Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons^™

The Yukos Annulment: Answered And Unanswered Questions, George A. Bermann

Faculty Scholarship

On April 20, 2016, a Dutch court issued a major judgment annulling awards rendered in a dispute between the Russian Federation and three majority shareholders of the former giant Russian oil producer, OAO Yukos Oil Company (“Yukos”). The annulment by a national court of any investor-State award is always of great moment, but it was particularly so in the case of an award in excess of $50 billion. Discussion of the judgment has understandably occupied much of the international arbitration blogosphere.

After setting out the basic facts of the case, this piece briefly describes the position that the Tribunal had …

"International Standards" As A Choice Of Law Option In International Arbitration, George A. Bermann

Faculty Scholarship

A steady preoccupation of international arbitration has been the extent to which international arbitral tribunals should distance themselves in their conduct and practices from the conduct and practices of national courts. That distance is noticeably variable as one moves from one aspect of the adjudicatory process to another. Variable as well among aspects of the adjudicatory process is the degree of consensus as to what that distance on any given issue should be.

Ask For The Moon, Settle For The Stars: What Is A Reasonable Period To Comply With Wto Awards?, Petros C. Mavroidis, Niall Meagher, Thomas J. Prusa, Tatiana Yanguas

Faculty Scholarship

The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement process allows a defending Member a “reasonable period of time” (RPT) to implement any findings that its contested measures are inconsistent with WTO law. If agreement on this RPT cannot be reached, Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) provides for the possibility of arbitration on the length of the RPT. The DSU provides limited guidelines on the RPT, stating only that it should not normally exceed 15 months. In practice, Arbitrators have developed the standard that the RPT should reflect the shortest possible period …

Dispute Settlement In The Wto: Mind Over Matter, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

The basic point I advocate in this paper is that the WTO Dispute Settlement System aims to curb unilateralism. No sanctions can be imposed, unless if the arbitration process is through, the purpose of which is to ensure that reciprocal commitments entered should not be unilaterally undone through the commission of illegalities. There are good reasons though, to doubt whether practice guarantees full reciprocity. The insistence on calculating remedies prospectively, and not as of the date when an illegality has been committed, and the ensuing losses for everybody that could or could not be symmetric, lend support to the claim …

Tpp Would Let Foreign Investors Bypass The Canadian Public Interest, Lisa E. Sachs, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

In early October, prime ministerial candidate Justin Trudeau promised Canadians “a full and open public debate” on the Trans-Pacific Partnership. With 30 chapters that would bind Canada to sweeping agreements on everything from services to intellectual property to the environment to procurement, there is much to debate.

Next Generation Treaty – India’S New Model Bit Makes It Clear That Its Goal Is To Accomplish More Than Investor Protection, Lisa E. Sachs, Lise Johnson, Sudhanshu Roy

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

The April release of India’s draft model bilateral investment treaty 1(BIT), which is expected to be approved by the cabinet soon, has generated a rich public debate on its international investment regime. There are important questions about the purpose and content of investment treaties, both in India and other countries. However, some reactions – like Augusts Law Commission report suggesting that the model BIT was not sufficiently investor-friendly – frame the discussion too narrowly, ignoring key questions and objectives behind India’s transitioning investment policy regime.

The Tpp’S Investment Chapter: Entrenching, Rather Than Reforming, A Flawed System, Lise Johnson, Lisa E. Sachs

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

During the negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, many stakeholders raised strong concerns about the Investment Chapter of the TPP, and in particular, the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS). The US Trade Representative (USTR) and other representatives of the negotiating partners assured the stakeholders that the TPP’s investment chapter would respond to the legitimate concerns about expansive investor protections and ISDS. The actual text, however, when made public, showed the opposite: a further evisceration of the role of domestic policy, institutions, and constituents. In their current form, the TPP’s substantive investment protections and ISDS pose significant potential costs to …

Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest And U.S. Domestic Law, Lise Johnson, Lisa E. Sachs, Jeffrey D. Sachs

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

As negotiations are ongoing in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP), CCSI staff and Jeffrey Sachs discuss the implications of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) for domestic law and policy, focusing on effects within the US. The paper concludes that the risks ISDS poses for domestic law are significant and unjustified, and that there are preferable policy alternatives to pursue as a means of protecting the rights of investors operating overseas.

Why Fast Track Is A Dangerous Gift To Corporate Lobbies, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Lisa E. Sachs, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

The Obama Administration is now on track to get "fast track" legislation through the Senate, heading towards a close vote in the House. The end goal is to conclude two major business treaties: the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). The House Democrats are right to withhold their support until key treaty positions favored by the White House are dropped.

Not So Fast, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Lisa E. Sachs, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

President Barack Obama and the Republican leadership in Congress are trying to pass "fast track" legislation in order to push through major economic agreements with eleven countries of the Pacific region (the Trans-Pacific Partnership) and Europe (the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) without the possibility for Congressional amendments. Both are being sold generally as "trade agreements," yet they involve key areas of business law and regulation far beyond trade. Before Congress approves fast track, these agreements need to be made public and exposed to thorough public scrutiny.

