Jurisprudence Commons^™

The Shadow Corroboration Doctrine In Sexual Violence Cases, Chris Cox

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Federal Courts Jurisprudence Of Justice Clarence Thomas, Barnett J. Harris

Catholic University Law Review

In “Personal Precedent at the Supreme Court,” Professor Richard Re argues that Supreme Court justices tend to rely on their “previously expressed views of the law,” including their prior separate opinions when deciding new cases. Richard M. Re, Personal Precedent at the Supreme Court, 136 Harv. L. Rev. 824, 825–26 (2023). These “previously expressed views of the law,” which Re refers to as “personal precedent,” play an extremely important and previously unrecognized role in the development of the law. Re even contends that “though typically excluded from the law, personal precedent may actually be its building block.” Richard M. Re, …

The Hidden Power Of Citizenship: Political Identity In The Twilight Zone Of Equal Protection, Charles J. Anderson

Indiana Law Journal

More than half a century ago, in the landmark case of Graham v. Richardson, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state-level blanket exclusions of noncitizens. That case ushered in a new rule: State classifications based on alienage are “inherently suspect” and subject to strict scrutiny. But Graham’s rule has a major exception. Just a few years after Graham was decided, the Court upheld several state laws excluding noncitizens from working as police officers, public school teachers, and probation officers. So was created what would later be termed “political function” doctrine. …

Does Textualism Constrain Supreme Court Justices?, James J. Brudney, Lawrence Baum

Northwestern University Law Review

A principal justification for textualism is the constraint hypothesis. Conservative Justices and leading textualist scholars contend that—in stark contrast to reliance on legislative history—focus on the ordinary meaning of enacted text leaves little room for the Justices to be policy-oriented or ideological in their interpretations. This Article represents the first systematic study probing the validity of the constraint hypothesis, one that employs both quantitative and qualitative analysis.

The Article examines the Justices’ reliance on interpretive resources in over 660 statutory decisions in the field of labor and employment, decided by the Burger Court, the Rehnquist Court, and the Roberts Court—during …

(Re)Individualizing Criminal Law, Itay Ravid

Faculty Publications

Criminal law purports to care about the individual culpability of those committing crimes. Individual mental states or defenses based on one’s beliefs are considered foundational to moral responsibility and criminal conviction. The expansion of algorithmic risk assessment tools in the criminal legal system, however, threatens these principles, changing the criminal law subject from an autonomous individual to merely a predicted object. This Article argues that risk assessment tools—now functioning as gatekeepers at both the entry and exit stages of the criminal process, from predictive policing to compassionate release eligibility—have shifted the criminal system away from its foundation in individual culpability. …

The Direct-Derivative Divide In Florida Shareholder Litigation, Itai Fiegenbaum

St. Thomas Law Review

This Article analyzes the evolving jurisprudence surrounding the classification of shareholder claims in Florida business entity litigation. Shareholder and member lawsuits take one of two forms: direct claims, which allege personal harm to the entity owner, and derivative claims, which seek redress on behalf of the entity. While both aim to deter insider misconduct and ensure accountability, the procedural posture and practical consequences of each are dramatically different. Direct claims allow shareholders immediate access to judicial relief. Derivative claims, by contrast, impose significant procedural hurdles that often preclude review on the merits. The proper classification of a claim is therefore …

Can We Talk—Really Talk—About Critical Race Theory? What A Game For All Ages Can Teach Us, Dan Subotnik

Touro Law Review

This essay may shock many readers. What it tries to do is look more closely than usual at the underpinnings of American racial discourse in the hope of leaving its readers, by its end, more willing than before to speak openly and listen carefully to people who disagree with them on the fraught subject of race. Wouldn’t many of us academics like to engage in a more open-minded sort of interracial conversation with a greater variety of our peers than we usually do? And yet it never seems to happen. Do any of us, black or white, feel we can …

Legal Realism, Legal Positivism, And Determinacy, Dan Priel

All Papers

It is a commonplace that the legal realists argued that law is deeply indeterminate. According to this familiar account, the legal realists insisted that legal materials don’t constrain judges, who are therefore free to decide cases in almost any way they want. An influential argument has argued that the only way to explain this view is by showing that the legal realists presupposed a legal positivist theory of law. This Essay offers a different understanding of the relationship between realism, positivism, and determinacy, challenging this interpretation of the realists as both historically false and as philosophically unwarranted. I provide many …

Constitutional Futurisms, Jeremiah Chin

Northwestern University Law Review

How do we reckon with the past? The Supreme Court’s recent embrace of originalism as a mode of constitutional analysis relies almost exclusively on a view of history and tradition that would bind us to an understanding of principles and ideals that legitimized the exclusion of minority voices. Cases such as New York State Pistol and Rifle Ass'n v. Bruen use flavors of originalism as a framework to define rights and governmental powers through their historical antecedents, but this broad standard of interpretation is notably absent in the Court’s recent discussions of histories and traditions of racism in the United …

