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Articles 421 - 445 of 445
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
The Uncertain Case For Takeover Reform: An Essay On Stockholders, Stakeholders And Bust-Ups, John C. Coffee Jr.
The Uncertain Case For Takeover Reform: An Essay On Stockholders, Stakeholders And Bust-Ups, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
In this Article, Professor John Coffee considers under what circumstances there could be a legitimate role for state regulation of tender offers. Professor Coffee suggests that state anti-takeover laws could (but do not) function to protect other stakeholders, including corporate management, in the target corporation where the implicit contract between the corporation and these stakeholders has broken down. He advances a model of corporate directors as mediators between shareholders and stakeholders in order to protect the expectations embodied in a web of implicit and explicit contracts.
Professor Coffee suggests that takeovers would be more palatable if the interests of stakeholders …
Reflections On Fuller And Perdue's The Reliance Interest In Contract Damages: A Positive Economic Framework, Avery W. Katz
Reflections On Fuller And Perdue's The Reliance Interest In Contract Damages: A Positive Economic Framework, Avery W. Katz
Faculty Scholarship
Fuller and Perdue's classic article, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, is regarded by many contemporary contracts scholars as the single most influential law review article in the field. For those of us who teach and think about contracts from the perspective of law and economics, the consensus would probably be close to unanimous. The article displays an approach highly congenial to an economic perspective. The connection goes beyond Fuller and Perdue's explicitly functional approach to law (which law and economics shares with other schools of thought descended from the legal realists) and beyond Fuller and Perdue's focus on …
Clarifying The Record: A Comment, Victor P. Goldberg
Clarifying The Record: A Comment, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
In their recent article in this journal, Boudreaux and Ekelund [1987] ha presented a distorted characterization of some of my work on the economics o regulation. The editor of this journal has graciously offered me the opportunity to respond to their criticisms and to redress some ambiguities, real or imagine in my earlier work.
Are We A Nation Of Tax Cheaters? New Econometric Evidence On Tax Compliance, Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael J. Graetz, Louis L. Wilde
Are We A Nation Of Tax Cheaters? New Econometric Evidence On Tax Compliance, Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael J. Graetz, Louis L. Wilde
Faculty Scholarship
In 1982, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue Roscoe Egger reported to Congress that legal sector noncompliance with the Federal Income Tax statutes generated an "income tax gap" of $81 billion in 1981, up from $29 billion in 1973. He further projected a gap of $120 billion for 1985 (U.S. Congress, 1982). Perceptions of accelerating noncompliance inspired a crisis mentality within the Internal Revenue Service, Congress, and the tax bar.
The IRS responded in part by funding a major independent study of tax noncompliance via the National Academy of Sciences, and the American Bar Foundation initiated an investigation of its own …
Quantity And Price Adjustment In Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study Of Petroleum Coke, Victor P. Goldberg, John R. Erickson
Quantity And Price Adjustment In Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study Of Petroleum Coke, Victor P. Goldberg, John R. Erickson
Faculty Scholarship
Much economic activity takes place within a framework of complex, long-term contracts. While economists have shown increased interest in these contracts, surprisingly little is known about them, or, indeed, about how to analyze the contracting activity of private economic actors. A case study of the actual contracts used in one industry could provide sorely needed data about the way in which reasonably clever businessmen and lawyers cope with problems scholars might consider intractable. In this article, we provide such an analysis of contracts concerning a particular product – petroleum coke. We focus on the problems of quantity and price adjustment. …
Economics Of Public Use, Thomas W. Merrill
Economics Of Public Use, Thomas W. Merrill
Faculty Scholarship
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as most state constitutions, provides that private property shall not be taken "for public use" unless just compensation is paid. American courts have long construed this to mean that some showing of "publicness" is a condition precedent to a legitimate exercise of the power of eminent domain. Thus, when a proposed condemnation of property lacks the appropriate public quality, the taking is deemed to be unconstitutional and can be enjoined. In practice, however, most observers today think the public use limitation is a dead letter. Three recent decisions, upholding takings …
Fishing And Selling, Victor P. Goldberg
Fishing And Selling, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
Consumers are a lot like fish, out there waiting to be hooked. Like most images, this one is a caricature of reality. The choice and search effort of consumers is suppressed in order to explore the implications of selling activity by manufacturers and retailers. In particular, the fishing analogy suggests that there is a tendency toward excessive selling activity if sellers do not take into account the effects of their activity on the costs of their rivals. However, sellers, like fishermen, have an incentive to arrange their affairs to mitigate the dissipation of rents. This argument is developed in Section …
Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment On Two Models, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lewis A. Kornhauser
Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment On Two Models, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lewis A. Kornhauser
Faculty Scholarship
One of the most important debates of current corporate law practice and scholarship is about the appropriate role of target management confronted with a takeover bid. The controversy turns on the identification of a criterion for evaluating takeovers and target management defensive tactics. An influential body of opinion contends that maximization of shareholder wealth is the appropriate criterion because, first, traditional notions of fiduciary duty generally require managers to act in the shareholders' interest, and, second, shareholder wealth maximization is seen as the best available proxy for social wealth maximization. On this view, takeovers are desirable because they can increase …
Understanding The Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications Of Economic Theory For Private Enforcement Of Law Through Class And Derivative Actions, John C. Coffee Jr.
Understanding The Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications Of Economic Theory For Private Enforcement Of Law Through Class And Derivative Actions, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Probably to a unique degree, American law relies upon private litigants to enforce substantive provisions of law that in other legal systems are left largely to the discretion of public enforcement agencies. This system of enforcement through "private attorneys general" is most closely associated with the federal antitrust and securities laws and the common law's derivative action, but similar institutional arrangements have developed recently in the environmental, "mass tort," and employment discrimination fields. The key legal rules that make the private attorney general a reality in American law today, however, are not substantive but procedural – namely, those rules that …
A Relational Theory Of Secured Financing, Robert E. Scott
A Relational Theory Of Secured Financing, Robert E. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
Despite advances in finance theory, secured debt remains a puzzle. As a consequence, the justification for the current legal regulation of secured financing is similarly unclear. What purposes, whether benign or malignant, does security serve? And what explains the peculiar system of priorities established by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code? These are particularly urgent questions for students of commercial law because legally created priorities among creditors are an apparent aberration. In most legal regimes, equal treatment of those similarly situated is an important normative goal. Indeed, much of federal bankruptcy law seems to reflect a conception of business …
Rethinking The Theory Of Legal Rights, Jules S. Coleman, Jody S. Kraus
Rethinking The Theory Of Legal Rights, Jules S. Coleman, Jody S. Kraus
Faculty Scholarship
In the economic approach to law, legal rights are designed, in part, to overcome the conditions under which markets fail. In correcting for market failure, economic analysis endorses two rules for assigning legal rights. The first specifies the allocation of rights under conditions of rational cooperation, full information and zero transaction costs. Provided that exchange is available and that obstacles to exercising it are insignificant, rational cooperators will negotiate around inefficiencies. Under these conditions, legal rights are not assigned in order to establish optimal levels of resource deployment directly; rather, they establish well-defined entitlements or negotiation points which create a …
Efficient Markets, Costly Information, And Securities Research, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lewis A. Kornhauser
Efficient Markets, Costly Information, And Securities Research, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lewis A. Kornhauser
Faculty Scholarship
Courts, administrative policy makers and legal scholars have widely embraced the theory that well-developed markets are efficient. In this Article, Professors Gordon and Kornhauser cast doubt on the wisdom of reliance on the efficient market hypothesis as applied to various areas of corporate law. Their charge is that legal decision makers and scholars have misunderstood the assumptions and limitations of the theory and have neglected recent critical economics scholarship. Professors Gordon and Kornhauser begin by detailing the assertions of the hypothesis in relation to the workings of securities markets, focusing on various asset pricing models used to test the hypothesis …
Federal Jurisdiction Over Preemption Claims: A Post-Franchise Tax Board Analysis, Ronald J. Mann
Federal Jurisdiction Over Preemption Claims: A Post-Franchise Tax Board Analysis, Ronald J. Mann
Faculty Scholarship
As Congress uses the commerce power to regulate areas of the economy previously controlled by the states, federal statutes conflict with state law with increasing frequency. When such conflicts occur, federal law "preempts" the state law under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. Litigants who foresee a preemption issue often seek a declaratory judgment of preemption or nonpreemption in order to clarify their rights and duties. This Note addresses the scope of federal question jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions in which preemption is the only federal question raised.
