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In (Partial) Praise Of (Some) Compromise: Comments On Tebbe, Chad Flanders Jan 2018

In (Partial) Praise Of (Some) Compromise: Comments On Tebbe, Chad Flanders

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I want to begin by sketching a point of view that, at best, makes only an implicit showing in Tebbe's persuasive, thoughtful, and challenging book. That viewpoint looks something like this:2 religion is unique, not just in substance but also in form. Start with substance: religion is a way of looking at the world as not exhausted by secular values or concerns; for money, prestige, or for "utility" broadly construed, or even exhausted by morality. Religion asks, repeatedly of those who believe in it, to do seemingly impossible things. It counts on miracles. Religion sees the world and our lives, …


The Presumptions Of Classical Liberal Constitutionalism, Matthew J. Lindsay Jan 2017

The Presumptions Of Classical Liberal Constitutionalism, Matthew J. Lindsay

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Richard A. Epstein’s The Classical Liberal Constitution is an imposing addition to the burgeoning body of legal scholarship that seeks to “restore” a robust conception of economic liberty and limited government to its rightful place at the center of American constitutionalism. Legislators and judges operating within a “classical liberal conception of government,” Epstein explains, would approach skeptically “[a]ll [regulatory] proposals that deviate from the basic common law protections of life, liberty, and property.” Classical liberal constitutional courts would thus renounce the toothless rational basis review of the post-New Deal “progressive mindset,” and instead subject to exacting scrutiny the government’s “purported …


Criminals Behind The Veil: Political Philosophy And Punishment, Chad Flanders Jan 2016

Criminals Behind The Veil: Political Philosophy And Punishment, Chad Flanders

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There is evidence everywhere that our criminal justice system is undergoing a crisis of practice. Increased police violence and the concomitant distrust of police in many communities, fear of aggressive enforcement tactics more generally, worries about widespread governmental surveillance and, above all, a concern with overcriminalization and mass incarceration-these are the dreary and familiar stuff of daily headlines. But, this crisis of practice in tum reflects a deeper crisis of how we theorize about criminal law. We lack, for the most part, any worked-out theory of what the policing and processing of crime should look like. Nor do we have …


Republicanism: Philosophical Aspects, Mortimer N.S. Sellers Jan 2015

Republicanism: Philosophical Aspects, Mortimer N.S. Sellers

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Republicanism is the doctrine that public power should always serve the common good of all those subject to its rule. This raises the question how to do so most effectively, either through particular policies or through constitutional structure (‘the republican form of government'). The republican philosophical tradition began with Plato and Aristotle, flowered in the writings of Marcus Tullius Cicero, and reappeared with the revival of learning in such authors as Niccolo Machiavelli, James Harrington, John Adams, and Immanuel Kant. More recently Philip Peuit, Jürgen Habermas, and others have returned to the republican conception of liberty as nondomination, and how …


The Case Against The Case Against The Death Penalty, Chad W. Flanders Jan 2013

The Case Against The Case Against The Death Penalty, Chad W. Flanders

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Despite the continuing belief by a majority of Americans that the death penalty is morally permissible, the death penalty has few academic defenders. This lack of academic defenders is puzzling because of the strong philosophical justification the death penalty finds in traditional theories of punishment. The three major theories of punishment (the deterrent, the retributive, and the rehabilitative), far from showing that the death penalty is not justified, tend to provide good reasons to favor the death penalty. Indeed, every attempt to show that the major theories of punishment rule out the death penalty either involves smuggling in other assumptions …


Micro-Symposium On Orin Kerr's 'A Theory Of Law', Laura Appleman, Shawn Bayern, Adam D. Chandler, Robert Cheren, Miriam A. Cherry, Ross E. Davies, Lee Anne Fennell, Paul A. Gowder, Caitlin Hartsell, Kieran Healy, Robert A. James, Jeffrey H. Kahn, Orin S. Kerr, Jacob T. Levy, Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Orly Lobel, Geoffrey A. Manne, Chad M. Oldfather, Ronak Patel, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Alexandra J. Roberts, Kent Scheidegger, Arthur Stock, Anders Walker Jan 2013

Micro-Symposium On Orin Kerr's 'A Theory Of Law', Laura Appleman, Shawn Bayern, Adam D. Chandler, Robert Cheren, Miriam A. Cherry, Ross E. Davies, Lee Anne Fennell, Paul A. Gowder, Caitlin Hartsell, Kieran Healy, Robert A. James, Jeffrey H. Kahn, Orin S. Kerr, Jacob T. Levy, Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Orly Lobel, Geoffrey A. Manne, Chad M. Oldfather, Ronak Patel, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Alexandra J. Roberts, Kent Scheidegger, Arthur Stock, Anders Walker

