Jurisprudence Commons^™

The Federal Courts Jurisprudence Of Justice Clarence Thomas, Barnett J. Harris

Catholic University Law Review

In “Personal Precedent at the Supreme Court,” Professor Richard Re argues that Supreme Court justices tend to rely on their “previously expressed views of the law,” including their prior separate opinions when deciding new cases. Richard M. Re, Personal Precedent at the Supreme Court, 136 Harv. L. Rev. 824, 825–26 (2023). These “previously expressed views of the law,” which Re refers to as “personal precedent,” play an extremely important and previously unrecognized role in the development of the law. Re even contends that “though typically excluded from the law, personal precedent may actually be its building block.” Richard M. Re, …

The Interpretive Force Of Alexander Hamilton’S Early Expositions Of Presidential Power, Michael Stokes Paulsen

Pepperdine Law Review

The most important, rightly influential, early interpretations of the Constitution on presidential power concerning matters of war, peace, and foreign affairs flowed from the able pen of Alexander Hamilton in three sets of pseudonymous public essays: as “Publius” in The Federalist (1787–1788); as “Pacificus” (1793–1794); and “Camillus” (1795–1796). As Publius, Hamilton expounded a broad understanding of presidential constitutional power generally and of presidential power in war and foreign affairs specifically, including an essentially plenary Commander-in-Chief power over the conduct of authorized war (but with no constitutional power to initiate war: that power being explicitly and exclusively assigned to Congress). As …

An Originalist Interpretation Of Article Iii Permits And Favors Bivens Actions As A Recognition Of The Intrinsic Connection Between Rights And Remedies, Shrivathsan Margam S

Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice

The Bivens Doctrine, which stands for the principle that judges may infer private causes of action for money damages against federal officers from a constitutional text that does not expressly create such remedies, has faced attack from Originalists on the Supreme Court of the United States. Every case seeking to extend the Bivens principle to a new context meets rejection from the Court with concurrences calling for overturning it altogether. This Article will argue that an Originalist approach to interpreting the Constitution, specifically the Original Methods subset of the ascendant lens of Original Public Meaning, permits and counsels in favor …

Faces Of Formalism, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Journal Articles

Formalist approaches to legal interpretation, such as textualism and originalism, are ascendant in federal statutory and constitutional law. Yet with success have come uncertainty and dissatisfaction. Formalists and their critics observe that textualism and originalism can seem as open-ended as the purposive and dynamic methods they were supposed to replace. This Article tries to diagnose the source of this discontent. It does so by identifying two different faces of formalist interpretation: the formalism of authority—adherence to original sources of law—and the formalism of method—constraint through predictable, rule-bound interpretation. Defenses of formalism often assume these two paths to constraint run together, …

A Conversation With Judge Stephanos Bibas, Stephanos Bibas, Kevin C. Walsh

Catholic University Law Review

On Friday, March 28th, 2025, the Catholic University Law Review hosted its annual spring symposium: Traditional Judicial Power & Doctrinal Development, which included a conversation between Judge Stephanos Bibas and Professor Kevin C. Walsh. The conversation covered topics such as standing, severability, and preliminary injunctions. This is a transcript of the conversation, and the text appears substantially as it was delivered.

Take In Case Of Emergency: Reconciling Necessity Takings With The Original Meaning Of The Takings Clause, Tony Smith

Northwestern University Law Review

Does the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause permit the state to destroy property without compensation whenever it declares an emergency? The long-standing doctrine of necessity empowers the state to do exactly that.

Courts dating back to common law England have permitted governments to claim a privilege of necessity to avoid paying for private property they destroy in times of crisis. The privilege rests on the principle that the public good sometimes outweighs the harm the individual suffers. Today’s courts and academics stretch this principle to its limits, arguing necessity should be used as a vehicle for combating all manner of social …

Constitutional Futurisms, Jeremiah Chin

Northwestern University Law Review

How do we reckon with the past? The Supreme Court’s recent embrace of originalism as a mode of constitutional analysis relies almost exclusively on a view of history and tradition that would bind us to an understanding of principles and ideals that legitimized the exclusion of minority voices. Cases such as New York State Pistol and Rifle Ass'n v. Bruen use flavors of originalism as a framework to define rights and governmental powers through their historical antecedents, but this broad standard of interpretation is notably absent in the Court’s recent discussions of histories and traditions of racism in the United …