Market Failure And The Economic Case For A Mandatory Disclosure System, John C. Coffee Jr.
Market Failure And The Economic Case For A Mandatory Disclosure System, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Recent academic commentary on the securities laws has much in common with the battles fought in historiography over the origins of the First World War. The same progression of phases is evident. First, there is an orthodox school, which tends to see historical events largely as a moral drama of good against evil. Next come the revisionists, debunking all and explaining that the good guys were actually the bad. Eventually, a new wave of more professional, craftsmanlike scholars arrives on the scene to correct the gross overstatements of the revisionists and produce a more balanced, if problematic, assessment.
The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, And The Economics Of Retailing Services, Victor P. Goldberg
The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, And The Economics Of Retailing Services, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
In GTE Sylvania, the Supreme Court acknowledged what a group of law and economics scholars had been arguing for the previous two decades: vertical restrictions that limit intrabrand competition can have a desirable effect on interbrand competition. The Court approvingly accepted the argument that the free rider problem might justify a manufacturer's use of vertical restrictions. The argument, in its simplest form, is that if a retailer provides services such as advice and demonstrations to consumers, a consumer could make use of the service and then buy the product from a "no- frills" retailer. If the manufacturer cannot control the …
An Economic Analysis Of The Lost-Volume Retail Seller, Victor P. Goldberg
An Economic Analysis Of The Lost-Volume Retail Seller, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
Suppose that a customer agrees to buy a boat and before it is delivered, he reneges. The dealer subsequently resells the boat to another customer at the same price. Has the seller suffered damages (aside from incidental damages) and, if so, should he be compensated? This question, dubbed the lost-volume seller problem, has been the subject of considerable legal analysis, usually in the context of explicating section 2-708(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). There have been a number of attempts to apply economic analysis to this difficult question, the most recent by Professors Goetz and Scott. Unfortunately, the economic …
Regulating The Market For Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment Of The Tender Offer's Role In Corporate Governance, John C. Coffee Jr.
Regulating The Market For Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment Of The Tender Offer's Role In Corporate Governance, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Better answers often await better questions. In the wake of a recent series of provocative articles dealing with contested tender offers, several questions have been vigorously debated:
(1) Should management of the target company be allowed to resist a hostile tender offer in order to remain an independent company? Which, if any, of the various "shark repellent" measures by which a potential target can make itself unattractive to a bidder are justified?;
(2) If defensive tactics were generally forbidden, should the target company's management still be permitted to encourage competing bids thereby creating an auction?; and
(3) Do hostile takeovers …
Corporate Crime And Punishment: A Non-Chicago View Of The Economics Of Criminal Sanctions, John C. Coffee Jr.
Corporate Crime And Punishment: A Non-Chicago View Of The Economics Of Criminal Sanctions, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
In this article, Professor Coffee argues that fines are an inefficient means by which to deter organizational crimes. Instead, he urges a focus on the individual decision-maker and a system of competitive bids with respect to the choice of a fine as an alternative punishment.
Implementing A Progressive Consumption Tax, Michael J. Graetz
Implementing A Progressive Consumption Tax, Michael J. Graetz
Faculty Scholarship
Much scholarly debate has been devoted to the theoretical merits of using an individual's consumption expenditures as the basis for measuring ability to pay tax. In this Article, Professor Graetz examines the practical problems of implementing and administering a progressive consumption tax as an alternative to the income tax. He concludes that although a consumption tax is feasible, practical implementation difficulties, together with the political unlikelihood of enacting a tax which is both administratively workable and retains the alleged theoretical advantages of a consumption-based tax, argue against its adoption.
