Law and Economics Commons^™

Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, And The Challenge Of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, Peter J. Hammer

Michigan Law Review

Should antitrust law ever sanction the accumulation of market power or permit other restraints of trade if such conduct would increase social welfare? This is the challenge raised by intramarket second- best tradeoffs. The lesson of second-best analysis is that one market failure can sometimes counteract the effects of another market failure. In the presence of multiple market failures, it is conceivable that mergers or other restraints traditionally viewed as anticompetitive may be welfare-enhancing. A social planner, given the mandate of maximizing total welfare, would permit such restraints. Could an antitrust judge come to the same result under a defensible …

Afterword: Antitrust And American Business Abroad Revisited, David J. Gerber

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Posse Is Coming To Town…Maybe: The Role Of United States Non-Governmental Organizations In Software Anti-Piracy Initiatives As China Seeks Wto Accession, Serri E. Miller

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law

In 1999, worldwide financial losses to business software piracy were estimated at $12 billion.

Talisman Energy, Sudan, And Corporate Social Responsibility, Chios Carmody

Law Publications

No abstract provided.

Labor Law And Industrial Peace: A Comparative Analysis Of The United States, The United Kingdom, Germany, And Japan Under The Bargaining Model, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In this Article, Professor Dau-Schmidt provides a comparative analysis of the labor laws of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan for the purposes of identifying which characteristics of a country's labor laws are likely to reduce strike incidence and intensity and promote industrial peace. To identify which characteristics of a country's law are likely to encourage industrial peace, Professor Dau-Schmidt presents game theory arguments based on his analysis of unions and collective bargaining. Dau-Schmidt then provides a simple empirical test as to the relative success of different countries' laws in advancing industrial peace by comparing data on …

Property Rights In John Marshall's Virginia: The Case Of Crenshaw And Crenshaw V. Slate River Company, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1175 (2000), J. Gordon Hylton

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

"Bad For Business": Contextual Analysis, Race Discrimination, And Fast Food, 34 J. Marshall L. Rev. 207 (2000), Regina Austin

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Foreward: Mergers, Market Access And The Millennium, Eleanor M. Fox

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

The symposium issue is a nice microcosm of the competition law issues facing the world. It presents the tensions between national control and world integration. It presents the twin, conflicting impulses to eschew internationalization, hoping to do well enough by deepened positive comity (Waller), and to embrace internationalization at least cautiously to address concerns where unharnessed operation of national interests obstructs efficient solutions and where internationalization is most likely to sidestep the political landmines (Fiebig).

Investing In China's Telecommunications Market: Reflections On The Rule Of Law And Foreign Investment In China, Leontine D. Chuang

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

The lack of clarity in China's investment laws has translated into an investment environment that is often uncertain, risky, and mired in red tape. In fact, there have been cases where foreign corporations have invested in joint ventures following what they thought to be all the requisite guidelines, only to find out after the money had exchanged hands that something was terribly wrong with the entire agreement. A perfect example of this is the birth, development, and eventual demise of the ill-fated China-China-Foreign (hereinafter "CCF") investment vehicles used for investment in China's telecommunications industry in the past few years. This …

The Three Types Of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, And Rules, Robert H. Lande, Howard P. Marvel

All Faculty Scholarship

Collusion can profitably be classified into three distinct types. In our classification, "Type I" collusion is the familiar direct agreement among colluding firms (a cartel) to raise prices or, equivalently, restrict output. Alternatively, firms can collude to disadvantage rivals in ways that causes those rivals to cut output. We term this "Type II" collusion. Its indirect effect is an increase in market prices.

A number of important collusion cases neither direct manipulation of prices or output, nor direct attacks on rivals. Examples include Supreme Court cases such as National Society of Professional Engineers v. US, Bates v. State Bar of …

The Marshall Court And Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1023 (2000), James W. Ely Jr.

