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Full-Text Articles in Evidence

Motor Vehicles; Driving While Intoxicated; Section 4511.19; Implied Consent; Aurora V. Kepley, Amie Bruggeman Jul 2015

Motor Vehicles; Driving While Intoxicated; Section 4511.19; Implied Consent; Aurora V. Kepley, Amie Bruggeman

Akron Law Review

With the constant problem of accidents caused by drinking drivers and the fairly reliable results of breathalyzer tests established, judicial decisions have upheld the statutory scheme providing for its use through an era when rights of an accused have been greatly expanded. It has been held that the breathalyzer test results are not testimonial but physical evidence and therefore not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, the accused has no constitutional right to refuse to take the test, and the prosecutor may comment at the trial on his refusal relying on its' probative value as to whether …


The Use Of Prior Inconsistent Statements Of Opinion To Impeach: Ohio's Position, Richard Milligan Jul 2015

The Use Of Prior Inconsistent Statements Of Opinion To Impeach: Ohio's Position, Richard Milligan

Akron Law Review

The purpose of this article is to examine prior inconsistent statements of opinion and point out why their exclusion, when offered to impeach, is improper. Ohio's three leading cases on this point will serve to exemplify the improper characterization and exclusion of these statements.


The Courtroom Status Of The Polygraph, John A. Turlik Jul 2015

The Courtroom Status Of The Polygraph, John A. Turlik

Akron Law Review

This comment will inform the reader of the status and various uses of the polygraph available to the criminal attorney, with an emphasis on Ohio law.


Free, But Still Behind Bars: Reading The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act To Allow Any Person Convicted Of A Crime To Raise A Claim Of Actual Innocence, Hugh M. Mundy Jul 2015

Free, But Still Behind Bars: Reading The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act To Allow Any Person Convicted Of A Crime To Raise A Claim Of Actual Innocence, Hugh M. Mundy

Hugh Mundy

As the number of wrongfully convicted prisoners who are subsequently exonerated continues to rise, the importance of access to post-conviction relief also increases. Under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, this access is restricted to petitioners who are currently imprisoned or otherwise facing a restraint on their liberty. Persons convicted of a crime who have completed their sentence are barred from pursuing post-conviction relief under the Act, regardless of the existence of exculpatory evidence that supports their innocence. Removing this procedural roadblock and interpreting the Act broadly to allow any person convicted of a crime to raise a claim of actual …


Culpability Evaluations In The State Supreme Courts From 1977 To 1999: A "Model" Assessment, Dannye Holley Jul 2015

Culpability Evaluations In The State Supreme Courts From 1977 To 1999: A "Model" Assessment, Dannye Holley

Akron Law Review

A key premise of this article is that a fair assessment of the performance of state supreme court judges with regard to culpability evaluations must begin by differentiating among the states based upon the relative quality of statutory guidance available to each court on this crucial substantive criminal law issue. In light of the above discussion defining culpability evaluation and legislative action with regard thereto, this article categorizes states based on relative improvement in their statutory culpability evaluation scheme: first are those states with a set of hierarchical culpability concepts, which are specifically defined in relation to types of objective …


Calculating Credibility: State V. Sharma And The Future Of Polygraph Admissibility In Ohio And Beyond, Vincent V. Vigluicci Jun 2015

Calculating Credibility: State V. Sharma And The Future Of Polygraph Admissibility In Ohio And Beyond, Vincent V. Vigluicci

Akron Law Review

Almost a century after its inception, the polygraph test remains one of the most fascinating forms of evidence. Firmly entrenched in popular mythology, the polygraph offers the promise of calculating truth and credibility with scientific certainty, a proposition that continues to capture the public’s imagination. At the same time, the polygraph has also been viewed with great trepidation as a flawed and dangerous instrument of oppression. Commonly called a “lie detector,” the polygraph does not actually detect lying; it measures subtle changes in blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and the skin’s resistance to electricity that are thought to result from the …


Hearsay In Illinois: A New Look At Some Old Problems, 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 159 (1990), John E. Corkery Jun 2015

Hearsay In Illinois: A New Look At Some Old Problems, 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 159 (1990), John E. Corkery

John E. Corkery

No abstract provided.


Disentangling Michigan Court Rule 6.502(G)(2): The "New Evidence" Exception To The Ban On Successive Motions For Relief From Judgment Does Not Contain A Discoverability Requirement, Claire V. Madill Jun 2015

Disentangling Michigan Court Rule 6.502(G)(2): The "New Evidence" Exception To The Ban On Successive Motions For Relief From Judgment Does Not Contain A Discoverability Requirement, Claire V. Madill

Michigan Law Review

Michigan courts are engaging in a costly interpretative mistake. Confused by the relationship between two distinct legal doctrines, Michigan courts are conflating laws in a manner that precludes convicted defendants from raising their constitutional claims in postconviction proceedings. In Michigan, a convicted defendant who wishes to collaterally attack her conviction must file a 6.500 motion. The Michigan Court Rules generally prohibit “second or subsequent” motions. Nonetheless, section 6.502(G)(2) permits a petitioner to avoid this successive motion ban if her claim relies on “new evidence that was not discovered” before her original postconviction motion. Misguided by the similarity between the language …


Illinois' Latest Version Of The Defense Of Voluntary Intoxication: Is It Wise? Is It Constitutional?, 39 Depaul L. Rev. 15 (1989), Timothy P. O'Neill May 2015

Illinois' Latest Version Of The Defense Of Voluntary Intoxication: Is It Wise? Is It Constitutional?, 39 Depaul L. Rev. 15 (1989), Timothy P. O'Neill

Timothy P. O'Neill

No abstract provided.


