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The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court's Failures In Dickerson, Paul G. Cassell

Michigan Law Review

Where's the rest of the opinion? That was my immediate reaction to reading the Supreme Court's terse decision in Dickerson, delivered to me via email from the clerk's office a few minutes after its release. Surely, I thought, some glitch in the transmission had eliminated the pages of discussion on the critical issues in the case. Yet, as it became clear that I had received all of the Court's opinion, my incredulity grew.

Miranda, Dickerson, And The Puzzling Persistence Of Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, Stephen J. Schulhofer

Michigan Law Review

Dickerson v. United States preserves the status quo regime for judicial oversight of police interrogation. That result could be seen, in the present climate, as a victory for due process values, but there remain many reasons for concern that existing safeguards are flawed - that they are either too restrictive or not restrictive enough. Such concerns are partly empirical, of course. They depend on factual assessments of how much the Miranda rules do restrict the police. But such concerns also reflect a crucial, though often unstated, normative premise; they presuppose a certain view of how much the police should be …

In The Stationhouse After Dickerson, Charles D. Weisselberg

Michigan Law Review

Miranda v. Arizona established the high water mark of the protections afforded an accused during a custodial interrogation. During the decades that followed, the United States Supreme Court allowed Miranda's foundation to erode, inviting a direct challenge to the landmark ruling. In Dickerson v. United States, the Court turned back such a challenge and placed Miranda upon a more secure, constitutional footing. This Article explores the impact of Dickerson in the place where Miranda was meant to matter most: the stationhouse. As I have described elsewhere, Supreme Court decisions have influenced a number of California law enforcement agencies to instruct …

Miranda'S Failure To Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, Welsh S. White

Michigan Law Review

As Yale Kamisar's writings on police interrogation demonstrate, our simultaneous commitments to promoting law enforcement's interest in obtaining confessions and to protecting individuals from overreaching interrogation practices have created a nearly irreconcilable tension. If the police must be granted authority to engage in effective questioning of suspects, it will obviously be difficult to insure that "the terrible engine of the criminal law . . . not . . . be used to overreach individuals who stand helpless against it." If we are committed to accommodating these conflicting interests, however, some means must be found to impose appropriate restraints on the …

When The Constable Blunders: A Comparison Of The Law Of Police Interrogation In Canada And The United States, Robert Harvie, Hamar Foster

Seattle University Law Review

This Article explores the Supreme Court of Canada's use of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in limiting police interrogations and compares its case decisions with cases from the Supreme Court of the United States. Part II of this Article examines the purposes and policies underlying sections 10(b), 7, and 24(2) of the Charter. Part III then examines the application of sections 10(b) and 7 in situations where (1) suspects are interrogated by uniformed police officers or other persons known to be in authority, and (2) suspects are interrogated surreptitiously by persons not known to be in authority. In both …

The Public Safety Exception To Miranda: Analyzing Subjective Motivation, Marc Schuyler Reiner

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues, however, that the appropriate inquiry under Quarles is whether an actual and reasonable belief in an emergency motivated the interrogating officer. This Note proposes a two-prong test to facilitate this inquiry. The subjective motivation prong evaluates the officer's subjective motivation as revealed by objective factors: the. content of the officer's questions, when he asked them, and when the suspect received Miranda warnings. The objective reasonableness prong looks at the objective circumstances to determine the reasonableness of the officer's belief in an emergency.

Part I demonstrates that the Quarles opinion actually contemplates and requires analysis of the officer's …

Chopping Miranda Down To Size, Michael Chertoff

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Confessions, Truth, and the Law by Joseph D. Grano

Privacy's Problem And The Law Of Criminal Procedure, William J. Stuntz

Michigan Law Review

Part I of this article addresses the connection between privacy-based limits on police authority and substantive limits on government power as a general matter. Part II briefly addresses the effects of that connection on Fourth and Fifth Amendment law, both past and present. Part ID suggests that privacy protection has a deeper problem: it tends to obscure more serious harms that attend police misconduct, harms that flow not from information disclosure but from the police use of force. The upshot is that criminal procedure would be better off with less attention to privacy, at least as privacy is defined in …

Response: The Problems With Privacy's Problem, Louis Michael Seidman

Michigan Law Review

A Response to William J. Stuntz's "Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure"

Reply, William J. Stuntz

Michigan Law Review

A Reply to Louis Michael Seidman's Response

Right To Counsel

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Waiver Of Rights In The Interrogation Room: The Court's Dilemma, William T. Pizzi

Publications

No abstract provided.