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Causation And Forseeability, Omri Ben-Shahar

Book Chapters

This chapter begins with a survey of the implicit role of causation in the writings of the early, pathbreaking economic analysts of tort law. It then clarifies the basic distinction between retrospective (ex post) causation and prospective (ex ante) causation, a distinction that forms the core of many subsequent economic discussions of causation. Next, the explicit role of causation doctrines in inducing optimal care and activity levels is examined under the strict liability and the negligence regimes. The analysis is then extended to cover several complications often plaguing the determination of causation: uncertainty over causation, joint actions among tortfeasors and …

A Presumption Of Innocence, Not Of Even Odds, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Now I know how the Munchkins felt. Here I have been, toiling in the fields of Evidenceland for some years, laboring along with others to show how use of Bayesian probability theory can assist in the analysis and understanding of evidentiary problems.' In doing so, we have had to wage continuous battle against the Bayesioskeptics-the wicked witches who deny much value, even heuristic value, for probability theory in evidentiary analysis.2 Occasionally, I have longed for law-and-economics scholars to help work this field, which should be fertile ground for them.3 So imagine my delight when the virtual personification of law and …

"Externalities And Other Parasites." Review Of The Strategic Constitution, By R. D. Cooter, And Constitutional Democracy, By D. C. Mueller, Donald J. Herzog

Reviews

I shall argue that despite the occasional and charmingly belligerent pose struck by some economists of offering a superior alternative to conventional moral and political theory, economics is covertly parasitic on that theory. I begin in Part I by describing some of the core features of economic analysis and by disclosing my own sentiments about that analysis. The description will be terse, the disclosure partial. My aim is to identify, but certainly not pretend to resolve, some thorny methodological issues that surface in these two books. As for the disclosure, well, even if full disclosure were possible, which I doubt, …

Linking The Visions, Omri Ben-Shahar

Other Publications

Professor Omri Ben-Shahar talks about his teaching and work.

Bankruptcy Reorganization: Legal Dynamics Associated With Economic Discontinuity, Young Rock Noh

LLM Theses and Essays

This thesis attempts to discover the factors leading to such failures and to propose a cure. It argues that the basic structure of Chapter 11 of the Code, the debtor in possession structure, is one of the essential factors causing such a high rate of failure. The thesis further asserts that it is possible to reduce the rate of unsuccessful reorganization if the bankruptcy court exercises its power of case management more actively and expeditiously. For example, the court can screen the debtors' filing for relief before the reorganization case proceeds too far. Chapter II of this thesis examines the …

Informality As A Bilateral Assurance Mechanism: Comments On Ronald Mann's The Role Of Letters Of Credit In Payment Transactions, Avery W. Katz

Faculty Scholarship

Ronald Mann's study of documentary defects in the presentation of commercial letters of credit1 is a valuable contribution to the commercial law literature in at least three respects. First, it offers a detailed and thorough empirical survey of an important though specialized aspect of commercial practice. Mann collected and coded a data sample of 500 randomly selected letter-of-credit transactions, personally evaluating each transaction to determine whether the documentary presentation by the beneficiary of the letter of credit (i.e., the seller) complied with the letter's formal terms. Then, for each case in which he found one or more documentary defects, Mann …

Economic Reasoning And The Framing Of Contract Law: Sale Of An Asset Of Uncertain Value, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

By analyzing two American contract law decisions, the paper illustrates the usefulness of economic analysis in framing the inquiry. The cases have a common feature, unrecognized by the courts: they both deal with the production and transfer of information regarding the sale of an asset of uncertain value. One involves the combination of an option and a lockup to encourage the buyer to produce information. The other involves contingent compensation to convey the seller's assurance of the quality of the assets. Once this is recognized, the outcomes are straightforward.

Trade Secrets And Mutual Investments, Gillian L. Lester, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

This paper employs an optimal contracting framework to study the question of how courts should adjudicate disputes over valuable trade secrets (such as customer lists). We focus principally on contexts where trade secrets are formed endogenously, through specific, non-contractible investments that could potentially come from either employers or employees (or both). Within such contexts, we argue, an "optimal" trade secret law diverges in many important respects from existing doctrine. In particular, an optimal doctrine would (1) expressly consider the parties' relative skills at making value enhancing investments rather than the mere existence of a valuable informational asset; (2) tend to …

Analyze This: A Law And Economics Agenda For The Patent System, Rebecca S. Eisenberg

Articles

Legal scholars and economists might enhance the value and impact of their work by making more effective use of each other's knowledge and capabilities. Legal scholars can offer a more nuanced understanding of the legal rules that underlie the patent system and the doctrinal levers that might be manipulated in furtherance of public policy goals. Economists bring to bear a set of analytical and methodological tools that could shed considerable light on what these doctrinal levers are doing and which of them we ought to be manipulating. Together, we have a better chance of asking the right questions and thinking …

