Judges Commons^™

Judges As Rulemakers, Larry A. Alexander, Emily Sherwin

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series

This essay analyzes and compares different approaches to the problem of legal precedent. If judges reasoned flawlessly, the ideal approach to precedent would give prior judicial opinions only the weight they naturally carry in moral reasoning. Given that judges are not perfect reasoners, the best approach to precedent is one that treats rules established in prior decisions as authoritative for later judges. In comparison to the natural model of precedent, a rule-based model minimizes error. A rule-based model is also superior to several popular attempts at compromise, which call on judges to reason from the results of prior cases or …

Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: An Empirical Investigation Of Ideology And Publication On The U.S. Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit, David S. Law

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series

Previous studies have demonstrated that, in a number of contexts, federal appeals court judges divide along ideological lines when deciding cases upon the merits. To date, however, researchers have failed to find evidence that circuit judges take advantage of selective publication rules to further their ideological preferences - for example, by voting more ideologically in published cases that have precedential effect than in unpublished cases that lack binding effect upon future panels. This article evaluates the possibility that judges engage in strategic judicial lawmaking by voting more ideologically in published cases than in unpublished cases. To test this hypothesis, all …

'You'd Better Be Good': Congressional Threats Of Removal Against Federal Judges, Marc O. Degirolami

ExpressO

In the attached article, I argue that congressional threats of removal against federal judges are increasing in prevalence and forcefulness and that as a result the strained relationship between the judiciary and Congress – a topic of recent attention and debate – will continue to deteriorate in the coming years. I examine two bills, the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act and House of Representatives Resolution 568 (in which Congress would disavow citation in judicial decisions to foreign law), to demonstrate this thesis.

I next ask what explains the phenomenon of congressional threats of removal, deploying first Thomas Hobbes’ state-of-nature …

Constitutional Law—Separation Of Powers—Restoring The Constitutional Formula To The Federal Judicial Appointment Process: Taking The Vice Out Of "Advice And Consent", Jason Eric Sharp

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Contaminating The Verdict: The Problem Of Juror Misconduct, Bennett L. Gershman

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

What's A Judge To Do? Remedying The Remedy In Institutional Reform Litigation, Susan Poser

Michigan Law Review

Democracy by Decree is the latest contribution to a scholarly literature, now nearly thirty-years old, which questions whether judges have the legitimacy and the capacity to oversee the remedial phase of institutional reform litigation. Previous contributors to this literature have come out on one side or the other of the legitimacy and capacity debate. Abram Chayes, Owen Fiss, and more recently, Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin, have all argued that the proper role of judges is to remedy rights violations and that judges possess the legitimate institutional authority to order structural injunctions. Lon Fuller, Donald Horowitz, William Fletcher, and Gerald …

Appropriate Role Of Foreign Judgments In The Interpretation Of American Law: Hearing Before The H. Comm. On The Judiciary, 108th Cong., Mar. 25, 2004 (Statement Of Vicki C. Jackson, Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), Vicki C. Jackson

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

The Role Of Purposivism In The Delegation Of Rulemaking Authority To The Courts, Michael Rosensaft

ExpressO

The courts are often used by Congress as a “political lightning rod,” when Congress cannot decide how to resolve an issue. Congress relies on administrative agencies for their expertise, and it also makes sense for Congress to delegate some rulemaking authority to the courts, relying on a court’s expertise in developing caselaw in an incremental basis. However, this authority should not be lightly implied. A court can tell that Congress has delegated rulemaking authority to it when the purpose of the statute is clear and the text is broadly worded. It thus makes sense in these cases that purposivism should …

The Three Independences, H. Jefferson Powell

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judicial Independence, William H. Rehnquist

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Legislative Restraint In The Confirmation Process, Kenneth W. Starr

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judicial Independence And The Scope Of Article Iii--A View From The Federalist, Michael G. Collins

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judge Keith, The Constitution And National Security From Haddad To Sinclair - The Damon J. Keith Law Collection Of African-American Legal History Wayne State University Spencer Partrich Auditorium November 18, 2003, Robert Allen Sedler

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.