Eyes Wide Shut On Isds, Lisa E. Sachs, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

Recent agreement among congressional leaders on a “fast-track” bill may have been a victory for the Obama administration’s trade agenda. However, members of congress should take a look at the recent Bilcon case, decided by a NAFTA tribunal, to understand what they are signing up for.

New Weaknesses: Despite A Major Win, Arbitration Decisions In 2014 Increase The Us’S Future Exposure To Litigation And Liability, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

In 2014, the US continued its overall record of success in defending investment treaty claims. But it did suffer losses on a number of important issues, and those losses will render the US (and its treaty parties) vulnerable to future claims, litigation expense, and liability. The US’s recent losses, which have thus far been largely ignored in commentary on the US’s experiences in investment arbitration, are highlighted in this briefing note.

Taking Care Of Business: The Legal Affairs Division From The Gatt To The Wto, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

The WTO is usually referred to as a ‘member-driven organisation’. This term aims to capture the idea that it is states and customs territories, the members of the WTO, that have the initiative to decide on the direction of the institution. The WTO Secretariat is more or less what the term denotes: staff hired in order to help the members realise their aspirations. This is as true today as it was yesterday. Actually, over the years the Secretariat has for various reasons accumulated extra responsibilities, always with the tacit acquiescence or explicit acknowledgement of the members. In short, the members …

Dramatic Sideshows At The Hearing, George A. Bermann

Faculty Scholarship

International arbitration has plenty of dramatic moments, strewn across the arbitration life cycle. They can surface quite early, as in the context of petitions for interim relief, document production, challenges to the arbitrator or various dispositive motions. They are less likely to occur at the post-award stage (i.e. annulment or opposition to the recognition or enforcement of awards), due in part to the fact that that stage typically plays out in the sober atmosphere of a national court. But more often than not, the drama associated with international arbitration takes place in and around the arbitral hearing room.

In my …

Black Cat, White Cat: The Identity Of The Wto Judges, Louise Johannesson, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

WTO judges are proposed by the WTO Secretariat and elected to act as ‘judges’ if either approved by the parties to a dispute, or by the WTO Director-General in case no agreement between the parties has been possible. They are typically ‘Geneva crowd’, that is, they are either current or former delegates representing their country before the WTO. This observation holds for both first- as well as second-instance WTO judges (e.g. Panelists and members of the Appellate Body). In that, the WTO evidences an attitude strikingly similar to the GATT. Whereas the legal regime has been heavily ‘legalized’, the people …

International Investment Agreements: Are Their Policy Aims Served By Their Broad Definitions Of Covered “Investors” And “Investments”?, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

With negotiation of “mega-treaties” such as the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and investment treaties between the EU and other large economies such as Canada and the United States, international investment agreements (IIAs) are gaining fame and raising a host of important policy questions. Among those questions are who/what the treaties benefit and at what cost.

The Mauritius Convention On Transparency: Comments On The Rreaty And Its Role In Increasing Transparency Of Investor-State Arbitration, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

In July 2014, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted the Mauritius Convention on Transparency that, if widely adopted, will do much to increase the transparency of investor-state arbitrations conducted under thousands of existing investment treaties and under any set of arbitration rules. This Policy Paper introduces the background and objectives of the Transparency Convention, provides commentary on each of its specific articles, and explains how the Transparency Convention can accomplish broad reform.

New Uncitral Arbitration Rules On Transparency: Application, Content And Next Steps, Lise Johnson, Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

In July 2013, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted a package of rules aiming to ensure transparency in investor-State arbitration (the “Rules on Transparency”), ratifying the work done by delegations to UNCITRAL – comprised of 55 Member States, additional observer States and observer organizations – over the course of nearly three years of negotiations.

Under previous versions of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, disputes between investors and States were often not made public, even where important public policies were involved or illegal or corrupt business practices were uncovered. In contrast, the new rules, which will officially come …

Leveraging Mining Demand For Internet And Telecommunications Infrastructure For Broad Economic Development: Models, Opportunities And Challenges, Perrine Toledano, Clara Roorda

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

The initial phase of the Leveraging Mining-Related Infrastructure Investments for Development project consisted of a worldwide survey of regulatory, commercial and operating case studies of shared use of mining-related infrastructure. This Policy Paper delivers the findings for internet and telecommunications.

State Liability For Regulatory Change: How International Investment Rules Are Overriding Domestic Law, Lise Johnson, Oleksandr Volkov

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

With governments around the world pushing efforts to negotiate and approve mega-investment treaties, it is important to be clear on just what these investment treaties do and do not mean. One issue that is increasingly apparent is that investment treaties are not merely tools to provide protections against abusive regimes and egregious conduct, but are mechanisms through which a small and typically powerful set of private actors can change the substantive content of the law outside the normal domestic legislative and judicial frameworks.