Dobbs V. Brown, Benjamin H. Barton

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization1is the most important and impactful Supreme Court decision since at least Roe v. Wade, and potentially since Brown v. Board of Education. Past survey data show that most Americans can only name two Supreme Court opinions: Roe and Brown. Dobbs will surely join that list. This Article compares the history, drafting, and opinions of Dobbs and Brown to show what a missed opportunity Dobbs represents. Regardless of whether you agree or disagree with the opinion, it should be clear that Dobbs was one of those unique times (like that of Brown) where the Court …

George Washington’S Teeth, Wittgenstein, And Two Gruesome Problems For Originalism, Scott Devito

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

With the conservative turn of the U.S. Supreme Court, originalism has become ascendant. This rise to preeminence should trouble the legal community because originalism is grounded on a naive understanding of the interpretative process. Once we wash away this naivety and delve more deeply into legislative interpretation, we see that originalism fails in three ways. First, here is recent empirical evidence that general meaning is rare and, as such, the original meaning required by the theory is unlikely to have existed. Second, originalism fails to take into account the Problem of Induction—that making generalized inferences from a limited dataset is …

Outcome Reasons And Process Reasons In Normative Constitutional Theory, Lawrence B. Solum

Faculty Scholarship

Constitutional theory is a mess. Disagreements about originalism and living constitutionalism have become intractable. Constitutional theorists make some arguments that seem clearly fallacious and advance proposals that are pie in the sky. One of the reasons for the mess is an overreliance by constitutional theorists on “outcome reasons,” justifications that rely on the theorist’s beliefs about what outcomes are good and what outcomes are bad. This outcome-drive approach is exemplified by the so-called “canonical cases” argument, which evaluates positions in normative constitutional theory on the basis of its counterfactual implications for a handful of prior decisions of the Supreme Court. …

The Problem Of Extravagant Inferences, Cass Sunstein

Georgia Law Review

Judges and lawyers sometimes act as if a constitutional or statutory term must, as a matter of semantics, be understood to have a particular meaning, when it could easily be understood to have another meaning, or several other meanings. When judges and lawyers act as if a legal term has a unique semantic meaning, even though it does not, they should be seen to be drawing extravagant inferences. Some constitutional provisions are treated this way; consider the idea that the vesting of executive power in a President of the United States necessarily includes the power to remove, at will, a …

A Textualist Defense Of A New Collateral Order Doctrine, Adam Reed Moore

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

As a general rule, federal appellate courts have jurisdiction over “final decisions.” Though the rule seems simple enough, the Court’s current approach to interpreting “final decisions,” the collateral order doctrine, is anything but straight­forward. That is because the Court has left the statutory text by the wayside. The collateral order doctrine is divorced from statutory text and is instead based on policy considerations.

Commentators (and, at times, the Court) have offered an alternative reading of “final decisions”: the final-judgment rule. This rule would allow appeals from final judgments only. But this alternative is not the product of close textual analysis. …

An Originalist Approach To Prospective Overruling, John O. Mcginnis, Michael Rappaport

Notre Dame Law Review

Originalism has become a dominant jurisprudential theory on the Supreme Court. But a large number of precedents are inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning and overturning them risks creating enormous disruption to the legal order. This article defends a prospective overruling approach that would harmonize precedent with originalism’s rise and reduce the disruption from overrulings. Under prospective overruling, the Court declares that an existing statute violates the original meaning but will continue to be enforced because declaring it unconstitutional would produce enormous costs; however, future statutes of this type will be voided as unconstitutional. Under our approach, the Court would …

Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, And Kennedy: The Role Of History And Tradition, Randy E. Barnett, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In three recent cases, the constitutional concepts of history and tradition have played important roles in the reasoning of the Supreme Court. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization relied on history and tradition to overrule Roe v. Wade. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen articulated a history and tradition test for the validity of laws regulating the right to bear arms recognized by the Second Amendment. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District looked to history and tradition in formulating the test for the consistency of state action with the Establishment Clause.

