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Articles 421 - 450 of 545

Full-Text Articles in Law and Philosophy

The Death Penalty In Traditional China, Chin Kim, Theodore R. Leblang Jul 2016

The Death Penalty In Traditional China, Chin Kim, Theodore R. Leblang

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


The English East India Company And The Modern Corporation: Legacies, Lessons, And Limitations, Philip J. Stern Mar 2016

The English East India Company And The Modern Corporation: Legacies, Lessons, And Limitations, Philip J. Stern

Seattle University Law Review

The English East India Company was first chartered in 1600, endured until the late nineteenth century, and, in a clever act of corporate resurrection, has even recently returned as a global, upmarket retail outlet selling fine foods and commemorative coins. It has also endured in the popular imagination and culture, churning out heroes and villains alike in film, television, and video games. The script writer for a forthcoming BBC miniseries, in which the East India Company stars as the prime antagonist, even noted recently that the Company was like “the CIA, the NSA, and the biggest, baddest multinational corporation on …


Customary International Law: A Reconceptualization, Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker Jan 2016

Customary International Law: A Reconceptualization, Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker

Brooklyn Journal of International Law

The current state of international law is one of deep confusion over the role of state practice and opinio juris within the customary element. The debate between adherents of “modern custom” versus those of “traditional custom” has resulted in deep uncertainty and confusion. New theories of customary international law have proved inadequate in clarifying the current state of the field. Confusions over the meanings and relationships between state practice and opinio juris aside, current approaches are all also flawed due to a heavily state-centric bias that fails to take into account the very real affects that norm-generating transnational actors have …


Taking Constitutional Identities Away From The Courts, Pietro Faraguna Jan 2016

Taking Constitutional Identities Away From The Courts, Pietro Faraguna

Brooklyn Journal of International Law

In federal states, constitutional identity is the glue that holds together the Union. On the contrary, in the European Union—not a fully-fledged federation yet—each Member state has its own constitutional identity. On the one hand, the Union may benefit from the particular knowledge, innovation, history, diversity, and culture of its individual states. On the other hand, identity-related claims may have a disintegrating effect. Constitutional diversity needs to come to terms with risks of disintegration. The Treaty on the European Union seeks a balance, providing the obligation to respect the constitutional identities of its Member states. Drawing from the European experience, …


Confounding Ockham's Razor: Minilateralism And International Economic Regulation, Eric C. Chaffee Jan 2016

Confounding Ockham's Razor: Minilateralism And International Economic Regulation, Eric C. Chaffee

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

In Minilateralism: How Trade Alliances, Soft Law, and Financial Engineering Are Redefining Economic Statecraft, Professor Chris Brummer embraces the complexity of the global economic system and its regulation by exploring the emerging role and dominance of varying strands of economic collaboration and regulation that he collectively refers to as “minilateralism.” In describing the turn toward minilateralism, Brummer notes a number of key features of this new minilateral system, including a shift away from global cooperation to strategic alliances composed of the smallest group necessary to achieve a particular goal, a turn from formal treaties to informal non-binding accords and other …


Legal Epistemologies, Howard Schweber Dec 2015

Legal Epistemologies, Howard Schweber

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.


Creating Kairos At The Supreme Court: Shelby County, Citizens United, Hobby Lobby, And The Judicial Construction Of Right Moments, Linda L. Berger Oct 2015

Creating Kairos At The Supreme Court: Shelby County, Citizens United, Hobby Lobby, And The Judicial Construction Of Right Moments, Linda L. Berger

The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process

No abstract provided.


The Third Pillar Of Jurisprudence: Social Legal Theory, Brian Z. Tamanaha May 2015

The Third Pillar Of Jurisprudence: Social Legal Theory, Brian Z. Tamanaha

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


Four Futures Of Legal Automation, Frank A. Pasquale, Glyn Cashwell Jan 2015

Four Futures Of Legal Automation, Frank A. Pasquale, Glyn Cashwell

Faculty Scholarship

Simple legal jobs (such as document coding) are prime candidates for legal automation. More complex tasks cannot be routinized. So far, the debate on the likely scope and intensity of legal automation has focused on the degree to which legal tasks are simple or complex. Just as important to the legal profession, however, is the degree of regulation or deregulation likely in the future.

