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Articles 1 - 16 of 16
Full-Text Articles in Evidence
Motor Vehicles; Driving While Intoxicated; Section 4511.19; Implied Consent; Aurora V. Kepley, Amie Bruggeman
Motor Vehicles; Driving While Intoxicated; Section 4511.19; Implied Consent; Aurora V. Kepley, Amie Bruggeman
Akron Law Review
With the constant problem of accidents caused by drinking drivers and the fairly reliable results of breathalyzer tests established, judicial decisions have upheld the statutory scheme providing for its use through an era when rights of an accused have been greatly expanded. It has been held that the breathalyzer test results are not testimonial but physical evidence and therefore not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, the accused has no constitutional right to refuse to take the test, and the prosecutor may comment at the trial on his refusal relying on its' probative value as to whether …
The Use Of Prior Inconsistent Statements Of Opinion To Impeach: Ohio's Position, Richard Milligan
The Use Of Prior Inconsistent Statements Of Opinion To Impeach: Ohio's Position, Richard Milligan
Akron Law Review
The purpose of this article is to examine prior inconsistent statements of opinion and point out why their exclusion, when offered to impeach, is improper. Ohio's three leading cases on this point will serve to exemplify the improper characterization and exclusion of these statements.
The Courtroom Status Of The Polygraph, John A. Turlik
The Courtroom Status Of The Polygraph, John A. Turlik
Akron Law Review
This comment will inform the reader of the status and various uses of the polygraph available to the criminal attorney, with an emphasis on Ohio law.
Free, But Still Behind Bars: Reading The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act To Allow Any Person Convicted Of A Crime To Raise A Claim Of Actual Innocence, Hugh M. Mundy
Hugh Mundy
As the number of wrongfully convicted prisoners who are subsequently exonerated continues to rise, the importance of access to post-conviction relief also increases. Under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, this access is restricted to petitioners who are currently imprisoned or otherwise facing a restraint on their liberty. Persons convicted of a crime who have completed their sentence are barred from pursuing post-conviction relief under the Act, regardless of the existence of exculpatory evidence that supports their innocence. Removing this procedural roadblock and interpreting the Act broadly to allow any person convicted of a crime to raise a claim of actual …
Culpability Evaluations In The State Supreme Courts From 1977 To 1999: A "Model" Assessment, Dannye Holley
Culpability Evaluations In The State Supreme Courts From 1977 To 1999: A "Model" Assessment, Dannye Holley
Akron Law Review
A key premise of this article is that a fair assessment of the performance of state supreme court judges with regard to culpability evaluations must begin by differentiating among the states based upon the relative quality of statutory guidance available to each court on this crucial substantive criminal law issue. In light of the above discussion defining culpability evaluation and legislative action with regard thereto, this article categorizes states based on relative improvement in their statutory culpability evaluation scheme: first are those states with a set of hierarchical culpability concepts, which are specifically defined in relation to types of objective …
Calculating Credibility: State V. Sharma And The Future Of Polygraph Admissibility In Ohio And Beyond, Vincent V. Vigluicci
Calculating Credibility: State V. Sharma And The Future Of Polygraph Admissibility In Ohio And Beyond, Vincent V. Vigluicci
Akron Law Review
Almost a century after its inception, the polygraph test remains one of the most fascinating forms of evidence. Firmly entrenched in popular mythology, the polygraph offers the promise of calculating truth and credibility with scientific certainty, a proposition that continues to capture the public’s imagination. At the same time, the polygraph has also been viewed with great trepidation as a flawed and dangerous instrument of oppression. Commonly called a “lie detector,” the polygraph does not actually detect lying; it measures subtle changes in blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and the skin’s resistance to electricity that are thought to result from the …
Hearsay In Illinois: A New Look At Some Old Problems, 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 159 (1990), John E. Corkery
Hearsay In Illinois: A New Look At Some Old Problems, 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 159 (1990), John E. Corkery
John E. Corkery
No abstract provided.
