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Articles 61 - 70 of 70
Full-Text Articles in Law and Psychology
To Tell What We Know Or Wait For Godot?, Phoebe C. Ellsworth
To Tell What We Know Or Wait For Godot?, Phoebe C. Ellsworth
Articles
Professor Elliott raises two questions about the American Psychological Association's practice of submitting amicus briefs to the courts. First, are our data sufficiently valid, consistent, and generalizable to be applicable to the real world issues? Second, are amicus briefs adequate to communicate scientific findings? The first of these is not a general question, but must be addressed anew each time the Association considers a new issue. An evaluation of the quality and sufficiency of scientific knowledge about racial discrimination, for example, tells us nothing at all about the quality and sufficiency of scientific knowledge about sexual abuse. "Are the data …
Some Implications Of Cognitive Psychology For Risk Regulation, Roger G. Noll, James E. Krier
Some Implications Of Cognitive Psychology For Risk Regulation, Roger G. Noll, James E. Krier
Articles
Beginning with a set of books and articles published in the 1950s, cognitive psychologists have developed a new descriptive theory of how people make decisions under conditions of risk and uncertainty. A dominant theme in the theory is that most people do not evaluate risky circumstances in the manner assumed by conventional decision theory-they do not, that is, seek to maximize the expected value of some function when selecting among actions with uncertain outcomes. The purpose of this article is to consider some implications of the cognitive theory for regulatory policies designed to control risks to life, health, and the …
Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, Phoebe C. Ellsworth
Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, Phoebe C. Ellsworth
Articles
Few advocates of the jury system would argue that the average juror is as competent a tribunal as the averagejudge. Whatever competence the jury has is a function of two of its attributes: its number and its interaction. The fact that a jury must be composed of at least six people,' with different backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives, provides some protection against decisions based on an idiosyncratic view of the facts. Not only must the jury include at least six people, but they must be chosen in a manner that conforms to the ideal of the jury as representative of community …
Comments On Parfit, Donald H. Regan
Comments On Parfit, Donald H. Regan
Articles
I will begin by saying that I am persuaded by most of Derek's claims and arguments. That may tend to make for rather uninteresting commentary, but I shall try to find something to say. I shall offer only one criticism of the main part of Derek's paper, and then I shall discuss at somewhat greater length the questions he raises in the last section of his paper. In the main body of the paper, Derek attempts to prove that if we accept what he calls the Complex View of personal identity, then we must abandon what he calls the Equal …
Trial-Type Ceremonies And Defendant Behavior: 'Moralizing' And 'Cooling In' In An Eviction Setting, Richard O. Lempert
Trial-Type Ceremonies And Defendant Behavior: 'Moralizing' And 'Cooling In' In An Eviction Setting, Richard O. Lempert
Articles
This study uses hearing transcripts to examine judge-defendant interaction in a trial-type setting. The setting is a public housing eviction hearing; judges are eviction board members and defendants are tenants facing eviction for non-payment of rent. All tenants in the sample were formally evicted, but in each case the execution of the eviction order was stayed on the condition that the tenant pay his rent. Two forms of verbal interaction are identified. The first, “moralizing” is deemed present when one or more board members directs a degrading remark toward the tenant. The second, “cooling in” is deemed present when one …
Alternatives To Civil Commitment Of The Mentally Ill: Practical Guides And Constitutional Imperatives, David L. Chambers
Alternatives To Civil Commitment Of The Mentally Ill: Practical Guides And Constitutional Imperatives, David L. Chambers
Articles
In 1930, Ford sold Fords only in black and states offered treatment for mental illness only in public mental hospitals. Today, new views of mental health care and mental health problems have begotten a galaxy of new treatment settings. Few cities can boast community-based programs sufficient to meet their needs, but almost all cities of any size rely increasingly on outpatient programs. The large public mental hospitals still stand, of course. Indeed, every year more people enter public hospitals than entered the year before. Over 400,000 Americans were admitted as inpatients to state and county mental hospitals last year.1 Partly …
Emotional Disturbance As Legal Damage, Herbert F. Goodrich
Emotional Disturbance As Legal Damage, Herbert F. Goodrich
Articles
MENTAL pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone. Lord Wensleydale's famous dictum in Lynch v. Knight will serve as a starting point for this discussion. His lordship's notion of mental pain is evidently that of a "state of mind" or feeling, hidden in the inner consciousness of the individual; an intangible, evanescent something too elusive for the hardheaded workaday common law to handle. Likewise, in that very interesting problem regarding recovery for damages sustained through fright, it is always assumed, tacitly or expressly, that mere …
Statutory Abolition Of Defense Of Insanity In Criminal Cases, John R. Rood
Statutory Abolition Of Defense Of Insanity In Criminal Cases, John R. Rood
Articles
The great lengths to which the defense of insanity has been carried in homicide cases has induced numerous legislative attempts to abolish the evil; and the fate which such legislation has met and deserves at the hands of the courts is a matter of considerable interest.
Fright Without Physical Impact But Resulting In Physical Injury, Joseph H. Drake
Fright Without Physical Impact But Resulting In Physical Injury, Joseph H. Drake
Articles
The recent Maryland case of Green v. T. A. Shoemaker & Co., reported in 73 Atlantic Reporter, 688, (June, 1909) puts this jurisdiction squarely on the side of those courts that do allow recovery for fright alone, if physical injury is caused thereby. The court confesses that "the numerical weight of authority supports the general rule that there can be no recovery for nervous affections unaccompanied by contemporaneous physical injury," but nevertheless holds firmly with the minority of the courts to the view that there are exceptions to this rule and that this case falls within the exceptions.
Confinement Of The Insane, Thomas M. Cooley
Confinement Of The Insane, Thomas M. Cooley
Articles
The time is almost within the memory of living persons when it was deemed not only lawful but proper to confine persons afflicted with mental disease in dungeons and with chains, and to subject them to beating, at the discretion of their keepers, in order to subdue their senseless fury and drive away their delusions.1 The notions of an ignorant and barbarous age justified such treatment, but the common law on the subject has been so much modified in the greater intelligence of the present century that opinions as to how much of the old rules remain must be expressed …