Situations involving conflicting rights, unique fact patterns, and open-ended laws will remain excessively difficult to automate for an extended period of time. Deregulation, however, may effectively strip many persons of their rights, rendering once-hard cases simple. …


Time-Mindedness And Jurisprudence, David Luban Jan 2015

Time-Mindedness And Jurisprudence, David Luban

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Analytic jurisprudence often strikes outsiders as a discipline unto itself, unconnected with the problems that other legal scholarship investigates. Gerald Postema, in the article to which this paper responds, traces this “unsociability” to two narrowing defects in the project of analytic jurisprudence: (1) from Austin on, it has concerned itself largely with the analysis of professional concepts, without connecting that analysis with other disciplines that study law, nor with the history of jurisprudence itself, nor with general philosophy; (2) analytic jurisprudence studies only time-­‐slice legal systems, rather than legal systems unfolding in history. He argues that a time-­‐slice legal system …


Reflections On Freedom And Criminal Responsibility In Late Twentieth Century American Legal Thought, Thomas A. Green, Merrill Catharine Hodnefield Jan 2015

Reflections On Freedom And Criminal Responsibility In Late Twentieth Century American Legal Thought, Thomas A. Green, Merrill Catharine Hodnefield

Articles

It is now a commonplace among historians that American criminal jurisprudence underwent a dramatic change something like two-thirds to three-quarters into the last century. Roughly, this development is understood as a shift (or drift) from a more-or-less pure consequentialism to a "mixed theory" wherein retributivism played a major-at times, dominant-role. As the new paradigm remains intact, now approaching a half-century, the development qualifies as a significant historical fact. The fact applies not only to the history of justification for punishment but also to conceptions of the underlying principle of (basis for) responsibility. The two are rightly distinguished: for many scholars …


The Legacy Of Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013): A Legal Theory And Methodology For Hedgehogs, Hercules, And One Right Answers, Imer Flores Dec 2014

The Legacy Of Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013): A Legal Theory And Methodology For Hedgehogs, Hercules, And One Right Answers, Imer Flores

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this paper the author addresses Ronald Dworkin’s work and assesses his legacy to legal, moral and political philosophy. And so, considers among its merits having developed an original legal theory with its distinctive methodology, which not only has transcended the Natural Law and Legal Positivism dichotomy, but also has reintegrated law into a branch of political morality and defended as a corollary the one right answer thesis. Hence, commences by identifying the dworkininan challenge; continues by introducing some basic definitions and distinctions between jurisprudence, legal philosophy (or philosophy of law) and legal theory (or theory of law), on the …


Closing The Doors To Justice: A Critique Of Pimentel V. Dreyfus And The Application Of Legal Formalism To The Elimination Of Food Assistance Benefits For Legal Immigrants, Hannah Zommick Nov 2014

Closing The Doors To Justice: A Critique Of Pimentel V. Dreyfus And The Application Of Legal Formalism To The Elimination Of Food Assistance Benefits For Legal Immigrants, Hannah Zommick

Seattle University Law Review

This Comment contends that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Pimentel v. Dreyfus employed a legal formalist approach and that by applying this framework, the court prevented legal immigrants, who were caught between the strict eligibility restrictions of welfare reform, from asserting their rights through the justice system. The legal formalist approach “treats the law as a set of scientific formulae or principles that are derived from the study of case law. These principles create an internal analytical framework which, when applied to a set of facts, leads the decision maker, through logical deduction, to the correct outcome in a case.” …


Twenty-One Theses On The Legal Legacy Of The French Revolution In Latin America, Dante Figueroa Sep 2014

Twenty-One Theses On The Legal Legacy Of The French Revolution In Latin America, Dante Figueroa

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


The Improbability Of Positivism, Andrew Tutt Sep 2014

The Improbability Of Positivism, Andrew Tutt

Pace Law Review

Ronald Dworkin’s contributions to legal philosophy have been subject to severe criticism in recent years. Other legal philosophers call his arguments “deflected or discredited,” laced with “philosophical confusions,” and “deeply embedded” mistakes. As Brian Leiter writes, “[t]he only good news in the story about Dworkin’s impact on law and philosophy is that most of the field declined to follow the Dworkinian path . . . .”

This Article endeavors to show that, far from an effort beset with primitive errors, Dworkin’s challenge to legal positivism in the opening pages of his seminal work was neither misguided nor trivial. Rather, Dworkin’s …


Epistemologies Of The South And Human Rights: Santos And The Quest For Global And Cognitive Justice, Jose-Manuel Barreto Jul 2014

Epistemologies Of The South And Human Rights: Santos And The Quest For Global And Cognitive Justice, Jose-Manuel Barreto

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

This article offers an introduction to Boaventura de Sousa Santos's general philosophical orientation, explores the concepts of "abyssal thinking" and "epistemologies of the South," and draws consequences for the theory of human rights, taking into consideration the idea of rewriting the history of rights in the context of colonialism and Santos's proposal of a post-abyssal conception of rights and intercultural dialogue. This piece ends with some considerations on the cultural and political conditions for advancing a new understanding of human rights.