Disentangling Michigan Court Rule 6.502(G)(2): The "New Evidence" Exception To The Ban On Successive Motions For Relief From Judgment Does Not Contain A Discoverability Requirement, Claire V. Madill
Michigan Law Review
Michigan courts are engaging in a costly interpretative mistake. Confused by the relationship between two distinct legal doctrines, Michigan courts are conflating laws in a manner that precludes convicted defendants from raising their constitutional claims in postconviction proceedings. In Michigan, a convicted defendant who wishes to collaterally attack her conviction must file a 6.500 motion. The Michigan Court Rules generally prohibit “second or subsequent” motions. Nonetheless, section 6.502(G)(2) permits a petitioner to avoid this successive motion ban if her claim relies on “new evidence that was not discovered” before her original postconviction motion. Misguided by the similarity between the language …
Illinois' Latest Version Of The Defense Of Voluntary Intoxication: Is It Wise? Is It Constitutional?, 39 Depaul L. Rev. 15 (1989), Timothy P. O'Neill
Illinois' Latest Version Of The Defense Of Voluntary Intoxication: Is It Wise? Is It Constitutional?, 39 Depaul L. Rev. 15 (1989), Timothy P. O'Neill
Timothy P. O'Neill
No abstract provided.
Instructing Illinois Juries On The Definition Of “Reasonable Doubt”: The Need For Reform, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 921 (1996), Timothy P. O'Neill
Instructing Illinois Juries On The Definition Of “Reasonable Doubt”: The Need For Reform, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 921 (1996), Timothy P. O'Neill
Timothy P. O'Neill
No abstract provided.
Illinois Courts And The Law Of Miranda Waivers: A Policy Worth Preserving, 30 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 429 (2010), Timothy P. O'Neill
Illinois Courts And The Law Of Miranda Waivers: A Policy Worth Preserving, 30 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 429 (2010), Timothy P. O'Neill
Timothy P. O'Neill
No abstract provided.
The Clear Initiative And Mental States: 1½ Problems Solved, 41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 701 (2008), Timothy P. O'Neill
The Clear Initiative And Mental States: 1½ Problems Solved, 41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 701 (2008), Timothy P. O'Neill
Timothy P. O'Neill
No abstract provided.
Standards Of Review In Illinois Criminal Cases: The Need For Major Reform, 17 S. Ill. U. L.J. 51 (1992), Timothy P. O'Neill
Standards Of Review In Illinois Criminal Cases: The Need For Major Reform, 17 S. Ill. U. L.J. 51 (1992), Timothy P. O'Neill
Timothy P. O'Neill
No abstract provided.
Why Illinois Should Adopt Federal Rule Of Evidence 803(18) To Allow The Learned Treatise Exception To The Hearsay Rule, 39 S. Ill. U. L.J. 275 (2015), Ralph Ruebner, Katarina Durcova, Amy Taylor
Why Illinois Should Adopt Federal Rule Of Evidence 803(18) To Allow The Learned Treatise Exception To The Hearsay Rule, 39 S. Ill. U. L.J. 275 (2015), Ralph Ruebner, Katarina Durcova, Amy Taylor
UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship
Illinois still adheres to a rigid and outdated common law principle that treats a learned treatise as hearsay. This principle stands at odds with the adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence 703 ("FRE 703")' and 705 ("FRE 705") by the Illinois Supreme Court. Illinois courts have developed clever ways to get around the common law prohibition thereby creating an incoherent and inconsistent jurisprudence that at times yields bizarre outcomes.
Adopting the federal learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule would set out a consistent standard in Illinois for admitting learned treatises and allowing them as substantive evidence. Now that Illinois …
Recent Development: Hailes V. State: The State May Appeal A Trial Court's Ruling Excluding A Dying Declaration; The Length Of Time Between A Declarant's Statement And Death Is Irrelevant In A Dying Declaration Analysis; The Confrontation Clause Is Inapplicable To Dying Declarations, Lauren A. Panfile
University of Baltimore Law Forum
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the State may appeal a trial court’s suppression of a victim’s dying declaration based on the legislative intent of Section 12-302(c)(4)(i) of the Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Procedure Article (“section 12-302(c)(4)(i)”). Hailes v. State, 442 Md. 488, 497-98, 113 A.3d 608, 613-14 (2015). The court further held that a victim’s statement, made while on life support, was a dying declaration regardless of the fact that the victim died two years after making the statement. Id. at 506, 113 A.3d at 618. Finally, the court held that the Confrontation Clause of the …
Recent Development: Sublet V. State: Authentication Of Evidence From Social Networking Websites Requires A Trial Judge To Find Sufficient Proof From Which A Reasonable Juror Could Conclude That The Evidence Is What The Proponent Claims It To Be, Denise A. Blake
University of Baltimore Law Forum
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in three consolidated cases, held that a trial judge must determine that evidence from a social networking website meets the “reasonable juror” standard of authentication as a condition precedent to admissibility. Sublet v. State, 442 Md. 632, 678, 113 A.3d 695, 722 (2015). This standard requires a preliminary determination by the trial judge that a reasonable juror could find the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.