Judges Commons^™

Not So Far Away: Visiting With Women Judges In China, Ann Marshall Young

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Naalj News: Draft Report Of Long-Range Planning Committee, Paul Wyler

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Panel Discussion On Independence And The Federal Alj, Arthur Fried, Ronald G. Bernoski

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Surviving The Politics Of Judging: National Association Of Adminsitrative Law Judges Luncheon Address, September 13, 1999 , Penny J. White

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Administrative Law Judges, Judicial Independence, And Judicial Review: Qui Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, W. Michael Gillette

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Judicial Independence, Joseph M. Hood

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Accommodating Alj Decision Making Independence With Institutional Interests Of The Administrative Judiciary, Harold J. Krent, Lindsay Duvall

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

The Administrative Judiciary's Independence Myth, James E. Moliterno

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Advancing The Judicial Independence And Efficiency Of The Administrative Judiciary: A Report To The President-Elect Of The United States, Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Buying A Judicial Seat For Appeal: Caperton V. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., Is Right Out Of A John Grisham Novel, Richard Gillespie

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Accountability In The Administrative Law Judiciary: The Right And The Wrong Kind, Edwin L. Felter Jr

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

This article discusses and evaluates several forms of accountability in the administrative law judiciary, and compares them with prevalent forms of accountability in the judicial branch. Felter argues that codes of judicial conduct, as well as formal enforcement mechanisms, work together to maintain a balance of independence and accountability in the administrative law judiciary. The article analyzes the "right kinds" of accountability as distinguished from the "wrong kind" of accountability, i.e., political accountability. The article maintains that decisional independence is the cornerstone of any properly functioning adjudication system. The price of decisional independence is accountability to concepts and mechanisms other …

Greater Independence For Aljs Plus Cost Savings For Agencies: The Coast Guard Model, Walter J. Brudzinski

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Judicial Ethics And Supreme Court Exceptionalism, Amanda Frost

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

In his 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, Chief Justice John Roberts cast doubt on Congress’s authority to regulate the Justices’ ethical conduct, declaring that the constitutionality of such legislation has “never been tested.” Roberts’ comments not only raise important questions about the relationship between Congress and the Supreme Court, they also call into question the constitutionality of a number of existing and proposed ethics statutes. Thus, the topic deserves close attention.

This Essay contends that Congress has broad constitutional authority to regulate the Justices’ ethical conduct, just as it has exercised control over other vital aspects of the …

The Contours Of Judicial Tenure In State Courts Of Last Resort: Accountability Vs. Independence, Todd A. Curry

Dissertations

The study of state courts of last resort is a field which has, up until recently, been significantly underrepresented in political science (Baum 1987, Dubois 1980). The bulk of work in judicial politics over the last fifty years has focused on the federal system. Furthermore, the study of state courts allows for a true comparative analysis. The methods of selection used for the staffing of state courts of last resort are highly varied. There are five distinctly different methods which are used for judicial selection in the states, and many states have institutional nuances that provide further variation for study. …

Evaluating Federally Appointed Judges In Canada: Analyzing The Controversy, Troy Riddell, Lori Hausegger, Matthew Hennigar

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

This commentary describes our experiences in trying to undertake a judicial performance evaluation of federally appointed judges in Canada. Some respondents were enthusiastic about the project, but others were strongly opposed to it and worried about the effects that our survey would have on judicial independence. After describing the feedback that we received and the fallout from our project, we examine the relationship between judicial performance evaluation and judicial independence. We argue that a well-conceived judicial performance evaluation does not violate judicial independence. We then explore the resistance to judicial performance evaluation in Canada, using a comparative lens. The explanation …

Public Funding Of Judicial Campaigns: The North Carolina Experience And The Activism Of The Supreme Court, Paul D. Carrington

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, the problem of selecting judges to sit on the highest state courts has become a national crisis. North Carolina remains among the states whose constitutions require competitive elections of all its judges. Presently, all candidates for its judicial offices must first compete for election in a non-partisan primary, a system motivated by the desire to maximize the power of the state’s citizen-voters to choose their judges and hold them accountable for their fidelity to the law. Some observers have continued to celebrate such judicial elections as an honorable democratic empowerment, while others have not. The disagreement has …

Electing Our Judges And Judicial Independence: The Supreme Court's "Triple Whammy", Martin Belsky

Akron Law Faculty Publications

In this article, Martin Belsky makes the case for judicial selection based on merit, as opposed to popular elections. Belsky cites Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company and the recent defeat of three Iowa supreme court justices because of their opinion in a controversial gay marriage case for the proposition that judicial elections can, and do, yield unjust results. Belsky asserts the need for judicial independence, but concludes that this goal is not achievable through elections because of the "triple whammy" of constitutional limitations: (1) the First Amendment protection of the right of judges and judicial candidates to give specific, …

The Law And Policy Of Judicial Retirement, Mitu Gulati, Stephen J. Choi, Eric A. Posner

Faculty Scholarship

Lifetime tenure maximizes judicial independence by shielding judges from political pressures, but it creates problems of its own. As is widely known, judges with judicial independence may implement their political preferences or shirk in other ways. Less attention has been given to another problem: that judges will remain in office after their abilities degrade as a result of old age. The U.S. federal system addresses these problems in an indirect way. When judges’ pensions vest, they receive a full salary regardless of whether they work or not; thus, the effective compensation for judicial work falls to zero. Judges can retire, …