These cases raise important questions about …

Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, And Kennedy: The Role Of History And Tradition, Randy E. Barnett, Lawrence B. Solum

Faculty Scholarship

In three recent cases, the constitutional concepts of history and tradition have played important roles in the reasoning of the Supreme Court. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization relied on history and tradition to overrule Roe v. Wade. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen articulated a history and tradition test for the validity of laws regulating the right to bear arms recognized by the Second Amendment. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District looked to history and tradition in formulating the test for the consistency of state action with the Establishment Clause.

These cases raise important questions about …

The Article Iii "Party" And The Originalist Case Against Corporate Diversity Jurisdiction, Mark Moller, Lawrence B. Solum

Faculty Scholarship

Federal courts control an outsize share of big-ticket corporate litigation. And that control rests, to a significant degree, on the Supreme Court’s extension of Article III’s Diversity of Citizenship Clause to corporations. Yet, critics have questioned the constitutionality of corporate diversity jurisdiction from the beginning.

In this Article and a previous one, we develop the first sustained critique of corporate diversity jurisdiction.

Our previous article demonstrated that corporations are not “citizens” given the original meaning of that word. But we noted this finding alone doesn’t sink general corporate diversity jurisdiction. The ranks of corporate shareholders include many undoubted “citizens.” And …

The Constitutional Law Of Interpretation, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark

Notre Dame Law Review

The current debate over constitutional interpretation often proceeds on the assumption that the Constitution does not provide rules for its own interpretation. Accordingly, several scholars have attempted to identify applicable rules by consulting external sources that governed analogous legal texts (such as statutes, treaties, contracts, etc.). The distinctive function of the Constitution—often forgotten or overlooked—renders these analogies largely unnecessary. The Constitution was an instrument used by the people of the several States to transfer a fixed set of sovereign rights and powers from one group of sovereigns (the States) to another sovereign (the federal government), while maintaining the “States” as …

The Moral Authority Of Original Meaning, J. Joel Alicea

Notre Dame Law Review

One of the most enduring criticisms of originalism is that it lacks a sufficiently compelling moral justification. Scholars operating within the natural law tradition have been among the foremost critics of originalism’s morality, yet originalists have yet to offer a sufficient defense of originalism from within the natural law tradition that demonstrates that these critics are mistaken. That task has become more urgent in recent years due to Adrian Vermeule’s critique of originalism from within the natural law tradition, which has received greater attention than previous critiques. This Article is the first full-length response to the natural law critique of …

Recovering Classical Legal Constitutionalism: A Critique Of Professor Vermeule's New Theory, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Kevin C. Walsh

Notre Dame Law Review

This Review proceeds in three Parts. Part I briefly summarizes Common Good Constitutionalism and provides a more detailed description of four of the book’s distinctive features. Part II critiques Vermeule’s argument in light of the classical tradition’s four essential aspects of law, namely that it is an ordinance of reason, for the common good, made by one who has care of the community, and promulgated. Part III draws on those reflections to respond to Vermeule’s criticisms of work like ours that argues that original-law-based understandings of the Constitution are at home in the classical legal tradition. A Conclusion briefly reflects …

Deep-State Constitutionalism, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this review, I explain how "Common Good Constitutionalism" taps into a deficiency of the conservative legal movement: namely, its exclusive focus on the law "as it is" at the expense of the underlying abstract normative principles that justify the positive law of our written Constitution. Due to this deficiency, the conservative legal movement gives short shrift to the Declaration of Independence and the Ninth Amendment and the natural rights to which both refer. This deficiency is in need of correction. But any such correction does not justify the jettisoning of originalism as Vermeule proposes. Nor does Vermeule defend his …

Slavery And The History Of Congress's Enumerated Powers, Jeffrey Schmitt

Arkansas Law Review

In his first inaugural address, President Abraham Lincoln declared, “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.” Like virtually all Americans before the Civil War, Lincoln believed in what historians call the “national consensus” on slavery. According to this consensus, Congress’s enumerated powers were not broad enough to justify any regulation of slavery within the states. Legal scholars who support the modern reach of federal powers have thus conventionally argued …

Originalism And The Inseparability Of Decision Procedures From Interpretive Standards, Michael L. Smith

Faculty Articles

In his article, Originalism: Standard and Procedure, Professor Stephen E. Sachs describes a never-ending debate between originalism's advocates and critics. Originalists argue that certain historical facts determine the Constitution's meaning. But determining these facts is difficult, if not impossible for judges, attorneys, and the public. Sachs seeks to rise above this debate, arguing that the legal community should not expect originalism to offer a procedure for interpreting the Constitution. Instead, the legal community should treat originalism as a

standard to judge interpretations.

