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Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics

A Presumption Of Innocence, Not Of Even Odds, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2000

A Presumption Of Innocence, Not Of Even Odds, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Now I know how the Munchkins felt. Here I have been, toiling in the fields of Evidenceland for some years, laboring along with others to show how use of Bayesian probability theory can assist in the analysis and understanding of evidentiary problems.' In doing so, we have had to wage continuous battle against the Bayesioskeptics-the wicked witches who deny much value, even heuristic value, for probability theory in evidentiary analysis.2 Occasionally, I have longed for law-and-economics scholars to help work this field, which should be fertile ground for them.3 So imagine my delight when the virtual personification of law and …


Bankruptcy Reorganization: Legal Dynamics Associated With Economic Discontinuity, Young Rock Noh Jan 2000

Bankruptcy Reorganization: Legal Dynamics Associated With Economic Discontinuity, Young Rock Noh

LLM Theses and Essays

This thesis attempts to discover the factors leading to such failures and to propose a cure. It argues that the basic structure of Chapter 11 of the Code, the debtor in possession structure, is one of the essential factors causing such a high rate of failure. The thesis further asserts that it is possible to reduce the rate of unsuccessful reorganization if the bankruptcy court exercises its power of case management more actively and expeditiously. For example, the court can screen the debtors' filing for relief before the reorganization case proceeds too far. Chapter II of this thesis examines the …


Three Faces Of Private Property, Michael A. Heller Jan 2000

Three Faces Of Private Property, Michael A. Heller

Articles

Private property is a rather elusive concept. Any kid knows what it means for something to be mine or yours, but grownup legal theorists get flustered when they try to pin down the term. Typically they, actually we, turn to a familiar analytic toolkit: including, for example, Blackstone's image of private property as "sole and despotic dominion"; Hardin's metaphor of the "tragedy of the commons"; and, more generally, the division of ownership into a trilogy of private, commons, and state forms. While each analytic tool has a distinguished pedigree and certain present usefulness, each also imposes a cost because it …


A New Economic Theory Of Regulation: Rent Extraction Rather Than Rent Creation, Douglas Ginsburg May 1999

A New Economic Theory Of Regulation: Rent Extraction Rather Than Rent Creation, Douglas Ginsburg

Michigan Law Review

Once upon a time, people believed that the government regulated various indus tries in "the public interest." The idea was that certain conditions, such as "natural monopoly" or the ability to externalize significant costs, caus ed markets to fail and governments to step in to correct that failure. Econmnic regulation predicated upon market failure can be dated conveniently to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, in which the Congress established the Inters tate Commerce Commission to regulate railroads in the interests of shippers, principally farmers and small businesses. The legal notion of "affectation with the public interest" dates back much …


The Tentative Case Against Flexibility In Commercial Law, Omri Ben-Shahar Jan 1999

The Tentative Case Against Flexibility In Commercial Law, Omri Ben-Shahar

Articles

Well-rooted in modern commercial law is the idea that the law and the obligations that it enforces should reflect the empirical reality of the relationship between the contracting parties. The Uniform Commercial Code ("Code") champions this tradition by viewing the performance practices formed among the parties throughout their interaction as a primary source for interpreting and supplementing their explicit contracts. The generous recognition of waiver and modifications, as well as the binding force the Code accords to course of performance, course of dealings, and customary trade usages, effectively permits unwritten commercial practices to vary and to erode explicit contractual provisions.


Law And Economics Of English Only, William W. Bratton Jan 1999

Law And Economics Of English Only, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Victims As Cost Bearers, Richard Adelstein Dec 1998

Victims As Cost Bearers, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A brief recasting of the price exaction model.


The Origins Of Property And The Powers Of Government, Richard Adelstein Dec 1998

The Origins Of Property And The Powers Of Government, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

The alternating influence of Locke and Bentham in American constitutional law.


