Judges Commons^™

John Marshall And Indian Nations In The Beginning And Now, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1183 (2000), Milner S. Ball

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Marshall Court And Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1023 (2000), James W. Ely Jr.

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judicial Institutions In Emerging Federal Systems: The Marshall Court And The European Court Of Justice, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1063 (2000), Herbert A. Johnson

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Marshall Misconstrued: Activist? Partisan? Reactionary?, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1109 (2000), Jean Edward Smith

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Marshall Court And The European Court Of Justice, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1197 (2000), Charles F. Hobson

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Conscience, Judging, And Conscientious Judging, Gene E. Franchini

The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process

Judging requires applying the law instead of personal morals, philosophy, or policy of the community. Doing so requires a respect for the separation of powers between branches of government. Justice Franchini of the New Mexico Supreme Court reflects on this challenge for judges through a personal anecdote.

Preliminary Thoughts On The Virtues Of Passive Dialogue, Michael Heise

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The judicial, legislative, and executive branches interact in many ways. These interactions fuel a constitutional dialogue that serves as a backdrop to myriad governmental activities, both large and small. The judiciary's participation is necessary, desirable, and, as a practical matter, inevitable. In my article I analyze two competing models that bear on the normative question: What form should the judiciary's participation take?

Debates over the judiciary's appropriate role in the public constitutional dialogue have captured scholarly attention for decades. Recent attention has focused on a growing distinction between the active and passive models of judicial participation. My article approaches this …

Thoughts On Some Potential Appellate And Trial Court Applications Of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Steve Leben

Faculty Works

To date, the application of therapeutic jurisprudence principles has been concentrated mainly on specialized trial courts: drug treat­ment courts, domestic violence courts, criminal courts, and juvenile and family courts. Its application to trial courts generally, as well as its application to the appellate courts, remains largely unexplored. This Article considers three areas in which trial and appellate courts may want to consider applying therapeutic jurisprudence.

My conclusions about the application of therapeutic jurispru­dence to the appellate courts are admittedly tentative ones: my day job is sitting as a state general jurisdiction trial judge, not as an appel­late court judge. Although …

Judicial Auditing, Matthew L. Spitzer, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

This paper presents a simple framework for analyzing a hierarchical system of judicial auditing. We concentrate on (what we perceive to be) the two principal reasons that courts and/or legislatures tend to scrutinize the decisions of lower echelon actors: imprecision and ideological bias. In comparing these two reasons, we illustrate how each may yield systematically distinct auditing and reversal behaviors. While auditing for imprecision tends to bring about evenhanded review/reversal, auditing for political bias tends to be contingent on the first mover's chosen action. Examples of these tendencies can be found in a number of legal applications, including administrative law, …

Imagining Justice, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

As we approach the new century and the new millennium, those of us who are legal professionals in liberal capitalist democracies need to drastically improve our practices of law if we are to bring those practices in line with our professed ideals. The commodification and marketing of legal services, for example, combined with a nearly blind commitment to overly combative advocacy, puts legal assistance beyond the means of large segments of the public, severely undercutting our commitment to equality before the law. A different and perhaps harder question, however, is whether the ideals against which we judge our practices are …

Are There Nothing But Texts In This Class? Interpreting The Interpretive Turns In Legal Thought, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Allan Hutchinson remarks at the beginning of his interesting article that Gadamer's writings have had only a peripheral influence on legal scholarship -- only occasionally cited, and then begrudgingly so, and never given the serious attention they deserve or require. Nevertheless, Hutchinson acknowledges, Gadamerian influences can be noted -- particularly in the now widely shared understanding that adjudication is, fundamentally, an interpretive exercise. Even with this qualification, though, I think Hutchinson understates Gadamer's impact. Whatever may be true of Gadamer's influence in other disciplines, his influence in law has been unambiguously both broad and deep -- although it has come …