Finding Order In The Morass: The Three Real Justifications For Piercing The Corporate Veil, Jonathan Macey, Joshua Mitts

Faculty Scholarship

Few doctrines are more shrouded in mystery or litigated more often than piercing the corporate veil. We develop a new theoretical framework that posits that veil piercing is done to achieve three discrete public policy goals, each of which is consistent with economic efficiency: (1) achieving the purpose of an existing statute or regulation; (2) preventing shareholders from obtaining credit by misrepresentation; and (3) promoting the bankruptcy values of achieving the orderly, efficient resolution of a bankrupt's estate. We analyze the facts of veil-piercing cases to show how the outcomes are explained by our taxonomy. We demonstrate that a supposed …

A Reply To "Hollow Spaces", George A. Bermann, Jack J. Coe Jr., Christopher R. Drahozal, Catherine A. Rogers

Faculty Scholarship

This short essay responds to Chip Brower's thoughtful and meticulous critique of Tentative Draft No. 2 of the Restatement Third of the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration. While we appreciate the concerns he raises, we disagree with the conclusions he draws both about the Restatement and the drafting process. We address here what we understand to be Professor Brower's major criticisms of the work.

Mobil V. Canada – Ratcheting Down The Scope Of Treaty Reservations, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

As part of States’ efforts to strike a balance in their international investment agreements (IIAs) between the obligations they assume and the rights and policy space they wish to retain, some adjoin annexes to their treaties to protect their ability to take “Non-Conforming Measures” (NCMs). States have generally: used such annexes to make exceptions to non-discrimination obligations, market access restrictions and performance requirements; have included the ability to grandfather in NCMs existing at the time an IIA enters into force; and have provided for the ability to maintain, amend, and enact new NCMs in specifically identified sectors, sub-sectors, activities, or …

New Uncitral Arbitration Rules On Transparency: Application, Content And Next Steps, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

This paper discusses the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, which were adopted in August of 2013 and went into effect on April 1, 2014. It draws on negotiating history to elaborate on the content of and purpose of each of the Rules’ provisions, and identifies options for and barriers to applying these Rules in future arbitrations.

Investor-State Contracts, Host-State “Commitments” And The Myth Of Stability In International Law, Lise Johnson, Oleksandr Volkov

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

A new de facto rule has emerged in international investment law that emphasizes and prioritizes investment stability, imposing liability on host governments for a wide range of public interest measures deemed to interfere with “commitments” given to foreign investors by host governments. The arbitral decisions from which this new rule has emanated in treaty-based investment disputes resolve types of claims that have long been familiar to domestic jurisdictions. Yet, as this article uncovers through a comparative law analysis of factually similar cases decided under United States law over roughly the past 200 years, the approaches taken and pronouncements issued by …

In The Shadow Of The Dsu: Addressing Specific Trade Concerns In The Wto Sps And Tbt Committees, Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, Erik Wijkström

Faculty Scholarship

The paper argues that focusing only on disputes formally raised in the WTO Dispute Settlement system underestimates the extent of trade conflict resolution within the WTO. Both the SPS and TBT Committees address a significant number of ‘specific trade concerns’ (STCs) that in the overwhelming majority of cases do not become formal disputes. The STCs address differences between Members concerning the conformity of national measures in the SPS and TBT areas with these agreements. It appears as if Committee work on STCs significantly helps defuse potential trade frictions concerning national policies in the covered areas.

The Restatement Of The U.S. Law Of International Commercial Arbitration: An Interim Report, George A. Bermann

Faculty Scholarship

Despite its title, the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law of International Arbitration is the ALI's first Restatement ever on the subject of international commercial arbitration. The ALI commissioned this Restatement not merely because the subject has become so important in international commerce, but because the American law on the subject is deeply unsettled. After all, the purpose of Restatements is to bring clarity and coherence and, where necessary, improvement to the law. Historically, Restatements have concentrated on state rather than federal law subjects precisely because of the discrepancies among the laws of the several states on …

Multilateral Environmental Agreements In The Wto: Silence Speaks Volumes, Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

This study contributes to the debate concerning the appropriate role of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) in in WTO dispute settlement. Its distinguishing feature is that it seeks to address this relationship in light of the reason why the parties have chosen to separate their obligations into two bodies of law without providing an explicit nexus between them. The basic conclusion is that legislators’ silence concerning this relationship should speak volumes to WTO adjudicating bodies: MEAs should not be automatically understood as imposing legally binding obligations on WTO Members, but could be used as sources of factual information.

The 2012 Us Model Bit And What The Changes (Or Lack Thereof) Suggest About Future Investment Treaties, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

In April of this year the US State Department released a new version of its model bilateral investment treaty (BIT). This text, like the various models the US has used over roughly the past 3 decades, represents the US’s basic policy position when it starts negotiations on investment treaties with other countries, and is therefore an important benchmark for the outcome US investors might hope for as a result of ongoing and potential future talks with countries such as China, Russia, and India. Overall, this new model text follows the approach taken by the US in its investment treaties over …

Inching Towards Consensus: An Update On The Uncitral Transparency Negotiations, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

From October 1-5, 2012, a working group of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) met in Vienna to continue work on how to ensure transparency in treaty-based investor-state arbitration. It was the working group’s fifth week-long meeting on the topic, but will not be the last. Although some issues were settled, many very significant ones remain contentious, and will be picked up again by the working group when it meets in February 2013.