Legal History Commons^™

Comment On The First Slave (And Why He Matters) By Jonathan Bush, Peter Kolchin

Cardozo Law Review

In his Article The First Slave (And Why He Matters), Professor Jonathan Bush returns to a persistent question in the history of the colonial Chesapeake: the status of blacks in the seventeenth century. He frames this question, however, in a new way. Rather than seeking to determine whether or not blacks were slaves before the codification of slave law-a largely unanswerable question that revolves, at least in part, around what one means by "slaves"-he asks, how could the English have imposed slavery on blacks in America when slavery was non-existent in England and under English law? In response, he …

Pretrial Publicity In Criminal Cases Of National Notoriety: Constructing A Remedy For The Remediless Wrong , Robert Hardaway, Douglas B. Tumminello

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Fictions And Meritocratic Success Stories, Robin West

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Comment On Earl Maltz, Kenneth M. Stampp

Cardozo Law Review

Professor Earl Maltz has written an excellent brief account of Benjamin R. Curtis's judicial record as it relates to slavery, including his dissenting argument in the famous Dred Scott case. He found Curtis to be a perfect example of mid-nineteenth century Northern conservative Whigs-the "Cotton Whigs," as their antislavery critics called them. They disliked slavery, but, in equal measure, they disliked those who agitated against it. Both Southern proslavery extremists and Northern abolitionists appalled them, for both groups endangered the Union. Conservative Whig President Millard Fillmore would not have appointed Curtis to the Supreme Court if he had shared the …

Bondage, Freedom & The Constitution, Eric Foner

Cardozo Law Review

Linking the papers on this most interesting panel are questions that center on the meaning of freedom. What is freedom? Who has the power to define what freedom is? What are the consequences of slavery and its abolition for Americans' understandings of freedom? In one way or another, these papers, as well as many others in this conference, illuminate these questions.

Comment On Donald Nieman's Paper, Randall Kennedy

Cardozo Law Review

I have two responses to Professor Neiman's paper. One emphasizes a point he makes. The other disagrees a bit with his reading of the promise of Reconstruction.

Black Suffrage And The Redefinition Of American Freedom, 1860-1870, Xi Wang

Cardozo Law Review

One of the most important outcomes of the Civil War was the establishment of a new constitutional order. Under this new order, African Americans, a people whose essential human rights had been denied under the old constitutional order, were constitutionally emancipated from slavery and recognized as American citizens. They received the privileges and immunities that white Americans had automatically assumed. Male black Americans also received the right to vote. This new order, as embraced by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, was a truly remarkable achievement of Reconstruction. What is additionally significant is that these Amendments became …

The Slavery Of Emancipation, Guyora Binder

Journal Articles

The Thirteenth Amendment abolishes the institution of slavery rather than freeing individual slaves. Yet it quickly came to stand for little more than granting universal rights to make labor contracts and to leave service. This article develops a distinction between abolishing an institution and reclassifying individuals within it. Drawing on the comparative history of slavery, it shows that the institution of slavery has generally included mechanisms for the manumission of slaves and their passage into a liminal status combining self-ownership with social subordination and relative isolation. A critical account of the Antelope litigation shows that proponents of mass manumission still …

Comments On James Oakes, “The Compromising Expedient”, Robert A. Burt

Cardozo Law Review

Professor Oakes's excellent paper convincingly characterizes the 1787 Constitution as a reactionary abandonment of the antislavery ethos of the 1776 Revolution that had appeared to set the new country on a course toward the abolition of slavery. "What," he asks, "accounts for the Constitution's failure to promote the cause already pushed so far by the Revolution?" If we could answer this question, we might not only explain the reactionary falling away from the Revolution, but also shed light on the historically parallel phenomena that Oakes identifies at the end of his paper-the abandonment of the emancipatory impulse from the Civil …

The Unlikely Hero Of Dred Scott: Benjamin Robbins Curtis And The Constitutional Law Of Slavery, Earl M. Maltz

Cardozo Law Review

The standard account portrays Dred Scott v. Sandford as a story of villains and heroes. The villains are the members of the majority, led by Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney, who concluded that descendants of slaves could never become citizens of the Union and that Congress could not outlaw slavery in the territories. The heroes, on the other hand, are the two dissenters, John McLean and Benjamin Robbins Curtis, who rejected these conclusions and determined that Scott should be deemed a free man. McLean's opinion, however, was not tightly reasoned and was rather clearly designed to advance his presidential ambitions; …

The Slavery Of Emancipation, Guyora Binder

Cardozo Law Review

The Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution commands that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist." What has been the effect of this command?

It will serve my present purpose to offer the following toosimple answer to this complex question: the Thirteenth Amendment secured little more than the manumission of slaves already practically freed by the friction of war. It guaranteed, in Confederate General Robert Richardson's now well-known phrase, "nothing but freedom."

Supposing this answer to be true, a further question presents itself: Did the Thirteenth Amendment's effect fulfill its command? Did universal manumission abolish slavery?

A full answer to …

The Fifteenth Amendment And "Political Rights", Akhil Reed Amar

Cardozo Law Review

Professor Xi Wang has offered us an altogether exemplary paper on black suffrage. Rather than trying to criticize it, I shall attempt to extend it by picking up where he left off. My main text is the Fifteenth Amendment. I would like to suggest that the best interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment would read it as encompassing a cluster of political rights; the Amendment protects not only the right to vote, but also the right to hold office, the right to be voted for, the right to vote in a legislature, the right to serve on a jury, and even …

Madisonian Multiculturalism, Alexandra Natapoff

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Toward A "Due Foundation" For The Separation Of Powers: The Federalist Papers As Political Narrative, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

During the past quarter century, lawyers have become strangely comfortable with descriptions of our government's structure that would, to an untutored ear, speak contradiction. We are quite satisfied to say that governmental powers are separate and shared, departments distinct and overlapping, functions autonomous and interdependent. We have settled into these contradictions as we would a roomy chair: talking this way is no longer controversial but taken for granted, uttered with a knowing wink, perceived as the starting point of sophisticated analysis. A not "entirely separate," but "entirely free," set of departments is the only way we can think about the …

To Accomplish Fairness And Justice: Substantive Due Process, 30 J. Marshall L. Rev. 95 (1996), James W. Hilliard

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

California's Proposition 187 - Does It Mean What It Says - Does It Say What It Means - A Textual And Constitutional Analysis, Lolita Buckner Inniss

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

No abstract provided.