This Article takes issue with this approach. Originalism is not like other instances in law where statutes or …

When Statutory Interpretation Becomes Precedent: Why Individual Rights Advocates Shouldn’T Be So Quick To Praise Bostock, Elena Schiefele

Washington and Lee Law Review

Justice Neil Gorsuch’s approach to textualism, which this Note will call “muscular textualism,” is unique. Most notably exemplified in Bostock v. Clayton County, muscular textualism is marked by its rigorous adherence to what Justice Gorsuch perceives to be the “plain language” of the text. Because Justice Gorsuch’s opinions exemplify muscular textualism in a structured and consistent manner, his appointment to the Supreme Court provides the forum from which he can influence the decision-making process of other members of the judiciary when they seek guidance from Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, it is important for both advocates and judges to understand …

Greenbacks, Consent, And Unwritten Amendments, John M. Bickers

Arkansas Law Review

"I remember a German farmer expressing as much in a few words as the whole subject requires: “money is money, and paper is paper.”—All the invention of man cannot make them otherwise. The alchymist may cease his labours, and the hunter after the philosopher’s stone go to rest, if paper cannot be metamorphosed into gold and silver, or made to answer the same purpose in all cases."

Every day Americans spend paper money, using it as legal tender. Yet the Constitution makes no mention of this phenomenon. Indeed, it clearly prevents the states from having the authority to make paper …

The Constitution And Democracy In Troubled Times, John M. Greabe

Law Faculty Scholarship

Does textualism and originalism approach positively impact democracy?

Finding Original Public Meaning, James Macleod

Georgia Law Review

Textualists seek to interpret statutes consistent with their “original public meaning” (OPM). To find it, they ask an avowedly empirical question: how would ordinary readers have understood the statute’s terms at the time of their enactment? But as the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County highlights, merely asking an empirical question doesn’t preclude interpretive controversy. In considering how Title VII applies to LGBT people, the Bostock majority and dissents vehemently disagreed over the statute’s bar on discrimination “because of sex”—each side claiming that OPM clearly supported its interpretation. So who, if anyone, was right? And how can textualists’ …

Keeping Up: Walking With Justice Douglas, Charles A. Reich

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

From Parchment To Dust: The Case For Constitutional Skepticism (Introduction), Louis Michael Seidman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This is the introduction to a new book entitled "From Parchment to Dust: The Case for Constitutional Skepticism." The introduction sets out a preliminary case for constitutional skepticism and outlines the arguments contained in the rest of the book.

The 2019 Higgins Distinguished Visitor Lecture: The Subversive Side Of Textualism And Original Intent, Donald B. Ayer

Lewis & Clark Law Review

The Lorene Sails Higgins Charitable Trust provides the Lewis & Clark community access to leading legal scholars from around the world. Each year, the campus is graced with a visitor renowned in their field whose stay is funded by a grant from the trust. This lecture, given by the former Deputy Attorney General and Principal Deputy Solicitor General Donald B. Ayer during the course of his visit, discussed the changes in American legal thinking during his career.

Saving America’S Privacy Rights: Why Carpenter V. United States Was Wrongly Decided And Why Courts Should Be Promoting Legislative Reform Rather Than Extending Existing Privacy Jurisprudence, David Stone

St. Mary's Law Journal

Privacy rights are under assault, but the Supreme Court’s judicial intervention into the issue, starting with Katz v. United States and leading to the Carpenter v. United States decision has created an inconsistent, piecemeal common law of privacy that forestalls a systematic public policy resolution by Congress and the states. In order to reach a satisfactory and longlasting resolution of the problem consistent with separation of powers principles, the states should consider a constitutional amendment that reduces the danger of pervasive technologyaided surveillance and monitoring, together with a series of statutes addressing each new issue posed by technological change as …