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- Confrontation Clause (3)
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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Evidence
Every Juror Wants A Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt And The Right To Present A Defense, John H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson, Emily C. Paavola
Every Juror Wants A Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt And The Right To Present A Defense, John H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson, Emily C. Paavola
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
On occasion, criminal defendants hope to convince a jury that the state has not met its burden of proving them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by offering evidence that someone else (a third party) committed the crime. Currently, state and federal courts assess the admissibility of evidence of third-party guilt using a variety of standards. In general, however, there are two basic approaches. Many state courts require a defendant to proffer evidence of some sort of direct link or connection between a specific third-party and the crime. A second group of state courts, as well as federal courts, admit evidence …
Comment: Experts Who Don't Know They Don't Know, Jonathan Koehler
Comment: Experts Who Don't Know They Don't Know, Jonathan Koehler
Faculty Working Papers
Sadly, the conclusion reached by Green and Armstrong (2006) – that experts should not be used for predicting the decisions that people will make in conflicts – comes as no surprise. Decades ago, Armstrong himself taught us that expertise beyond a minimal level does not improve judgmental accuracy across a variety of domains (Armstrong, 1980). More recently, Tetlock (2006) drove home the point in a study of hundreds of political experts who made thousands of forecasts over many years. Like Green and Armstrong (2006), Tetlock (2006) found that that expert forecasts were frequently inaccurate. In a nod to Armstrong's previous …
Evidentiary Wisdom And Blinders In Perspective: Thoughts On Misjudging, Elaine W. Shoben
Evidentiary Wisdom And Blinders In Perspective: Thoughts On Misjudging, Elaine W. Shoben
Scholarly Works
Empirical studies serve to enlighten the law, even when they simply confirm the wisdom of existing rules. Chris Guthrie's article, Misjudging, primarily serves that useful function—confirming the wisdom of existing rules—even though the author sought to establish something different. Guthrie's article applies insights from cognitive psychology to the resolution of legal disputes and presents some empirical proof of the effect of the application. He concludes that three sets of “blinders”—informational, cognitive, and attitudinal—affect the ability of judges to reach correct resolutions of disputes. He therefore recommends further appreciation of the ability of arbitration and mediation to avoid some of the …
Truth, Deterrence, And The Impeachment Exception , James L. Kainen
Truth, Deterrence, And The Impeachment Exception , James L. Kainen
Faculty Scholarship
James v. Illinois permits illegally-obtained evidence to impeach defendants, but not defense witnesses. Thus far, all courts have construed James to allow impeachment of defendants' hearsay declarations. This article argues against allowing illegally-obtained evidence to impeach defendants' hearsay declarations because doing so unduly diminishes the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect. The distinction between impeaching defendants and defense witnesses disappears when courts allow prosecutors to impeach defendants' hearsay declarations. Because defense witnesses report exculpatory conduct of a defendant who always has a substantial interest in disguising his criminality, their testimony routinely incorporates defendant hearsay. Defense witness testimony thus routinely paves the way …
Forfeiture Of The Confrontation Right After Crawford And Davis, Richard D. Friedman
Forfeiture Of The Confrontation Right After Crawford And Davis, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
So my topic this morning is on forfeiture of the confrontation right, which I think plays a central role in confrontation doctrine. And to try to present that, let me state the entirety of confrontation doctrine as briefly as I can. This is, at least, what I think the doctrine is and what it can be: A testimonial statement should not be admissible against an accused to prove the truth of what it asserts unless the accused either has had or will have an opportunity to confront the witness-which should occur at trial unless the witness is then unavailable-or has …
Crawford, Davis, And Way Beyond, Richard D. Friedman
Crawford, Davis, And Way Beyond, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Until 1965, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution hardly mattered. It was not applicable against the states, and therefore had no role whatsoever in the vast majority of prosecutions. Moreover, if a federal court was inclined to exclude evidence of an out-of-court statement, it made little practical difference whether the court termed the statement hearsay or held that the evidence did not comply with the Confrontation Clause.
Crawford And Davis: A Personal Reflection, Richard D. Friedman
Crawford And Davis: A Personal Reflection, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
I have to say that when I stood up to argue Hammon I felt the wind at my back. I was basically a lawyer with an easy case, and there wasn't anything particularly unpredictable at the argument of Hammon. Now it got a little bit interesting, as I will explain later, because to a certain extent I was trying to argue the other case as well. But Hammon itself was sort of ordinary, normal law.