The Denial Of A State Constitutional Right To Bail In Juvenile Proceedings: The Need For Reassessment In Washington State, Kathleen A. Baldi

Seattle University Law Review

Article I, section 20 of the Washington Constitution states that "[a]ll persons charged with crimes shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident, or the presumption great." Despite seemingly unequivocal language that this constitutional provision is applicable to "all persons," the Washington Supreme Court, in Estes v. Hopp, declared that juveniles do not have a constitutional right to bail. The Estes court engaged in little constitutional analysis, but instead, reasoned that juvenile proceedings are civil in nature and that article 1, section 20 applies only in criminal proceedings. Central to the Estes …

Democracy And Feminism , Tracy E. Higgins

Faculty Scholarship

Although feminist legal theory has had an important impact on most areas of legal doctrine and theory over the last two decades, its contribution to the debate over constitutional interpretation has been comparatively small. In this Article, Professor Higgins explores reasons for the limited dialogue between mainstream constitutional theory and feminist theory concerning questions of democracy, constitutionalism, and judicial review. She argues that mainstream constitutional theory tends to take for granted the capacity of the individual to make choices, leaving the social construction of those choices largely unexamined. In contrast, feminist legal theory's emphasis on the importance of constraints on …

What's In A Name - Nothing Good If It's Friday: The Seventh Circuit Invalidates Good Friday Public School Holiday, 29 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1031 (1996), Joanne Yasus

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Death Penalty And The Interstate Agreement On Detainers Act: A Proposal For Change, 29 J. Marshall L. Rev. 499 (1996), Edward G. Hild

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Struggle Over The Past, Robert W. Gordon

Cleveland State Law Review

History supplies a set of basic ground rules; the "traditional principles of the common law," from which much modem law, both judge-made and statutory law, is seen as having improperly deviated. As the New Right ideology spreads among elite decision-makers and intellectuals, it poses a serious challenge to the Progressive-liberal consensus about the legal meanings of history that had previously dominated American legal thought for a very long time. The historical claims of New Right ideology in particular have touched off a number of fierce debates among Old (Progressive) Liberal, New Right, and radical legal intellectuals. In Section II, the …

Term Limits On Original Intent--An Essay On Legal Debate And Historical Understanding, Polly J. Price

Faculty Articles

This Essay is divided into five Parts. Part I sets the stage for the historical debate by evaluating the text of the Qualifications Clauses as well as the limited evidence of what the Framers and the ratifiers thought about these provisions. Part II shows that many states, immediately after the federal Constitution was ratified, behaved as though the Qualifications Clauses did not prevent them from adding qualifications for congressional office-holding. Part III compares this early evidence of state behavior with a debate in Congress after the Civil War concerning the meaning of the Qualifications Clauses. Part IV returns to the …

A Nonoriginalist Perspective On The Lessons Of History, Michael C. Dorf

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Specific Agreements About Race: A Response To Professor Sunstein, Sheri Johnson

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Cabining The Constitutional History Of The New Deal In Time, G. Edward White

Michigan Law Review

A Review of William E, Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt

The Relevance Of The Framers’ Intent, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Ever since the revival of interest in originalism that occurred in the 1980s, critics have 'charged that for a variety of reasons it is impractical, if not impossible, to determine the Framers' intentions. In addition, they argue that we today should not be bound by the intentions of a few men who lived and died over two-hundred years ago. In sum, adherence to original intent is rejected as being impractical, unjust, or both.

In this article, the author argues that we cannot assess either the practicality or the justice of discerning original intent without first asking why it is we …

Conquering The Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism Of The Supreme Court In Indian Law, David H. Getches

Publications

For a century and a half, the Supreme Court was faithful to a set of foundation principles respecting Indian tribal sovereignty. Though the United States can abrogate tribal powers and rights, it can only do so by legislation. Accordingly, the Court has protected reservations as enclaves for Indian self-government, preventing states from enforcing their laws and taxes, and holding that even federal laws could not be applied to Indians without congressional permission. Recently, however, the Court has assumed the job it formerly conceded to Congress, considering and weighing cases to reach results comporting with the Justices' subjective notions of what …

The Court And The Changing Constitution: A Discussion, Carl Sividorski, James Gardner, Barry Latzer, Peter Galie

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Tragic Irony Of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty In Slavery And In Freedom, The Federalism In The 21st Century: Historical Perspectives, Robert J. Kaczorowski

Faculty Scholarship

A plurality on the Supreme Court seeks to establish a state-sovereignty based theory of federalism that imposes sharp limitations on Congress's legislative powers. Using history as authority, they admonish a return to the constitutional "first principles" of the Founders. These "first principles," in their view, attribute all governmental authority to "the consent of the people of each individual state, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole." Because the people of each state are the source of all governmental power, they maintain, "where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power-that is, …

Dutch Treats: The Lessons The U.S. Can Learn From How The Netherlands Protects Lesbians And Gays, Astrid A.M Mattijssen, Charlene L. Smith

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law

No abstract provided.