Courts Commons^™

The Shadow Corroboration Doctrine In Sexual Violence Cases, Chris Cox

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Federal Courts Jurisprudence Of Justice Clarence Thomas, Barnett J. Harris

Catholic University Law Review

In “Personal Precedent at the Supreme Court,” Professor Richard Re argues that Supreme Court justices tend to rely on their “previously expressed views of the law,” including their prior separate opinions when deciding new cases. Richard M. Re, Personal Precedent at the Supreme Court, 136 Harv. L. Rev. 824, 825–26 (2023). These “previously expressed views of the law,” which Re refers to as “personal precedent,” play an extremely important and previously unrecognized role in the development of the law. Re even contends that “though typically excluded from the law, personal precedent may actually be its building block.” Richard M. Re, …

The Hidden Power Of Citizenship: Political Identity In The Twilight Zone Of Equal Protection, Charles J. Anderson

Indiana Law Journal

More than half a century ago, in the landmark case of Graham v. Richardson, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state-level blanket exclusions of noncitizens. That case ushered in a new rule: State classifications based on alienage are “inherently suspect” and subject to strict scrutiny. But Graham’s rule has a major exception. Just a few years after Graham was decided, the Court upheld several state laws excluding noncitizens from working as police officers, public school teachers, and probation officers. So was created what would later be termed “political function” doctrine. …

Does Textualism Constrain Supreme Court Justices?, James J. Brudney, Lawrence Baum

Northwestern University Law Review

A principal justification for textualism is the constraint hypothesis. Conservative Justices and leading textualist scholars contend that—in stark contrast to reliance on legislative history—focus on the ordinary meaning of enacted text leaves little room for the Justices to be policy-oriented or ideological in their interpretations. This Article represents the first systematic study probing the validity of the constraint hypothesis, one that employs both quantitative and qualitative analysis.

The Article examines the Justices’ reliance on interpretive resources in over 660 statutory decisions in the field of labor and employment, decided by the Burger Court, the Rehnquist Court, and the Roberts Court—during …

"There Was Such An Array Of Circumstances Pointing To Defendant's Guilt…": Shepard V. United States And The Dying Declaration As A Legal, Social, And Political History Of People, Places, Times… And Utility, Joshua E. Kastenberg

Cleveland State Law Review

In 1933, the Court, in Shepard v. United States, limited the “dying declaration” exception to the prohibition against hearsay. Shepard has been cited over 500 times by courts of appeal, the decision appears in evidence casebooks, and scholars have challenged it as robbing the voice of victims. However, there has never been a legal history of the decision. The case arose from a criminal conviction that occurred in the last days of the “Roaring Twenties,” and the appeal transited through the courts in the first years of the Great Depression. The Court, in a unanimous decision authored by Justice …

Fighting For Fairness Where It's Needed Most 09-22-2025, Jane Govednik

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Futurisms, Jeremiah Chin

Northwestern University Law Review

How do we reckon with the past? The Supreme Court’s recent embrace of originalism as a mode of constitutional analysis relies almost exclusively on a view of history and tradition that would bind us to an understanding of principles and ideals that legitimized the exclusion of minority voices. Cases such as New York State Pistol and Rifle Ass'n v. Bruen use flavors of originalism as a framework to define rights and governmental powers through their historical antecedents, but this broad standard of interpretation is notably absent in the Court’s recent discussions of histories and traditions of racism in the United …

Toward A Perpetual Practice Of Affirmative Action, Sheldon Bernard Lyke

Northwestern University Law Review

Despite perceptions that affirmative action is “dead” following the Supreme Court ruling in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College (SFFA), this Essay argues that affirmative action remains crucial for addressing racial bias in admissions processes. This Essay examines the strict scrutiny standard, which requires that any use of race must serve a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Courts have interpreted the narrowly tailored prong of this standard to include a logical end point requirement, which mandates that race-conscious measures must have a clear and limited …

Standing On Stare Decisis After Students For Fair Admissions, Areeb Asif, Lindsey Roloff