Toward A Perpetual Practice Of Affirmative Action, Sheldon Bernard Lyke

Northwestern University Law Review

Despite perceptions that affirmative action is “dead” following the Supreme Court ruling in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College (SFFA), this Essay argues that affirmative action remains crucial for addressing racial bias in admissions processes. This Essay examines the strict scrutiny standard, which requires that any use of race must serve a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Courts have interpreted the narrowly tailored prong of this standard to include a logical end point requirement, which mandates that race-conscious measures must have a clear and limited …

Standing On Stare Decisis After Students For Fair Admissions, Areeb Asif, Lindsey Roloff

Northwestern University Law Review

The Supreme Court recognized nearly half a century ago in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke that “the ‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.” Nevertheless, the Court seriously undercut efforts to bring such a future to life by striking down race-conscious admissions programs in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College and Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina (collectively SFFA). Though SFFA’s binding effect is limited to educational institutions, …

Statutory Construction, Maine Law Review

Maine Law Review

The various rules a court may invoke as the time-worn tests of a statute's meaning reveal little of its institutional approach to statutory construction unless considered in the light of particular cases to which they are applied. Mindful that courts generally have failed to develop consistent approaches to statutory construction, the following survey attempts to rough out the contours of Maine doctrine. The reader should note that any critical evaluations derive from stated preferences for particular approaches to problems of statutory construction, and should recall that opinion on these topics varies widely.

Predicting What The Law Court Will Do In Fact, Harry P. Glassman

Maine Law Review

Over eighty years ago Oliver Wendell Holmes announced what became the manifesto of the legal realists when he stated: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." Legal philosophers and professors of jurisprudence may justifiably quarrel with Holmes' definition of law, but that definition continues to be useful to the practicing attorney engaged in the everyday business of counseling clients and advising them concerning the legality of anticipated activities. It is useful also to the trial court judge, bound by the decisions of an appellate court, who, …

The Problem Of Biased Precedents, Ronen Avraham, Issachar Rosen-Zvi

Cardozo Law Review

This Article addresses the problem ofbiased precedents, wherein sophisticated repeat players, often corporate and state entities armed with superior resources and a vested interest in shaping the law, manipulate legal proceedings to systematically establish self-advantageous precedents. Specifically, by strategically choosing to litigate cases they anticipate will lead to favorable precedents and settling those expected to produce unfavorable outcomes, these players systematically bias the law over time to their advantage, at the expense of one-shot parties and society at large. The problem of biased precedents challenges the commonly held view about the efficiency and fairness of the legal system and raises …

The Waiting Is The Hardest Part: The Constitutionality Of Firearm Waiting Periods, F. Lee Francis

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This Article examines the constitutionality of firearm waiting period laws through the lens of the Supreme Court’s evolving Second Amendment jurisprudence. Although such laws are frequently defended as prudent public safety measures, their validity turns not on legislative purpose but on constitutional principle, particularly as framed in District of Columbia v. Heller and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.

Under those decisions, the scope of the Second Amendment is determined not by judicial balancing of contemporary interests, but by reference to the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Article surveys that tradition and finds no …

Law In Society: Defending Hart, Alma Diamond

Fellow, Adjunct, Lecturer, and Research Scholar Works

I revisit the debate between Joseph Raz and H. L. A. Hart concerning the nature of legal content and reasoning. Raz contended that legal reasoning should be analyzed as a form of moral reasoning. In contrast, Hart emphasized the distinction between legal and moral content, proposing that legal reasoning is a form of what I will call social-institutional reasoning. I characterize social-institutional reasoning in terms of the agent-relative, domain-specific, universal, and content-insensitive justifications it draws upon. I evaluate Raz’s moralized analysis and argue that it obscures the distinctive contribution that law’s social and institutional grounds play in our understanding of …

2025 Shepard Broad College Of Law Admissions Viewbook, Nova Southeastern University

Shepard Broad College of Law Viewbook

No abstract provided.

Pozen And The Puzzle Of Counterfactuals, Louis Michael Seidman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Constitution and the War on Drugs, David Pozen’s carefully researched and brilliantly argued book, is both illuminating and disturbing: illuminating because it unearths forgotten moments when judicially formulated constitutional doctrine that could have ended or sharply restricted the War on Drugs were well within the Overton Window, and disturbing because it surfaces hard questions about historical contingency and the scope of the change that might have occurred in a counterfactual world. In this review, the author argues that the failure to specify both the nature of the counterfactual and the breadth of the alternative possibility have confused discussions …

The Sovereignty Problem In Federal Indian Law, Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Articles

There is a sovereignty problem in federal Indian law-namely, that the federal government's sovereign defenses prevent tribal nations and individual Indian people from realizing justice in the courts. Often, compelling tribal and Indian claims go nowhere as the judiciary defers to the interests of the United States, even where Congress has expressly stated its support for tribal interests. Conversely, tribal judiciaries allow claims to proceed to the merits, invoking customary and traditional law to hold tribal governments accountable.