The Evidentiary Theory Of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, Mitchell N. Berman Jan 1998

The Evidentiary Theory Of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, Mitchell N. Berman

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Four Entries, Richard Adelstein Dec 1997

Four Entries, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

Four entries: "American Institutional Economics and the Legal System" (I: 61-66); "John Rogers Commons" (I: 324-327); Richard Theodore Ely" (II: 28-29); and "Plea Bargaining: A Comparative Approach"


"Public Use" And The Independent Judiciary: Condemnation In An Interest-Group Perspective, Donald J. Kochan Dec 1997

"Public Use" And The Independent Judiciary: Condemnation In An Interest-Group Perspective, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

This Article reexamines the doctrine of public use under the Takings Clause and its ability to impede takings for private use through an application of public choice theory. It argues that the judicial validation of interest-group capture of the condemnation power through a relaxed public use standard in Takings Clause review can be explained by interest group politics and public choice theory and by institutional tendencies inherent in the independent judiciary. Legislators can sell the eminent domain power to special interests for almost any use, promising durability in the deal given the low probability that the judiciary will invalidate it …


Immigration Policy, Liberal Principles, And The Republican Tradition, Howard F. Chang Jan 1997

Immigration Policy, Liberal Principles, And The Republican Tradition, Howard F. Chang

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, Daniel C. Esty Dec 1996

Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, Daniel C. Esty

Michigan Law Review

Politicians from Speaker Newt Gingrich to President Bill Clinton, cheered on by academics such as Richard Revesz, are eagerly seeking to return authority over environmental regulation to the states. In the European Union, localist opponents of environmental decisionmaking in Brussels rally under the banner of "subsidiarity." And in debates over international trade liberalization, demands abound for the protection of "national sovereignty" in environmental regulation. All of these efforts presume that a decentralized approach to environmental policy will yield better results than more centralized programs. This presumption is misguided. While the character of some environmental concerns warrants a preference for local …


Can Families Be Efficient? A Feminist Appraisal, Ann Laquer Estin Jan 1996

Can Families Be Efficient? A Feminist Appraisal, Ann Laquer Estin

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

This Article examines the convergence of feminist and law and economics theory on family law questions, particularly issues of marriage and divorce. Both feminist legal theory and law and economics analysis have come to occupy a significant place in the American legal academy, demonstrated by growing numbers of conferences, journals, casebooks and monographs, and electronic mail lists in each area. Not surprisingly, as the two fields have grown, they have begun to touch, to overlap, and occasionally to come into conflict. This process has been evident in the extensive literature on sex discrimination in employment and is increasingly apparent in …


Women's Rights And Political Economy, Tamara Lothian Jan 1996

Women's Rights And Political Economy, Tamara Lothian

Tamara Lothian

No abstract provided.


How Charitable Organizations Influence Federal Tax Policy: "Rent-Seeking" Charities Or Virtuous Politicians?, Nancy J. Knauer Jan 1996

How Charitable Organizations Influence Federal Tax Policy: "Rent-Seeking" Charities Or Virtuous Politicians?, Nancy J. Knauer

Nancy J. Knauer

Tax-exempt charitable organizations exert considerable influence over Congress, the Department of the Treasury, and the Internal Revenue Service in matters dealing with exemption from federal income tax and the tax deductibility of charitable contributions. This Article uses both public choice and public interest analysis to help identify various features of the charitable community and explain how exempt organizations weild political influence despite the restrictions placed on their activities under the tax code. Arguing that the influence of charitable organizations over tax policy can be explained from either a public choice or public interest vantage point, the Article concluds that the …


Rising Temperatures: Rising Tides, Prof. Elizabeth Burleson Jan 1996

Rising Temperatures: Rising Tides, Prof. Elizabeth Burleson

Prof. Elizabeth Burleson

Transboundary environmental problems do not distinguish between political boundaries. Global warming is expected to cause thermal expansion of water and melt glaciers. Both are predicted to lead to a rise in sea level. We must enlarge our paradigms to encompass a global reality and reliance upon global participation.


On The Genealogy Of Moral Hazard, Tom Baker Jan 1996

On The Genealogy Of Moral Hazard, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


In Defence Of Exploitation, Justin Schwartz Jan 1995

In Defence Of Exploitation, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

The concept of exploitation is thought to be central to Marx's Critique of capitalism. John Roemer, an analytical (then-) Marxist economist now at Yale, attacked this idea in a series of papers and books in the 1970s-1990s, arguing that Marxists should be concerned with inequality rather than exploitation -- with distribution rather than production, precisely the opposite of what Marx urged in The Critique of the Gotha Progam.