Northwestern University Law Review

The Supreme Court recognized nearly half a century ago in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke that “the ‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.” Nevertheless, the Court seriously undercut efforts to bring such a future to life by striking down race-conscious admissions programs in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College and Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina (collectively SFFA). Though SFFA’s binding effect is limited to educational institutions, …

Statutory Construction, Maine Law Review

Maine Law Review

The various rules a court may invoke as the time-worn tests of a statute's meaning reveal little of its institutional approach to statutory construction unless considered in the light of particular cases to which they are applied. Mindful that courts generally have failed to develop consistent approaches to statutory construction, the following survey attempts to rough out the contours of Maine doctrine. The reader should note that any critical evaluations derive from stated preferences for particular approaches to problems of statutory construction, and should recall that opinion on these topics varies widely.

Predicting What The Law Court Will Do In Fact, Harry P. Glassman

Maine Law Review

Over eighty years ago Oliver Wendell Holmes announced what became the manifesto of the legal realists when he stated: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." Legal philosophers and professors of jurisprudence may justifiably quarrel with Holmes' definition of law, but that definition continues to be useful to the practicing attorney engaged in the everyday business of counseling clients and advising them concerning the legality of anticipated activities. It is useful also to the trial court judge, bound by the decisions of an appellate court, who, …

The Waiting Is The Hardest Part: The Constitutionality Of Firearm Waiting Periods, F. Lee Francis

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This Article examines the constitutionality of firearm waiting period laws through the lens of the Supreme Court’s evolving Second Amendment jurisprudence. Although such laws are frequently defended as prudent public safety measures, their validity turns not on legislative purpose but on constitutional principle, particularly as framed in District of Columbia v. Heller and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.

Under those decisions, the scope of the Second Amendment is determined not by judicial balancing of contemporary interests, but by reference to the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Article surveys that tradition and finds no …

The Problem Of Biased Precedents, Ronen Avraham, Issachar Rosen-Zvi

Cardozo Law Review

This Article addresses the problem ofbiased precedents, wherein sophisticated repeat players, often corporate and state entities armed with superior resources and a vested interest in shaping the law, manipulate legal proceedings to systematically establish self-advantageous precedents. Specifically, by strategically choosing to litigate cases they anticipate will lead to favorable precedents and settling those expected to produce unfavorable outcomes, these players systematically bias the law over time to their advantage, at the expense of one-shot parties and society at large. The problem of biased precedents challenges the commonly held view about the efficiency and fairness of the legal system and raises …

The Sovereignty Problem In Federal Indian Law, Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Articles

There is a sovereignty problem in federal Indian law-namely, that the federal government's sovereign defenses prevent tribal nations and individual Indian people from realizing justice in the courts. Often, compelling tribal and Indian claims go nowhere as the judiciary defers to the interests of the United States, even where Congress has expressly stated its support for tribal interests. Conversely, tribal judiciaries allow claims to proceed to the merits, invoking customary and traditional law to hold tribal governments accountable.

Sovereignty theory helps to explain why justice can be done in one court system but not another. But federal, state, and tribal …

Pozen And The Puzzle Of Counterfactuals, Louis Michael Seidman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Constitution and the War on Drugs, David Pozen’s carefully researched and brilliantly argued book, is both illuminating and disturbing: illuminating because it unearths forgotten moments when judicially formulated constitutional doctrine that could have ended or sharply restricted the War on Drugs were well within the Overton Window, and disturbing because it surfaces hard questions about historical contingency and the scope of the change that might have occurred in a counterfactual world. In this review, the author argues that the failure to specify both the nature of the counterfactual and the breadth of the alternative possibility have confused discussions …

The Incoherence Of Evidence Law, G. Alexander Nunn

Faculty Scholarship

What is the purpose of evidence law? The answer might seem intuitive. Evidence law exists, of course, to foster verdict accuracy, legitimacy, and efficiency. But these kindred aims often come into conflict. Policy tradeoffs are inescapable in evidence law, meaning that an evidentiary regime must clarify how its normative objectives cohere. Do accuracy, legitimacy, and efficiency work together on equal footing, such that the goal of a code is to maximize each objective to the extent possible? Or does one of evidence law’s aims take precedence over the rest? And if one goal takes priority, what is the role of …

Survival Labor, Yvette Butler

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This Article makes one simple, novel claim: crime is labor when it generates income, allows individuals to pursue self-sufficiency, or allows them to fulfill societal expectations of providing for or caring for dependents. When individuals engage in survival crimes, instead of seeing them as criminals, we should see them as workers engaged in survival labor.

