First Amendment Commons^™

Taking Exception To Assessments Of American Exceptionalism: Why The United States Isn't Such An Outlier On Free Speech, Evelyn Aswad

Faculty Articles

One of the most significant challenges to human freedom in the digital age involves the sheer power of private companies over speech and the fact that power is untethered to existing free speech principles. Heated debates are ongoing about what standards social media companies should adopt to regulate speech on their platforms. Some have argued that global social media companies, such as Facebook and Twitter, should align their speech codes with the international human rights law standards of the United Nations (“U.N.”). Others have countered that U.S.-based companies should apply First Amendment standards. Much of this debate is premised on …

Masthead, Editor-In- Chief

Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology

No abstract provided.

Seeing (Platforms) Like A State: Digital Legibility And Lessons For Platform Governance, Neil Chilson

Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology

The growing backlash against Big Tech companies is a symptom of digital technology increasing the world’s legibility. James C. Scott’s book, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, explores how past governments responded to increased legibility – for good and for ill. This article shows how Scott’s historical lessons can guide governments and tech platforms as they seek to improve the human condition online.

Hybrid Ip Rights For Software, Apis, And Guis: Understanding Copyright's Paradigm Shift, Howard Skaist

Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology

The non-literal scope of protection for software is intricate legally and is intricate technical. Thus, despite literally decades of court decisions and a mountain of legal scholar written on the subject in that time, it appears that there is still no consistent agreement about it, as evidenced by the Google v. Oracle which has percolated in the courts for nearly a decade and is now being heard by the US Supreme Court (oral argument was on October 7, 2020). However, the thesis of this article that a legal construct is capable of being formulated that is analytically consistent and that …

Table Of Contents, Editor-In- Chief

Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology

No abstract provided.

From Banned Books To Mail Censorship, Free Speech All But Ends At The Prison Doors, Meghan Holden

Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice

No abstract provided.

Microaggressions, Questionable Science, And Free Speech, Edward Cantu, Lee Jussim

Faculty Works

The topic of microaggressions is hot currently. Diversity administrators regularly propagate lists of alleged microaggressions and express confidence that listed items reflect what some psychologists claim they do: racism that is, at the very least, unconscious in the mind of the speaker. Legal academics are increasingly leveraging microaggression research in theorizing law and proposing legal change. But how scientifically legitimate are claims by some psychologists about what acts constitute microaggressions? The authors—one a law professor, the other a psychologist—argue that the answer is “not much.” In this article, the authors dissect the studies, and critique the claims, of microaggression researchers. …

Foreword, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

Foreword.

The Deans' Roundtable, Dean Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Dean Danielle Conway, Dean Tamara Lawson, Dean Mario Barnes, Dean L. Song Richardson

Seattle University Law Review

The Deans' Roundtable.

The Structure Of Intermediate Review, R. Randall Kelso

Lewis & Clark Law Review

Today, there are two well-established versions of intermediate review: stand- ard intermediate review, used for cases like gender discrimination or content-neutral regulations of speech in a public forum, and a heightened intermediate review standard used for content-based, subject-matter regulations of commercial speech under Central Hudson. Yet, in actual use, four other kinds of intermediate review tests have been formulated by the Court in some cases. These four should be viewed as “mutations” of the two kinds of intermediate review proper to apply. This Article discusses both the well-established versions of intermediate review, and the four variations on intermediate review applied …

God Is My Roommate? Tax Exemptions For Parsonages Yesterday, Today, And (If Constitutional) Tomorrow, Samuel D. Brunson

Indiana Law Journal

In 2019, the Seventh Circuit decided an Establishment Clause question that had been percolating through the courts for two decades. It held that the parsonage allowance, which permits “ministers of the gospel” to receive an untaxed housing allowance, does not violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. It grounded its conclusion in part on the “historical significance” test the Supreme Court established in its Town of Greece v. Galloway decision.

In coming to that conclusion, the Seventh Circuit cited a 200-year unbroken history of property tax exemptions for religious property. According to the Seventh Circuit, that history demonstrated that both …

Transparency And The First, Mark Fenster

UF Law Faculty Publications

In his book The First: How to Think About Hate Speech, Campus Speech, Religious Speech, Fake News, Post-Truth, and Donald Trump, Stanley Fish neatly reverses the polarity of rights-based claims that the public enjoys, under the First Amendment’s free speech and press rights, a right to government information. Transparency and free speech ideals are indeed related, he concedes, because they share a political vision and conceptual grounding in the notion that robust conceptions of free speech carry a commitment to increase the flow of information. But this is not a good thing, Fish argues—rather, the relationship between the two merely …

Scrutiny-Determination Avoidance In First Amendment Cases: Laudable Minimalism Or Condemnable Evasion?, Clay Calvert

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article examines the United States Supreme Court’s practice in First Amendment cases of not resolving the precise level of scrutiny that applies to measure a statute’s validity. Rather than opting for one of two tiers of scrutiny — one more rigorous than the other—the Court sometimes dodges the issue. It does this by concluding that a statute would not pass muster under the more lenient standard, thereby rendering it unnecessary to decide which test was, in fact, more appropriate. The Court thus adopts an “assuming-without-deciding” logic in such cases, simply supposing the lesser standard applies without definitively holding as …

Barring Immoral Speech In Patent And Copyright, Ned Snow

SMU Law Review

In the past three years, the Supreme Court has twice ruled that Congress’s moral bars to trademark protection violate the First Amendment. Those rulings raise a simple question in other areas of intellectual property. Does the First Amendment preclude Congress from denying patent or copyright protection based on a moral reason? Congress, for instance, might deny patent protection for inventions directed toward the consumption of marijuana. Inventors would accordingly choose not to disclose knowledge about those inventions to the public, and the denial would chill their speech. Similarly, Congress would chill speech if it denied copyright protection for moral reasons. …

Esica: Securing—Not Compelling—Speech On The “Vast Democratic Forums” Of The Internet, Philip Primeau

Roger Williams University Law Review

No abstract provided.

