Law and Economics Commons^™

Decoupling Sales Law From The Acceptance-Rejection Fulcrum, Jody S. Kraus

Faculty Scholarship

The determination of whether the buyer has accepted or rejected goods provides the sales law solution to the problems of allocating burden of proof, assigning duties to salvage goods in failed transactions, and reducing systematic undercompensation. But one doctrine is unlikely to provide the best solution to each of these distinct problems. Decoupling the rules addressing burden of proof, salvage, and undercompensation from the doctrines of acceptance and rejection, and thus from one another, would significantly improve sales law.

This strategy has a distinguished precedent in the history of sales law. Karl Llewellyn based his objection to the doctrine of …

Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing A Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, Ian Ayres, Eric Talley

Faculty Scholarship

It is a common argument in law and economics that divided ownership can create or exacerbate strategic behavior. For instance, when several persons own the land designated for a proposed stadium, individual sellers may "hold out" for a disproportionate share of the gains from trade. Alternatively, when building a public library would benefit multiple residents, individual buyers may "free ride" on the willingness of others to pay for its construction. Such transaction costs of collective action fall under a variety of analytic rubrics, including the "tragedy of the commons" and the theory of "public goods." Nonetheless, each example of market …

Challenges To The Doctrine Of Free Trade, Jagdish N. Bhagwati

Faculty Scholarship

The doctrine of free trade is facing new challenges today. As one surveys the policy arena, questions are raised about free trade by those who worry about Japan (and today this includes many more than the "revisionists") and who argue that free trade with Japan is not gainful. Several environmentalists as well oppose free trade with passion. These concerns relate to what now is called the absence of "level playing fields": "fair trade" as a precondition of free trade is the battle cry.

There is also the fear that free trade, even if efficient, hurts the unskilled and thus immiserizes …

The Prospects Of Pension Fund Socialism, William H. Simon

Faculty Scholarship

A substantial portion of corporate shareholdings in the United States is held by pension funds that secure retirement benefits for broad segments of the workforce. A number of commentators have argued that the assets secured by these pension funds should be used to promote the creation of a more democratic and egalitarian economy. Specifically, pension assets could be invested in projects that are deemed socially worthwhile, wielded in strategic "corporate campaigns" against companies resisting unionization, or directed toward allowing workers to obtain control over their own companies. This program of employing pension assets in the pursuit of a more democratic …

Chaos Theory And The Justice Paradox, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

"[T]he laws have mistakes, and you can't go writing up a law for everything that you can imagine."

"When you reach an equilibrium in biology you're dead."

As we approach the Twenty-First Century, the signs of social disarray are everywhere. Social critics observe the breakdown of core structures – the nuclear family, schools, neighborhoods, and political groups. As these traditional social institutions have disintegrated, the law has expanded to fill the void. There are more laws, more lawyers, and more use of legal mechanisms to accomplish social goals than at any other time in history. The custodians and interpreters of …

The Gains From Faith In An Unfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflicts Between Defendants And Liability Insurers, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

A pervasive problem in the settlement of liability litigation arises because liability insurers bundle their promise to indemnify the insured with a promise to represent the insured in settlement and litigation [see, e.g., Beckwith Machinery Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 638 F.Supp. 1179 (W.D. Pa. 1986)]. Standard policies not only require the insurer to pay for legal representation but, more importantly, give the insurer the privilege of controlling the litigation and settlement process. The problem is how to resolve the conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured that may arise during settlement negotiations. This conflict is manifest when …

Efficiency And Individualism, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Law and economics-the systematic application of neoclassical price theory to legal problems has dominated the legal academy in recent years. One recent study found that law and economics "for several decades appears to have pervaded about one quarter of scholarship in elite law reviews," and that figure may seriously

understate the theory's influence. A number of justifiably well regarded scholarly journals devote themselves almost exclusively to economic analysis of law, and the subject is now a regular part of law school curricula.' Perhaps most importantly, law and economics is a pervasive and influential presence in informal academic discussions. Even legal …

Social-Republican Property, William H. Simon

Faculty Scholarship

Economic democracy is the idea that the norms of equality and participation that classical liberalism confines to a narrowly defined sphere of government should apply to the sphere of economic life. Economic democracy thus entails a challenge to the classical liberal notion of property. In classical liberalism, property defines a realm of private enjoyment. No particular property right is a prerogative of, or a prerequisite to, citizenship, and the exercise of property rights by those who have them is not assessed in political terms.

One alternative to classical liberalism responsive to the ideal of economic democracy is classical socialism. Classical …

Long-Term Debt, The Term Structure Of Interest And The Case For Accrual Taxation, Theodore S. Sims

Faculty Scholarship

During the past 25 years, the Internal Revenue Code has become increasingly sophisticated in its treatment of long-term debt. That transformation occurred as part of a wider set of legislative changes, changes that have made the Code generally more sensitive to the consequences of compound interest and discounted (or present) values. Much of this was dictated by necessity. By ignoring the effects of compound interest, the Code often measured income in a way that was economically unsound, and thereby allowed taxpayers to take advantage of the statutory shortcomings, often with dramatic, unanticipated results.