"Our Cities Institutions" And The Institution Of The Common Law, Bernadette Meyler

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The audiences of early modern English drama were multiple, and they intersected with the legal system in various ways, whether through the cross-pollination of the theaters and the Inns of Court, the representations of the sovereign’s justice performed before him, or the shared evidentiary orientations of jurors and spectators. As this piece written for a symposium on “Reasoning from Literature” contends, Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure addressed to these various audiences the question of whether the King should judge in person. In doing so, it drew on extant political theories suggesting that the King refrain from exposing himself to public censure …

The Irrepressible Myth Of Klein, Howard M. Wasserman

Faculty Publications

The Reconstruction-era case of United States v. Klein remains the object of a “cult” among commentators and advocates, who see it as a powerful separation of powers precedent. In fact, Klein is a myth—actually two related myths. One is that it is opaque and meaninglessly indeterminate because, given its confusing and disjointed language, its precise doctrinal contours are indecipherable; the other is that Klein is vigorous precedent, likely to be used by a court to invalidate likely federal legislation. Close analysis of Klein, its progeny, and past scholarship uncovers three identifiable core limitations on congressional control over the workings of …

The Quasi-Class Action Method Of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems And A Proposal, Charles Silver, Geoffrey P. Miller

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Article uses three recent multi-district litigations ("MDLs") that produced massive settlements-Guidant ($240 million), Vioxx ($4.85 billion), and Zyprexa ($700 million)-to study the emerging quasi-class action approach to MDL management. This approach has four components: (1) judicial selection of lead attorneys, (2) judicial control of lead attorneys' compensation, (3) forced fee transfers from non-lead lawyers to cover lead attorneys' fees, and (4) judicial reduction of non-lead lawyers' fees to save claimants money. These procedures have serious downsides. They make lawyers financially dependent on judges and, therefore, loyal to judges rather than clients. They compromise judges' independence by involving them heavily …

Original Sin And Judicial Independence: Providing Accountability For Justices, Paul D. Carrington, Roger C. Cramton

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Brief Of The Conference Of Chief Justices As Amicus Curiae In Support Of Neither Party, Caperton V. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009), Roy A. Schotland

U.S. Supreme Court Briefs

No abstract provided.

Reframing The Independence V. Accountability Debate: Defining Judicial Structure In Light Of Judges' Courage And Integrity, David Pimentel

Articles

No abstract provided.

Reframing The Independence V. Accountability Debate: Defining Judicial Structure In Light Of Judges' Courage And Integrity, David Pimentel

Cleveland State Law Review

The perennial debate over striking the right balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability largely misses the mark. The tension between these concepts arises only in the structural sense of the terms, i.e. the conflict lies in the structural approaches traditionally taken to protect independence and to enforce accountability. In actuality, our primary concern should be the judge's own sense of independence and her internal sense of accountability. These more subjective concepts--which may be termed “judicial courage” (for the judge who is willing to act independently) and “judicial integrity” (for the judge who is willing to hold herself accountable)--do not …

Money, Politics, And Impartial Justice, Joanna Shepherd

Faculty Articles

A centuries-old controversy asks whether judicial elections are inconsistent with impartial justice. The debate is especially important because more than 90 percent of the United States’ judicial business is handled by state courts, and approximately nine in ten of all state court judges face the voters in some type of election. Using a stunning new data set of virtually all state supreme court decisions from 1995 to 1998, this paper provides empirical evidence that elected state supreme court judges routinely adjust their rulings to attract votes and campaign money. I find that judges who must be reelected by Republican voters, …

Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, Joanna Shepherd

Faculty Articles

The conventional wisdom among many legal scholars is that judicial independence can best be achieved with an appointive judiciary; judicial elections turn judges into politicians, threatening judicial autonomy. Yet the original supporters of judicial elections successfully eliminated the appointive systems of many states by arguing that judges who owed their jobs to politicians could never be truly independent. Because the judiciary could function as a check and balance on the other governmental branches only if it truly were independent of them, the reformers reasoned that only popular elections could ensure a truly independent judiciary. Using a data set of virtually …

Judicial Independence, Harry Tepker

Other Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Original Sin And Judicial Independence: Providing Accountability For Justices, Paul D. Carrington, Roger C. Cramton

Faculty Scholarship

The independence of the judiciary is an enduring and defining objective of the legal profession. Law depends on judges to observe and enforce it. To secure such virtuous judges, they must be protected from retaliation by those who disapprove their decisions and prevented from receiving rewards from those who benefit by them. Those having the greatest stake in shielding judges from intimidation or reward are the profession that shares their dependence on public acceptance and respect. And that task of protecting judicial independence stands today at the very top of the agenda of the American legal profession.

My Brethren’S (Gate) Keeper? Testimony By U.S. Judges At Others’ Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings: Its Implications For Judicial Independence And Judicial Ethics, Mary Clark

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

This article, prompted by the testimony of seven of Samuel Alito's then-current and former Third Circuit colleagues at his hearing to be Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, examines the merits of federal judges testifying at others' Supreme Court confirmation hearings. While mindful of other approaches to the question of judicial participation in other judicial appointments systems and of their comparative advantages and disadvantages, the author nevertheless concludes that judges threaten judicial independence and judicial ethics principles when they exercise power in the Article III appointments realm. It is not so much a question of judges usurping the …