Intellectual Property Law Commons^™

The Coming Copyright Judge Crisis, Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Dave Fagundes

Articles

Commentary about the Supreme Court's 2021 decision in United States v. Arthrex, Inc. has focused on the nexus between patent and administrative law. But this overlooks the decision's seismic and as-yet unappreciated implication for copyright law: Arthrex renders the Copyright Royalty Board ("CRB") unconstitutional. The CRB has suffered constitutional challenge since its 2004 inception, but these were seemingly resolved in 2011 when the D.C. Circuit held that the CRB's composition did not offend the Appointments Clause as long as Copyright Royalty Judges ("CRJs") were removable atwill. But when the Court invalidated the selection process for administrative patent judges on a …

The New Madison Approach To Antitrust Law And Intellectual Property Law, Anita Alanko

Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology

The New Madison Approach has recently been introduced by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division in an effort to address a weakening of patent rights in recent years. The approach has four premises: patent hold-up is not an antitrust problem, standard setting organizations should better protect against patent hold-out to ensure maximum incentives to innovate, patent holder injunction rights should be protected and not limited, and a unilateral and unconditional refusal to license a valid patent should be per se legal. After providing an introduction to the relevant law and terms of art, support and criticism of the New Madison …

Disguised Patent Policymaking, Saurabh Vishnubhakat

Faculty Scholarship

Patent Office power has grown immensely in this decade, and the agency is wielding its power in predictably troubling ways. Like other agencies, it injects politics into its decisions while relying on technocratic justifications. It also reads grants of authority expansively to aggrandize its power, especially to the detriment of judicial checks on agency action. However, this story of Patent Office ascendancy differs from that of other agencies in two important respects. One is that the U.S. patent system still remains primarily a means for allocating property rights, not a comprehensive regime of industrial regulation. Thus, the Patent Office cannot …

The Federal Circuit As An Institution, Ryan G. Vacca

Law Faculty Scholarship

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is a unique institution. Unlike other circuit courts, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is bound by subject area rather than geography, and it was created to address a unique set of problems specific to patent law. These characteristics have affected its institutional development and made the court one of the most frequently studied appellate courts. This chapter examines this development and describes the evolving qualities that have helped the Federal Circuit distinguish itself, for better or worse, as an institution.

This chapter begins with an overview of the concerns existing before creation of …

State Immunity And The Patent Trial And Appeal Board, Tejas N. Narechania

Tejas N. Narechania

The Porous Court-Agency Border In Patent Law, Saurabh Vishnubhakat

Faculty Scholarship

The progression toward reevaluating patent validity in the administrative, rather than judicial, setting became overtly substitutionary in the America Invents Act. No longer content to encourage court litigants to rely on Patent Office expertise for faster, cheaper, and more accurate validity decisions, Congress in the AIA took steps to force a choice. The result is an emergent border between court and agency power in the U.S. patent system. By design, the border is not absolute. Concurrent activity in both settings over the same dispute remains possible. What is troubling is the systematic weakening of this border by Patent Office encroachments …

Shifting The Burden Of Proving Patentability Vel Non In View Of Dickinson V. Zurko, Dawn-Marie Bey

Journal of Intellectual Property Law

This paper addresses the Patent Office's misinterpretation of the Supreme Court's ruling in Dickinson v. Zurko regarding the applicability of the factual review standards of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to Patent Office findings. More particularly, in accordance with this misinterpretation, recent guidelines promulgated by the Patent Office violate the APA and controlling precedent.

To date, the proper procedures for prosecuting a patent application have been carefully honed through a myriad of statutes, rules, and controlling legal opinions. The resulting procedures are set forth in exemplary prose in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) issued and revised periodically by …

Administering Patent Litigation, Jacob S. Sherkow

Articles & Chapters

Recent patent litigation reform efforts have focused on every branch of government — Congress, the President, and the federal courts — save the fourth: administrative agencies. Agencies, however, possess a variety of functions in patent litigation: they serve as “gatekeepers” to litigation in federal court; they provide scientific and technical expertise to patent disputes; they review patent litigation to fulfill their own mandates; and they serve, in several instances, as entirely alternative fora to federal litigation. Understanding administrative agencies’ functions in managing or directing, i.e., “administrating,” patent litigation sheds both descriptive and normative insight on several aspects of patent reform. …

Policy Tailors And The Rookie Regulator, Sarah Tran

Sarah Tran

Commentators have long lamented the lack of policy tailoring in the patent system. But unlike other administrative agencies, who regularly tailor regulatory policies to the needs of specific industries, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) was widely believed to lack the authority and institutional competence for such policymaking. This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of recent legislative reforms to the PTO’s policymaking authority. It shows the reforms empower the PTO to have a larger say in patent policy than ever before. The big question is thus: to what extent is it good policy for a rookie regulator to …

The U.S. Patent Office’S Proposed Fees Under The America Invents Act—Part I: The Scope Of The Office’S Fee-Setting Authority, Ron D. Katznelson

Ron D. Katznelson

This two-part article discusses the Patent and Trademark Office’s recent proposed rulemaking setting new patent user fees. In Part I the author argues that the PTO can raise fees in accordance with its aggregate costs but lacks authority to set national patent policies, or to skew certain fees to discourage or encourage a particular service. The author also asserts that the America Invents Act does not vest with the PTO discretion to set the level of its operating reserve – a determination reserved solely for congressional appropriations. In an upcoming Part II, the author will discuss specific fees and their …

Technology Transfer Laws Governing Federally Funded Research And Development, James V. Lacy, Bradford C. Brown, Michael R. Rubin

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Acting Like An Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, Ryan G. Vacca

Akron Law Faculty Publications

When Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982, it thought it was creating a court of appeals. Little did it know that it was also creating a quasi-administrative agency that would engage in substantive rulemaking and set policy in a manner substantially similar to administrative agencies. In this Article, I examine the Federal Circuit's practices when it orders a case to be heard en banc and illustrate how these practices cause the Federal Circuit to look very much like an administrative agency engaging in substantive rulemaking. The number and breadth of questions the Federal Circuit agrees to hear en banc …

Acting Like An Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, Ryan G. Vacca

Ryan G. Vacca

When Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982, it thought it was creating a court of appeals. Little did it know that it was also creating a quasi-administrative agency that would engage in substantive rulemaking and set policy in a manner substantially similar to administrative agencies. In this Article, I examine the Federal Circuit's practices when it orders a case to be heard en banc and illustrate how these practices cause the Federal Circuit to look very much like an administrative agency engaging in substantive rulemaking. The number and breadth of questions the Federal Circuit agrees to hear en banc …

Does The Supreme Court Still Matter?, Timothy B. Dyk

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.

When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent’S Poor Secondary Incentives Through An Optional Patent Purchase System, Jordan Barry

ExpressO

As research has advanced, technologies have become more closely knit, and the relationships between them—both complementary and competitive—have become increasingly important. Unfortunately, the patent system’s use of monopoly power to reward innovators creates inefficient results by overly encouraging the development of substitute technologies and discouraging the development of complementary technologies. This paper explains how an optional patent purchase system could help ameliorate such problems and discusses the implications of such a system.