Confusing The Fifth Amendment With The Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication Of The Innis Definition Of Interrogation, Jonathan L. Marks

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines how these courts have applied or misapplied Innis, and concludes that, while many of these decisions are consistent with Miranda and Innis, too many others are not. In order to evaluate these cases, it is first necessary to understand the meaning and significance of Innis. Part I thus considers Innis and its background. Part II then examines lower court decisions applying the Innis test, dividing these decisions into six groups based on the most common factual scenarios. Because the cases deal with factually specific police practices, this method constitutes the most useful way to …

Duckworth V. Eagan: A Little-Noticed Miranda Case That May Cause Much Mischief, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Professor Yale Kamisar, the country's foremost scholar of Miranda and police interrogation, presents an analysis and critique of the Supreme Court's latest interpretation of Miranda. In Duckworth, a 5-4 Court upheld the "if and when" language systematically used by the Hammond, Indiana, Police Department: "We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court." The real issue was whether the police effectively conveyed the substance of a vital part of Miranda: the right to have a lawyer appointed prior to any questioning. Professor Kamisar …

Arizona V. Youngblood: Does The Criminal Defendant Lose His Right To Due Process When The State Loses Exculpatory Evidence?, Willis C. Moore

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Police Interrogation And Confessions, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

In the police interrogation room, where, until the second third of the century, police practices were unscrutinized and virtually unregulated, constitutional ideals collide with the grim realities of law enforcement.

The Applicability Of Miranda Warnings To Non-Felony Offenses: Is The Proper Standard "Custodial Interrogation" Or "Severity Of The Offense"?, Kenneth W. Gaul

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note argues that the proper standard for determining the necessity of the Miranda warnings for any offense is the existence of custodial interrogation. When interrogation for non-felony offenses takes place in a custodial atmosphere, Miranda warnings should be required, as they are for more serious offenses. Part I summarizes the two basic approaches taken by courts that have confronted the question of the applicability of the Miranda warnings to non-felony offenses. Part Ill argues that neither the rationale for the Miranda doctrine nor the roots of the fifth amendment support a distinction based on the severity of the offense …

A Dissent From The Miranda Dissents: Some Comments On The 'New' Fifth Amendment And The Old 'Voluntariness' Test, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

If the several conferences and workshops (and many lunch conversations) on police interrogation and confessions in which I have participated this past summer are any indication, Miranda v. Arizona has evoked much anger and spread much sorrow among judges, lawyers and professors. In the months and years ahead, such reaction is likely to be translated into microscopic analyses and relentless, probing criticism of the majority opinion. During this period of agonizing appraisal and reappraisal, I think it important that various assumptions and assertions in the dissenting opinions do not escape attention.

Constitutional Law - Parole Revocation Hearings - Due Process Does Not Require That Federal Parolee Subsequently Convicted And Incarcerated For State Offense Be Given Immediate Parole Revocation Hearing, Charles F. Weyl

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

Due Process And Parole Revocation, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

In Morrissey, the Court set the level of due process needed in parole revocations. Specifically, it held that the parolee facing •revocation has a right (a) to receive written notice of the claimed parole violations; (b) to hear the evidence against him; (c) to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing the confrontation); (e) to have a neutral and detached hearing body, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) to be given …

Is The Exclusionary Rule An 'Illogical' Or 'Unnatural' Interpretation Of The Fourth Amendment?, Yale Kamisar

Articles

More than 50 years have passed since the Supreme Court decided the Weeks case, barring the use in federal prosecutions of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the Silverthorne case, invoking what has come to be known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. The justices who decided those cases would, I think, be quite surprised to learn that some day the value of the exclusionary rule would be measured by-and the very life of the rule might depend on-an empirical evaluation of its efficacy in deterring police misconduct. These justices were engaged in a less …

Potentiality Of Incarceration: A Proposed Standard For The Applicability Of Miranda To Nonfelony Offenses, Mark J. Roberts

