Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Evidence Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Evidence

Forgotten Points In The "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, James Boyd White Apr 1983

Forgotten Points In The "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, James Boyd White

Michigan Law Review

Most contemporary discussions of the "exclusionary rule" assume or assert that this "rule" is not part of the fourth amendment, nor required by its terms, but is rather a judicial "remedy" that was fashioned to protect those rights (against unreasonable search and seizure) that actually are granted by the fourth amendment. The protection is said to work by "deterring" official violations; this is, however, an odd use of the word, for the rule does not punish violations but merely deprives the government of some of the benefits that might ensue from them, namely the use in the criminal case of …


The Fourth Amendment As A Device For Protecting The Innocent, Arnold H. Loewy Apr 1983

The Fourth Amendment As A Device For Protecting The Innocent, Arnold H. Loewy

Michigan Law Review

Part I of this Article establishes that the government has a right to search for and seize evidence of crime. Part II develops the corollary proposition that the fourth amendment does not protect the right to secrete evidence of crime. Part III explores the impact of the reasonable expectation of privacy concept on the innocent. Part IV evaluates consent searches and their effect on the innocent. Finally, Part V considers the exclusionary rule as a device for protecting the innocent.


Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest On A 'Principled Basis' Rather Than An 'Empirical Proposition'?, Yale Kamisar Jan 1983

Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest On A 'Principled Basis' Rather Than An 'Empirical Proposition'?, Yale Kamisar

Articles

[U]ntil the [exclusionary rule] rests on a principled basis rather than an empirical proposition, [the rule] will remain in a state of unstable equilibrium. Mapp v. Ohio, which overruled the then twelve-year-old Wolf case and imposed the fourth amendment exclusionary rule (the Weeks doctrine) on the states as a matter of fourteenth amendment due process, seemed to mark the end of an era. Concurring in Mapp, Justice Douglas recalled that Wolf had evoked "a storm of constitutional controversy which only today finds its end."' But in the two decades since Justice Douglas made this observation, the storm of controversy has …