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For more than a century, careful readers of the Green Bag have known that “[t]here is nothing sacred in a theory of law...which has outlived its usefulness or which was radically wrong from the beginning...The question is What is the law and what is the true public policy?” Professor Orin Kerr bravely, creatively, and eloquently answered that question in his article, “A Theory of Law,” in the Autumn 2012 issue of the Green Bag. Uniquely among all theories of law that I know of, Kerr’s answer to the fundamental question of law and true public policy enables all scholars to …


Exile On Main Street: Competing Traditions And Due Process Dissent, Colin Starger Jul 2012

Exile On Main Street: Competing Traditions And Due Process Dissent, Colin Starger

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Everybody loves great dissents. Professors teach them, students learn from them, and journalists quote them. Yet legal scholars have long puzzled over how dissents actually impact the development of doctrine. Recent work by notable empirical scholars proposes to measure the influence of dissents by reference to their subsequent citation in case law. This Article challenges the theoretical basis for this empirical approach and argues that it fails to account for the profound influence that uncited dissents have exerted in law. To overcome this gap in the empirical approach, this Article proposes an alternative method that permits analysis of contextual and …


The Mutability Of Public Reason, Chad Flanders Jan 2012

The Mutability Of Public Reason, Chad Flanders

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Rawls's “public reason” has not been without its critics. One criticism is that public reason is “conservative.” Public reason must rely on those beliefs that are “widely shared” among citizens. But if public reason relies on widely shared beliefs, how can it change without departing from those beliefs, thus violating public reason? In part one of my essay, I introduce the conservatism objection and describe two unsatisfactory responses to it. Part two argues that there are aspects of public reason which diminish the force of the conservatism objection: first, that public reason is historical, and second, that it is mutable.


What Useful Role (If Any) Could Legal Positivism Play In The Study Or Advancement Of International Law?, Mortimer N.S. Sellers Jan 2012

What Useful Role (If Any) Could Legal Positivism Play In The Study Or Advancement Of International Law?, Mortimer N.S. Sellers

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What useful role (if any) could legal positivism play in the study or advancement of international law? For most of those who remember this once fashionable term at all, "international legal positivism" is redolent of the early years of the twentieth century-of Lassa Oppenheim' at best, and at worst of his model, John Austin, who famously denied that international law is or ever could be genuine law at all, "properly so called." 2 "Positive" law in its central and most usual sense is law "set by a sovereign individual or a sovereign body ... to a person or persons in …


Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray Jan 2011

Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray

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How central should hedonic adaptation be to the establishment of sentencing policy?

In earlier work, Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur (BBM) drew some normative significance from the psychological studies of adaptability for punishment policy. In particular, they argued that retributivists and utilitarians alike are obliged on pain of inconsistency to take account of the fact that most prisoners, most of the time, adapt to imprisonment in fairly short order, and therefore suffer much less than most of us would expect. They also argued that ex-prisoners don't adapt well upon re-entry to society and that social planners should consider their post-release …


Bentham On Stilts: The Bare Relevance Of Subjectivity To Retributive Justice, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray Jan 2010

Bentham On Stilts: The Bare Relevance Of Subjectivity To Retributive Justice, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray

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In recent work, various scholars have challenged retributive justice theorists to pay more attention to the subjective experience of punishment, specifically how punishment affects the experiences and well-being of offenders. The claim developed by these “subjectivists” is that because people’s experiences with pain and suffering differ, both diachronically and inter-subjectively, their punishments will have to be tailored to individual circumstances as well.

Our response is that this set of claims, once scrutinized, is either true, but of limited significance, or nontrivial, but unsound. We don’t doubt the possibility that different people will react differently to the same infliction of punishment. …


The Dna Of An Argument: A Case Study In Legal Logos, Colin Starger Jul 2009

The Dna Of An Argument: A Case Study In Legal Logos, Colin Starger

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This Article develops a framework for analyzing legal argument through an in-depth case study of the debate over federal actions for post-conviction DNA access. Building on the Aristotelian concept of logos, this Article maintains that the persuasive power of legal logic depends in part on the rhetorical characteristics of premises, inferences, and conclusions in legal proofs. After sketching a taxonomy that distinguishes between prototypical argument logo (formal, empirical, narrative, and categorical), the Article applies its framework to parse the rhetorical dynamics at play in litigation over post-conviction access to DNA evidence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, focusing in particular on …