Benign Restraint: The Sec's Regulation Of Execution Systems, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

To the handful of traders who founded the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1792 – and perhaps even to the securities traders of the 1960's – today's securities markets would be virtually unrecognizable. New communications and data processing technologies, the globalization of investment portfolios, and a surge in trading volume have created new needs and possibilities. As a result, revolutionary advances have occurred in the design and performance of execution systems: the technologies (computers, telephones, modems) and formats (auction-based stock exchanges, dealer-based "over-the-counter" markets, computerized single price auctions) that traders use to conduct trades. These advances enable trades on …

The Private Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procurement Oversight By Protest, Robert C. Marshall, Michael J. Meurer, Jean-Francois Richard

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, protests are analyzed, from both an economic and legal perspective, as a decentralized mechanism for oversight of the competitive procurement process. Attention focuses on the protest process at the General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals (hereinafter "the Board" or "GSBCA"). It is argued that protests are an effective means of deterring and correcting agency problems among procurement personnel and, consequently, accomplishing the procurement objectives of the government. Drawbacks of the protest process are identified, explanations are offered for the existence of these negative side effects, and solutions are proposed. In addition, protests are compared to centralized …

Corporations, Markets, And Courts, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

The times they are a changin'. Vanguard firms of the 1980s takeover boom have announced associate layoffs and salary freezes because business is down. Bankruptcy and corporate reorganization are the hot new specialties as reflected in law school class size and law firm entrepreneurialism. Acquisition activity has fallen dramatically from the halcyon days of the 1980s. The gargantuan headline-grabbing hostile bid is now rare. In particular, the "boot-strap, bust-up" highly leveraged transaction that so engaged the passions of corporate managers and raiders now seems part of the history of corporate finance rather than its future.

Many forces have played a …

Recovery For Pure Economic Loss In Tort: Another Look At Robins Dry Dock V. Flint, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In Robins Dry Dock and Repair Co. v. Flint, the Supreme Court laid down the general proposition that claims for pure economic loss are not recoverable in tort. Although courts have sometimes ignored or distinguished Robins, its holding is still a central feature of tort law. In a recent en bane decision regarding claims by those injured by a chemical spill in the Mississippi River, the Fifth Circuit engaged in an extensive debate over the continued vitality of Robins and concluded (despite five dissenters) that it remained good law.

The Robins rule is overbroad, lumping together a number of …

Interest Group Politics And Judicial Behavior: Macey's Public Choice, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The economic theory of government has lately gained the acceptance in legal circles that it has long enjoyed in political science and economics. The economic theory, also known as "public choice," analyzes and explains government action and private political activity according to the basic assumption of economics, that individuals respond to economic incentives in their environments in a self-interested manner. The economic theory is thus useful descriptively, to explain diverse political phenomena, and prescriptively, to help formulate reform strategy.

The Economic Theory Of Politics And Legal Interpretation In The United States, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Economic Rents And Essential Facilities, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper presents an economic analysis of the essential facility doctrine of antitrust. According to this doctrine, a firm or group of firms that possesses exclusive access to a cost-reducing facility must be prepared to share such access on fair terms with competitors.

Litigation Costs And The Economic Theory Of Tort Law, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

The economic theory of tort law has developed along two lines. The first and more traditional is positive theory, which justifies tort doctrine. The second is normative theory, which usually criticizes the operational efficiency of the tort system, and is the focus of this Article. This Article argues that once the dynamics of litigation are properly taken into account, all bets are off on the economic efficiency of tort law. The simple fact that litigation is a costly enterprise provides a rich source of inefficiencies with which the tort system must grapple.

The Law And Economics Of Organ Procurement, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper presents an economic analysis of the organ procurement system in the U.S. and examines proposals to alleviate the shortage of transplantable organs. The paper's principal conclusions are: (1) Although non-market solutions deserve the highest priority, demand increases fueled by improvements in transplant technology will probably make some market-based solution necessary in the future. (2) Quality deterioration and coercion will not necessarily be worrisome problems under a market-based procurement system.

The Strategic Structure Of Offer And Acceptance: Game Theory And The Law Of Contract Formation, Avery W. Katz

Faculty Scholarship

The purpose of this article is to promote a particular research program; namely, the use of game theory to analyze the law of contract formation. Although I will often simply speak of offer and acceptance in my discussion, I mean to refer to a broader set of issues than are commonly denoted by this doctrinal label. My program transcends the narrow issue of whether particular communications technically should be classified as offers and acceptances, and includes questions often analyzed under the rubrics of implication and interpretation. At its broadest, my argument addresses all legal rules that answer two types of …

The Demand For Tax Return Preparation Services, Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael J. Graetz, Michael A. Udell, Louis L. Wilde

Faculty Scholarship

We analyze taxpayer choices of return preparation services. We distinguish between two types of nonpaid preparers, six types of paid third parties, and self-preparation. Among other things, we find significant differences in the factors which explain the demand for paid third parties who are and are not able to represent clients before the IRS. Among these factors are increases in IRS audit rates and the frequency of IRS penalties.