The carceral system continues to disproportionately harm racial minorities and people living in poverty. The foundations of many laws regulating racialized bodies and the policing of those bodies has created a culture where blackness is equivalent to criminality. While a penal abolitionist framework is helpful …

Slaughtering Slaughter-House: An Assessment Of 14th Amendment Privileges Or Immunities Jurisprudence, Caleb Webb

Senior Honors Theses

In 1872, the Supreme Court decided the Slaughter-House Cases, which applied a narrow interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14^th Amendment that effectually eroded the clause from the Constitution. Following Slaughter-House, the Supreme Court compensated by utilizing elastic interpretations of the Due Process Clause in its substantive due process jurisprudence to cover the rights that would have otherwise been protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In more recent years, the Court has heard arguments favoring alternative interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause but has yet to evaluate them thoroughly. By applying the …

Litigating Original Meaning From Heller To Rahimi: The Role Of Lawyering In The Confused Path Of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, Lawrence Rosenthal

American University Law Review

The Second Amendment is on a jurisprudential march. An individual right to “keep and bear arms” for purposes unrelated to militia or military service was not recognized until the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, applying what it took to be the original meaning of the “right to keep and bear arms” found in the Second Amendment, in District of Columbia v. Heller. Subsequently, the Court, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, invalidated a statute requiring a permit to carry concealable firearms on a showing of particularized need. Most recently, in United States v. Rahimi, …

Decisionmaking In Patent Cases At The Federal Circuit, Jason Reinecke

Washington and Lee Law Review

This Article provides the results of an empirical study assessing the impact of panel composition in patent cases at the Federal Circuit. The dataset includes 2675 three-judge panel-level final written decisions and Rule 36 summary affirmances issued by the Federal Circuit between January 1, 2014 and May 31, 2021. The study informs the longstanding debate concerning whether the Federal Circuit is succeeding as a court with nationwide jurisdiction in patent cases and provides insight into judicial decisionmaking more broadly. And several results show that many of the worst fears that commentators have about the Federal Circuit appear overstated or untrue. …

Foreword: The Life, Work & Legacy Of Felix Frankfurter, The Justice Known As “Ff”, Rodger D. Citron

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Promoting Women’S Advancement In The Judiciary In The Midst Of Backlash: A Comparative Analysis Of Representation And Jurisprudence In Key Domestic And International Fora, Shruti Rana

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Women’s advancement in the judiciary of the United States has been slow and uneven, and has long lagged behind other nations. Parity in representation remains distant, and the gains to date vulnerable to changes in administrations and fluctuating levels of state commitment to gender equality, with the recent global backlash to gender equality and international norms and institutions providing a critical example of this fragility. In this light, this Article argues that gender parity in the judiciary should not be viewed as merely a laudable goal. Rather, representation and parity should be viewed as fundamental state legal obligations under international …

The Constitution As A Source Of Remedial Law, Carlos Manuel Vázquez

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Equity’s Constitutional Source, Owen W. Gallogly argues that Article III is the source of a constitutional default rule for equitable remedies—specifically, that Article III’s vesting of the “judicial Power” “in Equity” empowers federal courts to afford the remedies traditionally afforded by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the Founding, and to develop such remedies in an incremental fashion. This Response questions the current plausibility of locating such a default rule in Article III, since remedies having their source in Article III would be available in federal but not state courts and would apply to state-law …

The Purcell Principle And The Antiblackness Of Constitutional Fundamentalism, Brittany Carter

