Contracts Commons^™

Intent To Contract, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

There is a remarkable difference between black-letter contract laws of the United States and England. In England, the existence of a contract is supposedly conditioned on the parties' intent to be legally bound, while section 21 of the Second Restatement of Contracts states that "[n]either real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract." There are also differences within U.S. law on the issue. While section 21 describes courts' approach to most contracts, the parties' intent to contact can be a condition of validity of preliminary agreements, domestic agreements and social …

The Cost Of Consent: Optimal Standardization In The Law Of Contract, Joshua A.T. Fairfield

Scholarly Articles

This article argues that informed consent to contract terms is not a good to be maximized, but is rather an information cost that courts should minimize. The goal of mass-market contract law ought to be to keep costs low by encouraging contract standardization. The article applies information cost theory to show that information-forcing rules are often inefficient at both the micro- and macroeconomic levels. Such rules also impose greater costs on third parties than the benefits they create for the contracting parties. When one consumer creates an idiosyncratic deal, the information-savings benefits of standardization are reduced for all other potential …

Market Damages, Efficient Contracting, And The Economic Waste Fallacy, Alan Schwartz, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

Market damages are the best default rule when parties trade in thick markets: They induce parties to contract efficiently and to trade if and only if trade is efficient, and they do not create ex ante inefficiencies. Courts commonly overlook these virtues, however, when promisors bundle services that are not separately priced. For example, a promisor may agree to pay royalties on a mining lease and later to restore the promisee's property. When the cost of completion is large relative to the "market delta " – the increase in market value – courts concerned with avoiding "economic waste" limit the …

Contractual Enforcement Institutions And The Structure Of Information, Avery W. Katz

Faculty Scholarship

Many economic writers on contract theory have assumed that legal institutions are simply unable to do the job of enforcement, and have thus attempted to devise arrangements that motivate the parties to keep their commitments even though a government tribunal would be unable to tell whether they had performed. But non-legal enforcement mechanisms operate both as substitutes and complements for legal mechanisms (and as substitutes and complements for each other). This essay sketches how parties should choose among available enforcement mechanisms, based on the costs of information and other transaction costs.

Introduction: Private Ordering In A Globalizing World: Still Searching For The Basics Of Contract, Peer Zumbansen

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

Governing Contracts - Public and Private Perspectives, Symposium. Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, November 9-10, 2006

The New Public Contracting: Public Versus Private Ordering?, Peter Vincent-Jones

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

This article explores the hybrid character of contemporary public service organization with specific reference to the emergence in Britain over the last twenty-five years of a novel mode of governance, the "New Public Contracting." The New Public Contracting governs an ever-expanding range of aspects of modern life through contracting regimes directed at the attainment of particular policy purposes. In Britain, this mode of governance has been problematic in that many contracting regimes have failed to respond adequately to public needs. While the trend toward privatization may be politically irreversible, the role of the state should be to help establish the …

The Role Of Contracts And Networks In Public Governance: The Importance Of The "Social Epistemology" Of Decision Making, Karl-Heinz Ladeur

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

This article addresses the role of public contracts and of public-private networks in relation to the new cognitive infrastructure of postmodern societies and the rise of an experimental rationality. The use of contracts in public law has evolved: it is no longer just a new version of the administrative decision; it is now used as a means in a broad process of breaking up the permeability of public administration. New modes of contracting are a response to increasing fragmentation of interests in industry and in society as a whole. This evolution has also given rise to the concept of the …

Relational Contract And The Nature Of Private Ordering: A Comment On Vincent-Jones, David Campbell

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

This paper focuses on the enormous growth of contract in the public sector over the last twenty years as part of the development of the "new public management." In the United Kingdom, the most penetrating assessment of the significance of this growth for the law of contract, its theory and its use, is Peter Vincent-Jones's The New Public Contracting, the thrust of which has been the basis of Vincent-Jones's contribution to this issue, The New Public Contracting: Public versus Private Ordering? In this paper, the author examines the welfarism of public sector contracting by means of a comment on Vincent-Jones's …

The Law Of Society: Governance Through Contract, Peter Zumbansen

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

This paper focuses on contract law as a central field in contemporary regulatory practice. In recent years, "governance by contract" has emerged as the central concept in the context of privatization, domestic and transnational commercial relations, and law-and-development projects. Meanwhile, as a result of the neo-formalist attack on contract law, "governance of contract" through contract adjudication, consumer protection law, and judicial intervention into private law relations has come under severe pressure. Building on early historical critique of the formalist foundations of an allegedly private law of the market, the paper assesses the current justifications for contractual governance and posits that …

