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Articles 181 - 193 of 193
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Solving The Judgment-Proof Problem, Kyle D. Logue
Solving The Judgment-Proof Problem, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
A tortfeasor who cannot fully pay for the harms that it causes is said to be "judgment proof." Commentators have long recognized that the existence of judgment-proof tortfeasors seriously undermines the deterrence and insurance goals of tort law. The deterrence goal is undermined because, irrespective of the liability rule, judgment-proof tortfeasors will not fully internalize the costs of the accidents they cause. The insurance goal will be undermined to the extent that the judgment-proof tortfeasor will not be able to compensate fully its victims and that first-party insurance markets do not provide an adequate response. Liability insurance can ameliorate these …
Tax Policy V. Revenue Policy: Qualified Plans, Tax Expenditures, And The Flat, Plan Level Tax, Edward A. Zelinsky
Tax Policy V. Revenue Policy: Qualified Plans, Tax Expenditures, And The Flat, Plan Level Tax, Edward A. Zelinsky
Articles
No abstract provided.
Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, And The Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, And Public Services, Edward A. Zelinsky
Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, And The Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, And Public Services, Edward A. Zelinsky
Articles
Few contemporary issues concern state and local policymakers as intensely as unfunded mandates. Mayors, county executives, city councilmen, and the professional associations representing them routinely argue that the federal and state governments have, in recent years, imposed at an accelerating rate expensive requirements on municipalities without granting corresponding funds for compliance, thereby irresponsibly straining the fiscal capacity of municipalities, hampering their ability to provide essential services, and improperly infringing upon the scope of local control. The complaints of municipal policymakers have provoked a variety of proposals for restraining unfunded mandates: obligatory disclosure of the projected costs of proposed mandates, requirements …
Restraints On Alienation Of Human Capital, Stewart E. Sterk
Restraints On Alienation Of Human Capital, Stewart E. Sterk
Articles
No abstract provided.
Qualified Plans And Identifying Tax Expenditures: A Rejoinder To Professor Stein, Edward A. Zelinsky
Qualified Plans And Identifying Tax Expenditures: A Rejoinder To Professor Stein, Edward A. Zelinsky
Articles
No abstract provided.
Risk And Design, James E. Krier
Risk And Design, James E. Krier
Articles
Risk springs from uncertainty,' uncertainty invites error, and, since error can be costly, we would prefer to avoid it (provided, of course, that avoidance is not more costly yet). While there is much in the Noll and Krier article2 about judgmental error under conditions of risk and uncertainty, there is little about ways to avoid it. So avoidance-more accurately, minimization-of error costs is the topic I want to address very briefly and partially here.
The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification For Enterprise Liability, Jon D. Hanson, Kyle D. Logue
The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification For Enterprise Liability, Jon D. Hanson, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
This Article explores the insurance and deterrence implications of important and long overlooked facts. Consumers are insured through first-party mechanisms against most of the risks of product accidents. However, first-party insurers rarely and imperfectly adjust premiums according to an individual consumer's decisions concerning exactly what products she will purchase, how many of those products she will purchase, and how carefully she will consume them. Such consumer decisions we refer to as "consumption choices. " This failure by first-party insurers to adjust premiums according to consumption choices gives rise to a first-party insurance externality. Based on this insight, this Article offers …
Corporate Control: Markets And Rules, Caroline Bradley
Taxation And U.S. Multinational Investment, James R. Hines Jr.
Taxation And U.S. Multinational Investment, James R. Hines Jr.
Articles
In 1985, nonbank U.S. multinational companies employed 24.5 million workers, had worldwide sales of almost $3.5 trillion, and net income of $150 billion on assets of $4.2 trillion. The foreign (non-U.S.) affiliates of these companies had 6.4 million employees, $900 billion of those sales, and $43 billion of net income, with assets of $838 billion. United States multinationals accounted for roughly three-quarters of total American merchandise exports in 1985 and half of total imports, with approximately 40 percent of each category arising from transfers within U.S. multinationals between American parent firms and their own foreign affiliates. And 1985 is widely …
The Tax Treatment Of Qualified Plans: A Classic Defense Of The Status Quo, Edward A. Zelinsky
The Tax Treatment Of Qualified Plans: A Classic Defense Of The Status Quo, Edward A. Zelinsky
Articles
The current tax treatment of qualified pension and profit sharing plans has been criticized by commentators as an unfair and expensive tax expenditure. In this Article, Professor Zelinsky challenges this characterization and defends the current treatment of qualified plans on the ground that it is at least as attractive as its alternatives and superior to many of them. After evaluating the current treatment and the alternatives under the criteria of measurability, administrability, liquidity, equity, and simplicity, Professor Zelinsky concludes that the present treatment of qualified plans can be viewed as an acceptable part of a normative income tax.
The Un-Easy Case For Technological Optimism, James E. Krier, Clayton P. Gillette
The Un-Easy Case For Technological Optimism, James E. Krier, Clayton P. Gillette
Articles
"Technological optimism" is a term of art, an article of faith, and a theory of politics. It is a view that pervades modem attitudes, yet gets little explicit attention. For a brief period the situation was otherwise. In the early 1970s, the optimistic outlook figured prominently in an important debate about nothing less than the future of the world. Technological optimism won. The outcome was unsurprising, given the nature of the argument. On one side of the debate was a group of self-proclaimed Malthusians who foresaw an impending period of stark scarcity unless relatively drastic remedial steps were quickly taken; …
The Problem Of Social Cost Revisited, Donald H. Regan
The Problem Of Social Cost Revisited, Donald H. Regan
Articles
SOME years ago, in a paper entitled "The Problem of Social Cost," Professor Ronald Coase asserted and argued for a proposition which has since acquired the convenient sobriquet "the Coase Theorem." The proposition is: That in a world of perfect competition, perfect information, and zero transaction costs, the allocation of resources in the economy will be efficient and will be unaffected by legal rules regarding the initial impact of costs resulting from externalities. Note that there are two claims being made, which it is well to separate for purposes of discussion. The first claim is that, under the conditions described, …
Caveat Emptor And The Judicial Process, John B. Waite
Caveat Emptor And The Judicial Process, John B. Waite
Articles
"There are many issues in the law whose solution has an essentially economic cost. There is one issue in particular, however, of immense and most important economic effect, which has been decided and re-decided, but which, strangely enough, the courts never seem to have considered on the merits of its economic relations and effects....
"...[O]ught one to be permitted safely, if honestly, to intrust possession of goods to others; or should one have power safely, if honestly, to buy goods from those in possession...."