American University Law Review

In Milligan v. Merrill, a district court in Alabama found that the state legislature designed Alabama’s new congressional district map in a way that diminished Black political power, and ordered the legislature to redraw its map to remedy the violation. Two weeks later, the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s order, allowing Alabama’s congressional elections to proceed under the discriminatory maps. The only stated rationale, offered by Justices Kavanaugh and Alito in a concurring opinion, was the so-called Purcell principle – the notion that federal courts should not enjoin a state’s election laws in the period close to an election. …

The Paradoxes Of A Unified Judicial Philosophy: An Empirical Study Of The New Supreme Court, 2020-2022, Victoria Frances Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The 2021 Supreme Court Term ended with a bang, yielding blockbuster cases making headlines. But what of the rest of the cases? This is the first major paper to examine the “Trump effect,” meaning the influence of three Justices appointed by President Trump who all share a “unified” judicial philosophy. In a two-year project, starting from 2020, when Justice Barrett ascended to the Court, to the end of June 2022, this article reviews 124 cases and over 300 opinions. There is both good and bad news for the court’s new “unified” judicial philosophy. History and text are both upwardly mobile …

The Public Defender Movement In The Age Of Mass Incarceration: Georgia's Experience, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

Focusing on the efforts of the Southern Center for Human Rights, this article offers a grassroots history of the creation of the first statewide public defender in the State of Georgia in 2003. Whereas federal court litigation to improve indigent defense failed to achieve lasting reform, a shift in tactics toward “rebellious localism,” characterized by state court lawsuits against county and city officials, succeeded in prodding lawmakers to create a new framework for delivering legal services to indigent defendants. This model of legal change was effective in documenting structural flaws and creating momentum for reform. Yet other conditions—such as front-end …

The Common Law As Statutory Backdrop, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Amidst the whirl of commentary about how the U.S. Supreme Court has become increasingly textualist and what precise shape modern textualism should take, the Court’s continued reliance on one decidedly atextual interpretive tool has gone largely unnoticed — the common law. Indeed, the common law has played an underappreciated, often dispositive, gap-filling role in statutory interpretation for decades, even as the textualist revolution has sidelined other non-text-focused interpretive tools. But despite the persistent role that the common law has played in statutory interpretation cases, the use of common law rules and definitions as an interpretive resource is surprisingly understudied and …

The Right To Counsel In A Neoliberal Age, Zohra Ahmed

Faculty Scholarship

Legal scholarship tends to obscure how changes in criminal process relate to broader changes in the political and economic terrain. This Article offers a modest corrective to this tendency. By studying the U.S. Supreme Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence, as it has developed since the mid-70s, I show the pervasive impact of the concurrent rise of neoliberalism on relationships between defendants and their attorneys. Since 1975, the Court has emphasized two concerns in its rulings regarding the right to counsel: choice and autonomy. These, of course, are nominally good things for defendants to have. But by paying close attention to …

How Rhetoric Reveals Judicial Motives In Employment Discrimination Cases, Susan E. Provenzano

Tennessee Law Review

Employment discrimination plaintiffs tend to lose on summary judgment. In these cases, judges are acting like juries and undermining anti-discrimination legislation while paying lip service to the law and the judicial role. How and why are courts doing this? Legal scholars blame bad doctrine and biased judging. But neither one tells the full story. The tell is in the opinions' strategic use of language, which shows how the court, as an institution, "sized up" the case and the motives of key actors the parties, the lawmakers, other courts, and the court itself. Conducting the first-ever rhetorical analysis of this problem, …

Textualism, Dynamism, And The Meaning Of "Sex", Bill Watson

Cardozo Law Review de•novo

A recent Article by Professors William N. Eskridge, Brian G. Slocum, and Stefan Th. Gries critically examines textualism, both in general and as applied in Bostock v. Clayton County. This Essay makes three points in reply. First, the authors criticize strawman versions of textualism that no mainstream legal interpreter claims to hold. Second, the authors’ examples of “societal dynamism” do not put any pressure on textualism properly understood. And third, the authors’ corpus-linguistics analysis of the word “sex” is, from a textualist perspective, irrelevant to the issue in Bostock.