Instructing Illinois Juries On The Definition Of “Reasonable Doubt”: The Need For Reform, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 921 (1996), Timothy P. O'Neill May 2015

Instructing Illinois Juries On The Definition Of “Reasonable Doubt”: The Need For Reform, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 921 (1996), Timothy P. O'Neill

Timothy P. O'Neill

No abstract provided.


Illinois Courts And The Law Of Miranda Waivers: A Policy Worth Preserving, 30 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 429 (2010), Timothy P. O'Neill May 2015

Illinois Courts And The Law Of Miranda Waivers: A Policy Worth Preserving, 30 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 429 (2010), Timothy P. O'Neill

Timothy P. O'Neill

No abstract provided.


The Clear Initiative And Mental States: 1½ Problems Solved, 41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 701 (2008), Timothy P. O'Neill May 2015

The Clear Initiative And Mental States: 1½ Problems Solved, 41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 701 (2008), Timothy P. O'Neill

Timothy P. O'Neill

No abstract provided.


Standards Of Review In Illinois Criminal Cases: The Need For Major Reform, 17 S. Ill. U. L.J. 51 (1992), Timothy P. O'Neill May 2015

Standards Of Review In Illinois Criminal Cases: The Need For Major Reform, 17 S. Ill. U. L.J. 51 (1992), Timothy P. O'Neill

Timothy P. O'Neill

No abstract provided.


Why Illinois Should Adopt Federal Rule Of Evidence 803(18) To Allow The Learned Treatise Exception To The Hearsay Rule, 39 S. Ill. U. L.J. 275 (2015), Ralph Ruebner, Katarina Durcova, Amy Taylor Jan 2015

Why Illinois Should Adopt Federal Rule Of Evidence 803(18) To Allow The Learned Treatise Exception To The Hearsay Rule, 39 S. Ill. U. L.J. 275 (2015), Ralph Ruebner, Katarina Durcova, Amy Taylor

UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship

Illinois still adheres to a rigid and outdated common law principle that treats a learned treatise as hearsay. This principle stands at odds with the adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence 703 ("FRE 703")' and 705 ("FRE 705") by the Illinois Supreme Court. Illinois courts have developed clever ways to get around the common law prohibition thereby creating an incoherent and inconsistent jurisprudence that at times yields bizarre outcomes.

Adopting the federal learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule would set out a consistent standard in Illinois for admitting learned treatises and allowing them as substantive evidence. Now that Illinois …


Recent Development: Hailes V. State: The State May Appeal A Trial Court's Ruling Excluding A Dying Declaration; The Length Of Time Between A Declarant's Statement And Death Is Irrelevant In A Dying Declaration Analysis; The Confrontation Clause Is Inapplicable To Dying Declarations, Lauren A. Panfile Jan 2015

Recent Development: Hailes V. State: The State May Appeal A Trial Court's Ruling Excluding A Dying Declaration; The Length Of Time Between A Declarant's Statement And Death Is Irrelevant In A Dying Declaration Analysis; The Confrontation Clause Is Inapplicable To Dying Declarations, Lauren A. Panfile

University of Baltimore Law Forum

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the State may appeal a trial court’s suppression of a victim’s dying declaration based on the legislative intent of Section 12-302(c)(4)(i) of the Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Procedure Article (“section 12-302(c)(4)(i)”). Hailes v. State, 442 Md. 488, 497-98, 113 A.3d 608, 613-14 (2015). The court further held that a victim’s statement, made while on life support, was a dying declaration regardless of the fact that the victim died two years after making the statement. Id. at 506, 113 A.3d at 618. Finally, the court held that the Confrontation Clause of the …


Recent Development: Sublet V. State: Authentication Of Evidence From Social Networking Websites Requires A Trial Judge To Find Sufficient Proof From Which A Reasonable Juror Could Conclude That The Evidence Is What The Proponent Claims It To Be, Denise A. Blake Jan 2015

Recent Development: Sublet V. State: Authentication Of Evidence From Social Networking Websites Requires A Trial Judge To Find Sufficient Proof From Which A Reasonable Juror Could Conclude That The Evidence Is What The Proponent Claims It To Be, Denise A. Blake

University of Baltimore Law Forum

The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in three consolidated cases, held that a trial judge must determine that evidence from a social networking website meets the “reasonable juror” standard of authentication as a condition precedent to admissibility. Sublet v. State, 442 Md. 632, 678, 113 A.3d 695, 722 (2015). This standard requires a preliminary determination by the trial judge that a reasonable juror could find the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.