Benjamin Cardozo On The Supreme Court, Andrew L. Kaufman

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

Too Much (Legislation) Is Never Enough: Utilizing A Court's Equity Power To Enjoin Lawful Firearm Sales, 32 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1225 (1999), Edward G. Renner

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Understanding The Limits Of Power: Judicial Restraint In General Jurisdiction Court Systems, Justice Philip A. Talmadge

Seattle University Law Review

This Article draws on my legislative and judicial background to focus both on the tendency of the courts to exceed their core constitutional role and the implications of such judicial activism. This article contend that modern courts of general jurisdiction are too often embroiled in sociopolitical controversies best left to the political branches of government. Part I addresses the concept of judicial restraint in our constitutional system and the need to define the core powers of the judicial branch of government. Part II discusses principles of judicial restraint in the federal courts. Part III, using the example of Washington State …

What Spending Clause? - (Or The President's Paramour): An Examination Of The Views Of Hamilton, Madison, And Story On Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 Of The United States Constitution, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 81 (1999), Jeffrey T. Renz

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Impeaching A Jury Verdict, Juror Misconduct, And Related Issues: A View From The Bench Essay, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 145 (1999), Denise M. O'Malley

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Is The Excessive Fines Clause Excessively Kind To Money Launderers, Drug Dealers, And Tax Evaders, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 243 (1999), Ann Jennings Maron

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

An Argument On The Record For More Federal Judgeships, William M. Richman

The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process

A case is made for increasing the number of federal judges. The author uses the loss of judge involvement in decisionmaking to begin his argument. The discussion then addresses the arguments against increasing federal judgeships.

No Vehicles In The Park, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

An American Original, Ronald L. Carlson

Scholarly Works

This is one of many articles tributing Judge Myron H. Bright in recognition of thirty years of service on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. This article describes Professor Carlson's relationship with Judge Bright and details Judge Bright's career.

Literary Formalism, Legal Formalism, Jeffrey Malkan

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

Home Businesses, Llamas And Aluminum Siding: Trends In Covenant Enforcement, 31 J. Marshall L. Rev. 443 (1998), Katharine N. Rosenberry

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Reinventing Common Interest Developments: Reflections On A Policy Role For The Judiciary, 31 J. Marshall L. Rev. 397 (1998), Evan Mckenzie

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Fidelity To Original Preferences: An Application Of Consumer Choice Theory To The Problems Of Legal Interpretation, 31 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1111 (1998), Ahmed M. Saeed

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Extending The Constitution, 32 J. Marshall L. Rev. 197 (1998), Amy Walsh

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Justice Who Wouldn't Be Lutheran: Toward Borrowing The Wisdom Of Faith Traditions, Marie A. Failinger

Cleveland State Law Review

Only a few legal scholars have attempted to work out what jurisprudence might look like if lawmakers and judges took their religious world-views seriously-and explicitly-in their work, in a way respectful of "the fact of pluralism." My task is to imagine the concrete case: what a judge's jurisprudence might look like if a judge considered the wisdom of his own religious tradition in constitutional cases. This article explores broad jurisprudential themes and specific First Amendment and social welfare opinions of Justice William Rehnquist, who for some years has been a member of a Lutheran congregation, my own denomination. While Justice …

From Whence Cometh Our State Appellate Judges: Popular Election Versus The Missouri Plan, Robert L. Brown

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Authorizing Interpretation, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

Toward Humanistic Theories Of Legal Justice, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In an oft-quoted aside, Justice Holmes once remarked that when lawyers in his courtroom make appeal to justice, he stops listening: such appeals do nothing but signal that the lawyer has neither the facts nor law on his side, or worse, that he is ignorant of whatever law might be relevant.' Holmes's remark has not gone unheeded. Holmes's legacy, in part, is precisely this lapse: we don't have, or teach, a guiding theory of legal justice, nor do we have, or teach, a family of competing theories of legal justice, that might inform our work in law, at least as …

The Judge's Dilemma: Duty Or Conscience?, Robert W. Sweet

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.