Judges Commons^™

Extraordinary Rendition: A Wrong Without A Right, Robert Johnson

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

William Johnson, The Dog That Did Not Bark?, Mark R. Killenbeck

Vanderbilt Law Review

The conventional wisdom is that Justice William Johnson, Jr., was the "the first dissenter." This is not literally true. The first published opinion of the Court was Georgia v. Brailsford, in which each member of the Court expressed his views seriatim. Ironically, the first to speak was the first Justice Johnson, Thomas of Maryland, whose reasoning helped create a 4-2 split that produced a number of Supreme Court firsts: the first published set of opinions, the first split decision, and the first dissent.

It was the "other" Justice Johnson, William of South Carolina, who earned the reputation as the first …

Isaiah And His Young Disciples: Justice Brandeis And His Law Clerks, Todd C. Peppers

Scholarly Articles

It cannot be said that Louis Dembitz Brandeis has suffered from a lack of scholarly attention. Brandeis is considered to be one of the most influential Justices in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court, and scores of books and law-review articles have been written about Brandeis the lawyer, the political insider, the Zionist, and the Justice. A case can be made, however, that history has not fully recognized the important and lasting contribution that Brandeis made to the development of the institutional rules and norms surrounding the Supreme Court law clerk, an oversight that this essay seeks to rectify.

Dedication Of Issue To Chief Justice Thomas R. Fitzgerald, 42 J. Marshall L. Rev. Xxiii (2009), Editorial Board 2008-2009

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Charles Evans Hughes, Richard D. Friedman

Book Chapters

Hughes, Charles Evans (1862-1948). Lawyer, politician, diplomat, and chief justice of the United States. Hughes was born in Glens Falls, N.Y., the son of a Baptist preacher from the English- Welsh border country who changed congregations from time to time. Young Hughes spent his earliest years in several locations in New York and New Jersey before the family settled in Brooklyn. A precocious child, he was educated both at home and in public school. At age 14, he began college at Madison (now Colgate) University, a Baptist institution. After his sophomore year, he transferred to Brown, which also had a …

Justice Sutherland Reconsidered, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 639 (2009), Samuel R. Olken

UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Owen J. Roberts, Richard D. Friedman

Book Chapters

Roberts, Owen Josephus (1875-1955). Lawyer and U.S. Supreme Court justice. Roberts was born in Philadelphia and graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1895 and from its law school in 1898. He taught there part-time beginning almost immediately until 1919, reaching the rank of full professor in 1907. While operating a profitable dairy farm, Roberts practiced law privately, punctuated by a three-year stint beginning in 1901 as first assistant district attorney of Philadelphia County. Tall and robust, he made a striking figure in both classroom and courtroom.

Reconceptualizing The Judicial Activism Debate As Judicial Responsibility: A Tale Of Two Justice Kennedys, Eric J. Segall

Faculty Publications By Year

The academic and political debate over judicial activism has been based on the overriding but patently false assumption that the Supreme Court’s performance can be measured by examining the results that it reaches in constitutional cases. When scholars and politicians equate judicial activism with judicial invalidation of the works of the political branches or the reversal of precedent, however, these commentators don’t reveal anything different than would a pure descriptive account of the Court’s decision and rationale. Moreover, the judicial activism debate is unhelpful because the ambiguous sources of constitutional interpretation cannot privilege fundamental baselines or generate consensus over correct …

Competing Models Of Judicial Coalition Formation And Case Outcome Determination, Tonja Jacobi

Faculty Articles

Forming a coalition on a multi-judge panel involves an inherent trade-off between coalition maximization and ideological outcome optimization. Much scholarship is premised on assumptions about how judges make that trade-off; these assumptions have consequences for how we view and measure judicial decision-making. Specifying these assumptions, formally modeling their effects, and basing measures of judicial behavior on these results offer the potential to improve analysis of judicial decision-making.

This article formally explores three commonly posited modes of judicial decision-making: a minimum winning coalition model, representing attitudinalist views of judicial decision-making; a maximum winning coalition, capturing the effect of norms of joint …

Issue 2: Table Of Contents

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

From Bush V. Gore To Namudno: A Response To Professor Amar, Ellen D. Katz

Articles

In his Dunwody Lecture, Professor Akhil Amar invites us to revisit the Bush v. Gore controversy and consider what went wrong. This short essay responds to Professor Amar by taking up his invitation and looking at the decision through a seemingly improbable lens, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last June in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One (NAMUDNO) v. Holder. Among its many surprises, NAMUDNO helps illuminate the Court’s fundamental error nine years ago. Professor Amar forcefully argues that the mistrust with which the Justices in the Bush v. Gore majority viewed the Florida Supreme Court was both unjustified …

Limits Of Interpretivism, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Justice Stephen Markman sits on the Supreme Court of my home state of Michigan. In that capacity, he says, he is involved in a struggle between two kinds of judging. On one side are judges like him. They follow the rules. On the other side are unconstrained judges who decide cases on the basis of what they think the law ought to be. This picture is relatively simple, and Justice Markman apparently approves of its simplicity. But matters may in fact be a good deal more complex.