Sovereignty theory helps to explain why justice can be done in one court system but not another. But federal, state, and tribal …

Empty Voting And Hidden Ownership In Canadian Jurisprudence, Maziar Peihani

All Faculty Publications

The classic understanding of equity encompasses a suite of economic and governance rights, which typically includes the rights to vote, receive dividends, and participate in distribution of assets upon dissolution. This conventional view, outlined in corporate legislations, is supported by Canadian jurisprudence and corporate law scholarship. However, financial innovations have facilitated the separation of voting rights from the financial entitlements of shares, creating a marketplace where shareholder interests are reconfigured and traded in diverse ways. Derivatives and securities lending arrangements have led to phenomena known as empty voting and hidden ownership. In empty voting, an investor retains voting rights without …

Utah V. Strieff And Teaching Analysis, Lisa A. Tucker

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

In Utah v. Strieff, the Supreme Court considered whether the Fourth Amendment required suppression of evidence obtained in an unlawful investigatory stop when police discovered that the person stopped was subject to lawful arrest based on an unrelated outstanding warrant. The majority opinion, written by Justice Clarence Thomas, held that suppression was not required in such a case; the dissent by Justice Sotomayor argued that it should be.

These two legal opinions took jarringly different approaches to determining a question of law, one that disproportionately impacts people of color, who are statistically most likely to be unlawfully stopped …

In Praise Of Ignoring Facts, Stephen E. Sachs

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Treating every use of legal rhetoric as equally probative of American law is fatal to the theoretical project—including to [Jack] Balkin’s own “thin” theory of constitutional law, which stretches itself past the breaking point in the hopes of accommodating the changing winds of social movements. Rather than take advocates’ rhetorical moves for granted, we scholars have the indulgence and time to look for the implicit theories underlying these moves, to air those theories explicitly, to identify what might make them true or false, and to assess how plausible they are on those grounds. Constitutional theories need microfoundations: a theory of …

Two Forms Of Formalism In Contract Law, Gregory Klass

Cardozo Law Review

Formalism in contract interpretation has had many defenders and many critics. What lawmakers need, however, is an account of when formalism works and when it does not. This Article addresses that need by providing a general theory of contract exposition and differentiating between two forms of formalism in contract law. Formalities effect legal change by virtue of their form alone, thereby obviating interpretation. Examples include “as is,” the seal, and sometimes contract boilerplate. Evidentiary formalism, in distinction, limits the evidence that goes into interpretation. Plain meaning rules are an example of evidentiary formalism. This Article provides a detailed analysis of …

Textualism In Practice, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

It is by now axiomatic to note that textualism has won the statutory interpretation wars. But contrary to what textualists long have promised, the widespread embrace of textualism as an interpretive methodology has not resulted in any real clarity or predictability about the interpretive path—or even the specific interpretive tools—that courts will invoke in a particular case. Part of the reason for this lack of predictability is that textualism-in-practice often differs significantly from the approach that textualism-in-theory advertises; and part of the reason is that textualism-in-theory is sometimes in tension with itself. In light of textualism’s ascendance—and now dominance—on the …

Interactional Ordering: Reconstructing Lon Fuller's Theory Of Private Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

Faculty Scholarship

While Lon Fuller is best remembered for his contributions to the fields of general jurisprudence and contract law, his work in each has long been seen as unrelated to the other. This Article shows that in a significantly underappreciated body of work, Fuller did connect the two and, in the process, developed the outlines of a robust theory of private law, best characterized as “interactional ordering.” Driven by Fuller’s efforts to develop a jurisprudence of form that was derived from conventionalism and natural law thinking, interactional ordering sees all normativity as originating in horizontal interactions between individuals in society, seeking …

Death By Jury: Jurisprudential Trends And Hybrid Capital Sentencing Authority, Jacob T. Hayes

Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy

No abstract provided.

Keynote Address: Protecting The Pillars Of Our Legal System, Bernard W. Nussbaum

Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy

No abstract provided.

Dealing With Excessive Caseloads Without Litigation, Robert Stein, John Terzano, Norman Lefstein, Avis Buchanan, Robert Boruchowitz, Dennis Keefe, James R. Neuhard

Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy

No abstract provided.

Major Questions, Common Sense?, Kevin Tobia, Daniel E. Walters, Brian Slocum

Faculty Scholarship

The Major Questions Doctrine (“MQD”) is the newest textualist interpretive canon, and it has driven consequential Supreme Court decisions concerning vaccine mandates, environmental regulation, and student loan relief. But the new MQD is a canon in search of legitimization. Critics allege that the MQD displaces the Court’s conventional textual analysis with judicial policymaking. Textualists have now responded that the MQD is a linguistic canon, consistent with textualism. Justice Barrett recently argued in Biden v. Nebraska that the MQD is grounded in ordinary people’s understanding of language and law, and scholarship contends that the MQD reflects ordinary people’s understanding of textual …

The Incoherence Of Evidence Law, G. Alexander Nunn

Faculty Scholarship

What is the purpose of evidence law? The answer might seem intuitive. Evidence law exists, of course, to foster verdict accuracy, legitimacy, and efficiency. But these kindred aims often come into conflict. Policy tradeoffs are inescapable in evidence law, meaning that an evidentiary regime must clarify how its normative objectives cohere. Do accuracy, legitimacy, and efficiency work together on equal footing, such that the goal of a code is to maximize each objective to the extent possible? Or does one of evidence law’s aims take precedence over the rest? And if one goal takes priority, what is the role of …