Law and Economics Commons^™

Monopoly Power And Market Power In Antitrust Law, Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande, Steven C. Salop

All Faculty Scholarship

This article seeks an answer to a question that should be well settled: for purposes of antitrust analysis, what is 'market power' and/or 'monopoly power'? The question should be well settled because antitrust law requires proof of actual or likely market power or monopoly power to establish most types of antitrust violations.

Examination of key antitrust law opinions, however, shows that courts define 'market power' and 'monopoly power' in ways that are both vague and inconsistent. We conclude that the present level of confusion is unnecessary and results from two different but related errors:

(1) the belief or suspicion that …

Do The Doj Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Vertical restraints come in a glittering menu of exceptional variety, including resale price maintenance (RPM), tying, exclusive dealing, requirements contracts, "best efforts" clauses, full-line forcing, airtight and nonairtight exclusive territories, customer restrictions, areas of primary responsibility, profit-passover provisions, restrictions on locations of outlets, and dual distribution. Firms sometimes combine vertical restraints into packages. The great variety of individual and combined vertical restraints complicates the discovery of market effects. Indeed, identifying what restraint(s) a given firm is using at any particular time can be difficult.

Robert H. Bork's Civil Rights Record, Gary B. Born

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

Economists As Judges: A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, Janet Sinder

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Out-Of-State Attorney Fee Forfeiture, Lawrence A. Cunningham

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

Trademark Law, Economics And Grey-Market Policy, Lars H. Liebeler

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Volatility And Market Inefficiency: A Commentary On The Effects Of Options, Futures, And Risk Arbitrage On The Stock Market , Thomas Lee Hazen

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Road Signs And The Goals Of Justice, Joseph Sanders

Michigan Law Review

Review of Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law: Private Law Perspectives on a Public Law Problem by Guido Calabresi

Introduction, Elliott J. Weiss

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

Coase And The Courts: Economics For The Common Man, Barbara Ann White

All Faculty Scholarship

The arguments collectively known as the Coase Theorem criticize the judicial policy of requiring businesses to ‘internalize’ their external costs of production, i.e., pay for the social costs their production incurs such as environmental or noise pollution. Coase argues that the policy of internalization often leads to economic inefficiency rather than efficiency maximization, contrary to what Pigouvian economic analysis asserts. The right to be free of the external costs of production ought to be based, instead, on Coase’s total product rule: Courts should allocate rights according to what maximizes overall total production and thereby maximize social welfare.

Coasian analysis has …

Intragroup (Upstream, Cross-Stream, And Downstream) Guaranties Under The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Phillip Blumberg

Faculty Articles and Papers

No abstract provided.

Reformas En La Corte Suprema, Horacio M. Lynch, Silvana Stanga

Horacio M. LYNCH

Investigación realizada con el auspicio de la Fundación Antorchas. Se trata de un trabajo único en su género que estudió el trabajo de un mes de la CSN argentina (más de 400 fallos) para determinar su funcionamiento, con pautas y sugerencias en el orden institucional, y funcional (v. comentario del diario La Nación).

Función Del Tribunal Constitucional De 1980, Enrique Barros Bourie, Raúl Bertelsen, Sergio Diez, Teodoro Ribera

Enrique Barros Bourie

No abstract provided.

La Democracia Como Forma Del Poder. Un Enfoque Normativo, Enrique Barros Bourie

Enrique Barros Bourie

The essay investigates the regulatory background of the modern constitutional democracy. Its principal theory is that democracy is, above all, a system of government and as such, is inseparable from the need for an established and efficient public power. The paper contests the collectivist idea that wide social consensus could substitute for public decisions. In doing so, it restates the difference between the organic and representative concepts of democracy. It also shows how the constitutional tradition combines with an instrumental and demystified concept of public power. Government is indispensable but also tamable. From this perspective, democracy and the Constitution are …

The Free Rider Rationale And Vertical Restraints Analysis Reconsidered, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Legal Factors In The Acquisition Of A United State Corporation: Litigation By Hostile Targets, Johan E. Droogmans

LLM Theses and Essays

Acquisitions of United States corporations have become increasingly complex takeover contests, where bidders and target corporations are forced into offensive and defensive litigation strategies to protect their respective interests. Targets often assert that the bidders have violated federal or state securities laws, federal antitrust laws, federal margin regulations, federal and state regulatory systems, and federal anti-racketeering laws. These lawsuits are primarily based on the principal federal regulation of takeovers in section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the Williams Act. Target litigation is customary, but entails certain disadvantages; a lawsuit rarely stops an offer, is expensive, …

Quantity And Price Adjustment In Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study Of Petroleum Coke, Victor P. Goldberg, John R. Erickson

Faculty Scholarship

Much economic activity takes place within a framework of complex, long-term contracts. While economists have shown increased interest in these contracts, surprisingly little is known about them, or, indeed, about how to analyze the contracting activity of private economic actors. A case study of the actual contracts used in one industry could provide sorely needed data about the way in which reasonably clever businessmen and lawyers cope with problems scholars might consider intractable. In this article, we provide such an analysis of contracts concerning a particular product – petroleum coke. We focus on the problems of quantity and price adjustment. …

Rethinking The Rule Against Corporate Privacy Rights: Some Conceptual Quandries For The Common Law, 20 J. Marshall L. Rev. 607 (1987), Anita L. Allen

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

International Economic Arbitration In The Ussr And Eastern Europe, Vratislav Pechota

NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Are We A Nation Of Tax Cheaters? New Econometric Evidence On Tax Compliance, Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael J. Graetz, Louis L. Wilde

Faculty Scholarship

In 1982, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue Roscoe Egger reported to Congress that legal sector noncompliance with the Federal Income Tax statutes generated an "income tax gap" of $81 billion in 1981, up from $29 billion in 1973. He further projected a gap of $120 billion for 1985 (U.S. Congress, 1982). Perceptions of accelerating noncompliance inspired a crisis mentality within the Internal Revenue Service, Congress, and the tax bar.

The IRS responded in part by funding a major independent study of tax noncompliance via the National Academy of Sciences, and the American Bar Foundation initiated an investigation of its own …

The Conservation Movement In A Corporate Age, Charles F. Wilkinson

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Brilliant, The Curious, And The Wrong, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

Collective Bargaining And The Coase Theorem, Stewart J. Schwab

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Contingent Income Items And Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions: Correlative Adjustments And Clearer Reflection Of Income, John W. Lee, Mark S. Bader

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Economic Due Process And The Takings Clause, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

The discussion which follows will examine the new verbalizations repeatedly employed in Supreme Court takings decisions of the past decade and the Court's enlistment of the just compensation requirement as a basis for undertaking substantive review of legislation. As an introduction, the distinctive historical roles and roots of the substantive due process and just compensation requirements will be reviewed.

Economic Rights Of The Institutionalized Mentally Disabled, Michael L. Perlin

Articles & Chapters

No abstract provided.

Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 68: A Comment, Tom Campbell

Tom Campbell

No abstract provided.

Democracy As A Form Of Power: A Regulatory Focus, Enrique Barros Bourie

Enrique Barros Bourie

The essay investigates the regulatory background of the modern constitutional democracy. Its principal theory is that democracy is, above all, a system of government and as such, is inseparable from the need for an established and efficient public power. The paper contests the collectivist idea that wide social consensus could substitute for public decisions. In doing so, it restates the difference between the organic and representative concepts of democracy. It also shows how the constitutional tradition combines with an instrumental and demystified concept of public power. Government is indispensable but also tamable. From this perspective, democracy and the Constitution are …