Jurisprudence Commons^™

Faces Of Formalism, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Journal Articles

Formalist approaches to legal interpretation, such as textualism and originalism, are ascendant in federal statutory and constitutional law. Yet with success have come uncertainty and dissatisfaction. Formalists and their critics observe that textualism and originalism can seem as open-ended as the purposive and dynamic methods they were supposed to replace. This Article tries to diagnose the source of this discontent. It does so by identifying two different faces of formalist interpretation: the formalism of authority—adherence to original sources of law—and the formalism of method—constraint through predictable, rule-bound interpretation. Defenses of formalism often assume these two paths to constraint run together, …

Human Rights Methodology For Clinical Instruction: Legal Theory And Interdisciplinary Practices To Realize Human Rights Outcomes, Diane Desierto

Journal Articles

The interdisciplinary fact-finding and analytical methodologies of global human rights law, when translated to experiential learning practices (e.g., in the form of human rights legal assessments that integrate international law with domestic law and inject rigorous plausibility evaluations of client claims applicable to global as well as domestic fora) can usefully enhance and expand United States law school clinical teaching practices and the transfer of practical lawyering skills. By teaching law students: (1) the wide range of available human rights factfinding and empirical tools; (2) the techniques for broad use and application of primary and secondary evidentiary sources; and (3) …

Dissenting Authority, Guyora Binder

Journal Articles

This essay explicates J.B. White’s rhetorical conception of authority as a potentially collaborative achievement and contrasts it with the conception of authority as surrender of judgment prevailing in legal philosophy. On White’s view, authority is not an instrument held and deployed, but is conferred, like respect. This conception of authority illuminates three puzzles concerning the relationship between dissent and legal authority. First, Legal Positivism’s purportedly descriptive account of law insists it must claim an authority to govern independent of justice and assent. Yet law’s language is replete with justice-based appeals for popular assent. White’s reading of the practice of legal …

Reasons For Interpretation, Francisco J. Urbina

Journal Articles

What kinds of reasons should matter in choosing an approach to constitutional or legal interpretation? Scholars offer different types of reasons for their theories of interpretation: conceptual, linguistic, normative, legal, institutional, and reasons based on theories of law. This Article argues that normative reasons, and only normative reasons, can justify interpretive choice. This is the "normative choice thesis." This Article formulates the normative choice thesis and offers a systematic analysis of the different kinds of reasons usually canvassed to defend theories of interpretation, showing why each type of non-normative reason cannot justify interpretive choice. In doing this, this Article also …

St. John Henry Newman's Development Of Doctrine And Law: Some Preliminary Notes And Questions, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Journal Articles

This essay, presented at a conference at the Catholic University of America's Columbus School of Law, considers how Newman's theory of development of church doctrine can illuminate the development of human law. The argument, which focuses primarily on constitutional law and tradition, identifies promising parallels but also offers cautionary notes about straightforward analogies between the two bodies of doctrine.

Historical Kinship And Categorical Mischief: The Use And Misuse Of Doctrinal Borrowing In Intellectual Property Law, Mark Bartholomew, John Tehranian

Journal Articles

Analogies are ubiquitous in legal reasoning, and, in copyright jurisprudence, courts frequently turn to patent law for guidance. From introducing doctrines meant to regulate online intermediaries to evaluating the constitutionality of resurrecting copyrights to works from the public domain, judges turn to patent law analogies to lend ballast to their decisions. At other times, however, patent analogies with copyright law are quickly discarded and differences between the two regimes highlighted. Why? In examining the transplantation of doctrinal frameworks from one intellectual property field to another, this Article assesses the circumstances in which courts engage in doctrinal borrowing, discerns their rationale …

From Scanner To Court: A Neuroscientifically Informed “Reasonable Person” Test Of Trademark Infringement, Zhihao Zhang, Maxwell Good, Vera Kulikov, Femke Van Horen, Mark Bartholomew, Andrew S. Kayser, Ming Hsu