Aversion To Risk Aversion In The New Institutional Economics, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

One significant division that emerged during the conference involved the role of risk aversion in analyzing institutional arrangements. I, along with Oliver Williamson, took the position that the risk aversion assumption deflects attention from the more significant determinants and that more progress would be made if we could bind our hands and agree to invoke attitudes toward risk only as a last resort. Professor Richter has graciously given me this opportunity to elaborate upon this theme.

What Can Be Done About Stock Market Volatility, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Volatility is as old as the financial markets. The bull market of 1986 and the crash that followed in 1987 were but the latest of periodic market gyrations that started with the South Sea Bubble and the Lombard Street run on commercial paper and have continued ever since.' Volatility in the financial markets would not be very important if market activity simply mirrored economic activity. Volatility would be much less important if the markets moved independently of the economy. But if we believe, as I do, that the markets and the economy are interdependent, and that their volatility is generally …

Independent Agencies – Independent From Whom?, Sally Katzen, Edward Markey, James Miller, Joseph Grundfest, R. Gaull Silberman, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Foreword: The Economics Of Contract Law, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

The articles in this issue are samples from the burgeoning economics of contract law. They demonstrate that lawyers a can bring economic models to bear on quite specific issues of co offer normative guidance regarding the structure of efficient The success of the symposium and the quality of the articles of this field will continue to flourish. The articles cover a fairly narrow range of contract law issues. The second through sixth articles all address topics involving remedies. Two of these loo at the optimal remedies to be provided by contract law, and the other three are concerned with remedies …

The Mandatory Structure Of Corporate Law, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

It has become standard in the law and economics literature to refer to the corporation as a "nexus of contracts." On this view, the corporate entity is nothing more than a gathering point for a series of contracts, express and implied, among assorted actors: shareholders, bondholders, managers, employees, suppliers and customers, for example. This view rankles some sensibilities, because the economists' conception of a "contract" as an arrangement between two or more actors supported by reciprocal expectations and behavior is far broader than the lawyer's conception, which focuses on the existence of judicially cognizable duties and obligations. Thus the lawyer, …

Reflections On Fuller And Perdue's The Reliance Interest In Contract Damages: A Positive Economic Framework, Avery W. Katz

Faculty Scholarship

Fuller and Perdue's classic article, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, is regarded by many contemporary contracts scholars as the single most influential law review article in the field. For those of us who teach and think about contracts from the perspective of law and economics, the consensus would probably be close to unanimous. The article displays an approach highly congenial to an economic perspective. The connection goes beyond Fuller and Perdue's explicitly functional approach to law (which law and economics shares with other schools of thought descended from the legal realists) and beyond Fuller and Perdue's focus on …

Clarifying The Record: A Comment, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In their recent article in this journal, Boudreaux and Ekelund [1987] ha presented a distorted characterization of some of my work on the economics o regulation. The editor of this journal has graciously offered me the opportunity to respond to their criticisms and to redress some ambiguities, real or imagine in my earlier work.

The Uncertain Case For Takeover Reform: An Essay On Stockholders, Stakeholders And Bust-Ups, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, Professor John Coffee considers under what circumstances there could be a legitimate role for state regulation of tender offers. Professor Coffee suggests that state anti-takeover laws could (but do not) function to protect other stakeholders, including corporate management, in the target corporation where the implicit contract between the corporation and these stakeholders has broken down. He advances a model of corporate directors as mediators between shareholders and stakeholders in order to protect the expectations embodied in a web of implicit and explicit contracts.

Professor Coffee suggests that takeovers would be more palatable if the interests of stakeholders …

Economists As Judges: A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, Janet Sinder

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Are We A Nation Of Tax Cheaters? New Econometric Evidence On Tax Compliance, Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael J. Graetz, Louis L. Wilde

Faculty Scholarship

In 1982, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue Roscoe Egger reported to Congress that legal sector noncompliance with the Federal Income Tax statutes generated an "income tax gap" of $81 billion in 1981, up from $29 billion in 1973. He further projected a gap of $120 billion for 1985 (U.S. Congress, 1982). Perceptions of accelerating noncompliance inspired a crisis mentality within the Internal Revenue Service, Congress, and the tax bar.

The IRS responded in part by funding a major independent study of tax noncompliance via the National Academy of Sciences, and the American Bar Foundation initiated an investigation of its own …