The Law And Economics Of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective, Victor P. Goldberg
The Law And Economics Of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
Vertical restrictions between franchisors and their dealers have long been a thorny problem in antitrust law. Richard Posner's characterization of the case law as a "fiasco" and a "doctrinal shambles" is echoed by many other commentators. Perhaps partly because of the intellectual confusion in the area, the Supreme Court recently made an apparently sharp change in direction. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. the Court reversed the decade-old Schwinn per se doctrine, holding that at least some vertical restrictions deserve a rule of reason test. Whether this decision will prove a more durable precedent than Schwinn remains …
Measuring Sellers' Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle, Charles J. Goetz, Robert E. Scott
Measuring Sellers' Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle, Charles J. Goetz, Robert E. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
A buyer repudiates a fixed-price contract to purchase goods, and the seller sues for damages. How should a court measure the seller's loss? The answer seems simple: The seller should be awarded damages sufficient to place it in the same economic position it would have enjoyed had the buyer performed the contract. But the seductive conceptual simplicity of the compensation principle disguises substantial practical problems in measuring seller's damages.
Contract law has traditionally minimized measurement difficulties by basing damages in most cases on the difference between the contract price and market value of the repudiated goods. The common law courts …
The "Stationarity" Of Shadow Prices Of Factors In Project Evaluation, With And Without Distortions, Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Henry Wan Jr.
The "Stationarity" Of Shadow Prices Of Factors In Project Evaluation, With And Without Distortions, Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Henry Wan Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Until recently, the literature on cost-benefit analysis for projects has been largely within the domain of research on "public monopoly," literature currently reviewed by Jacques Lesourne, (ch. 3), and the work of public finance theorists as typified in the celebrated practical work of Ian Little and James Mirrlees in their Manual, and in the recent theoretical contribution of Peter Diamond and Mirrlees. International trade theorists have, however, turned now to the analysis of these problems, starting with the early work of Vijay Joshi and Deepak Lai, then that of W. M. Corden, and most recently culminating in the contributions of …
Constitutional Regulation Of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost Of Procedural Due Process, Robert E. Scott
Constitutional Regulation Of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost Of Procedural Due Process, Robert E. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
In recent years a series of Supreme Court decisions has purported to envelop the rights of defaulting debtors in an enlarged concept of procedural due process. The central theme underlying this development is clearly an attempt by the Court to impose some degree of constitutional control on the exercise of provisional creditor remedies. The path that leads from Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. to North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., is however, far from clear and the cases have provoked serious questioning of the meaning and impact of this doctrine. Due process as reflected in Sniadach and Fuentes …
Institutional Change And The Quasi-Invisible Hand, Victor P. Goldberg
Institutional Change And The Quasi-Invisible Hand, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
The fundamental principle of economics is that people will pursue their own self-interest within a given institutional framework. The economist's basic policy premise is that (so long as certain "market failures" do not arise) this self-interest will, like an Invisible Hand, guide resources to their proper usage; when market failures arise the usual policy prescription is to amend the rules (for example, by breaking up monopolies, placing an "optimal" tax on pollution, or redefining property rights) to make the marginal private costs and benefits equal to the marginal social costs and benefits so that the free play on self-interest will …
Marginal Cost Pricing, Investment Theory And Catv, Victor P. Goldberg
Marginal Cost Pricing, Investment Theory And Catv, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
In his article, Marginal Cost Pricing, Investment Theory and CATV, James Ohls makes a number of erroneous assertions concerning the optimum pricing of CATV. Most of his problems stem from a failure to properly define the environment in which the optimum price is to be set and the role that an optimum price should play. If one alters Ohls' implicit (and sometimes contradictory) assumptions and if one keeps in mind the purpose prices should serve in an economic system, a number of Ohls' conclusions are altered.