Journal Articles

Many legal decisions center on the thoughts or perceptions of some idealized group of individuals, referred to variously as the “average person,” “the typical consumer,” or the “reasonable person.” Substantial concerns exist, however, regarding the subjectivity and vulnerability to biases inherent in conventional means of assessing such responses, particularly the use of self-report evidence. Here, we addressed these concerns by complementing self-report evidence with neural data to inform the mental representations in question. Using an example from intellectual property law, we demonstrate that it is possible to construct a parsimonious neural index of visual similarity that can inform the reasonable …

Statutory Interpretation And Chevron Deference In The Appellate Courts: An Empirical Analysis, Amy Semet

Journal Articles

What statutory methods does an appellate court use in reviewing decisions of an administrative agency? Further, in doing this review, are appellate judges more likely to use certain statutory methods when they expressly cite the Chevron two-step framework than if they do not? This Article explores the answers to these questions using an original database of over 200 statutory interpretation cases culled from more than 2,500 cases decided in appellate courts reviewing National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) adjudications from 1994 through 2020. In particular, the study examined the use of text, language canons, substantive canons, legislative history, …

The Conceptual Problems Arising From Legal Pluralism, Jorge Luis Fabra-Zamora

Journal Articles

This paper argues that analytical jurisprudence has been insufficiently attentive to three significant puzzles highlighted by the legal pluralist tradition: the existence of commonalities between different types of law, the possibility of a distinction between law and non-law, and the explanatory centrality of the state. I further argue that the resolution of these questions sets the stage for a renewed agenda of analytical jurisprudence and has to be considered in attempts for reconciliation between the academic traditions of analytical jurisprudence and legal pluralism, often called “pluralist jurisprudence.” I also argue that the resolution of these problems affects the empirical, doctrinal, …

"Grievously And Egregiously Wrong": American Abortion Jurisprudence, Alyson M. Cox, O. Carter Snead

Journal Articles

This paper considers American abortion jurisprudence in the light of the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. We conclude that Casey and its precedent case of Roe are egregiously wrong, have no grounding in the Constitution, and are unjustifiable on stare decisis grounds. This article argues that the Court should take this opportunity to overturn Roe and Casey once and for all, and restore to the political branches of government the authority to enact laws and policies that offer comprehensive protections to mothers, children (born and unborn), and families. Just as both parties made …

The Internal Point Of View In Private Law, Paul B. Miller, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Journal Articles

Many leading private law theorists claim to analyze private law from an internal point of view; a vantage point within which private law doctrine, institutions and procedure enjoy pride of place. Private law theory of a generation ago distinguished the internal from external points of view, valorizing the former and criticizing the latter for ignoring the normativity of private law or for mistaking private law for public law or regulation. The New Private Law, by contrast, asserts the complementarity of internal and external points of view, partly by emphasizing the value of functionalist analyses of legal form. In this article, …

The Ostensible (And, At Times, Actual) Virtue Of Deference, Anthony O'Rourke

Journal Articles

In Rethinking Police Expertise, Anna Lvovsky exposes how litigators leverage judicial understandings of police expertise against the government. The article is rich not only with descriptive insights, but also with normative potential. By rigorously analyzing the relationship between expertise and authority in specific cases, Professor Lvovsky offers guidance as to how judges and lawyers should factor a police officer’s expertise into an assessment of whether the officer’s conduct is lawful. This Response argues, however, that Rethinking Police Expertise’s normative potential is weakened by the sharp conceptual distinction it draws between judicial understandings of expertise as a “professional virtue” (which it …

Judicial Populism, Anya Bernstein, Glen Staszewski

Journal Articles

Populism has taken center stage in discussions of contemporary politics. This Article details a judicial populism that resonates with political populism’s tropes, mirrors its traits, and enables its practices. Like political populism, judicial populism insists there are clear, correct answers to complex, debatable problems, treating reasonable disagreement as illegitimate. It disparages the institutions that mediate divergent interests in a republican democracy, claiming special access to the law’s clear objective meaning. And it imagines a pure, unified people locked in battle with a subversive elite.

While commentators have recognized political populism as fundamentally undemocratic, judicial populism has largely escaped recognition and …

Legal Corpus Linguistics And The Half-Empirical Attitude, Anya Bernstein

Journal Articles

Legal writers have recently turned to corpus linguistics to interpret legal texts. Corpus linguistics, a social-science methodology, provides a sophisticated way to analyze large data sets of language use. Legal proponents have touted it as giving empirical grounding to claims about ordinary language, which pervade legal interpretation. But legal corpus linguistics cannot deliver on that promise because it ignores the crucial contexts in which legal language is produced, interpreted, and deployed.