Rejecting The Legal Process Theory Joker: Bill Nelson's Scholarship On Judge Edward Weinfeld And Justice Byron White, Brad Snyder Jun 2014

Rejecting The Legal Process Theory Joker: Bill Nelson's Scholarship On Judge Edward Weinfeld And Justice Byron White, Brad Snyder

Chicago-Kent Law Review

My contribution to this tribute places Bill Nelson’s scholarship about Judge Edward Weinfeld and Justice Byron White within several contexts. It is a personal history of Nelson the law student, law clerk, and young scholar; an intellectual history of legal theory since the 1960s; an examination of the influence of legal theory on Nelson’s scholarship based on his writings about Weinfeld and White; and an example of how legal historians contend with the subject of judicial reputation. Nelson was one of many former Warren Court and Burger Court clerks who joined the professoriate and rejected the legal process theory that …


The Federal Rules At 75: Dispute Resolution, Private Enforcement Or Decisions According To Law?, James R. Maxeiner Jun 2014

The Federal Rules At 75: Dispute Resolution, Private Enforcement Or Decisions According To Law?, James R. Maxeiner

Georgia State University Law Review

This essay is a critical response to the 2013 commemorations of the75th anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were introduced in 1938 to provide procedure to decide cases on their merits. The Rules were designed to replace decisions under the “sporting theory of justice”with decisions according to law.

By 1976, at midlife, it was clear that they were not achieving their goal. America’s proceduralists split into two sides about what to do. One side promotes rules that control and conclude litigation: e.g.,plausibility pleading, case management, limited discovery, cost indemnity for discovery, and summary …


Why Restate The Bundle? The Disintegration Of The Restatement Of Property, Thomas W. Merrill, Henry E. Smith Jan 2014

Why Restate The Bundle? The Disintegration Of The Restatement Of Property, Thomas W. Merrill, Henry E. Smith

Faculty Scholarship

The American Law Institute (ALI) has devoted a great deal of time and energy to restating the law of property. To date, the ALI has produced 17 volumes that bear the name First, Second, or Third Restatement of Property. There is unquestionably much that is valuable in these materials. On the whole, however, the effort has been a disappointment. Some volumes seek faithfully to restate the consensus view of the law; others are transparently devoted to law reform. The ratio of reform to restatement has increased over time, to the point where significant portions of the Third Restatement …


Jack Balkin's Rich Historicism And Diet Originalism: Health Benefits And Risks For The Constitutional System, Neil S. Siegel Apr 2013

Jack Balkin's Rich Historicism And Diet Originalism: Health Benefits And Risks For The Constitutional System, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

In Living Originalism, Jack Balkin reasons from two points of view — the perspective of the constitutional system as a whole and the perspective of the faithful participant in that system. First, he provides a systemic account of constitutional change, which he calls “living constitutionalism.” Second, he offers an individual approach to constitutional interpretation and construction, which he calls “framework originalism” or “the method of text and principle.” Reasoning from the systemic perspective, Balkin develops a compelling theory of the processes of constitutional change. Balkin may insufficiently appreciate, however, that public candor about — or even deep awareness of — …


Instrumentalist And Holmesian Voices In The Rhetoric Of Reapportionment: The Opinions Of Justices Brennan And Frankfurter In Baker V. Carr, Carlo A. Pedrioli Jan 2013

Instrumentalist And Holmesian Voices In The Rhetoric Of Reapportionment: The Opinions Of Justices Brennan And Frankfurter In Baker V. Carr, Carlo A. Pedrioli

Faculty Scholarship

In his autobiography, Chief Justice Earl Warren described Baker v.Carr as “the most important case of [his] tenure on the Court.” Following Brown v. Board of Education by eight years, Baker was the second “blockbuster” case of the Warren Court. Warren felt that, if the progeny of Baker had preceded Brown, Brown would have been unnecessary. As with other major Supreme Court cases, Baker featured rhetoric from highly influential justices, two of whom in this case were Justice William Brennan and Justice Felix Frankfurter. Justice Brennan would write the groundbreaking opinion for the Court that would be part of “the …


Devising Law: On The Philosophy Of Legal Emblems, Peter Goodrich Jan 2013

Devising Law: On The Philosophy Of Legal Emblems, Peter Goodrich

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.


Micro-Symposium On Orin Kerr's 'A Theory Of Law', Laura Appleman, Shawn Bayern, Adam D. Chandler, Robert Cheren, Miriam A. Cherry, Ross E. Davies, Lee Anne Fennell, Paul A. Gowder, Caitlin Hartsell, Kieran Healy, Robert A. James, Jeffrey H. Kahn, Orin S. Kerr, Jacob T. Levy, Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Orly Lobel, Geoffrey A. Manne, Chad M. Oldfather, Ronak Patel, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Alexandra J. Roberts, Kent Scheidegger, Arthur Stock, Anders Walker Jan 2013