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Kauper's 'Judicial Examination Of The Accused' Forty Years Later—Some Comments On A Remarkable Article, Yale Kamisar

Articles

For a long time before Professor Paul Kauper wrote "Judicial Examination of the Accused" in 1932, and for a long time thereafter, the "legal mind" shut out the de facto inquisitorial system that characterized American criminal procedure. Paul Kauper could not look away. He recognized the "naked, ugly facts" (p. 1224) and was determined to do something about them -more than thirty years before Escobedo v. Illinois' or Miranda v. Arizona.2

Criminal Procedure--Self-Incrimination--Harmless Error--Application Of The Harmless Error Doctrine To Violations Of Miranda: The California Experience, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Using decisions of the appellate courts of California that have applied the federal harmless error rule to violations of Miranda v. Arizona and Escobedo v. Illinois, this Note will examine the logic and effects of the California application. However, the California experience can only be understood by first briefly describing the United States Supreme Court's decisions regarding harmless constitutional error and then showing the approaches taken by other states in their application of the harmless error rule to Miranda violations. Not only will this analysis put the California experience in its proper perspective, but it will also show the …

'Custodial Interrogation' Within The Meaning Of Miranda, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

The primary conceptual hurdle confronting the Miranda Court was the "legal reasoning" that any and all police interrogation is unaffected by the privilege against self-incrimination because such interrogation does not involve any kind of judicial process for the taking of testimony; inasmuch as police officers have no legal authority to compel statements of any kind, there is no legal obligation, ran the argument, to which a privilege can apply. See, e.g., the discussion and authorities collected in Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. …

Police Interrogation And The Supreme Court--The Latest Round, Jerold H. Israel

Book Chapters

My first task is to explain to some degree the nature of the problem embodied in our title. This book has been designated as "Escobedo-The Second Round." What we will be discussing is a series of cases, decided in June, 1966, the most noteworthy of which is Miranda v. Arizona [384 U.S. 436 (1966)]. In these cases, the United States Supreme Court prescribed a new set of standards governing the introduction in evidence of statements obtained from the defendant through police interrogation. Actually, to a degree these standards were not entirely new. They had been suggested, at least in part, …

The Citizen On Trial: The New Confession Rules, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Commenting on why it has taken the United States so long to apply "the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel to the proceedings in the stationhouse as well as to those in the courtroom" - as the Supreme Court did in Miranda v. Arizona - this author notes that, "To a large extent this is so because here, as elsewhere, there has been a wide gap between the principles to which we aspire and the practices we actually employ."

A Dissent From The Miranda Dissents: Some Comments On The 'New' Fifth Amendment And The Old 'Voluntariness' Test, Yale Kamisar

Articles

F the several conferences and workshops (and many lunch conversations) on police interrogation and confessions in which I have participated this past summer3 are any indication, Miranda v. Arizona' has evoked much anger and spread much sorrow among judges, lawyers and professors. In the months and years ahead, such reaction is likely to be translated into microscopic analyses and relentless, probing criticism of the majority opinion. During this period of agonizing appraisal and reappraisal, I think it important that various assumptions and assertions in the dissenting opinions do not escape attention.

Criminal Law And Procedure - Admissibility Of Confessions - Exhortations To Tell The Truth, Dan K. Cook

Michigan Law Review

Defendant, while in the custody of police officers, confessed to the crime of murder. It was shown that the police officers during the course of defendant's examination, stated to the defendant that "it was better for him to tell the whole truth," and ''You are not telling the truth, give us the truth on this," "You might as well tell the truth; to me now," "I advise you to tell the truth in this case." In the subsequent prosecution of the defendant for murder, it was held that the confession was properly admissible notwithstanding these statements by the officers. Commonwealth …

Prohibition And The Doctrine Of The Weeks Case, Thomas E. Atkinson

Michigan Law Review

One of the most disputed present day questions is whether evidence obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures should be admissible. The case of Weeks v. United States is perhaps the leading authority upon the proposition that evidence procured by officers through unreasonable search is not admissible. The holding may be justified upon how theories, vis., (1) that the admission of the evidence substantially violates the rule against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment, (2) that the exclusion of the evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.