Three Pictures Of Contract: Duty, Power And Compound Rule, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A fundamental divide among theories of contract law is between those that picture contract as a power and those that picture it as a duty. On the power-conferring picture, contracting is a sort of legislative act, in which persons determine what law will apply to their transaction. On the duty-imposing picture, contract law puts duties on persons entering into agreements for consideration whether they want them or not. Until now, very little attention has been paid to the problem of how to tell whether a given rule is power conferring or duty imposing -- a question that should lie at …

The Law And Economics Of Contracts, Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz, Richard Craswell

Faculty Scholarship

This paper, which will appear as a chapter in the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics (A.M. Polinsky & S. Shavell, eds.), surveys major issues arising in the economic analysis of contract law. It begins with an introductory discussion of scope and methodology, and then addresses four topic areas that correspond to the major doctrinal divisions of the law of contracts. These areas include freedom of contract (i.e., the scope of private power to create binding obligations), formation of contracts (both the procedural mechanics of exchange, and rules that govern pre-contractual behavior), contract interpretation (what consequences follow when agreements are …

Inequality Of Bargaining Power, Daniel D. Barnhizer

University of Colorado Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Realistic Proposal For The Contract Duress Doctrine, Grace M. Giesel

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

Rediscovering Williston, Mark L. Movsesian

Washington and Lee Law Review

This Article is an intellectual history of classical contracts scholar Samuel Williston. Professor Movsesian argues that the conventional account of Williston's jurisprudence presents an incomplete and distorted picture. While much of Williston 's work can strike a contemporary reader as arid and conceptual, there are strong elements of pragmatism as well. Williston insists that doctrine be justified in terms of real-world consequences, maintains that rules can have only presumptive force, and offers institutional explanations for judicial restraint. As a result, his scholarship shares more in common with today's new formalism than commonly supposed. Even the undertheorized quality of Williston 's …

Leaving Money On The Table: Contract Practice In A Low-Trust Environment, Ruben Kraiem

ExpressO

Social capital – the level of trust inherent in a society – will affect the contracting practices that are considered standard, practical or fair. These practices in turn will help determine the parties’ positions as they approach their negotiation, how they will communicate, and what terms they will agree in any particular transaction. This is true not only for the small transaction, but also for large and complex deals. As a result, when operating in a low-trust environment, even sophisticated parties (who can bear the costs of tailoring an agreement to their particular case), will be prone to relinquish or …

Contract Theory And The Limits Of Contract Law, Alan Schwartz, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

Contract law has neither a complete descriptive theory, explaining what the law is, nor a complete normative theory, explaining what the law should be. These gaps are unsurprising given the traditional definition of contract as embracing all promises that the law will enforce. Even a theory of contract law that focuses only on the enforcement of bargains must still consider the entire continuum from standard form contracts between firms and consumers to commercial contracts among businesses. No descriptive theory has yet explained a law of contract that comprehends such a broad domain. Normative theories that are grounded in a single …

The Rise And Fall Of Article 2, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

In August 13,2001 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws voted eighty-nine to fifty-three to reject the Amendments to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code that had just been approved in May by the American Law Institute. The vote followed a last minute effort by the Article 2 drafting committee to amend the scope provisions of Article 2 in response to continuing criticism from representatives of the software and information industries. Several months later, at the request of the NCCUSL leadership, amended Article 2 with its revised scope provision was withdrawn from the agenda of the ALI …

Promises, Trust, And Contract Law, Anthony J. Bellia Jr.

Journal Articles

The need for individuals to be able to trust that promises will be performed is central to justifying a law that renders certain promises enforceable. This Article argues that the legal enforcement of certain promises to meet this need does not necessarily diminish the personal relationships of trust in which such promises are made, as has been argued. Rather, this Article argues, the making and performance of legally enforceable promises can assist individuals in building relationships of trust, as it assists them in the pursuit of myriad goods.

Contracting With Electronic Agents, Anthony J. Bellia Jr.