Micro-Symposium On Orin Kerr's 'A Theory Of Law', Laura Appleman, Shawn Bayern, Adam D. Chandler, Robert Cheren, Miriam A. Cherry, Ross E. Davies, Lee Anne Fennell, Paul A. Gowder, Caitlin Hartsell, Kieran Healy, Robert A. James, Jeffrey H. Kahn, Orin S. Kerr, Jacob T. Levy, Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Orly Lobel, Geoffrey A. Manne, Chad M. Oldfather, Ronak Patel, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Alexandra J. Roberts, Kent Scheidegger, Arthur Stock, Anders Walker

All Faculty Scholarship

For more than a century, careful readers of the Green Bag have known that “[t]here is nothing sacred in a theory of law...which has outlived its usefulness or which was radically wrong from the beginning...The question is What is the law and what is the true public policy?” Professor Orin Kerr bravely, creatively, and eloquently answered that question in his article, “A Theory of Law,” in the Autumn 2012 issue of the Green Bag. Uniquely among all theories of law that I know of, Kerr’s answer to the fundamental question of law and true public policy enables all scholars to …


Theorizing American Freedom, Anthony O'Rourke Apr 2012

Theorizing American Freedom, Anthony O'Rourke

Michigan Law Review

Some intellectual concepts once central to America's constitutional discourse are, for better and worse, no longer part of our political language. These concepts may be so alien to us that they would remain invisible without carefully reexamining the past to challenge the received narratives of America's constitutional development. Should constitutional theorists undertake this kind of historical reexamination? If so, to what extent should they be willing to stray from the disciplinary norms that govern intellectual history? And what normative aims can they reasonably expect to achieve by exploring ideas in our past that are no longer reflected in the Constitution's …


Grassroots Originalism: Rethinking The Politics Of Judicial Philosophy, Mary Ziegler Jan 2012

Grassroots Originalism: Rethinking The Politics Of Judicial Philosophy, Mary Ziegler

Scholarly Publications

How has originalism become so politically successful? In answering this question, leading scholarship has focused on the ways in which political leaders, judges, and lawyers have cultivated popular support for originalism. In one account, legal academics, politicians, and judges have explained the legal merits of originalism as a method of interpretation: its political neutrality and its democratic legitimacy. In a second version, political leaders—in particular, the Reagan Administration and the judges it nominated—made apparent that originalism would often produce outcomes that social conservatives found satisfactory. With some exceptions, leading studies primarily address the contributions made by elites to rhetoric about …


Experimental Pragmatism In The Third Globalization, Justin Deystone Jan 2012

Experimental Pragmatism In The Third Globalization, Justin Deystone

Publications

Pragmatism dominates contemporary legal thought, but knowing this isn’t knowing so much. Legal pragmatism means different things to different people, and as this essay argues, minimalist and experimentalist forms of regulation both share a broadly pragmatic sensibility about law and democracy. As a consequence, we need to tease out the various threads of legal pragmatism in the hope of distinguishing the pragmatisms that work from the ones that don’t, or less pragmatically, the ones that are just from the ones that are not. This knowledge will come from an ongoing assessment of the political stakes immanent in the pragmatisms, and …


On Equality: The Anti-Interference Principle, Donald J. Kochan Jan 2011

On Equality: The Anti-Interference Principle, Donald J. Kochan

University of Richmond Law Review

This essay seeks to summarize the general equality concept and proposes that equality requires that the government engage in anti-interference with individual choices and activities, so long as these things create no negative externalities for others. If we are serious about respecting equality, such interference actions should be avoided. Adopting an "anti-interference principle" is a necessary foundation for achieving the goal of true equality. The primary point is that equality matters. The purpose of this essay is not to survey the vast political, jurisprudential, and academic debate on equality, but instead, to take a broad look at the philosophical concept …


Justice As Play, Jack L. Sammons Mar 2010

Justice As Play, Jack L. Sammons

Mercer Law Review

I am interested here in using Johannes Huizinga's work on play, Homo Ludens, to explore a strange, yet civilizing, phenomenon. Why do we take those social disputes in our ordinary lives that often seem most serious and therefore most divisive, turn them over to playful participants in a legal game, and then choose, more or less, to call the outcome of this game justice and to trust it as such even to the point of preferring it to the political? Why, that is, do we think that it is justice that arises from this play?

This inquiry is not …


Shari'ah And Choice: What The United States Should Learn From Islamic Law About The Role Of Victims' Families In Death Penalty Cases, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1 (2010), Susan C. Hascall Jan 2010

Shari'ah And Choice: What The United States Should Learn From Islamic Law About The Role Of Victims' Families In Death Penalty Cases, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1 (2010), Susan C. Hascall

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.


In God We Trust: The Judicial Establishment Of American Civil Religion, 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 869 (2010), James J. Knicely, John W. Whitehead Jan 2010

In God We Trust: The Judicial Establishment Of American Civil Religion, 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 869 (2010), James J. Knicely, John W. Whitehead

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.