Contracts Commons^™

Remedies And The Cisg: Another Perspective, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In this brief comment, I apply behavioral decision theory to the question of the enforcement in transnational sales of super-compensatory agreed damages. I conclude that a good case can be made that such damages provisions should be enforced.

On-Line Consumer Standard-Form Contracting Practices: A Survey And Discussion Of Legal Implications, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In a recent article, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429 (2002), Jeffery Rachlinski and I analyzed whether contract law's approach to the problem of paper standard forms can effectively govern electronic forms. We thought the rational and cognitive reasons consumers fail to read their paper forms apply in the e-environment. Further, although e-consumers do not face manipulative sales agents or impatient customers waiting in line but, instead, largely contract at home in the evening without time constraints, e-consumers are impatient, even click happy, and therefore still do not read their forms or shop for the …

Enriching The Contracts Course, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Contract Lore, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Nonmaterial Misrepresentation: Damages, Rescission, And The Possibility Of Efficient Fraud, Emily Sherwin

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Buried in the details of legal doctrine governing misrepresentation is a remedial anomaly that raises some interesting questions about how law should deal with moral wrongs such as fraud. We tend to think of deliberate deception--fraud--as a grave moral wrong. At least, we think of deception as gravely wrong when the deceiver's objective is not to avert harm or spare feelings, but to obtain someone's money or goods. Deception denies the autonomy of the person deceived and undermines the foundation of trust in human interaction. The law, however, does not penalize every instance of fraud. Moreover, the standards governing when …

Rolling Contracts, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

"Rolling contracts" are one method of presenting standard forms to contracting parties, including consumers, who are the focus of this paper. In a rolling contract, a purchaser orders goods and pays for them before seeing most of the terms, which come later in or on the packaging of the goods. The purchaser can return the goods for a limited time period.

This paper addresses the controversy over whether the new terms are part of the contract and enforceable against the purchaser. Although most analysts focus on when the contract is formed, this paper urges that this analysis yields little fruit. …

Contract Lore, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The article investigates why contracts lawyers, judges, and theorists ("contracts people") routinely and confidently invoke "traditional beliefs" about contract law that are not even close to true. For example, contracts people often declare that the purpose of expectancy damages is to put the injured party in as good a position as if the contract had been performed. But expectancy damages virtually never do this. Contracts people also recite that the reasons for breach, whether willful, negligent or unavoidable, do not matter, and that formation and interpretation issues focus on the parties' intentions. Neither of these assertions is close to true …

Comment: More In Defense Of U.C.C. Methodology, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Standard-Form Contracting In The Electronic Age, Robert A. Hillman, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The development of the Internet as a medium for consumer transactions creates a new question for contract law. In this Article, Professors Robert Hillman and Jeffrey Rachlinski address whether the risks imposed on consumers by Internet boilerplate requires a new lens through which courts should view these types of contracts. Their analysis of boilerplate in paper and Internet contracts examines the social, cognitive, and rational factors that affect consumers' comprehension of boilerplate and compares business strategies in presenting it. The authors conclude that the influence of these factors in Internet transactions is similar to that in proper transactions. Although the …

Knowledge At Work: Disputes Over The Ownership Of Human Capital In The Changing Workplace, Katherine V.W. Stone

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Employee Representation In The Boundaryless Workplace, Katherine V.W. Stone

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Restitution And Equity: An Analysis Of The Principle Of Unjust Enrichment, Emily Sherwin

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Approaches To Teaching Contracts: Enriching Case Reports, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Limits Of Behavioral Decision Theory In Legal Analysis: The Case Of Liquidated Damages, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Discontent with the apparent tunnel vision of economic analysis of law's rational choice theory, legal scholars recently have turned with enthusiasm to "behavioral decision theory" (BDT) to enrich their understanding of how people make decisions and of the law's effect on human behavior. This article, for the first time, evaluates BDT's potential contribution to legal analysis by focusing on a single, important legal paradox: Despite contract law's freedom of contract paradigm, courts actively and enthusiastically police agreed damages provisions. Although the article finds an important place in legal analysis for this new discipline, the article raises and discusses several obstacles …

The Unfulfilled Promise Of Promissory Estoppel In The Employment Setting, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Although the theory of promissory estoppel enforces promises that induce reasonable detrimental reliance, this article reveals the theory's colossal failure in the non-union employment setting. This conclusion is based on an examination of all of the reported decisions in the United States that discussed promissory estoppel over a two-year period in the mid 1990's. During this period, employees won only 4.23 percent of employment promissory estoppel cases decided on the merits. At first blush, this is very surprising because employers, through their communications, seek to create the expectation of a stable, secure work environment and employees, because of their lack …

The "New Conservatism" In Contract Law And The Process Of Legal Change, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Employment Contract, Ian Ayres, Stewart J. Schwab

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This article consists of Professors Ian Ayres and Stewart Schwab 's presentation given at the Economic Analysis of State Employment Law Issues Symposium. Following the presentation, audience members and the presenters participated in a discussion concerning employment contracts. The Journal staff and Professors Ayres and Schwab compiled and edited some of these questions and responses.

Questioning The "New Consensus" On Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical And Theoretical Study, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Professor Hillman presents evidence that contradicts several assumptions about how courts apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Although theorists have claimed the importance, even dominance, of the theory as a ground for enforcing promises, he shows that this theory is remarkably unsuccessful in the courts. Professor Hillman also demonstrates the crucial role of reliance in both successful and unsuccessful promissory estoppel cases, despite the "new consensus" that courts enforce promises without a showing of reliance. Finally, Professor Hillman shows that courts award damages flexibly in successful promissory estoppel cases, although analysts have claimed that courts strongly favor expectancy damages.

Professor …

The Best Law School Subject, Robert A. Hillman, Robert S. Summers

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Triumph Of Gilmore's The Death Of Contract, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

"Instinct With An Obligation" And The "Normative Ambiguity Of Rhetorical Power", Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Epstein And Levmore: Objections From The Right?, Emily Sherwin, Maimon Schwarzschild

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Standards For Revising Article 2 Of The U.C.C.: The Nom Clause Model, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Contribution Arguments In Commercial Law, Steven Walt, Emily Sherwin

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Policing Employment Contracts Within The Nexus-Of-Contracts Firm, Katherine V.W. Stone

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Legacy Of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights And The New Deal Collective Bargaining System, Katherine V.W. Stone

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Law And Equity In Contract Enforcement, Emily Sherwin

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Contract Excuse And Bankruptcy Discharge, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Contract Modification And "Self-Help Specific Performance": A Reaction To Professor Narasimhan, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

A Coasean Experiment On Contract Presumptions, Stewart J. Schwab

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Despite the theoretical importance of the Coase Theorem, scholars have given surprisingly little attention to verifying its predictions empirically. Supporters often accept the theorem as dogma, while armchair critics assail its assumptions. In an exciting series of recent articles, however, Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer have presented experimental evidence, as have others, that largely supports the Coasean prediction that bargainers will negotiate around inefficient property rights to reach a Pareto-optimal solution. The methodology has even gained sufficient attention to have its detractors.

The existing experiments analyze the results of bargains when one side has the power to impose unilaterally one …