This paper expounds and criticizes Roemer's objections and his alternative inequality based theory of exploitation, while accepting some of his criticisms. It may be viewed as a companion paper to my What's …


Reinventing Labor Law: A Rejoinder, Tamara Lothian Jan 1995

Reinventing Labor Law: A Rejoinder, Tamara Lothian

Tamara Lothian

No abstract provided.


The Democratized Market Economy In Latin America (And Elsewhere): An Exercise In Institutional Thinking Within Law And Political Economy, Tamara Lothian Jan 1995

The Democratized Market Economy In Latin America (And Elsewhere): An Exercise In Institutional Thinking Within Law And Political Economy, Tamara Lothian

Tamara Lothian

No abstract provided.


The Criticism Of The Third-World Debt And The Revision Of Legal Doctrine, Tamara Lothian Jan 1995

The Criticism Of The Third-World Debt And The Revision Of Legal Doctrine, Tamara Lothian

Tamara Lothian

No abstract provided.


A Contractual Approach To Data Privacy, Stephanos Bibas Jan 1994

A Contractual Approach To Data Privacy, Stephanos Bibas

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Constitutional Design And Law: The Political Economy Of Cabinet And Congressional Government, Matthew S. R. Palmer Nov 1993

Constitutional Design And Law: The Political Economy Of Cabinet And Congressional Government, Matthew S. R. Palmer

The Hon Justice Matthew Palmer

The dissertation takes a political economy approach to constitutional design and legislation in the Westminster (Cabinet) and US (Congressional) models of government. Part I develops the economics of comparative political organization by constructing a theoretical framework for analyzing constitutional design. Part II applies the framework to distinguish the essences of the Cabinet and Congressional systems of constitutional design in the contexts of US and Canadian federal government. Part III analyzes the effects of the different constitutional designs on the processes of legislating in each system and on the substantive characteristics of legislation in each system. The analysis is subjected to …


From Libertarianism To Egalitarianism, Justin Schwartz Jan 1992

From Libertarianism To Egalitarianism, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

A standard natural rights argument for libertarianism is based on the labor theory of property: the idea that I own my self and my labor, and so if I "mix" my own labor with something previously unowned or to which I have a have a right, I come to own the thing with which I have mixed by labor. This initially intuitively attractive idea is at the basis of the theories of property and the role of government of John Locke and Robert Nozick. Locke saw and Nozick agreed that fairness to others requires a proviso: that I leave "enough …


Charles E. Lindblom, Richard Adelstein Dec 1991

Charles E. Lindblom, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

An intellectual biography and review of the work of Charles E. Lindblom.


Continuity And Change Redux: Market And State In American History, Richard Adelstein Dec 1991

Continuity And Change Redux: Market And State In American History, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A review of Jonathan Hughes, The Government Habit Redux (1991).


"The Nation As An Economic Unit:" Keynes, Roosevelt, And The Managerial Ideal, Richard Adelstein Dec 1990

"The Nation As An Economic Unit:" Keynes, Roosevelt, And The Managerial Ideal, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

The First New Deal as central economic planning, and the lost opportunity to reconstruct the federal government toward peaceful Keynesianism.


Deciding For Bigness, Richard Adelstein Dec 1990

Deciding For Bigness, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

Antitrust as a constitutional constraint on the growth of firms.


The Role Of The Democratic And Republican Parties As Organizers Of Shadow Interest Groups, Jonathan R. Macey Oct 1990

The Role Of The Democratic And Republican Parties As Organizers Of Shadow Interest Groups, Jonathan R. Macey

Michigan Law Review

This article advances a new theory to explain the relationship between political parties and interest groups. Among the as yet unanswered questions that I resolve are: (1) why many politicians -both Republicans and Democrats - develop a reputation for "party loyalty" despite the parties' inability to employ any meaningful sanctions against politicians who deviate from the party line; (2) why candidates for public office run in contested primaries when running as an independent generally would be a less costly mechanism for getting on the ballot; (3) why the two major U.S. political parties continue to attract resources from contributors and …