The Possibility Of A Secular First Amendment, Chad Flanders Jan 2008

The Possibility Of A Secular First Amendment, Chad Flanders

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In a series of articles and now in their new book, Religious Freedom and the Constitution, Lawrence Sager and Christopher Eisgruber (E&S) defend an interpretation of the religion clauses of the First Amendment which, they write, "denies that religion is a constitutional anomaly, a category of human experience that demands special benefits and/or necessitates special restrictions." While not a book review in the traditional sense, my essay takes E&S's defense of a secular First Amendment as a starting point and asks, how did we get to the point where an interpretation of the First Amendment which denies that religion is …


Legality And Discretion, Stephen C. Thaman Jan 2007

Legality And Discretion, Stephen C. Thaman

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Volume II: This is an encyclopedia entry on legality and discretion.


Mathematics And The Legal Imagination: A Response To Paul Edelman, Michael I. Meyerson Jan 2002

Mathematics And The Legal Imagination: A Response To Paul Edelman, Michael I. Meyerson

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This article, a response to a review by Prof. Paul Edelman of Prof. Meyerson's book "Political Numeracy: Mathematical Perspectives on Our Chaotic Constitution," explains how the study of mathematics can spur creative legal thinking.


Persuasion: A Model Of Majoritarianism As Adjudication, Christopher J. Peters Oct 2001

Persuasion: A Model Of Majoritarianism As Adjudication, Christopher J. Peters

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This article, which has been published in slightly revised form at 96 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1 (2001), is an application and extension of my theory of adjudication as representation, which holds that the procedural elements of litigant participation and interest representation confer democratic legitimacy on court decisions. In the article, I first develop the notion of a "majoritarian difficulty": the often-ignored tension between democratic self-rule and majority domination of the political minority. Second, I offer a model of majoritarianism as a type of adjudication, in which interested parties lobby for favorable decisions by a neutral decisionmaker. Third, I contend that …


Outcomes, Reasons, And Equality, Christopher J. Peters Oct 2000

Outcomes, Reasons, And Equality, Christopher J. Peters

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In this article, Christopher Peters responds to arguments made by Kenneth Simons in The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L. REV. 693 (2000), in which Professor Simons defends the normative value of equal treatment against Peters’s earlier critiques. Peters first explains and justifies his attack on deontological rather than consequentialist motivations for equal treatment. He then articulates a difference between two distinct conceptions of “treatment”: an outcome-focused and an holistic conception. Peters argues that the holistic conception must be accepted by anyone who defends a deontological theory of equality. Peters then explains how certain of Simons’s arguments in defense …


Slouching Towards Equality, Christopher J. Peters May 1999

Slouching Towards Equality, Christopher J. Peters

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Drawing on his work in two previous articles, Christopher Peters contends that uncertainty about substantive moral norms cannot justify a presumption of equal treatment. Arguments for equal treatment in the face of uncertainty are types of consequentialist claims; they are not claims of what Peters calls prescriptive equality, that is, for treating likes alike merely because they are alike. Peters contends that the consequentialist case for equal treatment as a response to uncertainty fails in two respects. First, it fails to demonstrate that equal treatment is likely to be a more satisfactory response to moral uncertainty than unequal treatment. Second, …


Equality Revisited, Christopher J. Peters Apr 1997

Equality Revisited, Christopher J. Peters

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In legal, political, and philosophical discourse, and indeed in everyday life, equality often plays the role of a normatively significant prescriptive principle, a principle that provides reasons for action. Professor Peters, however, joins Peter Westen and others who argue that the traditional statement of prescriptive equality-equals are entitled to equal treatment--is normatively empty because it is a tautology. Like Professor Westen, Professor Peters notes that this traditional principle translates into a statement of simple redundancy: people entitled to equal treatment are entitled to equal treatment. Unlike Professor Westen, however, Professor Peters discerns a nontautological principle of equality, which claims that …


Rejecting The Fruits Of Action: The Regeneration Of The Waste Land’S Legal System, Phillip J. Closius Jan 1995

Rejecting The Fruits Of Action: The Regeneration Of The Waste Land’S Legal System, Phillip J. Closius

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In his greatest work, The Waste Land, T. S. Eliot presents a picture of twentieth century Western civilization as a culture which has lost its essential values and has come undone from its historical moorings. Material wealth has become the focal point of society and its inhabitants. In such a value distorted context, human relationships are devoid of meaning. Honest communication and a meaningful life for the soul and intellect are lost in a dehumanizing daily grind. Religious, communal, and even familial values are subverted to a culturally encouraged drive for personal gain. In this respect, modern Western civilization in …