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Articles 301 - 305 of 305

Full-Text Articles in Law and Philosophy

The Requirement Of Death: Mandatory Language In The Pennsylvania Death Penalty Statute, Bruce Ledewitz Jan 1982

The Requirement Of Death: Mandatory Language In The Pennsylvania Death Penalty Statute, Bruce Ledewitz

Ledewitz Papers

Published scholarship collected from academic journals, law reviews, newspaper publications & online periodicals.


The Requirement Of Death: Mandatory Language In The Pennsylvania Death Penalty Statute, Bruce Ledewitz Jan 1982

The Requirement Of Death: Mandatory Language In The Pennsylvania Death Penalty Statute, Bruce Ledewitz

Ledewitz Papers

Published scholarship collected from academic journals, law reviews, newspaper publications & online periodicals.


One Philosophy For An American Revolution, Paul K. Conkin Mar 1979

One Philosophy For An American Revolution, Paul K. Conkin

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Philosophy of the American Revolution by Morton White


The Uncertain Power Of The President To Execute The Laws, Bruce Ledewitz Jan 1979

The Uncertain Power Of The President To Execute The Laws, Bruce Ledewitz

Ledewitz Papers

Published scholarship collected from academic journals, law reviews, newspaper publications & online periodicals.


Jus Non Scriptum And The Reliance Principle, Stanley L. Paulson Nov 1976

Jus Non Scriptum And The Reliance Principle, Stanley L. Paulson

Michigan Law Review

On the Continent, a general theory of customary law has been developed-what I term the Continental theory; it identifies formation and validity as the central issues in the analysis of custom and customary law. Yet the Continental theory, notwithstanding its longevity and continuing favorable reception among international lawyers, is ridden with problems. In particular, as I argue in the following section, the theory fails for want of a coherent position on the formation issue. In the course of my argument, I suggest a classification of the norms of customary law in terms of a generic category broader in scope than …