Jurisprudence Commons^™

Ai And Legal Malpractice: Are We Due For A Reckoning?, John Browning

Texas A&M Law Review

As the rate of AI adoption by lawyers steadily climbs, unfortunately so has the number of incidents of AI misuse by attorneys. For some time, courts satisfied themselves with giving offending lawyers warnings, ordering them to take additional CLE, and/or administering relatively nominal monetary sanctions. Lately, however, frustrated judges throughout the country have upped the ante by not only assessing increasingly higher sanctions but also imposing case dismissals and suspensions or disciplinary referrals for the lawyers involved. As this article discusses, with their negligence exposed to the public eye and the harsh gaze of their clients, lawyers who misuse AI …

Deemed Acceptance, Not Deemed Consent: Nonvoting Stakeholders And A Uniform Conspicuousness Standard For Opt-Out Third-Party Releases, Zach Cavagnaro

Student Scholarship

After Harrington v. Purdue Pharma, the fight over third-party opt-out releases has shifted from whether consent is necessary to what consent means. The Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize non-consensual nondebtor releases outside 11 U.S.C § 524(g), and—critically—left out what exactly counts as consent. The fight over consent is expected to command a lot of litigation, so a simple, uniform conspicuousness standard for nonvoting stakeholders’ opt-out releases can help alleviate litigation costs and focus on the definition of consent. This Comment argues that courts should evaluate consent through a unified, contract-law-grounded conspicuousness standard calibrated to the …

Aggregation And The “Universal” Injunction, Portia Pedro, Adam N. Steinman

Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay, we begin with a brief summary of the CASA decision’s holding regarding the availability of “universal” injunctions. Part II discusses the relationship between remedies and judicial review and the important role that such injunctions play in that regard. Part III explores how class actions could serve as an alternative path for federal courts, after engaging in judicial review, to make their decisions meaningful by requiring officials to comply with the law and to cease illegal actions or policies. We also respond to several objections to the use of class actions in this context. The final Part addresses …

Nonparty Claim Preclusion, Mark D. Rosen

Texas A&M Law Review

For nearly two centuries, American courts recited that the preclusive effects of a court’s final judgment were subject to a requirement of “mutuality,” meaning that a party in Lawsuit 2 who would not be bound by a judgment from a prior Lawsuit 1 could not benefit in Lawsuit 2 from the first lawsuit’s judgment either. While the Supreme Court eliminated the mutuality requirement for issue preclusion in the 1970s—paving the way for “nonmutual collateral estoppel”—to this date, the Court has not decided if mutuality remains a requirement for claim preclusion. Although many courts today insist there is no such thing …

Symmetry, Presumptions, And The Judges Design, Murat C. Mungan

Faculty Scholarship

An instrumental variables approach called ‘the judges design’ used frequently in social sciences relies on an assumption called ‘average monotonicity’. This assumption pertains to how different judges’ (or other classifiers’) decision making processes relate to each other. Violations of it are hard to detect, which raises the importance of it being supported by a plausible theory. Decisions of judges who solve Bayesian decision problems violate average monotonicity as long as the signals they process are symmetric and they do not possess strong presumptions. This result is extended to cases where judge presumptions are symmetrically distributed and may include strong presumptions. …

Causation’S Due Process Dimensions, Cassandra Burke Robertson, Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes

Texas A&M Law Review

For decades, courts have grappled with the tension between compensating victims of mass harms and maintaining fairness to defendants when causation is difficult to prove. This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence provides a relevant framework for navigating this tension. We contend that the Court over the last three decades has established a consistent Fourteenth Amendment due process approach in punitive damages and personal jurisdiction cases, which is rooted in antecedents tracing to the nineteenth century and relies on a nexus of interests that balances individual rights, state interests, and federalism concerns. This framework, we argue, has …

Chimeric Contacts And Consent: The Ill-Reasoned Expansion Of Corporate Jurisdictional Exposure, James Paul George

Faculty Scholarship

Two recent Supreme Court decisions have imposed aspects of general jurisdiction in a way that exposes corporations and possibly other legal actors to litigation in spuriously connected forums. One case-Ford Motor Company v. Montana-reached a fair result but with strained reasoning that will support unfair results. The second case-Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railroad Company-was wrong on the facts and the law, imposing general jurisdiction based on a vaguely worded corporate registration statute validated by a more than century-old precedent based on Pennoyer v. Neff's limited territorial model. Both decisions were the result of conceptual corners the Supreme Court has created …

Drive-By Mediation And Other Opportunistic Distortions Of Process, Nancy A. Welsh

