Judges Commons^™

The Ways Of A Judge And On Appeal, Kermit V. Lipez

Maine Law Review

What do you do when your judicial hero, the author of two important books on appellate judging, was for many years your neighbor, friend, colleague, and mentor? You revel in your good fortune, and you share your admiration for his books. Judge Coffin’s long involvement in the political world contributed significantly to a primary focus of his two books on appellate judging, The Ways of a Judge, published in 1980, and On Appeal, published in 1994. As a political organizer, a candidate for public office, a Congressman, and an administrator in a federal agency, Judge Coffin understood his accountability to …

Coffin's Court: A Colleague's View, Levin Campbell

Maine Law Review

These reminiscences focus on the eleven years, from 1972 to 1983, that Frank M. Coffin of Maine was the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. While Coffin’s judicial career extended over more than forty years, I chose this period because it was a time when his influence over the court’s work was at its peak, as well as because he himself later singled it out as a “judicial Garden of Eden,” during which the First Circuit enjoyed its status as the last remaining three-judge federal court of appeals in the nation.

Frank Morey Coffin's Political Years: Prelude To A Judgeship, Donald E. Nicoll

Maine Law Review

Each day when I go to my study, I see a wood block print of two owls gazing at me with unblinking eyes. Ever alert, they remind me of the artist, who in his neat, fine hand, titled the print “Deux Hiboux,” inscribed it to the recipients and signed it simply “FMC 8-2-87.” In addition to his talents as an artist and friend in all seasons, FMC was a remarkable public servant in all three branches of the federal government and, with his friend and colleague Edmund S. Muskie, a creative political reformer for the State of Maine. Throughout his …

Frank Coffin And Enlightened Governance, Robert A. Katzmann

Maine Law Review

I have often thought that Judge Frank M. Coffin is one of a handful of statesmen of recent times I could easily imagine in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 (indeed, as a central figure in a David McCollough biography). If he had been, as competing factions struggled to find solutions to thorny issues, Madison’s Notes would inevitably and often have recorded: “With negotiations on the verge of collapse, all eyes turned to Frank Coffin, who found not only the key to compromise, but also the better way.”

The Legacy Of Judge Frank M. Coffin, Peter R. Pitegoff

Maine Law Review

Judge Coffin had adopted the University of Maine School of Law as if it were his own. He was a committed friend to the Law School and served on the advisory Board of Visitors for almost two decades. Like so many others, I felt his keen personal commitment as well, with his periodic calls and visits, his steady counsel and encouragement. Before arriving in Maine, I had known of Judge Coffin. Little did I anticipate that he would so enrich my experience as Dean at Maine Law. He remains a role model to so many of our graduates and leaves …

Partisan Judicial Speech And Recusal Procedure, Dmitry Bam

Faculty Publications

This article discusses Associate Professor Appleby’s thoughtful comment criticizing the Supreme Court’s self-recusal procedure in light of Justice Ginsberg’s critical remarks about then-Presidential Candidate Trump.

Crafting Precedent, Richard C. Chen

Faculty Publications

(with the Hon. Paul J. Watford & Marco Basile)

How does the law of judicial precedent work in practice? That is the question at the heart of The Law of Judicial Precedent, a recent treatise by Bryan Garner and twelve distinguished appellate judges. The treatise sets aside more theoretical and familiar questions about whether and why earlier decisions (especially wrong ones) should bind courts in new cases. Instead, it offers an exhaustive how-to guide for practicing lawyers and judges: how to identify relevant precedents, how to weigh them, and how to interpret them. This Review takes up the treatise on …

Seen And Heard: A Defense Of Judicial Speech, Dmitry Bam

Faculty Publications

Judicial ethics largely prohibits judges from engaging in political activities, including endorsing or opposing candidates for public office. These restrictions on judicial politicking, intended to preserve both the reality and the appearance of judicial integrity, independence, and impartiality, have been in place for decades. Although the Code of Conduct for United States Judges does not apply to the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Justices have long followed the norm that they do not take sides, at least publicly, in partisan political elections. And while elected state judges have some leeway to engage in limited political activities associated with their own candidacy," …

Tailored Judicial Selection, Dmitry Bam

Faculty Publications

American states have experimented with different methods of judicial selection for two centuries, creating uniquely American models of selection, like judicial elections, rarely used throughout the rest of the world. But despite the wide range of selection methods in existence throughout the nation, neither the American people nor legal scholars have given much thought to tailoring the selection method to particular levels of the judiciary. To the contrary, the most common approach to judicial selection in the United States is what I call a unilocular, “a judge is a judge,” approach. For most of our nation’s history, all judges within …

Restoring The Civil Jury In A World Without Trials, Dmitry Bam

Faculty Publications

Early in this nation’s history, the civil jury was the most important institutional check on biased and corrupt judges. Recently, concerns about judicial bias, especially in elected state judiciaries, have intensified as new studies demonstrate the extent of that bias. But the jury of Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson is nowhere to be found. In fact, the civil jury is virtually dead. It is used in less than 1% of all civil cases, and even when it makes a rare appearance, the jury’s powers have been significantly curtailed.

This article argues that we must reimagine the civil jury to match the …

Our Unconstitutional Recusal Procedure, Dmitry Bam

Faculty Publications

In this article, I argue that the recusal procedure used in state and federal courts for nearly all of American history is unconstitutional. For centuries, recusal procedure in the United States has largely resembled that of England before American independence. To this day, in most American courtrooms, the judge hearing the case decides whether recusal is required under the applicable substantive recusal rules. If the judge determines that she can act impartially, or that her impartiality could not reasonably be questioned, the judge remains on the case. And although the judge’s decision is typically subject to appellate review — with …

Remarks: Caperton's Next Generation -- Beyond The Bank, Dmitry Bam

Faculty Publications

On November 14, 2014, a symposium entitled, "Courts, Campaigns, and Corruption: Judicial Recusal Five Years After Caperton," was held at New York University. The symposium was sponsored by the Brennan Center for Justice, the American Bar Association's Center for Professional Responsibility, and NYU's Journal of Legislation and Public Policy. This document contains the transcript starting from Dmitry Bam's remarks from one of the four panels, and is entitled "Caperton's Next Generation: Beyond the Bank." The panel members included Professors Jed Shugerman, Debra Lyn Bassett, Gregory S. Parks, Dmitry Bam, and Rex Perschbacher.

Recusal Failure, Dmitry Bam

Faculty Publications

The American judiciary is suffering from a terrible affliction: biased judges. I am not talking about the subconscious or unconscious biases — stemming from different backgrounds, experiences, ideologies, etc. — that everyone, including judges, harbors. Rather, I am describing invidious, improper biases that lead judges to favor one litigant over another for reasons that almost everyone would agree should play no role in judicial decision-making: the desire to repay a debt of gratitude to those who helped the judge get elected and be reelected.

In this article, I argue that that recusal has failed to prevent biased judges from rendering …

Understanding Caperton: Judicial Disqualification Under The Due Process Clause, Dmitry Bam

Faculty Publications

It is virtually impossible to discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. without hearing some variant of the following response: “I can’t believe it was as close as it was.” And it does not matter whether you are chatting with your next-door neighbor who had never thought about judicial ethics in his life or discussing the case with a judicial-recusal expert. Nearly everyone seems to agree: Caperton was an “easy” case and that four justices dissented is an indication that there is something terribly wrong. Not only has Caperton elevated the issue of judicial impartiality …