Law and Economics Commons^™

Maximum Vertical Price Fixing From Albrecht Through Brunswick To Khan: An Antitrust Odyssey, James M. Fesmire

Seattle University Law Review

The article attempts to sort out some of this confusion caused by the legal journey from Albrecht to Khan by portraying that long road as a successful example of the antitrust injury doctrine's ability to bring substantive antitrust law into compliance with the goals of antitrust. First, the article examines how the existence of successive monopoly provides an incentive for maximum vertical price fixing and how maximum vertical price fixing leads to an increase in consumer welfare. Second, it examines manufacturer alternatives to vertical price restraints, finding them less attractive in terms of social welfare. Third, the article analyzes other …

Resurrecting Incipiency: From Von's Grocery To Consumer Choice, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The merger incipiency doctrine is virtually ignored in the courts today. This article argues that it should be resurrected, and it also explores the ways that effectuating Congressional intent in the area would reinvigorate merger policy.

The article documents how the legislative history of the antimerger statutes shows that Congress intended mergers to be evaluated under an incipiency approach, and explores the possible meanings of this idea. It then shows that this is a strong basis for reviving significantly stricter or more prophylactic merger enforcement.

The article shows how there are aspects of the doctrine that could be revived without …

Afterword: Antitrust And American Business Abroad Revisited, David J. Gerber

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Three Types Of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, And Rules, Robert H. Lande, Howard P. Marvel

All Faculty Scholarship

Collusion can profitably be classified into three distinct types. In our classification, "Type I" collusion is the familiar direct agreement among colluding firms (a cartel) to raise prices or, equivalently, restrict output. Alternatively, firms can collude to disadvantage rivals in ways that causes those rivals to cut output. We term this "Type II" collusion. Its indirect effect is an increase in market prices.

A number of important collusion cases neither direct manipulation of prices or output, nor direct attacks on rivals. Examples include Supreme Court cases such as National Society of Professional Engineers v. US, Bates v. State Bar of …

The Evolution Of United States Antitrust Law: The Past, Present, And (Possible) Future, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

As the world’s nations rapidly move from systems in which central planning and monopoly are replaced by free markets,2 it becomes increasingly valuable to consider the histories of competition policy experienced in different nations, on a comparative basis.3 In this article, we focus on the history of antitrust in the United States, the first nation to develop and fully-articulate a competition policy, drawing out themes that may be useful to other countries as they contemplate the shape and direction of their own competition regimes. We show that the American competition policy has reflected an underlying stability and bi-partisanship, but that …

The Midas Touch: The Lethal Effect Of Wealth Maximization, Jeanne L. Schroeder

Articles

No abstract provided.

Measuring Market Power When The Firm Has Power In The Input And Output Markets, Keith N. Hylton, Mark Lasser

Faculty Scholarship

We examine the problem of measuring market power when the firm has monopoly power in the output market and monopsony power in the input market - a case we refer to as 'dual-market' power. We show how the Lerner index, which measures the mark-up over the marginal cost, can be modified to reflect the firm's ability to set price above the competitive level.

Recent Trends In Merger Enforcement In The United States: The Increasing Impact Of Economic Analysis, Robert H. Lande, James Langenfeld

All Faculty Scholarship

From its modern origins more than thirty years ago federal merger policy has centered around the use of standard surrogates for market power to make presumptions about the likely effects of mergers. Since that time it has been evolving towards an increasingly complex approach as economic considerations have expanded their influence on merger policy. This trend was solidified in the 1982 revision of the Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines, accelerated by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines' increased emphasis on unilateral (as opposed to collusive) anticompetitive effects, and has reached new heights in the …

Creating Competition Policy For Transition Economies: Introduction, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This is an introduction to a symposium on Creating Competition for Transition Economies. This article provides an overview of the topic, and also briefly introduces the authors of the articles in the symposium; William Kovacic, Eleanor Fox, Spencer Weber Waller, Malcolm Coate, and Armando Rodriguez.

The Problem With Baker Hughes And Syufy: On The Role Of Entry In Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.

Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories In Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.

The Factional Foundations Of Competition Policy In America 1888-1992, James May

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.

Strategic Alliances: Emerging Trends In Future Corporate Business, Naresh Menghraj Gehi

LLM Theses and Essays

A strategic alliance is an arrangement for economic collaboration between firms at the same level of distribution, involving an exchange of critical skills aimed at buffering the core business strategy, technology, or markets of the partners. Research indicates that the care and thought of the strategic alliance partners increases with the importance of the venture to the strategic objectives of the entity. This paper describes the importance of strategic alliances in today’s competitive world. It examines the benefits of entering into strategic alliances, the legal implications of strategic alliances, and various industries where strategic alliances are dominant. Finally, this paper …

Criminal Penalties Under The Sherman Act: A Study Of Law And Economics, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Joseph Gallo, Charles Parker, Joseph Craycraft

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This paper presents an empirical analysis of criminal antitrust prosecutions undertaken by the Department of Justice during the period 1955-1993. The authors report data on the number of criminal cases, the type of offense alleged, whether the defendants were individuals or firms, the position individual defendants held in their firm, the Department of Justice's won/lost record and the nature and amount of any sanctions imposed. A brief discussion of whether the reported sanctions have been adequate to promote efficient deterrence is also presented.

Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, The Oligopoly Problem, And Contemporary Economic Theory, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.

Enterprise And American Law 1836-1937. By Herbert Hovenkamp. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1991., Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

Book review of Enterprise and American Law 1836-1937 by Herbert Hovenkamp. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991

A Redrafted Section I Of The Sherman Act, Robert H. Heidt

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Economic Rents And Essential Facilities, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper presents an economic analysis of the essential facility doctrine of antitrust. According to this doctrine, a firm or group of firms that possesses exclusive access to a cost-reducing facility must be prepared to share such access on fair terms with competitors.

Commentary: Implications Of Professor Scherer's Research For The Future Of Antitrust, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

One way to test the accuracy of Professor Scherer's research is to compare it to the best previous work in the area. Prior to his current article the best analysis of the state of economic thinking and knowledge during antitrust's formative period was presented twelve years ago by—Professor Scherer. This was a skeletal precurser to the well-documented version that he now presents, but his overall conclusions are identical. During the twelve years since his conclusions were presented in the Yale Law Journal no one has demonstrated that his research is in any way faulty or misleading, even though many have …

Cable Traffic And The First Amendment Must-Carry Under A Diversity Approach And Antitrust As Possible Alternative, Bruno Vandermeulen

LLM Theses and Essays

Recent technological progress in the field of telecommunications has greatly changed the competitive structure between broadcasters, cable operators, and telephone companies. The legal and economic environment for these media participants has shifted, and new problems have arisen. One major problem is the enhanced threat of concentration of media corporations, as corporate bigness becomes desirable and the number of diversified owners of media outlets continues to decrease. This paper analyzes broadcasting regulations and subsequent case law to show the concern by the legislature and regulatory agencies to preserve diversity in opinion and media-ownership through emphasis on “localism” and a “marketplace of …

Where Do We Go From Here - An Overview, Milton Handler

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antitrust And The Challenge Of Internationalization, David J. Gerber

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Monopoly Power And Market Power In Antitrust Law, Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande, Steven C. Salop

All Faculty Scholarship

This article seeks an answer to a question that should be well settled: for purposes of antitrust analysis, what is 'market power' and/or 'monopoly power'? The question should be well settled because antitrust law requires proof of actual or likely market power or monopoly power to establish most types of antitrust violations.

Examination of key antitrust law opinions, however, shows that courts define 'market power' and 'monopoly power' in ways that are both vague and inconsistent. We conclude that the present level of confusion is unnecessary and results from two different but related errors:

(1) the belief or suspicion that …

Do The Doj Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Vertical restraints come in a glittering menu of exceptional variety, including resale price maintenance (RPM), tying, exclusive dealing, requirements contracts, "best efforts" clauses, full-line forcing, airtight and nonairtight exclusive territories, customer restrictions, areas of primary responsibility, profit-passover provisions, restrictions on locations of outlets, and dual distribution. Firms sometimes combine vertical restraints into packages. The great variety of individual and combined vertical restraints complicates the discovery of market effects. Indeed, identifying what restraint(s) a given firm is using at any particular time can be difficult.

Antitrust Law And Economic Analysis: The Swedish Approach, David J. Gerber

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Is Somebody "Crying Wolf"?: An Assessment Of Whether Antitrust Impedes Export Trade, John Will Ongman

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

The impact of the United States antitrust laws on American exports has in recent years become a controversial issue, especially in view of the increasing U.S, trade deficit. In this article, Mr. Ongman employs economic analysis to determine the desirability of a protectionistic Sherman Act. He concludes that such a policy, resulting in foreign retaliation and spillover into the domestic market, would be unwise.

Book Reviews, George A. Hay, H. Michael Mann, Teresa Amott

Vanderbilt Law Review

Book Reviews:

The Antitrust Penalties: A Study in Law and Economics By Kenneth G. Elzinga and William Breit

Reviewed by George A. Hay

The Antitrust Penalties was published in 1976. Its main mes-sage is that the only efficient antitrust penalty is a heavy fine and that incarceration comes out poorly by any benefit-cost standard.Later that year, in a celebrated and possibly unprecedented appearance, newly appointed Assistant Attorney General Donald I. Baker argued before a federal district judge that jail sentences were the appropriate penalty for a group of defendants who had just been convicted in one of the major price-fixing …

Decision Theory And Antitrust: Quantitative Evaluation For Efficient Enforcement, Ira Horowitz

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Possibilities And Limits Of Decision Theory In Antitrust: A Response To Professor Horowitz, Joseph F. Brodley

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Economic Pressure And Antitrust (With James A. Wilkinson), Henry H. Perritt Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.