Faculty Scholarship

Many states in the United States, along with many nations, have implemented special benefits and privileges to encourage parties’ use of mediation to assist their communication, negotiation, and ultimate resolution of disputes. This is despite how loosely mediation is defined. This Article discusses how vague definitions, paired with special benefits and privileges, are incentivizing both the opportunistic distortion of mediation and the use of mediation for improper purposes. In Texas, for example, judges are extraordinarily limited in their ability to disapprove parents’ mediated child custody agreements—even if there is reason to worry that an agreement is contrary to the best …

Traditional And Computational Canons, Eric H. Martinez

Faculty Scholarship

As part of the rise of modern textualism, dictionaries and linguistic canons have become a ubiquitous part of legal interpretation. One longstanding question is whether judges citing these tools sincerely attempt to follow the meaning of a text, or if their invocation is merely window-dressing for a preferred outcome. The practical significance of this question extends across all major doctrinal areas, and with the Supreme Court’s overturning of Chevron deference, its importance is only to grow, as courts are now instructed to use every tool at their disposal to resolve ambiguity when interpreting a law. This Article is the first …

Custom’S Pervasive Role In Law And The Boundaries Of Positivism, James Paul George

Faculty Scholarship

Custom is law’s foundation, modulator, and occasional antithesis. This Article explores that relationship, starting with varying insights from some of the few legal philosophers who have examined the custom/law dynamic. The heart of this Article provides examples showing custom’s many influences on the law, set in five functional areas: origin, application, interstitial, rule-source, and oppositional. Although the custom/law interplay spans human behavior, these examples come from law practice where custom is exposed. Many are routine, some are significant, and all show our reliance on behaviors and norms that are not positive law. The conclusion addresses but does not resolve some …

The Great Unsettling: Administrative Governance After Loper Bright, Cary Coglianese, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

“Chevron is overruled.” These three words surely captured more attention than any others in the U.S. Supreme Court’s thirty-five-page opinion in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. For forty years, the Chevron doctrine had been virtually synonymous with administrative law. Now that the Court has taken a step that many scholars thought unfathomable even just a few years ago, speculation abounds about the possible downstream impacts of Loper Bright on both what agencies will be able to do in the future and how lower courts will respond when reviewing agency action. The vast majority of early expert commentaries suggest …

From Race-Conscious To Race-Neutral: The Next Generation Of Litigation Over Selective Admissions, Rachel F. Moran

Faculty Scholarship

In the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, there have been fierce debates over the meaning of colorblindness in the higher education admissions process. Setting the stage for these controversies are recent lawsuits challenging changes to admissions policies at selective public high schools. In these cases, the plaintiffs allege that although school officials relied on facially race-neutral criteria, their actions were motivated by a desire to improve the representation of Black and Latino students. According to the complaints, these revised policies are an impermissible form …

Original Discontent, William Magnuson

Faculty Scholarship

There are many theories of constitutional interpretation. Most, but not all, of them assert that, in interpreting the Constitution’s provisions, we should start by taking seriously the intentions of the enactors, meaning, roughly speaking, its drafters, defenders and ratifiers. This Article argues that, in doing so, judges, scholars and policymakers have underestimated an important feature of the process of constitution-making: the discontent of the enactors themselves with the Constitution they were enacting. Time and again, during the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, during the penning of the Federalist Papers, and during the state ratifying conventions, the enactors expressed deep reservations about …

Law, Fact, And Appellate Review, Adam N. Steinman

Faculty Scholarship

For centuries, courts have been called upon to distinguish between law and fact. That distinction played a key role in recent Supreme Court decisions on two critical components of appellate review. Dupree v. Younger considered an important question regarding what a party must do at trial to preserve an issue for appellate review. And Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. addressed how to select and apply the standard of appellate review--specifically, whether and how the appellate court must show deference to particular decisions made at the trial level.
Both decisions were partially right. Dupree correctly focused on whether certain early …

Prudence, Role Morality, And Restraint: Judge Wilkinson On The Separation Of Powers, Katherine Mims Crocker, Jack Goldsmith

Faculty Scholarship

Caution in reviewing the actions of the legislative and executive branches has been a hallmark of the jurisprudence of Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III. The Constitution “at most gives judges specific authority to redress violations of specific provisions,” Judge Wilkinson writes in his book Cosmic Constitutional Theory. But even when doing so, “courts must exercise great caution before injecting themselves into the vortex of varied political questions,” for “[i]t is often far preferable to allow the political institutions under our Constitution to struggle among themselves, with each bringing to bear the respective arsenal of powers the Framers accorded them.” …