Journal Articles

Established contract doctrine provides no clear answer to the question whether exchanges arranged by the interaction of electronic agents are enforceable. This Article explores whether the law should enforce exchanges arranged by the interaction of electronic agents. It examine how normative theories of contractual obligation inform the issue, with an eye toward the strengths and weaknesses of each theory. The theories that most strongly support the enforcement of exchanges arranged by electronic agents, this Article explains, are those that ground contractual obligation in protecting the ability of individuals to pursue their reasonable objectives through reliable arrangements.

Humans, Computers, And Binding Commitment, Margaret Jane Radin

Indiana Law Journal

Addison C. Harris Lecture at the Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington on October 26, 1999.

The Richness Of Contract Theory, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay is a review of The Richness of Contract Law: An Analysis and Critique of Conemporary Theories of Contract Law by Robert A. Hillman (1997).

Throughout the book, Hillman offers a number of useful insights about various issues of contract law and theory--as he has in his numerous law review articles--but in this review the author is concerned with his overall theme: a general skepticism about "unifying" or "highly abstract" contract theories that fail to mirror the richness of contract law. In this regard, Hillman stands in the "realist" tradition of the previous generation of contracts scholars. Hillman attempts …

Reviving Jacob And Youngs, Inc. V. Kent: Material Breach Doctrine Reconsidered, Amy B. Cohen

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

The Meaning Of Value In Contract Damages And Contract Theory , David W. Barnes

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Death Of Reliance, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In the mid-1970s, it was an article offaith that contract was not properly conceived as a means by which persons could, by their own choice, make law for themselves to govern their relations. Instead, contract was thought best conceived as the rectification of injuries persons may have caused by their verbal conduct in much the same way that persons have a duty to rectify the injuries caused by their physical acts. With contracts, these injuries consisted of detrimental reliance on the words of another. So conceived, both contract and tort duties are imposed by law, and do not arise from …

Bargaining About Future Jeopardy, Daniel Richman

Faculty Scholarship

The debate about how much protection criminal defendants should have against successive prosecutions has generally been conducted in the context of how to interpret the Double Jeopardy Clause. The doctrinal focus of this debate ignores the fact that for the huge majority of defendants – those who plead guilty instead of standing trial – the Double Jeopardy Clause simply sets a default rule, establishing a minimum level of protection when defendants choose not to bargain about the possibility of future charges. In this Article, Professor Richman examines the world that exists in the shadow of minimalist double jeopardy doctrine, exploring …

A Defense Of Judicial Reconstruction Of Contracts, Mark P. Gergen

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Reunification Of Contract Law: The Objective Theory Of Consumer Form Contracts, Michael I. Meyerson

University of Miami Law Review

No abstract provided.

Striking The Balance In Contract History, Joel Levin, Banks Mcdowell

Cleveland State Law Review

The past three decades have seen an enormous amount of writing by Anglo-American scholars about contract theory. If nothing else, this demonstrates the almost universal perception that there are serious problems with the received theory of contract, the product of giants like Holmes, Williston, Cardozo and Corbin. This theoretical activity, instead of creating a new paradigm, has produced divergent theoretical approaches with various bands of scholars striking off in quite different directions, and in the process leaving most judges and lawyers back at the starting point. What should we be trying to do when we build a contract theory for …

Rational Bargaining Theory And Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, The Duty To Disclose, And Fraud, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The author begins by responding to Coleman's rational choice approach to choosing default rules. In part I, he applies the expanded analysis of contractual consent and default rules that he had recently presented elsewhere to explain how rational bargaining, hypothetical consent, and actual consent figure in the determination of contractual default rules. Whereas Coleman advocates the centrality of rational bargaining analysis to this determination, the author explains why rational bargaining theory's role must be subsidiary to that of consent.

The author then turns his attention to Coleman's appraisal of contracting parties' duty to disclose information concerning the resources that are …

Plea-Bargaining As A Social Contract, Robert E. Scott, William J. Stuntz

Faculty Scholarship

Most criminal prosecutions are settled without a trial. The parties to these settlements trade various risks and entitlements: the defendant relinquishes the right to go to trial (along with any chance of acquittal), while the prosecutor gives up the entitlement to seek the highest sentence or pursue the most serious charges possible. The resulting bargains differ predictably from what would have happened had the same cases been taken to trial. Defendants who bargain for a plea serve lower sentences than those who do not. On the other hand, everyone who pleads guilty is, by definition, convicted, while a substantial minority …