’S Legal Modernism: Challenging The National Discourse, Mohamed A. El-Deeb

Theses and Dissertations

Egypt’s legal modernity is the story of the modern Egyptian state itself. Reforming the country’s judiciary in the late nineteenth century was meant to achieve ambitious aims beyond the functionality of a justice system. The utmost goal was the country’s independence from the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. The judicial reforms modernized the Egyptian state and built a judiciary and legal community like no other place. Egypt achieved its independent judiciary before gaining its political independence. That was a remarkable achievement of the judicial reform. That rich part of Egypt’s modern history is negated and disregarded from public awareness. Not …

Settler Colonialism And Ecosystem Change: How Ideology Has Shaped Minnesota’S Environments, Sarah E. Hobby

History Honors Projects

The formation of a uniquely American land ethic—defined by European political history and Christian biblical doctrine and forged through systems of dispossession—is central to the creation of environments within the United States today. Using Minnesota as a microcosm to understand how settler colonial interactions played out all across the United States, this paper analyzes connections between violent dispossession of Indigenous people and the degradation of environments. By understanding how Ojibwe and Dakota people think about and have shaped Minnesotan lands throughout their history and comparing Indigenous land-ethics to the Euro-American-settler land ethic, this paper evaluates the role that ideology and …

The History Of Bans On Types Of Arms Before 1900, David B. Kopel, Joseph G.S. Greenlee

Journal of Legislation

This Article describes the history of bans on particular types of arms in America, through 1899. It also describes arms bans in England until the time of American independence. Arms encompassed in this article include firearms, knives, swords, blunt weapons, and many others. While arms advanced considerably from medieval England through the nineteenth-century United States, bans on particular types of arms were rare.

The Original Meaning Of Commerce In The Indian Commerce Clause, Gregory Ablavsky

Connecticut Law Review

In Haaland v. Brackeen, the Supreme Court returned to the foundational question of federal authority over relations between the United States and Native nations, long known as “Indian affairs.” The decision reaffirmed well-established precedent affirming broad federal authority in the area, but it also underscored ongoing disagreement, as Justices Gorsuch and Thomas offered lengthy and dueling investigations of the original understanding.

This Essay explores one aspect of that history: the original meaning of “commerce” in the Indian Commerce Clause. Nearly a decade ago, I wrote an article that sought, as its title indicated, to move “beyond the Indian Commerce Clause.” …

American Law In The New Global Conflict, Mark Jia

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article surveys how a growing rivalry between the United States and China is changing the American legal system. It argues that U.S.-China conflict is reproducing, in attenuated form, the same politics of threat that has driven wartime legal development for much of our history. The result is that American law is reprising familiar patterns and pathologies. There has been a diminishment in rights among groups with imputed ties to a geopolitical adversary. But there has also been a modest expansion in rights where advocates have linked desired reforms with geopolitical goals. Institutionally, the new global conflict has at times …

Original Public Meaning And Pregnancy’S Ambiguities, Evan D. Bernick, Jill Wieber Lens

Michigan Law Review

Relying on 1868 abortion statutes, the 2022 Supreme Court held in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization that no federal constitutional right to abortion exists. Mere months later, a petition for certiorari asked the Court to determine that “person” in the Fourteenth Amendment includes prenatal existence, which would require criminalization of abortion in all states. The petitioners cited Dobbs and claimed the authority of legal history in 1868 and before. These arguments will be heard again, and they are increasingly framed in terms of the “original public meaning” of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This Article refutes these arguments on their own …

An Originalist Approach To Puerto Rico: Arguments Against The Status Quo, Micah Allred

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Few originalists have grappled with a fundamental question about Puerto Rico: whether the Constitution permits the United States to hold the island indefinitely as nonstate territory. There are reasons to doubt that it does. The main purpose of the Constitution’s territorial provisions was to allow Congress to transition the then West-ern Territory into states. And, as a structural matter, Congress’s direct authority over Puerto Ricans conflicts with important constitutional principles such as federalism. But for originalists, arguments from purpose and structure are helpful only insofar as they elucidate the original meaning of the Constitution’s text. This Article lays out two …

Pretrial Commitment And The Fourth Amendment, Laurent Sacharoff

Notre Dame Law Review

Today, the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause governs arrest warrants and search warrants only. But in the founding era, the Warrant Clause governed a third type of warrant: the “warrant of commitment.” Judges issued these warrants to jail defendants pending trial. This Article argues that the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause, with its oath and probable cause standard, should be understood today to apply to this third type of warrant. That means the Warrant Clause would govern any initial appearance where a judge first commits a defendant—a process that currently falls far short of fulfilling its constitutional and historical function. History supports …