Major Questions, Common Sense?, Kevin Tobia, Daniel E. Walters, Brian Slocum

Faculty Scholarship

The Major Questions Doctrine (“MQD”) is the newest textualist interpretive canon, and it has driven consequential Supreme Court decisions concerning vaccine mandates, environmental regulation, and student loan relief. But the new MQD is a canon in search of legitimization. Critics allege that the MQD displaces the Court’s conventional textual analysis with judicial policymaking. Textualists have now responded that the MQD is a linguistic canon, consistent with textualism. Justice Barrett recently argued in Biden v. Nebraska that the MQD is grounded in ordinary people’s understanding of language and law, and scholarship contends that the MQD reflects ordinary people’s understanding of textual …

Administrative Arrest Warrants: Armed Encounters Outside The Judicial Process, Meg Penrose

Faculty Scholarship

This Article considers three related questions. First, is a person “seized” under the Fourth Amendment when law enforcement restricts a person’s movements in their home and limits their ability to leave or go about their business? Second, does the answer to this seizure inquiry turn on the person’s citizenship status? And third, how do lawyers ensure that courts discard bad law? This last question is not a qualitative assessment— with good and bad law being tied to one’s legal ideology. Rather, certain legal holdings, dating back over half a century, have been whittled away if not entirely eroded. When this …

The Incoherence Of Evidence Law, G. Alexander Nunn

Faculty Scholarship

What is the purpose of evidence law? The answer might seem intuitive. Evidence law exists, of course, to foster verdict accuracy, legitimacy, and efficiency. But these kindred aims often come into conflict. Policy tradeoffs are inescapable in evidence law, meaning that an evidentiary regime must clarify how its normative objectives cohere. Do accuracy, legitimacy, and efficiency work together on equal footing, such that the goal of a code is to maximize each objective to the extent possible? Or does one of evidence law’s aims take precedence over the rest? And if one goal takes priority, what is the role of …

Even Laypeople Use Legalese, Eric H. Martinez, Francis Mollica, Edward Gibson

Faculty Scholarship

Whereas principles of communicative efficiency and legal doctrine dictate that laws be comprehensible to the common world, empirical evidence suggests legal documents are largely incomprehensible to lawyers and laypeople alike. Here, a corpus analysis (n=59 million words) first replicated and extended prior work revealing laws to contain strikingly higher rates of complex syntactic structures relative to six baseline genres of English.

Next, two pre-registered text generation experiments (n=286) tested two leading hypotheses regarding how these complex structures enter into legal documents in the first place. In line with the magic spell hypothesis, we found people tasked with writing official laws …

Constitutional Rights And Remedial Consistency, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Scholarship

When the Supreme Court declined definitively to block Texas’s S.B. 8, which effectively eliminated pre-enforcement federal remedies for what was then a plainly unconstitutional restriction on abortion rights, a prominent criticism was that the majority would have never tolerated the similar treatment of preferred legal protections—like gun rights. This refrain reemerged when California enacted a copycat regime for firearms regulation. This theme sounds in the deep-rooted idea that judge-made law should adhere to generality and neutrality values requiring doctrines to derive justification from controlling a meaningful class of cases ascertained by objective legal criteria.

This Article is about consistency, and …

Four Futures Of Chevron Deference, Daniel Walters

Faculty Scholarship

In two upcoming cases, the Supreme Court will consider whether to overturn the Chevron doctrine, which, since 1984, has required courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of otherwise ambiguous statutes. In this short essay, I defend the proposition that, even on death’s door, Chevron deference is likely to be resurrected, and I offer a simple positive political theory model that helps explain why. The core insight of this model is that the prevailing approach to judicial review of agency interpretations of law is politically contingent—that is, it is likely to represent an equilibrium that efficiently maximizes the Supreme Court’s …

Outcome Reasons And Process Reasons In Normative Constitutional Theory, Lawrence B. Solum

Faculty Scholarship

Constitutional theory is a mess. Disagreements about originalism and living constitutionalism have become intractable. Constitutional theorists make some arguments that seem clearly fallacious and advance proposals that are pie in the sky. One of the reasons for the mess is an overreliance by constitutional theorists on “outcome reasons,” justifications that rely on the theorist’s beliefs about what outcomes are good and what outcomes are bad. This outcome-drive approach is exemplified by the so-called “canonical cases” argument, which evaluates positions in normative constitutional theory on the basis of its counterfactual implications for a handful of prior decisions of the Supreme Court. …