The Pace And Cause Of Change, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 357 (2004), Larry D. Kramer

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Foreword, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 317 (2004), Samuel R. Olken

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Province Of The Judiciary, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 325 (2004), William E. Nelson

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Secret Life Of The Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 441 (2004), Louis Michael Seidman

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Ironies Of Marbury V. Madison And John Marshall's Judicial Statesmanship, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 391 (2004), Samuel R. Olken

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Marbury V. Madison As The First Great Administrative Law Decision, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 481 (2004), Thomas W. Merrill

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 523 (2004), Mark Tushnet

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judicial Independence In Virginia, W. Hamilton Bryson

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Original Meaning Of The Judicial Power, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this paper, the author refutes any claim that judicial review was invented in Marbury v. Madison, or that, because it is contrary to the original meaning of the Constitution, it must be justified by some nonoriginalist interpretive methodology. He will do so, not by discerning the shadowy and often counterfactual "intentions" of the founding generation, but by presenting as comprehensively as he can what the founders actually said during the constitutional convention, in state ratification conventions, and immediately after ratification. These statements, taken cumulatively, leave no doubt that the founders contemplated judicial nullification of legislation enacted by the …

Searching For The Soul Of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study Of Religious Freedom Decisions, Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, Andrew P. Morriss

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

During the past half century, constitutional theories of religious freedom have been in a state of great controversy, perpetual transformation, and consequent uncertainty. Given the vitality of religious faith for most Americans and the vigor of the enduring debate on the proper role of religious belief and practice in public society, a searching exploration of the influences upon judges in making decisions that uphold or reject claims implicating religious freedom is long overdue. Many thoughtful contributions have been to the debate about whether judges should allow their religious beliefs to surface in the exercise of their judicial role. Yet much …

The Most Rational Branch: Guinn V. Legislature And The Judiciary's Role As Helpful Arbiter Of Conflict, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

When the Nevada Supreme Court decided Guinn v. Legislature, one would have thought from reading the popular press accounts that the court had forcibly displaced the State legislature by means of a violent coup d'etat. Newspaper accounts of the decision referred to it as a usurpation of power in violation of clear constitutional language, belittling the court in language sometimes more appropriate to the baseball bleachers than to serious editorial commentary. Following suit, politicized elements of the citizenry began a recall effort (seemingly unsuccessful as of this writing) directed at the court as well as joining the chorus of criticisms. …

Judicial Independence: Whether, Why, And How To Defend It, Michael Boucai

Other Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Defining Democracy: The Supreme Court's Campaign Finance Dilemma, Lori A. Ringhand

Scholarly Works

On December 10, 2003 the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in McConnell v. FEC. In McConnell, the Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCRA"). A divided Court, in a deeply fractured decision in which six justices wrote individual opinions, upheld the major provisions of the legislation. Yet despite the almost 300 pages of reasoning provided by the Court, and a voluminous record developed by the district court, the Justices could not agree on what purportedly is the central issue in campaign finance law: whether the challenged regulations were necessary …

Functional Departmentalism And Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, Dawn E. Johnsen

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Published as part of a Duke Law School symposium on Conservative and Progressive Legal Orders, this article considers the appropriate role of the political branches - Congress and the President - in the development of constitutional meaning, including the extent of presidential and congressional authority to act on constitutional views at odds with judicial doctrine. The article discusses deficiencies in strong forms of both judicial supremacy (such as that behind the Rehnquist Court's recent limits on Congress's section 5 authority) and what is described in the academic literature as departmentalism (which emphasizes near-plenary authority for each branch to act on …

Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party Of Minnesota V. White, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

The vast majority of judicial offices in the United States are subject to election. The votes of the people select or retain at least some judges in thirty-nine states, and all judges are elected in twenty-one states. By one count, 87% of the state and local judges in the United States have to face the voters at some point if they want to win or remain in office. Judicial elections, however, differ from elections for legislative or executive offices in a number of significant ways. In nineteen states, most judges are initially appointed but must later go before the voters …

Legislative Supremacy: Myth Or Reality?, James Oakes

Cardozo Public Law, Policy & Ethics Journal

No abstract provided.

Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure For Resolving Valuation Disputes, Keith Sharfman

Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers

In this Article, Professor Sharfman addresses the problem of "discretionary valuation": that courts resolve valuation disputes arbitrarily and unpredictably, thus harming litigants and society. As a solution, he proposes the enactment of "valuation averaging," a new procedure for resolving valuation disputes modeled on the algorithmic valuation processes often agreed to by sophisticated private firms in advance of any dispute. He argues that by replacing the discretion of judges and juries with a mechanical valuation process, valuation averaging would cause litigants to introduce more plausible and conciliatory valuations into evidence and thereby reduce the cost of valuation litigation and increase the …