First, legal corpus linguistics neglects the relevant legal context—the conditions that give legal language authority. Because of this, legal corpus studies’ evidence about language use perversely obscures and misstates …

Legal Positivism As A Theory Of Law’S Existence: A Comment On Margaret Martin’S "Judging Positivism", Jorge Luis Fabra-Zamora

Journal Articles

This comment critically examines the conception of legal positivism that informs Margaret Martin’s interesting and multilayered challenge against the substance and method of this intellectual tradition. My central claim is that her characterization of the substantive theory of legal positivism sets aside a more fundamental and explanatory prior dimension concerning the positivist’s theory of the existence of legal systems and legal norms. I also argue that her understanding of the positivist’s descriptive methodology as a nonnormative project is too demanding and overlooks both the relationships between law and morality recognized by contemporary legal positivists and the pivotal distinction between internal …

Reframing Law's Domain: Narrative, Rhetoric, And The Forms Of Legal Rules, Stephen Paskey

Journal Articles

Legal scholars typically understand law as a system of determinate rules grounded in logic. And in the public sphere, textualist judges and others often claim that judges should not "make" law, arguing instead that a judge's role is simply to find the meaning inherent in law's language. This essay offers a different understanding of both the structure of legal rules and the role of judges. Building on Caroline Levine's claim that texts have multiple ordering principles, the essay argues that legal rules simultaneously have three overlapping forms, none of which is dominant: not only the form of conditional, "if-then" logic, …

The Morality Of Fiduciary Law, Paul B. Miller

Journal Articles

Recent work of fiduciary theory has provided conceptual synthesis requisite to understanding core fiduciary principles and the structure of fiduciary liability. However, normative questions have received only sporadic attention. What values animate fiduciary law? How does, or ought, fiduciary law prove responsive to them?

Where in other areas of private law theory – notably, tort theory – pioneering scholars went directly at normative questions like these, fiduciary theory has been exceptional for the reticence shown toward them. The reticence is sensible. Fiduciary principles are the product of equity’s most extended and convoluted program of supplementing surrounding law. They span several …

Dissenting From The Bench, Christine M. Venter

Journal Articles

This paper examines the oral dissents of Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg from the year 2000 to the times of their respective deaths. It explores the concept and purpose of oral dissent and details the kinds of cases in which each justice was more likely to orally dissent. The paper analyzes the kinds of rhetoric that each justice used to refer to their subject matter, and argues that Scalia's rhetoric evinces a view of the law as "autonomous", operating independently of the facts of the case. In contrast, Ginsburg's view espouses a view of the law as responsive …

Legal Pluralism And Analytical Jurisprudence: An Inapposite Contrast, Jorge Luis Fabra-Zamora

Journal Articles

The intellectual tradition of legal pluralism characterizes itself by way of a contrast to legal centralism or monism. Self-styled pluralists typically attribute centralist and monist views to mainstream theories of law, which I call here analytical jurisprudence. This article argues that the pluralist foundational contrast with analytical jurisprudence suffers from three recurrent defects. First, the pluralist opposition to analytical jurisprudence conflates conceptual questions with empirical, doctrinal, and politico-moral inquiries. Second, pluralists misattribute to analytical jurisprudents an equation between law and state that they do not hold and have the resources to reject. Third, pluralists address the conceptual problems of legal …

Untangling Entanglement, Stephanie H. Barclay

Journal Articles

The Court has increasingly signaled its interest in taking a more historical approach to the Establishment Clause. And in its recent American Legion decision, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the three-prong Lemon test is essentially dead letter. Such a result would make sense for the first two prongs of the Lemon test about secular purpose and the effects. Many scholars have observed that these aspects of the prong are judicial creations far afield of the Establishment Clause history. But what of the entanglement prong of the test? If we rejected all applications of this prong of the analysis, would …

Derecho Penal Sustantivo, Luis E. Chiesa

Journal Articles

No abstract provided.