The Wages Of Crying Roe: Some Realism About Dobbs V. Jackson Women’S Health Organization, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organizationcannot be taken seriously. The Court’s stated rationale for rejecting continued protection of the abortion right—that abortion is not deeply rooted in nineteenth century history and tradition—applies with equal force to other substantive due process rights that the DobbsCourt repeatedly insisted were not under threat even without considering stare decisis, including contraception, sexual intimacy between consenting adults, and same-sex marriage. One should add inter-racial marriage and protection from involuntary sterilization to that list. Rather than applying its draconian version of the “history and tradition” test in a …

The Physical-Emotional Distinction In Tort, Philip Petrov

Faculty Scholarship

Several legal scholars have recently argued that U.S. tort law’s physical-emotional distinction commits tort to the objectionable position of mind-body dualism, but they have not considered the distinction’s role as an aid to judicial cognition and decision-making. Drawing primarily on the law of negligent infliction of emotional distress, this essay argues that tort’s physical-emotional distinction is not a relic of mind-body dualism but a heuristic that judges have used to structure and simplify the difficult but unavoidable task of drawing lines between legally cognizable and non-cognizable harm. The analysis has at least three normative implications: (1) users of tort’s physical-emotional …

Social Costs Of Dobbs' Pro-Adoption Agenda, Malinda L. Seymore

Faculty Scholarship

Abortion opponents have long claimed that women denied access to abortion can simply give their children up for adoption. Justice Alito repeated this argument in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health. Of course, this claim assumes away the burdens of the pregnancy itself, which can result in economic strife, domestic violence, health risks, and potentially death in childbirth. But even on its own terms, the argument that adoption is an adequate substitute for abortion access makes normative assumptions about adoption as a social good in and of itself, ignoring the social costs of adoption for birth parents and adoptees. Idealizing adoption …

Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, And Kennedy: The Role Of History And Tradition, Randy E. Barnett, Lawrence B. Solum

Faculty Scholarship

In three recent cases, the constitutional concepts of history and tradition have played important roles in the reasoning of the Supreme Court. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization relied on history and tradition to overrule Roe v. Wade. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen articulated a history and tradition test for the validity of laws regulating the right to bear arms recognized by the Second Amendment. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District looked to history and tradition in formulating the test for the consistency of state action with the Establishment Clause.

These cases raise important questions about …

Legal Clutter: How Concurring Opinions Create Unnecessary Confusion And Encourage Litigation, Meg Penrose

Faculty Scholarship

Good judges are clear writers. And clear writers avoid legal clutter. Legal clutter occurs when judges publish multiple individually written opinions that are neither useful nor necessary. This essay argues that concurring opinions are the worst form of legal clutter. Unlike majority opinions, concurring opinions are legal asides, musings of sorts—often by a single judge—that add length and confusion to an opinion often without adding meaningful value. Concurring opinions do not change the outcome of a case. Unlike dissenting opinions, they do not claim disagreement with the ultimate decision. Instead, concurring opinions merely offer an idea or viewpoint that failed …

Even Lawyers Do Not Like Legalese, Eric H. Martinez, Francis Mollica, Edward Gibson

Faculty Scholarship

Significance

Pdf Killed The Copier Star: Modernizing The Access To Sources Of Proof Factor In A 28 U.S.C. § 1404(A) Transfer Analysis, Kyle L. Dockendorf

Texas A&M Journal of Property Law

With digital solutions to document storage, non-physical sources of evidence will become increasingly relevant for different types of legal actions. For patent proceedings, where evidence is often electronic, the need for a clearly defined approach to analyzing physical and electronic evidence has appeared within the first private factor of a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) transfer analysis. The evidentiary factor evaluating non-witness evidence—the access to sources of proof factor or first private factor—was interpreted by the Fifth Circuit when faced with weighing electronic evidence in favor, or against, potential transfer venues. Fifth Circuit precedent—relied upon in other circuit court opinions and …

The Article Iii "Party" And The Originalist Case Against Corporate Diversity Jurisdiction, Mark Moller, Lawrence B. Solum

Faculty Scholarship

Federal courts control an outsize share of big-ticket corporate litigation. And that control rests, to a significant degree, on the Supreme Court’s extension of Article III’s Diversity of Citizenship Clause to corporations. Yet, critics have questioned the constitutionality of corporate diversity jurisdiction from the beginning.

In this Article and a previous one, we develop the first sustained critique of corporate diversity jurisdiction.

Our previous article demonstrated that corporations are not “citizens” given the original meaning of that word. But we noted this finding alone doesn’t sink general corporate diversity jurisdiction. The ranks of corporate shareholders include many undoubted “citizens.” And …