Explaining Market Mechanisms, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, environmental regulation has seen a debate between supporters of traditional command-and-control regulation – a system of uniform pollution control standards – and proponents of a system of fees or permits for individual polluters known as market mechanisms. In this article, Professor Merrill considers two theories, wealth-maximization theory and distributional theory, that have been used to explain the emergence of market mechanisms in American environmental policy. He notes that (1) relatively few American environmental-enforcement programs have adopted market mechanisms; (2) those that exist overwhelmingly use grandfathered transferable permits instead of pollution taxes or auctioned permits; and (3) they …

Corporate Governance Lessons From Russian Enterprise Fiascoes, Merritt B. Fox, Michael A. Heller

Faculty Scholarship

This Article draws on a rich array of deviant behavior in Russian enterprises to craft lessons for corporate governance theory. First, Professors Fox and Heller define corporate governance by looking to the economic functions of the firm. Based on this definition, they develop a typology that comprehensively shows all the channels through which bad corporate governance can inflict damage on a country's real economy. Second, they explain the causes of Russian enterprise fiascoes by looking to the particular initial conditions prevailing at privatization – untenable firm boundaries and insider allocation of firm shares – and the bargaining dynamics that have …

Patterns Of Legal Change: Shareholder And Creditor Rights In Transition Economies, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

This paper analyses changes in the legal protection of shareholder and creditor rights in 24 transition economies from 1990 to 1998. It documents differences in the initial conditions and a tendency towards convergence of formal legal rules as the result of extensive legal reforms. Convergence seems to be primarily the result of foreign technical assistance programs as well as of harmonisation requirements for countries wishing to join the European Union. The external supply of legal rules not withstanding, the pattern of legal reforms suggests that law reform has been primarily responsive, or lagging, rather than leading economic development. In comparison, …

A Judicious Solution: The Criminal Law Committee Draft Redefinition Of The Loss Concept In Economic Crime Sentencing, Frank O. Bowman Iii

Faculty Publications

In December 1999, the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission), an institution that had been in suspended animation for over a year with all seven voting seats vacant, fluttered its eyelids and came back to life. An agreement between the Senate and the White House produced seven new Commissioners: five sitting federal judges, the former General Counsel of the Commission, and a law professor. The new group began work immediately, making itself accessible in meetings with lawyers and judges around the country, exuding an air of intelligence and collegiality, and dispensing in short order with a backlog of amendments to the …

The Problem With Scorecards: How (And How Not) To Measure The Cost-Effectiveness Of Economic Sanctions, Richard Parker

Faculty Articles and Papers

No abstract provided.

On The Cost- Effectiveness Of Economic Sanctions, Richard Parker

Faculty Articles and Papers

For over one hundred years, the attraction of economic sanctions as a middle path between talk and violence has prompted the use of sanctions for a wide variety of purposes ranging from weakening adversaries, toppling governments, and promoting human rights to opening foreign markets, promoting intellectual property, and protecting the global environment.

In recent years, however, economic sanctions have been subjected to stricter scrutiny than ever before, due to a sustained media and lobbying blitz by the U.S. business community under the banner of "USA*Engage." The campaign, begun in 1997, has produced a deluge of newspaper editorials and stories, virtually …

Hidden Economy Of The Unconscious, The, Anne Dailey

Faculty Articles and Papers

No abstract provided.

Patching A Hole In The Jobs Act: How And Why To Rewrite The Rules That Require Firms To Make Periodic Disclosures, Michael D. Guttentag

Indiana Law Journal

Provisions in the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 have made it much easier for firms to avoid federal periodic disclosure obligations, but these provisions were enacted based upon a virtually nonexistent legislative record and upended rules established only after careful consideration almost fifty years earlier. Determining when firms should be required to comply with federal periodic disclosure requirements is best done in the context of a broader understanding of the history and economics of periodic disclosure regulation. This Article provides such an understanding.

The history of periodic disclosure regulation in the United States is traced back to its …

Analyzing Bank Drafted Letter Of Credit Rules, The International Standby Practice (Isp98), John F. Dolan

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.

Three Faces Of Private Property, Michael A. Heller

Articles

Private property is a rather elusive concept. Any kid knows what it means for something to be mine or yours, but grownup legal theorists get flustered when they try to pin down the term. Typically they, actually we, turn to a familiar analytic toolkit: including, for example, Blackstone's image of private property as "sole and despotic dominion"; Hardin's metaphor of the "tragedy of the commons"; and, more generally, the division of ownership into a trilogy of private, commons, and state forms. While each analytic tool has a distinguished pedigree and certain present usefulness, each also imposes a cost because it …