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Articles 31 - 33 of 33
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Reflections On Fuller And Perdue's The Reliance Interest In Contract Damages: A Positive Economic Framework, Avery W. Katz
Reflections On Fuller And Perdue's The Reliance Interest In Contract Damages: A Positive Economic Framework, Avery W. Katz
Faculty Scholarship
Fuller and Perdue's classic article, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, is regarded by many contemporary contracts scholars as the single most influential law review article in the field. For those of us who teach and think about contracts from the perspective of law and economics, the consensus would probably be close to unanimous. The article displays an approach highly congenial to an economic perspective. The connection goes beyond Fuller and Perdue's explicitly functional approach to law (which law and economics shares with other schools of thought descended from the legal realists) and beyond Fuller and Perdue's focus on …
Quantity And Price Adjustment In Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study Of Petroleum Coke, Victor P. Goldberg, John R. Erickson
Quantity And Price Adjustment In Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study Of Petroleum Coke, Victor P. Goldberg, John R. Erickson
Faculty Scholarship
Much economic activity takes place within a framework of complex, long-term contracts. While economists have shown increased interest in these contracts, surprisingly little is known about them, or, indeed, about how to analyze the contracting activity of private economic actors. A case study of the actual contracts used in one industry could provide sorely needed data about the way in which reasonably clever businessmen and lawyers cope with problems scholars might consider intractable. In this article, we provide such an analysis of contracts concerning a particular product – petroleum coke. We focus on the problems of quantity and price adjustment. …
Institutional Change And The Quasi-Invisible Hand, Victor P. Goldberg
Institutional Change And The Quasi-Invisible Hand, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
The fundamental principle of economics is that people will pursue their own self-interest within a given institutional framework. The economist's basic policy premise is that (so long as certain "market failures" do not arise) this self-interest will, like an Invisible Hand, guide resources to their proper usage; when market failures arise the usual policy prescription is to amend the rules (for example, by breaking up monopolies, placing an "optimal" tax on pollution, or redefining property rights) to make the marginal private costs and benefits equal to the marginal social costs and benefits so that the free play on self-interest will …