In Search Of An Established Church, Teresa M. Bejan

Roger Williams University Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Legal Ramifications Of Christian Nationalism, Steven K. Green

Roger Williams University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Curing The First Amendment Scrutiny Muddle Through A Breyer-Based Blend Up? Toward A Less Categorical, More Values-Oriented Approach For Selecting Standards Of Judicial Review, Clay Calvert

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article argues that the United States Supreme Court should significantly alter its current categorical approach for discerning standards of judicial review in free-speech cases. The present system should become nondeterminative and be augmented with a modified version of Justice Stephen Breyer’s long-preferred proportionality framework. Specifically, the Article’s proposed tack fuses facets of today’s policy, which largely pivots on distinguishing content-based laws from content-neutral laws and letting that categorization determine scrutiny, with a more nuanced, values-and-interests methodology. A values-and-interests formula would allow the Court to climb up or down the traditional ladder of scrutiny rungs – strict, intermediate or rational …

Offensive Mark Owners Have An Enforcement Problem, Yvette Joy Liebesman

All Faculty Scholarship

In Iancu v. Brunetti, the Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act 2(a) bars for "immoral" or "scandalous" marks are facially unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, and thus violate a trademark owner’s First Amendment rights. Brunetti, as well as its predecessor, Matal v. Tam, focused entirely on how the government might generate viewpoint discrimination at the point of trademark registration. The Court did not consider whether enforcement of trademarks—via courts of law, Customs and Border Protection, or the International Trade Commission—is government speech, and thus exempt from First Amendment free speech scrutiny. Yet the Court’s seminal holding of Shelley v. Kraemer illustrates …

Transparency And The First, Mark Fenster

FIU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Professor Fish—Why Are You Still Picking On Liberalism?, Micah Schwartzman

FIU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Sport And Expression, Sport As Expression, Howard M. Wasserman

FIU Law Review

No abstract provided.

First Amendment Freedoms Diluted: The Impact Of Disclosure Requirements On Nonprofit Charities, Bailie Mittman

Indiana Law Journal

Since the birth of the Bill of Rights in 1791, the freedoms protected by the First Amendment have been cherished by all members of this nation. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” Over time, courts have acknowledged that the freedom to speak freely means very little if the guarantee is not protected by an additional right: the freedom to associate. Thus, the freedom of expressive association stands as an essential component of an individual’s free speech rights and state infringement on associative rights has the power of potentially …

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents and Special Thanks.

Technological Transformation Of The Public Square: Government Officials Use Of Social Media And The First Amendment, Patricia Beety, Joline Zepcevski

Mitchell Hamline Law Review

No abstract provided.

In Contracts We Trust (And No One Can Change Their Mind)! There Should Be No Special Treatment For Religious Arbitration, Michael J. Broyde, Alexa J. Windsor

Faculty Articles

The recent article In God We Trust (Unless We Change Our Mind): How State of Mind Relates to Religious Arbitration ("In God We Trust") proposes that those who sign arbitration agreements that consent to a religious legal system as the basis of the rules of arbitration be allowed to back out of such agreements based on their constitutional right to free exercise. This article is a response and is divided into two sections. In the first section, we show that such an exemption would violate the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA) basic rules preventing the states from heightened regulation of arbitration …

Debunking “De Minimis” Violations Of Prisoners’ Religious Rights: Further Problems With The Supreme Court’S “Hands Off” Approach, Samantha Sparacino

Touro Law Review

Circuits are split as there continues to be an inconsistent application of Supreme Court doctrine stemming from the notion of the separation of church and the state. Imprisonment does not strip a wrongdoer of his constitutionally guaranteed rights and protections. Some Circuits have held that a minor, or de minimis, interpretation of an inmate’s religious rights can constitute a substantial burden under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. In the absence of clear direction from the Supreme Court, I propose that courts should refrain from determining the value of a religious belief or practice as it relates …

Slapps Across America, Jack Toscano

Touro Law Review

The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in New York Times v. Sullivan was meant to protect our fundamental right to free speech from defamation lawsuits. However, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, known as SLAPPS, continue to chill free speech through weak but expensive to defend defamation lawsuits. In response to SLAPPs many states have passed anti-SLAPP statutes that are meant to identify SLAPPs, quickly dismiss SLAPPS, and punish plaintiffs who bring SLAPPs. A difficult issue for federal courts throughout the country is whether these state anti-SLAPP statutes should apply in federal courts. This Note examines the Supreme Court opinions in Shady …

Fundamental Funds: Tax Credits And The Increasing Tension Between The Free Exercise Clause And Establishment Clause—Espinoza V. Montana Department Of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020), Elizabeth Jacobson

Mitchell Hamline Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Elasticity Of Protected Speech: A Balance Of Breadth, Deborah Alexander

Mitchell Hamline Law Review

No abstract provided.