The Judicial Behavior Of Justice Souter In Criminal Cases And The Denial Of A Conservative Counterrevolution, Scott P. Johnson

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] “The following article documents the judicial career of Justice David Souter from his time served as an attorney general and state judge in New Hampshire until his recent tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court. Based upon his written opinions and individual votes, Justice Souter clearly has evolved into a more liberal jurist than ideological conservatives would have preferred in the area of criminal justice. Over the course of his judicial career, Justice Souter has gained respect as an intellectual scholar by attempting to completely understand both sides of a dispute and applying precedent and legal rules in a flexible—albeit …

Guarding The Guardians: Judges' Rights And Virginia's Judicial Inquiry And Review Commission, Jeffrey D. Mcmahan Jr.

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Issue 1: Table Of Contents

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

"The Threes": Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, Chris Guthrie, Tracey E. George

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this Essay--the first in a series of essays designed to reimagine the Supreme Court--we argue that Congress should authorize the Court to adopt, in whole or part, panel decision making... With respect to the prospect of different Court outcomes, we demonstrate empirically in this Essay that the vast majority of cases decided during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries--including "Grutter", "Roe", and "Bush v. Gore" --would have come out the same way if the Court had decided them in panels rather than as a full Court.

Justice Kennedy's Short-Lived Libertarian Revolution: A Brief History Of Supreme Court Libertarian Ideology, Stephen O'Hanlon

Cardozo Public Law, Policy & Ethics Journal

This paper contends that Justice Anthony Kennedy did not initiate a libertarian jurisprudential revolution following Lawrence v. Texas. The article begins with an overview of constitutional fundamental rights jurisprudence and examines similarities with libertarian theory.

The paper then assesses the legal decisions of Justice Kennedy but concludes that Justice Kennedy is not a libertarian. This provides the basis for critiquing Professor Randy Barnett's assertion that Justice Kennedy was the instigator of a libertarian revolution in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. The fact that Justice Kennedy is not a libertarian is apparent from his reasoning in the recent partial birth abortion …

The Supreme Common Law Court Of The United States, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Supreme Court's primary role in the history of the United States, especially in constitutional cases (and cases hovering in the universe of the Constitution), has been to limit Congress's ability to redefine and redistribute rights in a direction most people would characterize as liberal. In other words, the Supreme Court, for most of the history of the United States since the adoption of the Constitution, has been a conservative force against change and redistribution. The Court has used five distinct devices to advance its control over the law. First, it has construed rights-creating constitutional provisions narrowly when those …

Issue 5: Table Of Contents

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Subject Index

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Title Index

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Author Index

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Dear President Bush: Leaving A Legacy On The Federal Bench, Carl Tobias

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Brennan V. Scalia, Justice Or Jurisprudence? A Moderate Proposal, Travis A. Knobbe

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Virtue Of Judicial Statesmanship, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

Some of America's most important judges have emphasized or embodied the practice of judicial statesmanship. Yet from the examples they set, it is not particularly clear what judicial statesmanship is or why it matters. In this Article, I conceptualize the elusive phenomenon of judicial statesmanship, and I defend statesmanship as a core, if under appreciated, dimension of judicial role.

I argue that judicial statesmanship defines a virtue in the role of a judge. Statesmanship charges judges with approaching cases so as to facilitate the capacity of the legal system to legitimate itself over the long run and with respect to …

William Thaddeus Coleman, Jr.: Breaking The Color Barrier At The U.S. Supreme Court, Todd C. Peppers

Scholarly Articles

The purpose of this essay is twofold: It will endeavor to succinctly summarize the important events of Coleman’s life and professional career, while making the argument that these achievements were as groundbreaking in the legal community as Robinson’s were to baseball. Admittedly, looking to our national pastime is hardly an original literary maneuver; The myriad similarities and links between baseball and the law have offered rich material for many legal writers.2 Moreover, this article does not wish to diminish Coleman’s accomplishments by comparing them to a mere “game.” By drawing upon the sixtieth anniversary of Robinson’s debut, my hope is …

Law Clerk Influence On Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, Todd C. Peppers, Christopher Zorn

Scholarly Articles

Here, we undertake the first effort at assessing the existence and extent of law clerk influence in the U.S. Supreme Court. Drawing upon original survey data on the political ideology of 532 former law clerks, we evaluate the extent to which both the Justice's personal policy preferences and those of his or her law clerks exert an independent influence on the Justice's votes. While our results are preliminary, they nonetheless support the contention that--over and above "selection effects" due to Justices choosing like-minded clerks--clerks' ideological predilections exert an additional, and not insubstantial, influence on the Justices' decisions on the merits. …

A New Era Of Federal Sentencing: The Guidelines Provide District Court Judges A Cloak, But Is Gall Their Dagger?, Anna E. Papa

Georgia Law Review

Federal district court judges today have a level of sentencing discretion that has been unknown since the adoption of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. This Note reviews the history of the Guidelines and outlines the problems that have resulted from the Supreme Court's decisions in Booker, Rita, and Gall This Note argues that the confusion may be clarified by giving effect to the text of 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), which requires that federal district court judges impose sentences that are sufficient, but not greater than necessary, and requires them to examine all the factors provided in the statute. The court's recent …

Friction By Design: The Necessary Contest Of State Judicial Power And Legislative Policymaking, Michael L. Buenger

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Different Take On The Roberts Court: The Court As An Institution, Ideology, And The Settled Nature Of American Constitutional Law, Robert A. Sedler

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.