The Bp Mdl And Its Aftermath: Whither Opa's Displacement Jurisprudence?, John Costonis

Journal Articles

No abstract provided.

Teaching Jurisprudence In A Catholic Law School, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Journal Articles

This essay is a contribution to a symposium on John Breen and Lee Strang's forthcoming book, A Light Unseen: A History of Catholic Legal Education in the United States. Breen and Strang's book offers not just a history, but a program for the future of Catholic legal education. Their program places the teaching of jurisprudence and the natural law tradition at the center of Catholic legal education. This essay draws on lessons from teaching jurisprudence at Notre Dame Law School which, in delightfully countercultural fashion, is one of the few remaining law schools in the nation that require jurisprudence. It …

Democratizing Interpretation, Anya Bernstein

Journal Articles

Judges interpreting statutes sometimes seem eager to outsource the work. They quote ordinary speakers to define a statutory term, point to how an audience understands it, or pin it down with interpretive canons. But sometimes conduct that appears to diminish someone’s power instead sneakily enhances it. So it is, I argue, with these forms of interpretive outsourcing. Each seems to constrain judges’ authority by handing the reins to someone else, giving interpretation a democratized veneer. But in fact each funnels power right back to the judge.

The outsourcing approaches I describe show a disconnect between the questions judges pose and …

Teaching The Lochner Era, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

This article, prepared for the St. Louis University Law Journal's issue on “Teaching the Fourteenth Amendment,” develops a taxonomy of the Supreme Court's economic substantive due process jurisprudence during the so-called “Lochner Era” of the late-19th and early-20th centuries, and offers an assessment of the trajectory and mechanisms of the decline of that body of doctrine.

Irreconcilable Differences? Whole Woman’S Health, Gonzales, And Justice Kennedy’S Vision Of American Abortion Jurisprudence, O. Carter Snead, Laura Wolk

Journal Articles

A law is unconstitutional if it "has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."' Twenty-five years have elapsed since a plurality of the Supreme Court articulated this undue burden standard in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, yet its contours remain elusive. Notably, two current members of the Court-Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy-seem to fundamentally differ in their understanding of what Casey requires and permits. In Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Kennedy emphasized a wide range of permissible state interests implicated by abortion and indicated …

The Force Of Law, Gerard V. Bradley

Journal Articles

SCHAUER, Frederick. The Force of Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015. xiv + 239 pp. Cloth, $35.00.

So long as our task is, Schauer writes, "the pursuit of law's essential properties in all possible legal systems in all possible worlds, there would be little point in being concerned with force, sanctions, coercion." But perhaps there is another, equally important, task to perform. Schauer writes that one could view his book as an "attempt [] to account for what seems to be an obviously important fact about the world: law is commonly and valuably coercive." Indeed, "[i]t has long …

The Case Against Oral Argument: The Effects Of Confirmation Bias On The Outcome Of Selected Cases In The Seventh Circuit Court Of Appeals, Christine M. Venter

Journal Articles

Scholars have long been divided over the role, function, and significance, if any, of oral argument in judicial decision-making.' Federal courts seem similarly divided, as some circuits routinely grant oral argument in almost every case, while others grant oral argument in only a small fraction of appeals. This divide should not be dismissed as merely an idiosyncratic debate or as a response to excessive workload, particularly when one considers that approximately 53,000 appeals were filed in federal courts of appeals in the year ending September 30, 2016.2 Since the Supreme Court grants certiorari in only approximately eighty cases each year, …

Semantic Vagueness And Extrajudicial Constitutional Decisionmaking, Anthony O'Rourke

Journal Articles

No abstract provided.

Truth And Politics: A Symposium On Peter Simpson's Political Illiberalism: A Defense Of Freedom., Gerard V. Bradley

Journal Articles

There is no more important question in thinking about life-and actually living-in political community than whether it is to be permeated by, and purposefully oriented around, the main truths about human flourishing. It is at least paradoxical that, precisely when the state and its law and political life are shaping people's lives more and more, the professed roots of all this influence are growing thinner, more shallow. Lawmakers who profess and in many cases even think they should be "neutral" about values are more involved with how persons' lives go than, perhaps, ever before.

Of course, any community which has …